Examen de Ingenios.

THE EXAMINATION of mens VVits.

In whicch, by diſcouering the varietie of natures, is ſhewed for what profeſſion each one is apt, and how far he ſhall profit therein.

By John Huarte.

Tranſlated out of the Spaniſh tongue by
M. Camillo Camili.

Engliſhed out of his Italian, by
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BIBLIOTHECA · BODLEIANA

TO THE RIGHT WORSHIPFVL SIR *FRANCIS GODOLPHIN* KNIGHT, ONE OF THE DEPVTIE LIEVTENANTS OF CORNWAILE.

GOod Sir, your Booke returneth vnto you clad in a Corniſh gabardine, which if it become him not wel, the fault is not in the ſtuffe, but in the botching Tailor, who neuer bound Prentice to the occupation, and working only for his paſſe-time, could hardly obſerue the preciſe rules of meaſure: but ſuch as it is, yours it is, and yours is the workeman, entirely addicted to reuerence you for your vertues, to loue you for your kindneſſe, and ſo more readie in deſire, than able in power to teſtifie the ſame, doe with my deweſt remembrance take leaue, reſting

At your diſpoſition,

R. C.

TO THE MAIESTIE of *Don Philip*, our Soueraigne.

TO the end that Artificers may attaine the perfection requisit for the vse of the commonwealth, me-thinketh (Catholike roiall Maiestie) a law should be enacted, that no carpenter should exercercise himselfe in any work which appertained to the occupation of an husbandman, nor a tailor to that of an architect, and that the Aduocat should not minister Phisicke, nor the Phisition play the Aduocat, but ecah one excercise only that art to which he beareth a naturall inclination, and let passe the residue. For considering how base and narrowly bounded a mans wit is for one thing and no more, I haue alwaies held it for a matter certaine, That no man can be perfectly seene in two arts, without failing

in

in one of them: now to the end he may not erre in chuſing that which fitteth beſt with his owne nature, there ſhould be deputed in the common-wealth, men of great wiſedome and knowledge, who might diſcouer each ones wit in his tender age, and cauſe him perforce to ſtudie that ſcience which is agreeable for him, not permitting him to make his owne choice: whence this good would enſue to your ſtates and ſigniories; that in them ſhould reſide the rareſt artificers of the world, and their workes ſhould be of the greateſt perfection, for nought elſe than becauſe they vnited art with nature. The like would I that the vniuerſities of our kingdomes did put in practiſe, for ſeeing they allow not that a ſcholer ſhould paſſe to another facultie, vnleſſe he perfectly vnderſtand the Latine tongue, they ſhould haue alſo examiners, to trie whether he who purpoſeth to ſtudie Logick, Philoſophie, Diuinitie, or the Laws, haue ſuch a wit as is requiſit for euery of theſe ſciences, for otherwiſe, beſides the dammage that ſuch a one ſhall worke afterwards to the Common-wealth, by vſing an art wherein he is not skilled, it is a greefe to ſee that a man ſhould take paines, and beat his brains about a matter wherein he

cannot reape any aduantage. For that at this day such a diligence is not vsed, those vvho had not a wit fit for Diuinitie, haue destroied the Christian religion. So doe those who are vntoward for Phisicke, shorten many a mans daies: neither possesseth the Legall Science that perfection vvhich it might receiue, because it is not made knowne, to what reasonable power the vse and interpretation of the laws appertaineth. All the antient Philosophers found by experience, that where nature doth not dispose a man to knowledge, it falleth out a superfluous labour to toile in the rules of art. But none hath cleerely and distinctly deliuered vvhat that nature is vvhich maketh a man able for one science, and vncapaple of another, nor how many differences of vvittes there are found in mankind, nor vvhat Arts or Sciences doe answer each in particular, nor by what tokens this may be knovvn, vvhich is the thing that most importeth.

These foure points (though they seeme vnpossible) containe the matter vvhereof I am to entreat, besides many others appurtenant to the purpose of this doctrine, vvith intention that curious parents may haue an art & maner to discouer

ther the vvit of their children, and may vveet hovv to set ech of them in hand with that science vvherin he shall principally profit. And this is an aduise vvhich *Galen* sayth vvas giuen his father, namely that he should set him to studie Phisicke, because for that science he had a singular vvit. By vvhich your maiestie shall vnderstand hovv much it importeth the common-vvealth, that there be established in the same a choice, and examination of vvits for the sciences, seeing frō the study vvhich *Galen* bestovved in Phisick, there ensued so great good to the diseased of his time, and he left so many remedies in vvriting for the posteritie. Euen as *Baldus* (a notable man in profession of the lavves) vvhen he studied and practised Phisick, if he had passed further therein, vvould haue prooued but an ordinarie Phisitian, as he vvas not better, for that he vvanted the difference of vvit requisit for this science, but the lavves should haue lost one of the greatest helps that might be found amongst men for expounding them.

When I therfore purposed to reduce this nevv manner of Philosophie to art, and to proue the same in some vvits, I remembered my selfe of your Maiestie, as the best knovvne, and one, at vvhom

the whole world wondereth, beholding a Prince of so great knowledge and vvisedome, of vvhome here we cannot conueniently entreat, the last chapter saue one is your conuenient place, where your Maiestie shall see the purport of your owne wit, and the art and learning vvherewith you vvould haue benefited your common-wealth if you had bene a priuat person, as by nature you are our king and souereigne.

The ſecond Proeme to the Reader.

WHen Plato *would teach any doctrine graue, ſubtile, and diuided from the vulgar opinion, he made choiſe amongſt his ſcholers of ſuch as he reputed beſt witted, and to thoſe only he imparted his mind, knowing by experience, that to teach delicat matters to perſons of baſe vnderſtanding, was loſſe of time, loſſe of pains, and loſſe of learning. The ſecond thing which he did after this choiſe made, was to preuent them with certaine preſuppoſitions, cleare and true, which ſhould not be wide from his concluſion: for the ſpeeches and ſentences which vnlooked for are deliuered againſt that which the vulgar beleeueth, at the beginning ſerue for nought elſe, (ſuch preuention not being made) than to put in a confuſion him that liſteneth, and to breed ſuch a loathing in mens minds, as it cauſeth them to looſe their good*

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good

good affection, and to abhorre and deteſt this doctrin. This manner of proceeding would I, that I might obſerue with thee, (curious Reader) if meanes could be vſed, that I might firſt treate with thee, and diſcouer betweene thee and me the diſpoſition of thy wit. For if it be ſuch as is requiſite for this doctrine, and eſtranged from the ordinarie capacities, I would in ſecret tell thee ſuch new and ſpeciall conceites, as thou wouldeſt neuer haue thought could fall within the compaſſe of a mans imagination Bnt inaſmuch as this will not be, and this worke muſt iſſue in publicke for all ſortes, I could not but ſet thy braines ſomewhat a worke: for if thy wit be of the common and vulgar alloy, I know right well thou art alreadie perſuaded, that the number of the ſciences, and their perfection, hath been accompliſhed many daies agoe. And heereto thou art mooued by a vaine reaſon, that they hauing found out no more what to ad, it is a token, that now there is in nothing, any more nouelties. Now if by hap thou art poſſeſſed of ſuch an opinion, go no further, nor read thou anie longer on, for thou wilt be much agreeued, to ſee how miſerable a difference of wit poſſeſſeth thee. But if thou be diſcreet, well compounded, and ſufferent, I will

deliuer

deliuer vnto thee 3 conclusions very true, albeit for their noueltie they are worthie of great maruell.

The first is, that of many differẽces of wit, which are in mankind, one only with preheminence can fall to thy lot, if alreadie, nature, as verie mighty, at such time as she framed it for thee, did not bestow all her endeuour, in vniting two onely, or three, or (in that she could not effect the same) left thee a dolt, and depriued of them all.

The second, that to euery difference of wit there answereth in preheminence, but one only science, and no more of that condition. So as if thou diuine not to chuse that which answereth thy naturall ability, thou shalt be very remisse in the rest, though thou ply them night and day.

The third, that after thou hast knowen which the science is, that most answereth thy wit, there resteth yet (that thou mayst not be deceiued) another greater difficultie, which is, whether thine abilitie be more appliable to the practick than the theorick, for these 2 parts (be it what science it wil) are so opposit betwixt themselues, & require wits so different, that they may be placed one against the other, as if they were contraries. Hard are these sentẽces, but yet they haue greater

difficul-

difficultie and hardneſſe, vz. that we cannot appeale from them, nor pretend that we haue receiued wrong. For God being the author of nature, and ſeeing that ſhe gaue not to each man more than one difference of wit, (as I haue ſayd before) through the oppoſition or difficultie which combreth vs in vniting them, he applied himſelfe to her, and of the Sciences which are diſtributed amongſt men by grace, it is a miracle, if in an eminent degree, he giue more than one. But there are (ſayth S. Paule) diuiſions of graces, and the ſame ſpirit; there are diuiſions of minſteries, and the ſame Lord; there are diuiſions of operations, but the ſame God, who worketh all things in all perſons. To euery one is giuen the miniſterie of the ſpirit for profit: and to one is giuen by the ſpirit the word of wiſedome, to another that of knowledge, after the ſame ſpirit, to another fayth, in the ſame ſpirit, and to another the grace of healing, in the ſame ſpirit, to another the working of vertues, to another prophecieng, and the deſcription of ſpirits, to others the varietie of toungs, to another the interpretation of words: but one ſelfe ſpirit, which diuideth to euery one as him pleaſeth, worketh all theſe things.

This beſtowing of ſciences (I doubt not) God vſeth, hauing

hauing regard to the wit and naturall disposition of euery person. For the Talents which he distributed, in S. Matthew, *the same Euangelist sayth, that he gaue them vnto euery one according to his proper vertue.*

And to thinke that these supernaturall Sciences require not some dispositions in the subiect, before they be infused, is an errour very great: for when God formed Adam *and* Eue, *it is certaine that before he filled them with wisedome, he instrumentalized their braine in such sort, as they might receiue it with ease, and serue as a commodious instrument, therewith to be able to discourse, and to forme reasons. And therefore the diuine scripture sayth; God gaue them an heart to thinke, and filled them with the discipline of vnderstanding, and that according to the difference of which euery one partaketh, one science is infused, and not another, or more or lesse of each of them, is a thing which may be vnderstood by this example of our first parents, for God filling them both with wisedome, it is a verifyed conclusion, that he infused the leßer portion into her, for which reason the Diuines say, that the diuell tooke hardineße to begu le her, and durst not tempt the man, as fearing his much*

wisedome:

wisedome The reason hereof (as hereafter we will proue) is, that the naturall composition which the woman had in her braine, is not capable of much wit, nor much wisedome. In the Angelicall substances, we shall find also the like count and reason: for God, to giue an angell more degrees of glorie and higher gifts, first giueth him a more delicat nature; and if you enquire of the Diuines whereto this delicat nature serueth, they answer, that the Angell who hath the deepest vnderstanding, and the best nature, with most facilitie conuerteth himselfe vnto God, and vseth his gift with the more efficacie; and that the like betideth in men. Hence we cleerely inferre, that there being an election of wit for sciences supernaturall, and that, not whatsoeuer difference of abilitie, is their commodious instrument, humane learning (with more reason) requireth the same, because it is to be learned by men, with the force of their wit.

To be able then to distinguish and discerne these naturall differences of mans wit, and to applie to each by art, that science wherein he may profit, is the intention of this my worke. If I bring the same to end (as I haue purposed) we will yeeld the glorie to God, seeing from his hand proceedeth whatsoeuer is good

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and certaine: and if not, thou knowest well (discreet Reader) that it is impossible both to deuise an art, and to reduce the same to perfection. For so long and large are humane sciences, that a mans life sufficeth not to find them out, and to giue them that perfection which is requisit.

The first inuenter performeth very much, if he discouer some notable principles, to the end that such as come after, may with this seed take an occasion to amplifie the art, and to bring it into that estimation and account which is due thereunto. Aristotle *alluding hereunto, sayth: that the errors of those who first began to handle matters of Philosophie, are to be held in great reuerence, for it prooving a matter so difficult, to deuise new things, and so easie to aduanto that which hath bene alreadie spoken and treated of; the defects of the first deserue not (by this reason) to be much reprooued, neither he who addeth ought, meriteth any great commendation. I confesse that this my worke cannot be excused from some errors, seeing the matter is so delicat, and no way fore-opened to entreat thereof. But if the same be in a matter where the vnderstanding hath place to thinke, in this case I pray thee (wittie Reader) that before thou giue sen-*

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tence thou read ouer the whole worke, and assure thy selfe what the difference of thine owne wit is, and if in the worke thou find ought which in thine opinion is not well sayd, consider well of the reasons which sway the most against it, and if thou canst not resolue, then turne to read the eleuenth chapter, for in that shalt thou find the answer which they may receiue.



The Examination or Triall of mens wits and diſpoſitions.

CHAP. I.

He prooueth by an example, that if a Child haue not the diſpoſition and abilitie, which is requiſit for that ſcience whervnto he will addict himſelfe, it is a ſuperfluous labour to be inſtructed therein by good ſchoolemaiſters, to haue ſtore of bookes, and continually to ſtudie it.

THe opinion of *Cicero* was good, who, that his ſonne *Marke* might proue ſuch a one in that kind of learning, which himſelfe had made choiſe of, as he deſired; iudged, that it ſufficed to ſend him to a place of ſtudie, ſo renowmed and famous in the world, as that of *Athens*, and to giue him *Cratippus* for his ſchoolemaiſter, who was the greateſt Philoſopher of thoſe daies, bringing him vp in a citie ſo populous, where, through the great concourſe of people which thither aſſembled, he ſhould of neceſsitie haue many examples and profitings of ſtrangers, fit to teach him by experience thoſe things which appertained to the knowledge that himſelfe was to learne. But, notwithſtanding all this diligence, and much more

1. Booke of Offices.

beſides, which (as a good father) he vſed, prouiding him bookes, and writing ſome vnto him of his own head; the Hiſtorians report, that he prooued but a Cods-head, with little eloquence, and leſſe philoſophie, (a matter vſuall amongſt men, that the ſonne abies the much wiſedome of the father.) Verely *Cicero* greatly beguiled himſelfe, imagining that albeit his ſonne were not iſſued out of natures hands, with that wit and habilitie which is requiſit for eloquence and philoſophie, yet by means of the good induſtrie of ſuch a teacher, and the many books, and examples of *Athens*, togither with the yoong mans continuall endeuour, and proceſſe of time, the defects of his vnderſtanding would be amended: but we ſee, that finally he deceiued himſelfe, neither do I maruell thereat, for he had many examples to this purpoſe, which encouraged him to beleeue, that the ſame might alſo befall in the perſon of his ſonne.

Booke of Deſtinie.

For the ſame *Cicero* reports in his booke of *Deſtinie*, that *Zenocrates* had a wit very vntoward for the ſtudie of Naturall and Morall philoſophie, of whome *Plato* ſayd, That he had a ſcholer, who ſtood in need of a ſpurre; and yet notwithſtanding, through the good induſtrie of ſuch a maiſter, and the continuall trauell of *Zenocrates* himſelfe, he became a very great Philoſopher. And he writes the like alſo of *Cleantes*, who was ſo doltiſh and void of vnderſtanding, that no teacher would receiue him into his ſchoole; whereat the yoong man agreeued and aſhamed, endured ſo great toile in ſtudying, that he came afterwards to be called a ſecond *Hercules* for wiſedome. No leſſe vntoward for matters of eloquẽce, ſeemed the wit of *Demoſthenes*, of whome it is ſayd, that when he was now growne big, he could not yet ſpeake plaine, but labouring and applying the art, by hearing of good teachers, he pro-

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ued the beſt Oratour of the world: and ſpecially (as *Cicero* recounts) he could not pronounce the letter, R, for that he did ſomwhat ſtãmer, and yet by practiſe he grew to articulat it ſo well, as if he had neuer had that way any defect. Hence tooke that prouerbe his originall, which ſaith, That mans wit in matters of ſcience, is like a plaier at dice, for if any one prooue vnluckie in throwing his chaunce, by artificiall practiſe he comes to amend his euill fortune. But none of theſe examples produced by *Cicero*, remains without a conuenient anſwer in my doctrine: for (as we will hereafter proue) there is in yongmen a certaine dulnes, which argues a greater wit in another age, than if the ſame had bene ſharpe from their childhood: nay it is a iudgement that they will prooue lowtiſh men, when they begin very ſoone to diſcourſe and be quicke of conceipt. Wherefore, if *Cicero* had known the true tokens by which wits are in their firſt age to be diſcouered, he would haue held it a good ſigne, that *Demoſthenes* was rude and ſlow of ſpeech, and that *Zenocrates* had need of a ſpurre whileſt he learned. I take not from a good inſtructor art, and induſtrie, their vertue and force, to manure wits, as well rude as pliant: but that which I will ſay, is, that if a yoong man haue not of himſelfe an vnderſtanding capable of precepts and rules, which properly belong to the art he would learne, and to none other, that the diligence vſed by *Cicero* with his ſonne, was as vaine as that which any other parent ſhal vſe with his ſonne, will be in the like. Thoſe who haue read *Plato* ſhall eaſily know, that this doctrine is true, who reports that *Socrates* was the ſonne (as he alſo reported himſelfe) of a midwife, & that as his mother (albeit ſhe were much praiſed in the art) could not make a woman to be deliuered, that before her comming to her was not with child; ſo he (performing the like of-

*Dialoge of knowledge. By the only vnderſtanding of Socrates, may this compariſon be verefied, for he taught by demaunds, and handled the matter ſo, that the ſcholler himſelfe attained to knowledge, without his telling him the ſame.

fice as his mother) could not make his ſcholers bring foorth any ſcience, if of themſelues they had not their vnderſtanding conceiued therwith. He was of opinion, that ſciences were (as it were) naturall to thoſe men only, who had their wits appliable therevnto; and that in ſuch it befell, as we ſee by experience in thoſe who haue forgotten ſomewhat which they firſt knew, who if we put them in mind but of one word, gather from that all the reſidue.

Maiſters (for ought that I can gather) haue none other office with their ſchollers, than to bring learning to their remembrance, for if they haue a fruitfull wit, they make them with this only to bring forth woonderful conceipts, otherwiſe they do but afflict themſelues, and thoſe whom they inſtruct, nor euer obtaine their deſires. And (at leaſt if I were a teacher) before I receiued any ſcholer into my ſchoole, I would grow to many trials and experiments with him, vntill I might diſcouer the qualitie of his wit, and if I found it by nature directed to that ſcience whereof I made profeſſion, I would willingly receiue him, for it breeds a great contentment in the teacher, to inſtruct one of good towardlineſſe: and if not, I would counſaile him to ſtudie that ſcience, which were moſt agreeable with his wit. But if I ſaw, that he had no diſpoſition or capacitie for any ſort of learning, I would friendly and with gentle words tell him; Brother, you haue no means to proue a man of that profeſſion which you haue vndertaken, take care not to looſe your time and your labour, and prouide you ſome other trade of liuing, which requires not ſo great an habilitie as appertaineth to learning. Hereof is ſeene very plaine experience, for we behold a great number of ſchollers enter the courſe of whatſoeuer ſcience, and (be the teacher very good or very bad) finally euery day ſome prooue of great skill, ſome of meane, and ſome in their

Mans Wiſedome, is not Remẽbrance: wherefore we haue here aboue ſpoken againſt *Plato*, for that he held this opinion.

their whole course, haue done nought else than leese their time, spend their goods, and beat their brains without any maner of profit.

I wot nere whence this effect may spring, they all hearing one selfe teacher, and with equall diligence and care, and perhaps the dull take more paine than the wittie, and this difficultie growes the greater, by seeing that those who are vntoward for one science, are very apt to another, and the toward in one sort of learning, passing to another sort, can vnderstand nothing. But my selfe am at least a good witnesse in this truth; for there were three companions of vs, who entered together to studie the Latine toong, and one of vs learned the same with great facilitie, the rest could neuer make any commendable composition; but all passing on to Logicke, one of those who could not learne Grammer, proued in that art a principall Aegle, and the other two, in the whole, neuer learned one ready point; then all three comming to heare Astrologie, it was a matter worthie of consideration, that he who could no skill of Latine or Logicke, in few daies knew more in Astrologie than his maister that taught them, and the rest could neuer learne it. I then maruelling hereat, began forthwith to make discourses, and play the Philosopher hereon, and so I found that euery science required a speciall and particular wit, which reaued from that, was little worth in other sorts of learning. And if this be true (as verely it is, and we will so proue it hereafter) he that at this day should enter into the schooles of our times, making proofe and assay of the scholers wits, how many would he change from one science to another, & how many would he send into the fields for dolts and vnable to learne? and how many would he call backe of those, who for want of abilitie are occupied in base exercises, and yet their wits

were by nature created only for learning? but ſithens this cannot be brought about nor remedied, it behooues to ſtay no longer hereon, but to paſſe forward.

It cannot be denied, but that (as I haue ſayd) there are wits found capable of one ſcience, which are vntoward for another: and therefore it behooues, before the child be ſet to ſtudie, to diſcouer the manner of his wit, and to ſee what ſcience agreeth with his capacitie, and then to prouide that he may applie the ſame. But it is neceſſarie alſo to conſider, that this which hath bene ſayd, ſufficeth not to make a man prooue ſufficiently learned, but we muſt haue regard of other conditions no leſſe requiſit than is this of towardlineſſe. For *Hippocrates* ſayth, that mans wit holds the like proportion with knowledge, as the earth doth with ſeed, which though of her ſelfe ſhe be fruitfull and fat, yet it behooues to mannure her, and vſe aduiſement to what ſort of ſeed her naturall diſpoſition enclineth; for euery ſort of earth cannot without diſtinction, produce euery ſort of ſeed. Some better brings foorth Wheat than Barley, and ſome Barley better than Wheat; and of Wheats ſome bring a plentifull increaſe of good Lammas Wheat, and cannot away with the Baſeſt ſort.

Neither doth the good husbandman content himſelfe to make this only diſtinction, but after he hath manured the earth in due ſeaſon, he lookes for conuenient time to ſow it, for it cannot be done at all times of the yeare, and after that the graine is ſprung vp, he clenſeth and weedeth it, that it may encreaſe and grow, giuing the fruit which of the ſeed is expected. After this ſort, it is neceſſarie that the ſcience being knowne, which beſt fitteth with the perſon, he begin to ſtudie from his firſt age, for this (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is the moſt pliant of all others to learning. Moreo-

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uer, mans life is very ſhort, and the arts long and toilſome, for which it behooues that there be time ſufficient to know them, and ſpace to exerciſe them, and therewith to profit the common wealth. Childrens memorie (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is a table without any picture, becauſe it was but a little while ſince they were borne, and ſo they receiue any thing whatſoeuer with facilitie; and not as the memorie of old men, which full of thoſe many things they haue ſeene in the long courſe of their life, is not capable of more: and therefore *Plato* ſayth, that in the preſence of youth, we ſhould recount honeſt tales and actions, which may incite them to vertuous doings, for what they learne in that age, abides ſtill in their minds, and not (as *Galen* ſayth) that then it behooues to learne the arts, when our nature hath accrued al the forces that ſhe can haue; which point is void of reaſon if you admit nō diſtinction. He that is to learne the Latine tongue or any other language, ought to do it in his childhood, for if he tarrie till the bodie be hardened, and take the perfection that it ought to haue, he ſhall neuer reape auaileable profit. In his ſecond age, namely boyes ſtate, it is requiſit that he trauaile in the art of Syllogiſmes, for then the vnderſtanding begins to diſplay his forces, which hath the ſame proportion with Logicke, as ſhackles haue with the feet of mules not yet trayned, who going ſome daies therewith, take afterward a certaine grace in their pace: ſo our vnderſtanding ſhackled with the rules & precepts of Logicke, takes afterwards a gracefull kind of diſcourſing and arguing in ſciences and diſputations. Then followes youth, in which all the ſciences appertaining to the vnderſtanding may be learned, for that hath a ripened knowledge.

In the ſecond age called youth, a man makes an vnion of all the differences of wit, in ſuch as they may be vnited, for that this age is more temperat than all the reſt: wherfore it is vnfitting to let it paſſe without learning of knowledge, whereby a man may liue.

True it is, that *Ariſtotle* excepteth naturall Philoſophie, ſaying, a yoong man is not of fit diſpoſition for this kind

of doctrine, wherein it seemeth he hath reason, for that it is a science of deeper consideration and wisedome than any other.

Now the age thus knowne, in which sciences are to be learned, it behooues to search out a commodious place for the same, where nothing else saue learning may be handled, and such are the Vniuersities: but the youth must forgo his fathers house, for the dandling of the mother, brethren, kindred, and friends which are not of his profession, do greatly hinder his profiting. This is plainly seene in the scholers who are natiue of the cities and places where Vniuersities are seated, none of which (saue by great miracle) euer become learned. And this may easily be remedied, by changing of Vniuersities, and the natiue of one citie going to studie in another. This faring, that a man takes from his owne countrie to make himselfe of woorth and discretion, is of so great importaunce, that there is no maister in the world who can teach him more, and especially, when a man sees himselfe (sometimes) abandoned of the fauour and delights of his countrie. Depart out of thy land (sayd God to *Abraham*) and seuer thy selfe from amidst thy kindred and thy fathers house, and come to the place where I will shew thee, in which thou shalt make thy name great, & I will giue thee my blessing. The like sayes God to all men, who desire to prooue of value and wisedome: for albeit he can blesse them in their natiue countrie, yet he will, that men dispose themselues by this meane which he hath ordained, and that wisdome be not attained by them with idlenesse. All this is meant with a foregoing presupposall, that a man haue a good wit and be apt, for otherwise, *He that goes a beast to Rome, returns a beast againe.* Little auailes it, that a dullard go to learne in the famous places of studie, where there is no chaire of vnder-

vnderſtanding, nor wiſedome, nor a man to teach it.

The third point of diligence is, to ſeeke out a maiſter who hath a direction and method in teaching, whoſe doctrine is ſound and firme, not ſophiſticall nor of vaine conſiderations: for all that the ſcholler doth, whileſt he is a learning, is to credit all that which his maiſter propounds vnto him, for he hath no found iudgement or diſcretion to diſcerne or ſeparat falſhood from truth, albeit this is a chauncefull caſe, and not placed in the choiſe of ſuch as learne, that the ſcholers come in due time to ſtudie, and that the Vniuerſities haue good or vnfit inſtructers; as it befell certaine Phiſitions, of whome *Galen* reports, that hauing conuinced them by many reaſons and experiments, and ſhewed them, that the practiſe which they vſed was falſe and preiudiciall to mens health; the tears fell from their eyes, and in his preſence they began to curſe their hard hap, in lighting on ſuch bad maiſters as bare ſway during the time that they were learners. True it is, that there are found ſome ſchollers of ſo ripe wit, as they ſtraightwaies looke into the condition of the teachers, and the learning which he teacheth, and if it be vitious, they know how to confute the ſame, and to giue allowance to ſuch as deliuer ſoundly; theſe at the yeares end teach their maiſter much more than their maiſter taught them; for doubting & demaunding wittily, they make him to vnderſtand and anſwer things ſo exquiſit, as he himſelfe neuer knew nor ſhould haue knowne, if the ſcholler with the felicitie of his wit, had not brought them to his mind: but thoſe who can do this, are one or two at the moſt, and the dullards are infinit, through which, it would do well (ſeeing this choiſe and Examination of Wits for euery ſcience is not had) that the

Vniuer-

Vniuersities alwaies made prouision of good teachers, endued with sound learning, and a cleere discerning wit, to the end they may not instruct the ignorant in errours and false propositions.

The fourth diligence requisit to be vsed, is to studie euerie science with order, beginning at his principles, and passing through the midst to the end, without hauing matter that may presuppose another thing before. For which cause, I haue alwaies held it an errour, to heare many lessons of diuers matters, and to carrie them all home fardled vp together. By this means there is made a masse of things in the vnderstanding, which afterwards, when they come to practise, a man knowes not how to turne to vse the precepts of his art, nor to assigne them a place conuenient: and it is much better to bestow labour in euery matter by it selfe, and with that naturall order which it holds in his composition, for in the selfe manner as it is learned, so is it also preserued in the memorie. And more in particular, it is necessarie that they do this, who of their owne nature haue a confused wit: and this may easily be remedied by hearing one matter by it selfe, and that being ended, to enter into the next following, till the whole art be atchieued. *Galen* well vnderstanding of how great importance it was to studie matters with order and conceit, wrot a booke to teach the manner that was to be held in reading his works, to the end that the Phisition might not be tangled in confusion. Others adde herevnto, that the scholler, whilest he learneth, haue but one booke which may plainly containe the points of his learning, and that he attend to studie that only and no more, least he grow into a garboile and confusion, and herein they are warranted by great reason.

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The laſt thing which makes a man proue of rare learning, is to conſume much time at his booke, and to expect, that knowledge haue his due digeſtion, and take deepe root; for as the bodie is not maintained by the much which we eat and drinke in one day, but by that which the ſtomacke digeſteth and turneth: ſo our vnderſtanding is not filled by the much which we read in little time, but by that which by little and little it proceeds to conceiue and chew vpon. Our wit day by day diſpoſeth it ſelfe better and better, and comes (by proceſſe of time) to light on things which before it could neither vnderſtand nor conceiue. Vnderſtanding hath his beginning, his increaſe, his ſtanding, and his declining, as hath a man, and other creatures and plants; it begins in boies age, hath his increaſe in youth, his ſtanding in middle or mans age, and in old age it begins to decline. Who ſo therefore would know at what time his vnderſtanding enioieth all the forces which it may partake, let him weet, that it is frō the age of thirtie and three vntill fiftie, little more or leſſe, within which compaſſe we may beſt giue credit to graue authors, if in the diſcourſe of their life, they haue held contrarie opinions; and he that will write bookes, let him do it about this age, and not before nor after, if he meane not to vnſay againe, or change opinion.

But mans age hath not in all people a like meaſure and reaſon; for in ſome, childhood ends in twelue yeares, in ſome at fourteene, ſome haue ſixteene, and ſome eighteen; ſuch liues very long, becauſe their youth arriues to little leſſe than fortie yeares, and their ripe or firme age to three-ſcore, and they haue afterward twentie yeares of old age, wherethrough their life amounts to foureſcore, and this is the terme of thoſe who are verie

rie ſtrong. The firſt ſort, who finiſh their childhood at twelue yeares, are very ſhort liued, and begin ſpeedily to diſcourſe, their beard ſoone ſprowteth out, and their wit laſteth but a ſmall time, theſe at thirtie fiue yeares begin to decline, and at fortie and eight, finiſh their life.

The principall of all theſe, is Nature, for if ſhe be in them who applie their mind to Art, they may pierce thorow all the other things aboue ſpecified. So *Baldus* betooke himſelfe to the ſtudie of the Lawes, when he was wel aged, wherethrough ſome ſayd vnto him in a ſcoffe: Thou commeſt too late, O *Baldus*, and wilt prooue a good aduocate in the other world: but becauſe he had a capacitie conformable for the lawes, he proued learned in a ſhort ſeaſon.

Of all the conditions aboue ſpecified, there is not any one which is not very neceſſary, profitable, and helpfull in practiſe for a yoong man to receiue notice of, but to haue a good and anſwerable nature to the ſcience which he pretendeth to ſtudy, is the matter which moſt makes for the purpoſe: for with this, we haue ſeene, that diuers men haue begun to ſtudie, after their youth was expired, and were inſtructed by bad teachers, with euill order, and in their owne birth-places, and yet for all that haue prooued great clearks. But if the wit faile (ſayth *Hippocrates*) all other diligences are loſt. But there is no man who hath better verefied this, than the good *Marcus Cicero*, who through greefe of ſeeing his ſonne ſuch a doo-nought, with whome none of the means could preuaile, that he had procured to breed him wiſedome, ſayd in the end after this ſort: *What elſe is it, after the manner of the Giants, to fight with the gods, than to reſiſt againſt nature?* as if he ſhould haue ſayd: What thing is there, which better reſembles the battaile, which the giants vndertooke againſt the gods, than that a man who wanteth capacitie, ſhould ſet himſelfe to ſtudie? for as the giants neuer ouercame the gods, but were ſtill vanquiſhed by them: ſo whatſoeuer ſcholler will labour to ouercome his owne vntoward nature, ſhall reſt vanquiſhed by her. For which cauſe, the ſame *Cicero* counſelleth vs, that we ſhould not vſe force againſt our nature, nor endeuour to become Orators, if ſhe aſſent not, for we ſhall vndergo labour in vaine.

CHAP. II.

That Nature is that which makes a man of habilitie to learne.

IT is an opinion very common and ordinarie amongſt the antient Philoſophers, to ſay, That Nature is ſhe who makes a man of habilitie to learne, and that art with her precepts and rules giues a facilitie therevnto, but then vſe and experience, which he reapes of particular things, makes him mightie in working. Yet none of them euer ſhewed in particular, what thing this nature was, nor in what ranke of cauſes it ought to be placed: only they affirmed, that this, wanting in him who learned, art, experience, teachers, bookes, and trauaile are of none auaile. The ignoraunt vulgar ſeeing a man of great wit and readineſſe, ſtraightwaies aſſigne God to be the author thereof, and looke no further, but hold euery other imagination that goes beyond this, for vanitie: but naturall Philoſophers deſpiſe this manner of talking, for put caſe that the ſame be godly, and containe therein religion and truth, yet it groweth from not knowing the order and diſpoſition which God placed amongſt naturall things that day when they were created, and ſo couer their ignorance with a kind of warrantiſe, and in ſort, that none may reprehend or gainſay the ſame, they affirme that all befals as God will, and that nothing ſucceeds, which ſprings not from his diuine pleaſure. But though this be neuer ſo apparant a truth, yet are they worthie of reproofe,

Nature giues habiliti:, Art facilitie, Vſe ſufficiencie.

Aboue all things Nature is neceſſarie, for if ſhe gainſay, al other drifts are attempted in vaine.

proofe: becauſe, as not euerie kind of demaund (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is to be made after one faſhion, ſo not euerie aunſwer (though true) is to be giuen.

Whileſt a natural Philoſopher reaſoned with a Grammarian, there came to them an inquiſitiue Gardener, and asked what the cauſe might be, that he cheriſhing the earth ſo charilie, in deluing, turning, dunging, and watering it, yet the ſame neuer well brought foorth the herbage which he ſowed therein; whereas the hearbes which ſhe bred of her ſelfe, ſhe cauſed to increaſe with great facilitie. The Grammarian aunſwered, This grew from the diuine prouidence, and was ſo ordained thorow the good gouernment of the world: at which anſwer, the naturall Philoſopher laughed, ſeeing he reduced this to God, becauſe he knew not the diſcourſe of naturall cauſes, nor in what ſort they proceeded to their effects. The Grammarian perceiuing the other laugh, asked whether he mocked him, or wherat elſe he laughed? The Philoſopher anſwered that he laughed not at him, but at the maiſter who taught him ſo ill, for the knowledge and ſolution of things which ſpring from the diuine prouidence (as are the workes ſupernaturall) appertaine to the Metaphiſicks (whom we now tearme Diuines:) but this queſtion propounded by the Gardener, is naturall, and appertaineth to the iuriſdiction of the naturall Philoſophers, becauſe there are certaine ordered and manifeſt cauſes, from which this effect may ſpring. And thus the naturall Philoſopher anſwered, ſaying, that the earth is conditioned like a ſtepmother, who very carefully brings vp her owne children which ſhee breeds her ſelfe, but takes away the ſuſtenance from thoſe which appertaine to her husband, and ſo we ſee that her owne children are fat and freſh, and her ſtep-

In all knowledges, we muſt vnderſtand how far their iuriſdiction extēdeth, and what queſtions apperteine vnto them.

children

children weake and ill coloured. The hearbs which the earth brings foorth of her ſelfe, are borne of her proper bowels, and thoſe which the Gardener makes to grow by force, are the daughters of another mother, wherethrough ſhe takes from them the vertue and nouriſhment, by which they ought to increaſe, that ſhe may giue it to the hearbs which are borne of her ſelfe.

Hippocrates likewiſe reports, that he going to viſit the great Philoſopher *Democritus*, he told him the follies which the vulgar ſpeake of Phiſicke, namely, that ſeeing themſelues recouered from ſickneſſe, they would ſay, it was God who healed them, and that if his wil were not, little had the good diligence of the Phiſition auailed. This is ſo antient a manner of talke, and the naturall Philoſophers haue ſo often refuted it, that the ſeeking to take the ſame away, were ſuperfluous, neither is it conuenient: for the vulgar, who know not the particular cauſes of any effect, anſwereth better and with more truth, as touching the vniuerſall cauſe, which is God, than to ſay ſome other vnfitting thing. But I haue often gone about to conſider the reaſon & the cauſe whence it may grow, that the vulgar ſort is ſo great a friend to impute all things to God, and to reaue them from nature, & do ſo abhor the naturall means: and I know not whether I haue bene able to find it out. The vulgar (at leaſt) giues hereby to vnderſtand, that foraſmuch as they know not what effects they ought to attribute to God immediatly, and what to Nature, they ſpeake after this maner. Beſides that, men are for the moſt part impatient, and deſirous to accompliſh ſpeedily what they couet. But becauſe the natural means are of ſuch prolixitie, and work with length of time, they poſſeſſe not the patience to ſtand marking thereof, and knowing that God is omnipo-

omnipotent, and in a moment of time performeth whatsoeuer him pleaseth (whereof they find many examples) they would that he should giue thē health, as he did to the sicke of the palsie; and wisedome, as to *Salomon*; riches, as to *Iob*; and that he should deliuer them from their enimie, as he did *Dauid*.

The second cause is, for that men are arrogant, and vaine conceited, many of whom, desire secretly in their hearts, that God would bestow vpon them some particular graces, which should not befall after the common vse (as is, that the sunne ariseth vpon the good and bad, and that the rainē fals vpon all in generall) for benefits are so much the more highly prized, as they are the more rare. And for this cause we haue seene many men to feigne miracles in houses and places of deuotion, for straightwaies, the people flockes vnto them, and holds them in great reuerence, as persons of whome God makes a speciall account: and if they be poore, they fauour them with large almes, and so some sinne vpon interest.

The third reason is, that men haue a liking to be well at their ease, whereas naturall causes are disposed with such order and conceit, that to obtaine their effects, it behooues to bestow labour. Wherefore they would haue God demeane himselfe towards them, after his omnipotencie, and that (without sweating) they might come to the well-head of their desires. I leaue aside the malice of those, who require miracles at Gods hand, thereby to tempt his almightinesse, and to prooue whether he be able to do it: and othersome, who to be reuenged after their hearts desire, cal for fire from heauen, and such other cruell chastisements.

The last cause is, for that many of the vulgar are religiously

ligiously giuen, and hold deere, that God may be honored and magnified; which is much sooner brought about by way of miracles than by naturall effects, but the common sort of men know not, that workes aboue nature and woonderfull, are done by God, to shew those who know it not, that he is omnipotent, and that he serues himselfe of them, as an argument to prooue his doctrine, and that this necessitie once ceasing, he neuer doth it more. This may well be perceiued, considering that God dooth no longer those vnwoonted things of the new testament: and the reason is, for that on his behalfe, he hath performed all necessarie diligence, that men might not pretend ignorance. And to thinke that he will begin anew to do the like miracles, and by them once againe to prooue his doctrine, in raising the dead, restoring sight to the blind, and healing the lame and sicke of the palsie, is an errour very great; for once God taught men what is behooffull, and prooued the same by miracles, but returnes not to do it any more. God speakes once (sayth *Iob*) and turnes not to a second repliall. *Iob.33.*

The Lord working therewithall, and confirming with his word followed by signs.

The token whereon I ground my iudgement, when I would discouer whether a man haue a wit appropriat to Naturall Philosophie, is, to see whether he be addicted to reduce all matters to miracle, without distinction; and contrariwise, such as hold not themselues contented, vntill they know the particular cause of euerie effect, leaue no occasion to mistrust the goodnesse of their wit. These doe well know, that there are effects which must be reduced to God immediatly, (as miracles) and others to nature, (and such are those, which haue their ordinarie causes, frō whence they accustome to spring) but speaking both of the one manner and the

other, we alwaies place God for author: for when *Aristotle* sayd, that God and nature did nothing in vaine, he meant not, that nature was an vniuersall cause, endowed with a iurisdiction seuered from God, but that she was a name of the order and concent, which God hath bestowed in the frame of the world, to the end that the necessarie effects might follow, for the preseruation thereof. For in the same manner, it is vsually sayd that the King, and Ciuile Reason, do no man wrong. In which kind of speech, no man conceiueth that this name Reason, signifieth a Prince which possesseth a seuerall iurisdiction from that of the king; but a terme, which by his signification, embraceth al the roiall lawes, and constitutions ordained by the same king, for the preseruation of his common wealth in peace. And as the king hath his speciall cases reserued to himselfe, which cannot be decided by the law, for that they are vnusuall and waightie: in like manner God left miraculous effects reserued for himself, neither gaue allowance vnto naturall causes, that they might produce them. But here we must note, that he who should know them for such, and difference them from naturall workes, behooues to be a great naturall Philosopher, and to vnderstand the ordinary causes that euery effect may hold, & yet all this sufficeth not, vnlesse the Catholike church ratifie them to be such. And as the Doctors labour and studie in reading this ciuile Reason, preseruing the whole in their memorie, that they may know and vnderstand what the kings will was, in the determination of such a case: so we naturall Philosophers (as doctors in this facultie) bestow all our studie in knowing the discourse and order, which God placed that day when he created the world, so to contemplat and vnderstand

The ignorance of naturall Philosophie, is cause that miracles are imputed where they ought not.

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in what ſort, and vpon what cauſe, he would that things ſhould ſucceed. And as it were a matter worthy laughter, that a doctor ſhould alleage in his writings (though approoued) that the king commaunds a caſe ſhould be thus determined, without ſhewing the Law and Reaſon, through which it was ſo decided: ſo naturall Philoſophers laugh at ſuch as ſay, This is Gods doing; without aſſigning the order and diſcourſe of the particular cauſes whēce they may ſpring. And as the king wil giue them no eare, when they require him to breake ſome iuſt law, or to rule ſome caſe beſides the order of iuſtice, which he hath commaunded to be obſerued: ſo God will not hearken when any man demaunds of him myracles and workes beſides naturall order, without cauſe why. For albeit the king euery day abrogates and eſtabliſheth new lawes, and changeth iudiciall order (as wel through the variation of times, as for that it is the iudgement of a fraile man, and cannot at one only time, attain to perfect right and iuſtice) notwithſtanding the naturall order of the vniuerſe, which we call nature, from that day wherein God created the world, vnto this, hath had no need of adioining or reauing any one iot, becauſe he framed the ſame with ſuch prouidence and wiſedome, that to require this order might not be obſerued, were to ſay, that his workes were vnperfect.

To returne then to that ſentence ſo often vſed by naturall Philoſophers, that *Nature makes able*; we muſt vnderſtand that there are Wits, and there are Abilities, which God beſtoweth vpon men beſides naturall order, as was the wiſedome of the Apoſtles, who being ſimple and of baſe account, were miraculouſly enlightened and repleniſhed with knowledge and learning. Of this ſort of abilitie & wiſdome, it cannot be verefied,

that nature makes able; for this is a worke, which is to be imputed immediatly vnto God, & not vnto nature: The like is to be vnderstood of the wisedome of the prophets, and of all those to whome God graunted some grace infused. Another sort of abilitie is found in men, which springs of their being begotten, with that order and consent of causes which are established by God to this end: and of this sort it may be sayd with truth; *Nature makes able*. For (as we will proue in the last chapter of this worke) there is to be found such an order and consent in naturall things, that if the fathers in time of procreation, haue regard to obserue the same, all their children shall prooue wise, and none otherwise. But the whilest, this significatiõ of nature is very vniuersall and confused, and the vnderstanding contents not it selfe, nor staieth, vntill it conceiue the particular discourse, and the latest cause, and so it behooues to search out another signification of this name Nature, which may be more agreeable to our purpose.

Aristotle and other naturall Philosophers, discend into more particularities, and call Nature, whatsoeuer substantiall forme, which giues the being to any thing, and is the originall of all the working thereof; in which signification, our reasonable soule may reasonably be tearmed nature, for from her we receiue our formall being, which we haue of being men, and the selfe same is the beginning of whatsoeuer we doe and worke. But all soules being of equall perfection (as well that of the wiser, as that of the foolish) it cannot be affirmed, that nature in this signification, is that which makes a man able, for if this were true, all men should haue a like measure of wit and wisedome: and therefore the same *Aristotle* found out another signification of nature, which is the

cause

cauſe, that a man is able or vnable; ſaying, that the temperature of the foure firſt qualities, (hot, cold, moiſt, and drie) is to be called nature, for from this iſſue al the habilities of man, all his vertues and vices, and this great varietie of wits which we behold. And this is clearely proued by conſidering the age of a man when he is wiſeſt, who in his childhood is no more than a brute beaſt, and vſeth none other powers than thoſe of anger and concupiſcence; but comming to youth, there begins to ſhoot out in him a maruellous wit, and we ſee that it laſteth til a time certaine, and no longer, for old age growing on, he goes euery day looſing his wit, vntill it come to be quite decaied.

This varietie of wits, it is a matter certaine that it ſprings not from the reaſonable ſoule, for that is one ſelfe in all ages, without hauing receiued in his forces and ſubſtaunce any alteration: but man hath in euery age a diuers temperature, and a contrarie diſpoſition, by means whereof, the ſoule doth other workes in childhood, other in youth, and other in old age. Whence we draw an euident argument, that one ſelfe ſoule, doing contrarie workes in one ſelfe bodie, for that it partakes in euery age a contrarie temperature, when of young men, the one is able, and the other vnapt, this growes for that the one of them enioies a diuers temperature from the other. And this (for that it is the beginning of all the workes of the reaſonable ſoule) was by the Phiſitions and the Philoſophers, termed Nature; of which ſignification, this ſentence is properly verefied, that *Nature makes able.*

Hippocrates vſed vnproper terms, when he ſayd, the ſoule of man is produced vntil his death.

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* writ a booke, wherein he prooueth, That the maners of the ſoule, follow the temperature of the body, in which it keepes reſidence,

ſidence, and that by reaſon of the heat, the coldneſſe, the moiſture, and the drouth, of the territorie where men inhabit, of the meats which they feed on, of the waters which they drinke, and of the aire which they breath: ſome are blockiſh, and ſome wiſe: ſome of woorth, and ſome baſe: ſome cruel, and ſome merciful: many ſtraight breſted, and many large: part lyers, and part true ſpeakers: ſundrie traitors, and ſundrie faythfull: ſomewhere vnquiet, and ſomewhere ſtayed: there double, here ſingle: one pinching, another liberall: this man ſhamefaſt, that ſhameleſſe: ſuch hard, and ſuch light of beleefe. And to prooue this, he cites many places of *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Ariſtotle*, who affirme, that the difference of nations, as well in compoſition of the body, as in conditions of the ſoule, ſpringeth from the varietie of this temperature: and experience it ſelfe euidently ſheweth this, how far are different *Greeks* from *Tartarians*: *Frenchmen* from *Spaniards*: *Indians* from *Dutch*: and *Æthiopians* from *Engliſh*. And this may be ſeene, not only in countries ſo far diſtant, but if we conſider the prouinces that enuiron all *Spaine*, we may depart the vertues and vices which we haue recounted, amongſt the inhabitants, giuing ech one his peculiar vice and vertue; and if we conſider the wit and manners of the *Catalonians*, *Valentians*, *Mercians*, *Granatines*, *Andaluzians*, *Eſtremenians*, *Portugals*, *Galleſians*, *Aſturians*, *Montagneſes*, *Biſcanes*, *Nauarriſts*, *Arragonois*, and of the kingdome of *Caſtile*, who ſees not and knowes not, how far theſe are different amongſt themſelues, not only in ſhape of countenaunce, and in feature of body, but euen in the vertues and vices of the ſoule? Which all growes, for that euery of theſe prouinces hath his particular and different temperature. And this varietie of manners is knowne, not onely in coun-

countries ſo farre off, but in places alſo that are not more than a little league in diſtance, it cannot be credited what ods there is found in the wits of the inhabitants. Finally, all that which *Galen* writeth in this his booke, is the groundplot of this my Treatiſe, albeit he declares not in particular, the differences of the habilities which are in men, neither as touching the ſciences which euerie one requires in particular. Notwithſtanding, he vnderſtood that it was neceſſarie to depart the ſciences amongſt yoong men, and to giue ech one that which to his naturall habilitie was requiſit, in as much as he ſayd, That well ordered common wealths, ought to haue men of great wiſedome and knowledge, who might in their tender age, diſcouer ech ones wit and naturall ſharpneſſe, to the end they might be ſet to learne that art which was agreeable, and not leaue it to their owne election.

In euery citie the wiſeſt and eldeſt perſons ſhould looke into and iudge of the naturall quickneſſe of children, and ſo giue notice, that ech one might learne an art agreeable to his nature.

CHAP. III.

What part of the body ought to be well tempered, that a young man may haue habilitie.

MAns body hath ſo many varieties of parts and powers (applied ech to his end) that it ſhal not ſtray from our purpoſe, but rather growes a matter of neceſſitie, to know firſt, what member was ordained by nature for the principall inſtrument, to the end man might become wiſe and aduiſed. For it is a thing apparant, that we diſcourſe not with our foot, nor walke on our head,

nor ſee with our noſtrils, nor heare with our eies, but that euery of theſe parts hath his vſe and particular diſpoſition, for the worke which it is to accompliſh.

Before *Hippocrates* and *Plato* came into the world, it held for a generall conceit amongſt the naturall Philoſophers, that the heart was the principall part where the reaſonable faculty made his reſidence, and the inſtrument wherewith the ſoule wrought the workes of wiſedome, of diligence, of memorie, and of vnderſtanding. For which cauſe, the diuine ſcripture (applying it ſelfe to the ordinary ſpeech of thoſe times) in many places, cals the heart the ſoueraigne part of a man. But theſe two graue Philoſophers comming into the world, gaue euidence that this opinion was falſe, and prooued by many reaſons and experiments, that the braine is the principall ſeat of the reaſonable ſoule, and ſo they all gaue hands to this opinion, ſaue only *Ariſtotle*, who (with a purpoſe of croſſing *Plato* in all points) turned to reuiue the former opinion, and with topicall places to make it probable: with which of theſe opinions the truth ſwaieth, time ſerueth not now to diſcuſſe. For there is none of theſe Philoſophers that doubteth, but that the braine is the inſtrument ordained by nature, to the end that man might become wiſe and skilfull, it ſufficeth only to declare with what conditions this part ought to be endewed, ſo as we may affirme, that it is duly inſtrumentalized, and that a yong man in this behalfe may poſſeſſe a good wit and habilitie.

And therefore the heart and the things ſeated therabouts haue great feeling, but for all that are not partakers of knowledge: but of all theſe things the braine is cauſer.

Foure conditions the braine ought to enioy, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may therewith commodiouſly performe the workes which appertaine to vnderſtanding and wiſdome. The firſt, good compoſition; the ſecond, that his parts be well vnited; the third, that the

heat

heat exceed not the cold, nor the moist the drie; the fourth, that his substance be made of parts subtile and verie delicate.

In the good composition, are contained other foure things: the first is, good figure: the second, quantitie sufficient: the third, that in the braine the foure ventricles be distinct and seuered, each duly bestowed in his seat and place: the fourth, that the capableneſſe of these be neither greater nor lesse than is conuenient for their workings.

Galen collects the good figure of the braine, by an outward consideration, namely the forme and disposition of the head, which he sayth, ought to be such, as it should be, if taking a perfect round ball of wax, and pressing it together somewhat on the sides, there will remaine (after that manner) the forehead and the nape with a little bunchineſſe. Hence it followes that the man who hath his forehead very plaine, and his nodocke flat, hath not his braine so figured, as is requisit for wit and habilitie. The quantitie of the braine, which the soule needeth to discourse & consider, is a matter that breeds feare, for amongst all the brute beasts, there is none found to haue so much braine as a man, in sort, as if we ioine those of two the greatest oxen together, they will not equall that of one onely man, be he neuer so little. And that whereto behooues more consideration, is, that amongst brute beasts, those who approch neereſt to mans wisedome and discretion (as the ape, the fox, and the dog,) haue a greater quantitie of braine than the other, though bigger bodied than they. For which cause, *Galen* said, that a little head in any man is euer faultie, because that it wanteth braine; notwithstanding, I auouch that if his hauing a great head, proceedeth from abundance

dance of matter, and ill tempered, at such time as the same was shaped by nature, it is an euill token, for the same consists all of bones and flesh, and containes a smal quantitie of braine, as it befals in very big orenges, which opened, are found scarce of iuice, and hard of rinde. Nothing offends the reasonable soule so much, as to make his abode in a body surcharged with bones, fat, and flesh. For which cause *Plato* sayd, that wise mens heads are ordinarily weake, and vpon any occasion are easily annoied, and the reason is, for that nature made them of an emptie skull, with intention not to offend the wit, by compassing it with much matter. And this doctrine of *Plato* is so true, that albeit the stomacke abides so far distant from the braine, yet the same workes it offence, when it is repleniſhed with fat and flesh. For confirmation hereof, *Galen* alleageth a prouerbe which sayth, *A grosse bellie makes a grosse vnderstanding*, and that this proceeds from nothing else, than that the brain and the stomacke are vnited and chained together with certaine sinewes, by way of which they interchangeably communicat their dammages. And contrariwise, when the stomacke is drie and shrunke, it affoords great aid to the wit, as we see in the hungerstarued, and such as are driuen to their shifts, on which doctrine (it may be) *Persius* founded himself, when he said, That the belly is that which quickens vp the wit. But the thing most pertinent to be noted for this purpose, is, that if the other parts of the body be fat and fleshie, and therethrough a man growes ouer grosse, *Aristotle* sayes, It makes him to leese his wit. For which cause, I am of opinion, that if a man haue a great head, albeit the same proceed for that he is endued with a very able nature, and that he is furnished with a quantitie of well tempered matter, yet he shall not

There are two sorts of fat men, the one full of flesh, bones, and blood: the other repleniſhed with fat, and these are very wittie.

not be owner of ſo good a wit, as if the ſame held a meaner ſize.

Ariſtotle is of a contrary opinion, whileſt he enquires for what cauſe a man is the wiſeſt of all liuing creatures; to which doubt he anſwers, That you ſhall find no creature which hath ſo little a head as man, reſpecting withall the greatneſſe of his bodie: but herein he ſwarued from reaſon, for if he had opened ſome mans head, and viewed the quantitie of his braine, he ſhould haue found, that two horſes together had not ſo much braine as that one man. That which I haue gathered by experience is, that in little men it is beſt that the head incline ſomewhat to greatneſſe; and in thoſe who are big bodied, it prooues beſt that they be little: and the reaſon is, for that after this ſort, there is found a meaſurable quantitie, with which the reaſonable ſoule may wel performe his working.

Beſides this, there are needfull the foure ventricles in the brain, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may diſcourſe and Philoſophize: one muſt be placed on the right ſide of the braine, the ſecond on the left, the third in the middle of theſe, and the fourth in the part behind the braine. Whervnto theſe ventricles ſerue, and their large or narrow capableneſſe for the reaſonable ſoule, all ſhall be told by vs a little hereafter, when we ſhall intreat of the diuerſities of mens wits.

But it ſufficeth not, that the braine poſſeſſe good figure, ſufficient quantitie, and the number of ventricles, by vs forementioned, with their capableneſſe, great or little, but it behooues alſo that his parts holds a certaine kind of continuedneſſe, and that they be not diuided. For which cauſe, we haue ſeene in hurts of the head, that ſome men haue loſt their memorie, ſome their vnderſtanding,

ſtanding, and others their imagination: and put caſe, that after they haue recouered their health, the braine re-vnited it ſelfe againe, yet this notwithſtanding, the naturall vnion was not made, which the braine before poſſeſſed.

The third condition of the fourth principall, was, that the braine ſhould be tempered with meaſurable heat, and without exceſſe of the other qualities, which diſpoſition, we ſayd heretofore that it is called *good nature*; for it is that which principally makes a man able, and the contrarie vnable.

But the fourth, (namely that the braine haue his ſubſtance or compoſition of ſubtle and delicate parts) *Galen* ſayth, is the moſt important of all the reſt. For when he would giue a token of the good diſpoſition of the brain, he affirmeth, that a ſubtile wit, ſheweth that the braine is framed of ſubtile and very delicat parts, and if the vnderſtanding be dull, it giues euidence of a groſſe ſubſtance, but he makes no mention of the temperature. Theſe conditions the braine ought to be endewed withall, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may therethrough ſhape his reaſons and ſyllogiſmes. But here encounters vs a difficultie very great, and this is, that if we open the head of any beaſt, we ſhall find his braine compoſed with the ſame forme and manner, as a mans, without that any of the fore-reported conditions will be failing. Whence we gather that the brute beaſts haue alſo the vſe of Prudence and reaſon, by means of the compoſition of their braine, or elſe that our reaſonable ſoule ſerues not it ſelfe of this member, for the vſe of his operations; which may not be auouched. To this doubt, *Galen* anſwereth in this manner: Amongſt the kinds of beaſts, it is doubted, whether that which is termed vnreaſonable, be altogether

gether void of reason, or not. For albeit the same want that which consists in voice (which is named speech) yet that which is conceiued in the soule, and termed discourse, of this it may be, that all sorts of beasts are partakers, albeit the same is bestowed more sparingly vpon some, and more largely on other some. But verely, how far man in the way of reason outgoeth all the rest, there is none who maketh question. By these words, *Galen* giues vs to vnderstand (albeit with some fearfulnesse) that brute beasts do partake reason, one more, and another lesse, and in their mind do frame some syllogismes and discourses, though they cannot vtter them by way of speech. And then the difference betweene them and man consisteth in being more reasonable, and in vsing Prudence with greater perfection.

The same *Galen* prooues also by many reasons and experiments, that Asses (being of all brute beasts the blunteſt) do ariue with their wit to the most curious and nice points, which were deuised by *Plato* and *Aristotle*, and thereon he collects saying: I am therefore so far from praysing the antient Philosophers, in that they haue found out some ample matter and of rare inuention, (as when they say, We must hold that there is selfe, and diuers: one, and not one: not only in number, but also in kind:) as I dare boldly affirme, that euen the very Asses (who notwithstanding seeme most blockish of all beasts) haue this from nature.

This selfe same meant *Aristotle*, when he enquired the cause, Why man amongst all liuing creatures is wisest: and in another place he turnes to doubt, For what cause man is the most vniust of all liuing creatures: in which he giues vs to vnderstand the selfe same which *Galen* sayd, That the difference which is found between

man

man and brute beast, is the selfe same which is found betweene a foole and a wise man; which is nought else than in respect of the more and the lesse. This (truly) is not to be doubted, that brute beasts enioy memorie and imagination, and another power which resembles vnderstanding, as the Ape is very like a man, and that his soule takes vse of the composition of the braine, it is a matter apparant: which being good, and such as is behooffull, performes his workes very wel, and with much prudence, and if the braine be ill instrumentalized, it executes the same vntowardly. For which cause we see that there be asses, which in their knowledge are properly such: and others againe are found so quicke conceipted and malicious, that they passe the propertie of their kind. And amongst horses are found many iadishnesses, and good qualities, and some there are more trainable than the rest: all which growes from hauing their braine well or ill instrumentalized. The reason and solution of this doubt, shall be placed in the chapter which followeth, for there we returne to reason anew of this matter.

There are in the body some other parts, from whose temperature, as well the wit as the braine depend; of which we will reason in the last chapter of this worke. But besides these and the braine, there is found in the body another substance, whose seruice the reasonable soule vseth in his operations, and so requireth the three last qualities which we haue assigned to the braine, that is, quantitie sufficient, delicate substance, and good temperature. These are the vitall spirits, and arteriall blood, which go wandring through the whole body, and remaine euermore vnited to the imagination, following his contemplation. The office of this spirituall substance

is,

is, to ſtir vp the powers of man, and to giue them force and vigour that they may be able to worke. This ſhall euidently be knowne to be their manner, if we take conſideration of the motions, of the imaginations, and of that which after ſucceeds in working. For if a man begin to imagine vpon any iniurie that hath bene profered him, the blood of the arteries runs ſodainly to the heart, and ſtirs vp the wrathfull part, and giues the ſame heat and forces for reuenge.

If a man ſtand contemplating any faire woman, or ſtay in giuing & receiuing by that imaginatiō touching the venerious act, theſe vitall ſpirits run foorthwith to the genitall members, and raiſe them to the performance. The like befals when we remember any delicat and ſauourie meat, which once called to mind, they ſtraight abandon the reſt of the body, and flie to the ſtomacke and repleniſh the mouth with water. And this their motion is ſo ſwift, that if a woman with child long for any meat whatſoeuer, and ſtill retaine the ſame in her imagination, we ſee by experience, that ſhe looſeth her burthen if ſpeedily it be not yeelded vnto her. The naturall reaſon of this, is, becauſe theſe vitall ſpirits, before the woman conceiued this longing, made abode in the bellie, helping her there to retaine the creature, and through this new imagination of eating, they hie to the ſtomacke to raiſe the appetite, and in this ſpace, if the belly haue no ſtrong retentiue, it cannot ſuſtaine the ſame, and ſo by this means ſhe leeſeth her burthen.

Galen vnderſtanding this condition of the vitall ſpirits, counſaileth Phiſitions that they giue not ſicke folke to eat, when their humors are raw and vpon digeſtion, for when they firſt feele the meat in the ſtomacke, they ſtraightwaies abandon the worke about which before they

they were occupied, and come thervnto to helpe it. The like benefit and ayd, the braine receiues of these vitall spirits, when the reasonable soule is about to contemplat, vnderstand, imagine, or performe actions of memorie, without which it cannot worke. And like as the grosse substance of the braine, and his euill temperature brings the wit to confusion: so the vitall spirits, and the arteriall blood (not being delicat and of good temperature) hinder in a man his discourse and vse of reason. Wherefore *Plato* sayd, That the suppleness and good temperature of the heart, makes the wit sharpe and quicke-sighted. Hauing prooued before that the braine and not the heart, is the principall seat of the reasonable soule. And the reason is, because these vitall spirits are engendred in the heart, and partake of that substance and that temperature, which rested in that which formed them. Of this arteriall blood, *Aristotle* meant when he sayd, That those men are well compounded who haue their blood hot, delicat, and pure; for they are also of good bodily forces, and of a wit well disposed. These vitall spirits are by the Phisitions termed Nature, for they are the principall instrument with which the reasonable soule performeth his workes, and of these also may that sentence be verefied, *Nature makes able.*

CHAP. IIII.

It is prooued that the soule vegetatiue, sensitiue, and reasonable, haue knowledge without that any thing be taught them, if so be that they possesse that conuenient temperature, which is requisit for their operation.

The

THe temperature of the four firſt qualities) which we heretofore termed Nature) hath ſo great force, to cauſe that (of plants, brute beaſts, and man) each one ſet himſelfe to performe thoſe workes which are proper to his kind, that they ariue to that vtmoſt bound of perfection which may be attained, ſodainly & without any others teaching them; the plants know how to forme roots vnder ground, and by way of them to draw nouriſhment to retaine it, to digeſt it, and to driue foorth the excrements: and the brute beaſts likewiſe ſo ſoone as they are borne, know that which is agreeable to their nature, and flie the things which are naughtie and noiſome. And that which makes them moſt to maruell who are not ſeene in naturall Philoſophie, is, that a man hauing his braine well tempered, and of that diſpoſition which is requiſit for this or that ſcience, ſodainly and without hauing euer learned it of any, he ſpeaketh and vttereth ſuch exquiſit matters, as could hardly win credit. Vulgar Philoſophers, ſeeing the maruellous works which brute beaſts performe, affirme it holds no cauſe of maruell, becauſe they do it by naturall inſtinct, in as much as nature ſheweth and teacheth each in his kind what he is to do. And in this they ſay very well, for we haue alreadie alleaged and prooued, that nature is nothing elſe than this temperature of the foure firſt qualities, and that this is the ſchoolemaiſter who teacheth the ſoules in what ſort they are to worke: but they tearme inſtinct of nature a certaine maſſe of things, which riſe from the noddocke vpward, neyther could they euer expound or giue vs to vnderſtand, what

it is. The graue Philoſophers (as *Hippocrates*, *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*) attribute all theſe maruellous workes to heat, cold, moiſture, and drouth, and this they affirme of the firſt principle, and paſſe no farther. And if you aske who hath taught the brute beaſts to doe theſe works, (which breed vs ſuch maruell) and men to diſcourſe with reaſon; *Hippocrates* anſwereth, It is the natures of them all without any teacher: as if he ſhould ſay, The faculties or the temperature of which they conſiſt, are al giuen them without being taught by any other. Which is cleerely diſcerned, if they paſſe on to conſider the workes of the ſoule vegetatiue, and of all the reſt which gouerne man, who if it haue a quantitie of mans ſeed, wel digeſted and ſeaſoned with good temperature, makes a body ſo ſeemly and duly inſtrumentalized, that all the caruers in the world cannot ſhape the like.

For which cauſe *Galen* woondring to ſee a frame ſo maruellous, the number of his ſeuerall parts, the ſeating, the figure, and the vſe of each one by it ſelfe, grew to conclude, it was not poſſible that the vegetatiue ſoule, nor the temperature, could faſhion a workmanſhip ſo ſingular, but that the author thereof was God, or ſome other moſt wiſe vnderſtanding. But this maner of ſpeech is alreadie by vs heretofore refuted: for it beſeemes not naturall Philoſophers to reduce the effects immediatly to God, and ſo to ſlip ouer the aſſigning of the ſecond reaſons, and eſpecially in this caſe, where we ſee by experience, that if mans ſeed conſiſt of an euill ſubſtance, and enioy not a temperature conuenient, the vegetatiue ſoule runs into a thouſand diſorders: for if the ſame be cold and moiſt more than is requiſit, *Hippocrates* ſayth, that the men prooue Eunuches, or Hermofrodites; and if it be very hote and drie, *Ariſtotle* ſayth, that

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it makes them curle-pated, crooke-legged, and flat noſed as are the *Æthiopians*, and if it be moiſt, the ſame *Galen* ſayth, that they grow long and lithie: and if it be drie, low of ſtature. All this is a great defect in mankind, and for ſuch works we find little cauſe to giue nature any commendation, or to hold her for aduiſed; and if God were the author hereof, none of theſe qualities could diuert him. Only the firſt men which the world poſſeſſed, *Plato* affirms were made by God, but the reſt were borne anſwerable to the diſcourſe of the ſecond cauſes, which if they be well ordered, the vegetatiue ſoule dooth well performe his operations: and if they concur not in ſort conuenient, it produceth a thouſand dammageable effects.

What the good order of nature for this effect muſt be, is, that the vegetatiue ſoule haue an endowment of a good temperature, or elſe, let *Galen* and all the Philoſophers in the world anſwer me, what the cauſe is that the vegetatiue ſoule poſſeſſeth ſuch skill and power in the firſt age of man to ſhape his body, and to increaſe and nouriſh the ſame, and when old age groweth on, can yeeld the ſame no longer. For if an old man leeſe but a tooth, he is paſt remedie of recouering another, but if a child caſt them all, we ſee that natures return to renew them againe. Is it then poſſible that a ſoule which hath done nought elſe in all the courſe of life, than to receiue food, retaine the ſame, digeſt it, and expell the excrements, new begetting the parts which faile, ſhould towords the end of life forget this, and want abilitie to do the ſame any longer? *Galen* (for certaine) will anſwer, that this skill and habilitie of the vegetatiue ſoule in youth, ſprings from his poſſeſſing much naturall heat and moiſture, and that in age the ſame wants skill and

power to performe it, by means of the coldneſſe and drineſſe, to which a bodie of thoſe yeares is ſubiect. The knowledge of the ſenſitiue ſoule, takes his dependance alſo from the temperature of the braine, for if the ſame be ſuch as his operations require that it ſhould be, it can perform with due perfection; otherwiſe, the ſame muſt alſo erre no leſſe than the ſoule vegetatiue. The manner which *Galen* held to behold and diſcerne by eyſight the wiſedome of the ſenſitiue ſoule, was to take a yoong kid, but newly kidded, which ſet on the ground, begins to go (as if it had bene told and taught that his legs were made to that purpoſe) and after that, he ſhakes from his backe the ſuperfluous moiſture which he brought with him from his mothers belly, and lifting vp the one foot, ſcrapes behind his eare; and ſetting before him ſundrie platters with wine, water, vinegre, oile, and milke, after he hath ſmelt them all, he fed onely on that of milke. Which being beheld by diuers Philoſophers there preſent, they all with one voice cried out, That *Hippocrates* had great reaſon to ſay, that ſoules were skilfull without the inſtruction of any teacher. But *Galen* held not himſelfe contented with this one proofe, for two months after he cauſed the ſame kid, being very hungrie, to be brought into the field, where ſmelling at many hearbs, he did eat only thoſe, whereon goats accuſtomably feed.

But if *Galen*, as he ſet himſelfe to contemplat the demeanure of this kid, had done the like with three or foure together, he ſhould haue ſeene ſome gone better than other ſome, ſhrug themſelues better, ſcratch better, and performe better al the other actions which we haue recounted. And if *Galen* had reared two colts, bred of one horſe and mare, he ſhould haue ſeene the one to

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pace with more grace than the other, and to gallop and ſtop better, and ſhew more fidelitie. And if he had taken an ayrie of Faulcons, and manned them, he ſhould haue found the firſt good of wing, the ſecond good of prey, and the third rauening and ill conditioned. The like ſhall we find in hounds, who being whelpes of the ſame litter, the one for perfection of hunting, will ſeeme to want but ſpeech, and the other haue no more inclination therevnto, than if he had bene engendered by a heardmans bandog.

All this cannot be reduced to thoſe vaine inſtincts of nature; which the Philoſophers faine. For if you aske for what cauſe one dog hath more inſtinct than another, both comming of one kind, and whelpes of one ſire, I cannot coniecture what they may anſwer, ſaue to flie backe to their old leaning poſt, ſaying, That God hath taught the one better than the other, and giuen him a more naturall inſtinct. And if we demaund the reaſon, why this good hound, being yet but a whelpe, is a perfect hunter, and growing in age, hath no ſuch ſufficiencie: and contrariwiſe, another being yoong cannot hunt at all, and waxing old, is wylie and readie; I know not what they can yeeld in replie. My ſelfe at leaſt would ſay, that the towardly hunting of one dog more than an other, growes from the better temperature of his brain: and againe, that his well hunting whileſt he is yoong, and his decay in age, is occaſioned by means that in one age he partakes the temperature which is requiſit to the qualities of hunting, and in the other not. Whence we infer, that ſithens the temperature of the foure firſt qualities is the reaſon and cauſe, for which one brute beaſt better performs the works of his kind than another, that this temperature is the ſchoolemaiſter which teacheth

the ſenſitiue ſoule what it is to do.

Go to the Ant, O ſluggard, and conſider his way and learne wiſedome: who hauing no guide nor maiſter, prouides himſelfe the ſummer of food, and in the time of harueſt furniſheth himſelfe of meat.

And if *Galen* had conſidered the demeanure and voiages of the Ant, and noted his prudence, his mercie, his iuſtice, and his gouernment, he would haue taken aſtoniſhment to ſee a beaſt ſo little endewed with ſo great ſageneſſe, without the helpe of any maiſter or teacher to inſtruct him. But the temperature which the ant hath in his braine, being knowne, and how aptly it is appropriated to wiſedome, (as hereafter ſhall be ſhowne) this woonderment will ceaſe, and we ſhall conceiue, that brute beaſts with the temperature of their braine, and the fantaſmes which enter thereinto by the fiue ſences, make ſuch diſcourſes, and partake thoſe abilities, which we do ſo note in them. And amongſt beaſts of one kind, he which is moſt ſchooleable and skilfull, is ſuch, becauſe he hath his braine better tempered, and if through any occaſion or infirmitie, the temperature of his braine incur alteration, he will ſodainly leeſe his skill and abilitie, as men alſo do.

A Faulconer affirmed to me with an oath, that he had a redye Faulcon for hawking, which grew buſſardly, for remedy wherof, he gaue hir a *boſton di fuoco* in the head, and ſhe amended.

But now we are to treat of a difficultie touching the reaſonable ſoule, which is, in what ſort he hath this naturall inſtinct for the operations of his kind, (namely Sapience, and Prudence) and how on the ſodaine, by means of his good temperature, a man can be skilled in the ſciences, without the inſtruction of any other: ſeeing experience telleth vs, that if they be not gotten by learning, no man is at his birth endewed with them.

Betweene *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*, there is a waightie queſtion, as touching the verefieng the reaſon or cauſe from whence the wiſedome of man may ſpring. One ſayth, That the reaſonable ſoule is more antient than the bodie, for that before ſuch time as Nature endowed the ſame with theſe inſtruments, it made abode in heauen,

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Plato tooke out of the holie Scripture the best sentences which are to be found in his workes, in respect whereof he was called Diuine.

Aristotle tooke another course, affirming that euerie doctrine, and euery discipline, comes from a foregoing knowledge, as if he would say, all that which men know and learne, springs from that they haue heard the same, seene it, smelt it, tasted it, or felt it. For there can grow no notice in the vnderstanding, which hath not first taken passage by some of the fiue sences. For which cause he sayd, that these powers issue out of the hands of nature, as a plaine table in which is no maner of painting, which opinion is also false as well as that of *Plato*. But that we may the better prooue and make the same apparant, it behooues first to agree with the vulgar Philosophers,

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that in mans body there rests but one soule, and that the same is reasonable, which is the originall of whatsoeuer we do or effect: albeit there are opinions, and there want not, who against this defend, that in company of the reasonable soule, there are associated some two or three more.

Plato attributes three soules vnto man.

This then standing thus in the workes which the reasonable soule performes, as it is vegetatiue, we haue alreadie proued that the same knowes how to shape man, and to giue him the figure which he is to keepe, and knowes likewise how to receiue nourishment, to retaine it, to digest it, and to expell the excrements, and if any part of the body do faile, she knowes how to supplie the same anew, and yeeld it that composition agreeable to the vse which it is to hold. And in the works of the sensitiue and motiue, the child so soone as it is borne, knowes to sucke, and fashion his lips to draw foorth the milke, and this so redily, as not the wisest man can do the like. And herewithall, it assures the qualities which are incident to the preseruation of his nature, shuns that which is noisome and dammageable thereunto, knowes to weepe and laugh, without being taught by any. And if this be not so, let the vulgar Philosophers tell me awhile, who hath taught the children to do these things, or by what sence they haue learned it. Well I know they will answer, That God hath giuen them this naturall instinct as to the brute beasts, wherein they say not ill, if the naturall instinct be the selfe same with the temperature.

Hippocrates answered better, saying: That nature is learned, though she haue not learned to do well.

The proper operations of the reasonable soule, namely, to vnderstand, to imagine and to performe actions of memorie, a man cannot do them forthwith so soone as he is borne, for the temperature of infancie serueth very vn-

vnfitly therefore, and is meerely appropriat to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue, as that of old age is appropriat to the reaſonable ſoule, and contrary to the vegetatiue and ſenſitiue. And if as the temperature which ſerues for prudence, is gotten in the brain by little and little, ſo the ſame could all be ioined together at one inſtant, man ſhould on the ſodaine haue better skill to diſcourſe and play the Philoſopher, than if he had attained the ſame in the ſchooles.

But becauſe nature cannot performe this ſaue by proceſſe of time, a man growes to gather wiſedome by little and little, and that this is the reaſon and cauſe thereof, is manifeſtly prooued, if we conſider, that a man after he hath bene very wiſe, growes by little and little into folly, for that he daily goes (till his decrepit age) accrewing a contrary temperature. I for mine owne part am of opinion, that if nature, as ſhe hath made man of ſeed hot and moiſt (and this is the temperature which directs the vegetatiue, and the ſenſitiue, what they are to effectuat) ſo ſhe had made him of ſeed cold and drie, euen after his birth, he ſhould ſtraight-waies haue bene able to diſcourſe and reaſon, and not haue attended to ſucke, in as much as this is the temperature agreeable to theſe operations. But for that we find by experience, that if the braine haue the temperature requiſit for naturall ſciences, he hath no need of a maiſter to teach him, it fals out neceſſarie that we marke one thing, which is, that if a man fall into any diſeaſe, by which his braine vpon a ſodaine changeth his temperature (as are madneſſe, melancholy, & frenzie) it happens, that at one inſtant he leeſeth, if he were wiſe, all his knowledge, and vtters a thouſand follies; and if he were a foole, he accrues more wit and abilitie than he had before.

The ſeed and menſtruall blood which are two materiall principles of which we be formed, are hote & moiſt, through which temperature children are ſo vnskilled.

I can ſpeake of a rude countrie fellow, who becomming frantike, made a very eloquent diſcourſe in my preſence, recommending his well dooing to the by-ſtanders, and that they ſhould take care of his wife and children (if it pleaſed God to call him away in that ſickneſſe) with ſo many flowers of Rhethorike, and ſuch apt choiſe of words, as if *Cicero* had ſpoken in the preſence of the Senate: whereat the beholders maruelling, asked me whence ſo great eloquence and wiſedome might grow, in a man who in his health time could ſcantly ſpeake? and I remember I made anſwer, That the art of Oratorie was a ſcience, which ſprings from a certaine point or degree of heat, and that this countrie fellow, before ſound, had by meanes of this infirmitie attayned therevnto.

When the braine is placed hot in the firſt degree, it makes a man eloquent, & furniſheth him with ſtore of matter to deliuer, for which cauſe the ſilent are alwaies cold of braine, & great talkers hot

I can alſo ſpeake of another frantike perſon, who for the ſpace of more than eight daies, neuer vttered word which I found not to carrie his iuſt quantitie, and moſtly he made couplements of verſes very well compoſed, whereat the by-ſtanders wondring to here a man ſpeake in verſe, who in his health had neuer ſo much skill; I ſayd, It ſildome fell out, that he who was a poet in his health time, ſhould be ſo alſo in his ſickneſſe. For the temperature of the braine, by which when a man is whole, he becommeth a Poet, in ſickneſſe altereth and brings foorth contrarie operations. I remember that the wife of this frantike fellow, and a ſiſter of his, named *Margaret*, reprooued him, becauſe he ſpake ill of the ſaints, whereat the patient growing impatient ſayd to his wife theſe words: I renounce God for the loue of you; and S. *Marie* for the loue of *Margaret*; and S. *Peter* for the loue of *Iohn* of *Olmedo*; and ſo he ran thorow a beadroll of many ſaints, whoſe names had conſonance

This frenzie was occaſioned by abundãce of cholar which tooke hold in the ſubſtance of the brain, which humor hath great congruence with Poetrie, for which cauſe Horace ſayd, That if ſummer did not make euacuation of choler, no Poet ſhould paſſe before him.

with

with the other by-ſtanders there preſent.

But this is nothing, and a matter of ſmall importance in reſpect of the notable ſpeeches, vttered by a Page of one of the great ones of this realme, whilſt he was mad, who in his health was reputed a youth of ſlender capacitie, but falling into this infirmitie, he deliuered ſuch rare conceits, reſemblances, and anſwers, to ſuch as aſked him, and deuiſed ſo excellent manners of gouerning a kingdome (of which he imagined himſelfe to be ſoueraigne) that for great wonder people flocked to ſee him and heare him, and his very maiſter ſcarcely euer departed from his beds head, praying God that he might neuer be cured. Which afterwards plainly appeared, for being recouered, his Phiſition (who had healed him) came to take leaue of his lord, with a mind to receiue ſome good reward, if of nothing elſe, yet at leaſt in good words; but he encountred this greeting: I promiſe you maiſter doctor, that I was neuer more aggreeued at any ill ſucceſſe, than to ſee this my page recouered, for it was not behooffull that he ſhould change ſo wiſe folly, for an vnderſtanding ſo ſimple as is this, which in his health he enioieth. Me-thinks that of one, who to fore was wiſe and well aduiſed, you haue made him a foole againe, which is the greateſt miſerie that may light vpon any man. The poore Phiſition ſeeing how little thankfully his cure was accepted, went to take leaue of the page, who amongſt many other words that paſſed betweene them, told him this: Maiſter doctor, I kiſſe your hands for ſo great a benefit beſtowed on me, in reſtoring mine vnderſtanding, but I aſſure you on my faith, that in ſome ſort, it diſpleaſeth me to haue bene cured. For whileſt I reſted in my folly, I led my life in the deepeſt diſcourſes of the world, and imagined my ſelfe ſo great a lord, as

there

This page was not yet perfectly cured.

there raigned no king on the earth, who was not my vaſſall, and were this a ieaſt or a lie, what imported that, whileſt I conceiued thereof ſo great a contentment, as if it had bene true? I reſt now in far woorſe caſe, finding my ſelfe in troth to be but a poore page, and to morrow I muſt begin againe to ſerue one, who whilſt I was in mine infirmitie, I would haue diſdayned for my foot-man.

It skils not much, whether the Philoſophers admit all this, and beleeue that it may be ſo or not; but what if I ſhould prooue by verie true ſtories, that ignorant men ſtrooken with this infirmitie, haue ſpoken Latine, which they neuer learned in their health; and that a franticke woman told all perſons who came to viſit her, their vertues and vices, and ſometimes reported matters with that aſſurance, which they vſe to giue who ſpeake by coniectures and tokens: and for this cauſe, none almoſt durſt come in to viſite her, fearing to heare of thoſe true tales which ſhe would deliuer? and (which is more to be maruelled at) when a barber came to let her blood, Friend (quoth ſhe) haue regard what you do, for you haue but few daies to liue, and your wife ſhall marrie ſuch a man: and this, though ſpoken by chaunce, fell out ſo true, as it tooke effect before halfe a yeare came to an end.

Me thinks I heare them who flie natural Philoſophy, to ſay that this is a foule leaſing, & that (put caſe it were true) the diuell as he is wiſe and craftie by Gods ſufferance, entred into this womans body, and into the reſt of thoſe frantike perſons, whom I haue mentioned, and cauſed them to vtter thoſe ſtrange matters, and yet euen to confeſſe this, they are very loath; for the diuell foreknoweth not what is to come, becauſe he hath no prophetical

pheticall ſpirit. They hold it a very ſufficient argument to auouch, This is falſe, becauſe I cannot conceiue how it may be ſo: as if difficult & quaint matters were ſubiect to blunt wits, and came within the reach of their capacities. I pretend not hereby to take thoſe to taske who haue defect of vnderſtanding, for that were a bootleſſe labour, but to make *Ariſtotle* himſelfe confeſſe, that men endowed with the temperature requiſit for ſuch operations, may conceiue many things without hauing receiued thereof any particular perſeuerance, or learned the ſame at the hands of any other. Sundry alſo, becauſe this heat is a neighbour to the ſeat of the mind, are wrapped in the infirmitie of ſottiſhneſſe, or are heated by ſome furious inſtinct, whence grew the *Sibils* and *Bacchants*, and all thoſe, who men thinke are egged on by ſome diuine inſpiration, whereas this takes his originall, not from any diſeaſe, but from a naturall diſtemperature. *Marcus* a citizen of *Siracuſa*, was excellenteſt poet after he loſt his vnderſtanding, and thoſe in whom this abated heat approcheth leaſt to mediocritie, are (verely) altogether melancholike, but thereby much the wiſer. In theſe words *Ariſtotle* cleerely confeſſeth, that when the braine is exceſſiuely heated, many thereby attaine the knowledge of things to come, (as were the *Sibils*) which *Ariſtotle* ſayth, growes not by reaſon of any diſeaſe, but thorow the inequalitie of the naturall heat, and that this is the very reaſon and cauſe thereof, he proues apparantly by an example; alleaging that *Mark* a citizen of *Siracuſe*, was a Poet in moſt excellencie at ſuch time as through exceſſiue heat of the braine he fell beſides himſelfe, and when he returned to a more moderat temperature, he loſt his verſifying, but yet remayned more wiſe and aduiſed. In ſo much that *Ariſtotle* not only admits

He ſpeakes to one aſleepe who teacheth wiſedome to a foole.

The Sibils admitted by the catholike church, had this naturall diſpoſition that Ariſtotle ſpeakes of, and beſides a propheticall ſpirit which God powred into thē, for naturall wit ſufficed not for ſo high a point, were the ſame neuer ſo perfect.

mits the temperature of the braine, for the principall occasion of these extrauagant successes, but also reprooues them who hold the same for a diuine reuelation, and no naturall cause.

When the diseased diuine thus, it is a token that the reasonable soule is now as wearie of the bodie, and so none such recouer.

The first who tearmed these maruellous matters by the name of diuinesse, was *Hippocrates*, and that if any such point of diuinesse be found in the disease, that it manifesteth also a prouidence. Vpon which sentence, he chargeth Phisitions that if the diseased vtter any such diuine matters, they may thereby know in what case she rests, and prognosticate what will become of him. But that which in this behalfe driues me to most woonder, is, that demaunding of *Plato* how it may come to passe, that of two sonnes begotten by one father, one hath the skill of versifying, without any other teaching, and the other, toiling in the art of poetrie, can neuer beget so much as one verse: he answereth, That he who was borne a Poet, is possessed, and the other not. In which behalfe, *Aristotle* had good cause to find fault with him, for that he might haue reduced this to the temperature, as else where he did.

The frantike persons speaking of Latine, without that he euer learned the same in his health time, shewes the consonance which the Latin toong holds with the reasonable soule, and (as we will prooue hereafter) there is to be found a particular wit, appliable to the inuention of languages, and Latine words, & the phrases of speech in that toong are so fitting with the eare, that the reasonable soule possessing the necessarie temperature for the inuention of some delicat language, sodainly encounters with this. And that two deuisers of languages may shape the like words (hauing the like wit and habilitie) it is very manifest, presupposing that when God created

Adam

Adam, and ſet all things before him, to the end he might beſtow on each his ſeuerall name, whereby it ſhould be called, he had likewiſe at that inſtant molded another man with the ſame perfection and ſupernaturall grace; now I demaund, if God had placed the ſame things before this other man, that he might alſo ſet them names whereby they ſhould be called, of what manner thoſe names ſhould haue bene? for mine owne part, I make no doubt, but he would haue giuen theſe things, thoſe very names which *Adam* did: and the reaſon is very apparant, for both carried one ſelfe eye to the nature of each thing, which of it ſelfe was no more but one. After this manner might the frantike perſon light vpon the Latine toong, and ſpeake the ſame without euer hauing learned it in his health, for the naturall temperature of his braine, conceiuing alteration, through the infirmitie it might (for a ſpace) become like his, who firſt inuented the Latine toong, and faine the like words, but yet not with that concert and continued fineneſſe, for this would giue tokē that the diuel moued that toong, as the church teacheth hir exorciſts. This ſelfe (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) befel ſome children, who at their birth-time ſpake ſome words very plainly, and afterward kept ſilence, and he finds fault with the vulgar Philoſophers of his time, who for that they knew not the naturall cauſe of this effect, imputed it to the diuell.

The cauſe why children ſpeake ſo ſoone as they are borne, and after foorthwith turne to hold their peace, *Ariſtotle* could neuer find out though he went much about it, but yet it could neuer ſinke into his braine, that it was a deuiſe of the diuels, nor an effect aboue nature, as the vulgar Philoſophers held opinion; who ſeeing themſelues hedged in with the curious and nice points

of

of naturall Philoſophie, make them beleeue who know little, that God or the diuell are authors of the prodigious and ſtrange effects, of whoſe naturall cauſe they haue no knowledge and vnderſtanding.

Children which are engendred of ſeed cold and drie, (as are thoſe begotten in old age) ſome few dayes and moneths after their birth, begin to diſcourſe and philoſophiſe; for the temperature cold and drie, (as we will hereafter prooue) is moſt appropriat to the operations of the reaſonable ſoule, and that which proceſſe of time, and many dayes and months ſhould bring about, is ſupplied by the preſent temperature of the brain, which for many cauſes anticipateth what it was to effect. Other children there are (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) who as ſoone as they are borne, begin to ſpeake, and afterwards hold their peace vntill they attaine the ordinarie and conuenient age of ſpeaking: which effect floweth from the ſame originall and cauſe that we recounted of the page, and of thoſe furious and frantike perſons, and of him who ſpake Latine on a ſudden without hauing learned it in his health. And that children whilſt they make abode in their mothers bellie, and ſo ſoone as they are borne, may vndergo theſe infirmities, is a matter paſt deniall. But whence that diuining of the franticke woman proceeded, I can better make *Cicero* to conceiue, than theſe naturall Philoſophers, for he deſcribing the nature of man, ſayd in this manner: The creature foreſightfull, ſearchfull, apt for many matters, ſharpe conceited, mindfull, repleniſhed with reaſon and counſell, whome we call by the name of Man. And in particular he affirmeth that there is found a certain nature in ſome men, which in foreknowing things to come, exceedeth other mens, and his words are theſe: For there is found a certaine force

Thoſe who haue bene crazed, and are called melãcholike, haue their mind endewed with a certain ſpice of prophefying and diuining.

force and nature, which foretels things to come, the force and nature of which, is not by reason to be vnfolded. The error of the naturall Philosophers consisteth, in not considering (as *Plato* did) that man was made to the likenesse of God, and that he is a partaker of his diuine prouidence, and that the power of discerning all the three differences of time, (memorie for the passed, concciuing for the present, and imagination and vnderstanding for those that are to come.) And as there are men superior to others in remembring things past, and others in knowing the present, so there are also many, who partake a more naturall habilitie for imagining of what shall come to passe. One of the greatest arguments which forced *Cicero* to thinke, that the reasonable soule is vncorruptible, was to see the certaintie with which the diseased tell things to come, and especially when they are neere their end. But the difference which rests betweene a propheticall spirit and this naturall wit, is, that that which God speaks by the mouth of his prophets, is infallible, for it is the expresse word of God: but that which man prognosticateth by the power of his imagination holds no such certaintie.

Those who say, that the discouering of their vertues and vices by the frantike woman, to the persons who came to visit her, was a tricke of the diuels playing; let them know, that God bestowes on men a certaine supernaturall grace, to attaine and concciue which are the workes of God, and which of the diuell: the which saint *Paule* placeth amongst the diuine gifts, and cals it, The imparting of spirits. Whereby we may discerne whether it be the diuell or some good angell that intermedleth with vs. For many times the diuell sets to beguile vs vnder the cloke of a good angell, and we haue

need of this grace and ſupernaturall gift, to know him, and difference him from the good. From this gift they are fartheſt ſundered, who haue not a wit capable of naturall Philoſophie: for this ſcience, and that ſupernaturall infuſed by God, fall vnder one ſelfe abilitie, to weet, the vnderſtanding at leaſt; if it be true, that God in beſtowing his graces, doe applie himſelfe to the naturall good of euery one, as I haue afore rehearſed.

Iacob lying at the point of death, (at which time the reaſonable ſoule is moſt at libertie, to ſee what is to come) all his twelue children entred to viſit him, and he to each of them in particular, recited their vertues and vices, and propheſied what ſhould befall, as touching them and their poſteritie. Certaine it is, that he did all this inſpired by God, but if the diuine ſcripture, and our fayth, had not aſcertained vs hereof, how would theſe naturall Philoſophers haue known this to be the worke of God: and that the vertues and vices which the frantike woman told to ſuch as came to viſit her, were diſcouered by the power of the diuell, whilſt this caſe in part reſembles that of *Iacob*?

They reckon that the nature of the reaſonable ſoule, is far different from that of the diuell, and that the powers thereof (vnderſtanding, imagination, and memorie,) are of another very diuers kind, and herein they be deceiued. For if a reaſonable ſoule informe a well inſtrumentalized body (as was that of *Adam*) his knowledge comes little behind that of the ſubtilleſt diuell, and without the body he partakes as perfect qualities as the other. And if the diuels foreſee things to come, coniecturing and diſcourſing by certaine tokens, the ſame alſo may a reaſonable man do when he is about to be freed from his body, or when he is endowed with that difference

rence of temperature, which makes a man capable of this prouidence. For it is a matter as difficult for the vnderſtanding to conceiue how the diuell can know theſe hidden things, as to impute the ſame to the reaſonable ſoule. It will not fall in theſe mens heads, that in natural things there may be found out certaine ſigns, by means of which they may attaine to the knowledge of matters to come. And I affirme, there are certaine tokens to be found, which bring vs to the notiſe of things paſſed and preſent, and to forecaſt what is to follow, yea & to coniecture ſome ſecrets of the heauen, Therfore we ſee that his things inuiſible are vnderſtood by the creatures of the world, by means of the things which haue bene created. Whoſoeuer ſhall haue power to accompliſh this, ſhall attaine therevnto, and the other ſhall be ſuch as *Homer* ſpake of, The ignorant vnderſtandeth the things paſſed, but not the things to come. But the wiſe and diſcreet is the Ape of God, for he immitates him in many matters, and albeit he cannot accompliſh them with ſo great perfection, yet he carries ſome reſemblance vnto him, by following him.

CHAP. V.

It is prooued that from the three qualities, hot, moiſt, and drie, proceed all the differences of mens wits.

THe reaſonable ſoule making abode in the body, it is impoſſible that the ſame can performe contrary and different operations, if for each of them it vſe not a particular inſtrument. This is plainly ſeen in the power of the ſoule, which performeth diuers operations in the

outward ſences, for euery one hath his particular compoſition: the eyes haue one, the eares another, the ſmelling another, and the feeling another; and if it were not ſo, there ſhould be no more but one ſort of operations, and that ſhould all be ſeeing, taſting, or feeling, for the inſtrument determines & rules the power for one action, and for no more.

By this ſo plaine and manifeſt a matter, which paſſeth through the outward ſences, we may gather what that is in the inward. With this ſelfe power of the ſoule, we vnderſtand, imagine, and remember. But if it be true, that euery worke requires a particular inſtrument, it behoueth of neceſſitie, that within the braine there be one inſtrument for the vnderſtanding, one for the imagination, and another different from them for the memorie: for if all the braine were inſtrumentalized after one ſelfe manner, either the whole ſhould be memorie, or the whole vnderſtanding, or the whole imagination. But we ſee that theſe are very different operations, and therfore it is of force that there be alſo a varietie in the inſtruments. But if we open by skill, and make an anotomie of the braine, we ſhall find the whole compounded after one maner, of one kind of ſubſtance, and alike, without parts of other kinds, or a different ſort; onely there appeare foure little hollowneſſes, who (if we well marke them) haue all one ſelfe compoſition and figure, without any thing comming betweene which may breed a difference.

What the vſe and profit of theſe may be, and whereto they ſerue in the head, is not eaſily decideable: for *Galen* and the Anotomiſts, as well new as ancient, haue laboured to find out the truth, but none of them hath preciſely nor in particular, expreſſed whereto the right

ventricle

ventricle ſerueth, nor the left, nor that which is placed in the middeſt of theſe two, nor the fourth, whoſe ſeat in the braine keepes the hinder part of the head. They affirme, only (though with ſome doubt) that theſe foure concauities, are the ſhops where the vitall ſpirits are digeſted, and conuerted into animals, ſo to giue ſence and motion to all the parts of the body. In which operation, *Galen* ſayd once, that the middle ventricle was the principall, and in another place he vnſayes it againe, affirming that the hindermoſt is of greateſt efficacie and valure.

But this doctrine is not true, nor founded on good naturall Philoſophie, for in all mans body, there are not two ſo contrary operations, nor that ſo much hinder one another, as are diſcourſing, and digeſtion of nouriſhment: and the reaſon is, becauſe contemplation requireth quiet, reſt, and a cleereneſſe in the animall ſpirits; and digeſtion is performed with great ſtirring and trauaile, & from this action riſe vp many vapours, which trouble and darken the animall ſpirits, ſo as by means of them, the reaſonable ſoule cannot diſcerne the figures. And nature was not ſo vnaduiſed, as in one ſelfe place to conioine two actions which are performed with ſo great repugnancie. But *Plato* highly commends the wiſdome and knowledge of him who ſhaped vs, for that he ſeuered the liuer from the braine by ſo great a diſtance, to the end, that by the rumbling there made, whilſt the nouriſhments are mingled, and by the obſcureneſſe and darkeneſſe occaſioned through the vapours in the animall ſpirits, the reaſonable ſoule might not be troubled in his diſcourſes and conſiderations. But though *Plato* had not touched this point of Philoſophie, we ſee hourly by experience, that becauſe the liuer and the ſtomack

are so far from the brain, presently vpon meat, and some space thereafter, there is no man that can giue himselfe to studie.

The truth of this matter is, that the fourth ventricle hath the office of digesting and altering the vitall spirits, and to conuert them into animal, for that end which we haue before remembred. And therefore nature hath seuered the same by so great a distance from the other three, and made that braine sundred apart, and so far off (as appeareth) to the end, that by his operation, he hinder not the contemplation of the rest. The three ventricles placed in the forepart, I doubt not, but that nature made them to none other end than to discourse and philosophise. Which is apparantly prooued, for that in great studyings and contemplations, alwaies that part of the head finds it selfe agreeued, which answereth these three concauities. The force of this argument is to be knowne, by consideration, that when the other powers are wearie of performing their workes, the instruments are alwaies agreeued, whose seruice they vsed; as in our much looking, the eyes are pained; and with much going, the soules of the feet wax sore.

Now the difficultie consists, to know in which of these ventricles the vnderstanding is placed, in which the memorie, and in which the imagination, for they are so vnited and nere neighboured, that neither by the last argument, nor by any other notice, they can be distinguished or discerned. Then considering that the vnderstanding cannot worke without the memorie be present, representing vnto the same the figures and fantasies agreeable thereunto, it behoueth that the vnderstanding part busie it selfe in beholding the fantasmes, and that the memorie cannot do it, if the imagination do

Aristotle in his third booke of the soule.

not

not accompany the ſame (as we haue already heretofore declared) we ſhall eaſily vnderſtand, that all the powers are vnited in euery ſeuerall ventricle, and that the vnderſtanding is not ſolely in the one, nor the memory ſolely in the other, nor the imagination in the third, as the vulgar Philoſophers haue imagined, but that this vnion of powers is accuſtomably made in mans body, in as much as the one cannot worke without the aid of the other, as appeareth in the foure naturall abilities, digeſtiue, retentiue, attractiue, and expulſiue, where, becauſe each one ſtands in need of all the reſidue, nature diſpoſed to vnite them in one ſelfe place, and made them not diuided or ſundered.

But if this be true, then to what end made nature thoſe three ventricles, and ioyned together the three reaſonable powers in euery of them, ſeeing that one alone ſufficed to vnderſtand and to performe the actions of memorie? To this may be anſwered, that there riſeth a like difficultie, in skanning whence it commeth that nature made two eyes, and two eares, ſithens in each of them is placed the whole power of ſight and hearing, and we can ſee, hauing but one eye? Whereto may be ſayd, that the powers ordayned for the perfection of a creature, how much the greater number they carrie, ſo much the better aſſured is that their perfection, for vpon ſome occaſion, one or two may faile, and therefore it ſerues well to the purpoſe, that there remaine ſome others of the ſame kind, which may be applied to vſe.

In an infirmitie which the Phiſitions tearme Reſolution, or Palſie of the middle ſide, the operation is ordinarily loſt of that ventricle which is ſtrooken on that ſide, & if the other two remained not ſound, & without endammageance, a man ſhould thereby become witles,

and void of reaſon. And yet for all this, by wanting that onely ventricle, there is a great abatement diſcerned in his operations, as well in thoſe of the vnderſtanding, as of the imaginatiue, and memorie, as they ſhal alſo find in the loſſe of one ſight, who were woont to behold with two; whereby we cleerely comprize, that in euery ventricle are all the three powers, ſithens by the annoiance of any one, all the three are weakened. Seeing then al the three ventricles are of one ſelfe compoſition, and that there reſts not amongſt them any varietie of parts, we may not leaue to take the firſt qualities for an inſtrument, and to make ſo many generall differences of wits, as they are in number. For to thinke that the reaſonable ſoule being in the body, can worke without ſome bodily inſtrument to aſſiſt her, is againſt all naturall Philoſophie. But of the foure qualities, heat, cold, moiſture, and drouth: all Phiſitions leaue out cold, as vnprofitable to any operation of the reaſonable ſoule, wherethrough it is ſeene by experience in the other habilities, that if the ſame mount abouc heat, all the powers of man do badly performe their operations, neither can the ſtomacke digeſt his meat, nor the cods yeeld fruitfull ſeed, nor the muſcles mooue the body, nor the braine diſcourſe. For which cauſe, *Galen* ſayd, Coldneſſe is apparantly noyſome to all the offices of the ſoule; as if he ſhould ſay, Cold is the ruine of all the operations of the ſoule, only it ſerues in the body to temper the naturall heat, and to procure that it burne not ouer-much: and yet *Ariſtotle* is of a contrary opinion, where he affirmeth, it is a matter certaine, that that blood carrieth moſt forcible efficacie, which is thickeſt and hotteſt, but the coldeſt & thinneſt hath a more accompliſhed force to perceiue and vnderſtand; as if he would ſay, the thicke and hot blood

makes

makes great bodily forces, but the pure and cold is cauſe that man poſſeſſeth great vnderſtanding. Whereby we plainly ſee, that from coldneſſe ſpringeth the greateſt difference of wit that is in any man, namely in the vnderſtanding.

Ariſtotle moreouer mooues a doubt, and that is, why men who inhabit very hot countries (as *Ægypt*) are more wittie and aduiſed than thoſe who are borne in cold regions. Which doubt he reſolues in this manner: That the exceſſiue heat of the countrie fretteth and conſumeth the naturall heat of the braine, and ſo leaues it cold, whereby man growes to be full of reaſonableneſſe. And that contrariwiſe, the much cold of the aire, fortifieth the much naturall heat of the braine, and yeelds it not place to reſolue. For which cauſe (ſayth he) ſuch as are very hot brained, cannot diſcourſe nor philoſophiſe, but are giddie headed, and not ſetled in any one opinion. To which opinion it ſeemes that *Galen* leaneth, ſaying that the cauſe why a man is vnſtable, and changeth opinion at euery moment, is, for that he hath a hote braine: and contrariewiſe, his being ſtable and firme, ſprings from the coldneſſe of his braine. But the truth is, that from this heat there groweth not any difference of wit, neither did *Ariſtotle* meane that the cold blood, by his predominance, did better the vnderſtanding, but that which is leſſe hote. True it is, that mans variableneſſe ſprings from his partaking of much heat, which lifts vp the figures that are in the braine, and makes them to boile, by which operation, there are repreſented to the ſoule many images of things, which inuite him to their contemplation, and the ſoule to poſſeſſe them all, leaues one and takes another. Contrariwiſe it befals in coldneſſe, which for that it imprints inwardly theſe figures

gures,and ſuffers them not to riſe,makes a man firme in one opinion,and it prooues ſo,becauſe none other preſents it ſelfe to call the ſame away. Coldneſſe hath this qualitie,that it not only hindereth the motions of bodily things, but alſo makes that the figures and ſhapes which the Philoſophers call ſpirituall, be vnmooueable in the braine.And this firmneſſe ſeemeth rather a negligence, than a difference of habilitie. Alike true it is, that there is found another diuerſity of firmneſſe,which proceeds from poſſeſſing an vnderſtanding well compacted together,& not from the coldneſſe of the brain. So there remaine drouth,moiſture,and heat for the ſeruice of the reaſonable facultie. But no Philoſopher as yet wiſt to giue to euery difference of wit determinatly that which was his. *Heraclitus* ſayd, *A drie brightneſſe makes a moſt wiſe mind:* by which ſentence he giues vs to vnderſtand,that drineſſe is the cauſe why a man becoms very wiſe, but he declares not in what kinde of knowledge.

The ſelfe ſame meant *Plato*, when he ſayd, that the ſoule deſcended into the body endowed with great wiſdome,and through the much moiſture which it there found,grew to become dull & vntoward. But this wearing away in the courſe of age, and purchaſing drineſſe, the ſoule grew to diſcouer the knowledge which he tofore enioyed. Amongſt brute beaſts,ſayth *Ariſtotle*,thoſe are wiſeſt whoſe temperature is moſt enclined to cold and drie, as are the ants and bees, who for wiſedome, concurre with thoſe men that partake moſt of reaſon. Moreouer, no brute beaſt is found of more moiſture,or leſſe wit than a hog,wherethrough the Poet *Pindare*, to gibe at the people of *Beotia*, and to handle them as fooles,ſayd thus:

Horace, to ſay that Vliſſes became not a fool, figured him, that he was not turned into a hog.

Th'vntoward ſolke which now is nam'd
Beotia, were once cald Hogs.

Moreouer, blood through his much moiſture, ſayth *Galen*, makes men ſimple. And for ſuch, the ſame *Galen* recounts that the Commicks ieaſted at *Hippocrates* children, ſaying of them, That they had much naturall heat, which is a ſubſtance moiſt and very vaporous. This is ordinarily incident to the children of wiſe men, & hereafter I will make report of the cauſe whence it groweth. Amongſt the foure humours which we enioy, there is none ſo cold and drie as that of melancholie, and whatſoeuer notable men for learning, haue liued in the world (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) they were all melancholike. Finally, all agree in this point, that drineſſe makes a man very wiſe, but they expreſſe not to which of the reaſonable powers it affoordeth greateſt helpe; only *Eſay* the Prophet cals it by his right name, where he ſayth, *That trauaile giues vnderſtanding*: for ſadneſſe and affliction not only diminiſheth & cõſumeth the moiſture of the brain, but alſo drieth vp the bones, with which qualitie, the vnderſtanding groweth more ſharpe & ſightfull. Wherof we may gather an example very manifeſt by taking into conſideration many men, who caſt into pouertie and affliction, haue therethrough vttered and written ſentences woorth the maruelling at, and afterwards riſing to better fortune, to eat and drinke well, would neuer once open their mouths. For a delicious life, contentment, and good ſucceſſe, and to ſee that all thinges fall out after our liking, looſeneth and maketh the braine moiſt. And this is it which *Hippocrates* ſayd, *Mirth looſeneth the heart*, as if he would haue ſayd, That the ſame enlargeth and giueth it heat and groſeneſſe.

And the ſame may eaſily be prooued another way,

for

for if ſadneſſe and affliction drie vp and conſume the flesh, and for that reaſon, man gaineth more vnderſtanding, it fals out a matter certain, that his contrary, namely mirth, will make the braine moiſt, and diminiſh the vnderſtanding. Such as haue purchaſed this manner of wit, are ſuddenly enclined to paſtimes, to muſicke, and to pleaſant conuerſations, and flie the contrarie, which at other times gaue them a reliſh and contentment. Now by this, the vulgar ſort may conceiue whence it growes, that a wiſe and vertuous man attaining to ſome great dignitie (whereas at firſt he was but poore & baſe) ſodainly changeth his manners, and his faſhion of ſpeech: and the reaſon is, becauſe he hath gotten a new temperature, moiſt and full of vapours, whence it followes that the figures are cancelled which tofore he had in his braine, and his vnderſtanding dulled.

The hart of wiſe men is where there is ſadneſſe, and the hart of fooles where there is mirth.

From moiſture, it is hard to know what difference of wit may ſpring, ſithens it is ſo far contrary to the reaſonable facultie. At leaſt (after *Galens* opinion) all the humours of our body, which hold ouer-much moiſture, make a man blockiſh and fooliſh, for which cauſe he ſayd, The readineſſe of mind and wiſedome growes from the humour of choler: the humour of melancholy is author of firmneſſe and conſtancie; blood, of ſimplicitie and dulneſſe; the flegmaticke complexion auaileth nothing to the poliſhing of mannes. In ſo much that blood with his moiſtures, and the flegme, cauſe an impairing of the reaſonable facultie.

But this is vnderſtood of the faculties or reaſonable wits, which are diſcourſiue and actiue, and not of the paſſiue, as is the memorie, which depends as well on the moiſt, as the vnderſtanding doth on the drie. And we call memorie a reaſonable power, becauſe without it, the vnder-

vnderſtanding and the imaginatiue are of no valure. It miniſtreth matter and figures to them all, whereupon they may ſyllogiſe conformably to that which *Ariſtotle* ſayth, It behooues that the vnderſtander go beholding the fantaſmes; and the office of the memorie is, to preſerue theſe fantaſmes, to the end that the vnderſtanding may contemplat them, and if this be loſt, it is impoſſible that the powers can worke; and that the office of memorie is none other, than to preſerue the figures of things, without that it appertains therto to deuiſe them. *Galen* expreſſeth in theſe words, Memorie (verely) laies vp and preſerueth in it ſelfe, the things knowne by the ſence, and by the mind, & is therin as it were their ſtore-houſe and receiuing place, and not their inuenter. And if this be the vſe thereof, it fals out apparant, that the ſame dependeth on moiſture; for this makes the braine pliant, and the figure is imprinted by way of ſtrayning. To prooue this, we haue an euident argument in boyes age, in which any one ſhall better conne by hart, than in any other time of life, and then doth the braine partake greateſt moiſture. Whence *Ariſtotle* moueth this doubt, Why in old age we haue better wit, and in yoong age we learne more readily? as if he ſhould ſay, What is the cauſe, that when we are old we haue much vnderſtanding, and when we are yoong we learne with more towardlineſſe? Whereto he anſwereth, That the memorie of old men is full of ſo many figures of things which they haue ſeene and heard in the long courſe of their life, that when they would beſtow more therein, it is not capable thereof, for it hath no void place where to receiue it. But the memorie of yoong folke, when they are newly borne, is full of plaits, and for this cauſe they receiue readily whatſoeuer is told or taught them. And he

Wherethrough Cicero defining thenature of wit, placeth memorie in his definition a Docilitie & Memorie, which as it were by one name are tearmed wit.

makes

makes this playner, by comparing the memorie of the morning with that of the euening, ſaying, That in the morning we learne beſt, becauſe at that time our memorie is emptie, and at the euening illy, becauſe then it is full of thoſe thinges which we encountred during the day. To this Probleme *Ariſtotle* wiſt not how to anſwer, and the reaſon is very plaine, for if the ſpices and figures which are in the memorie, had a body and quantitie to occupie the place: it would ſeeme that this were a fitting anſwer; but being vndeuided and ſpiritual, they cannot fill nor emptie any place where they abide; yea we ſee by experience, that by how much more the memorie is exerciſed euery day receiuing new figures, ſo much the more capable it becommeth. The anſwere of this Probleme is very euident after my doctrine, and the ſame importeth, that old men partake much vnderſtanding, becauſe they haue great drineſſe, and fayle of memorie, for that they haue little moiſture, and by this means the ſubſtance of the braine hardneth, and ſo cannot receiue the impreſſion of the figures, as hard wax with difficultie admitteth the figure of the ſeale, and the ſoft with eaſineſſe. The contrary befals in children, who through the much moiſture wherewith the braine is endowed, faile in vnderſtanding, and through the great ſuppleneſſe of their braine, abound in memorie: wherein, by reaſon of the moiſture, the ſhapes and figures that come from without, make a great, eaſie, deepe, and well formed impreſſion.

That the memorie is better the morning than the euening, cannot be denied, but this ſpringeth not from the occaſion alleaged by *Ariſtotle*, but the ſleepe of the night paſſed hath made the braine moiſt, and fortifyed the ſame, and by the waking of the whole day, it is dried

and

and hardened. For which cauſe, *Hippocrates* affirmeth thoſe who haue great thirſt at night, ſhall doe well to drinke, for ſleepe makes the fleſh moiſt, and fortifieth all the powers which gouern man. And that ſleepe ſo doth, *Ariſtotle* himſelfe confeſſeth.

By this doctrine is perfectly ſeene that the vnderſtanding and memorie, are powers oppoſit and contrary, in ſort, that the man who hath a great memorie, ſhall find a defect in his vnderſtanding, and he who hath a great vnderſtanding cannot enioy a good memorie: for it is impoſſible that the braine ſhould of his owne nature, be at one ſelfe time drie and moiſt. On this maxime, *Ariſtotle* grounded himſelfe, to prooue, that memorie is a power different from remembrance, and he frames his argument in this manner: Thoſe who haue much remembrance, are men of great vnderſtanding, and thoſe who poſſeſſe a great memorie, find want of vnderſtanding; ſo then memorie and remembrance are contrary powers. The former propoſition, after my doctrine is falſe; for thoſe who haue much remembrance, are of little vnderſtanding, and haue great imaginations, as ſoone hereafter I will prooue: but the ſecond propoſition is verie true, albet *Ariſtotle* knew not the cauſe, wherон was founded the enmitie which the vnderſtanding hath with the memorie.

From heat, which is the third qualitie, groweth the imaginatiue, for there is no other reaſonable power in the braine, nor any other qualitie to which it may be aſſigned beſides that, the ſciences which appertaine to the imaginatiue, are thoſe, which ſuch vtter as dote in their ſickneſſe, and not of thoſe which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, or to the memorie. And frenzie, peeuiſhneſſe, and melancholy, being hot paſſions of the braine,

it

it yeelds a great argument, to prooue that imagination consists in heat. One thing breeds me a difficultie herein, and that is, that the imagination carrieth a contrarietie to the vnderstanding, as also to the memorie, and the reason hereof is not to be gotten by experience, for in the braine may very wel be vnited much heat and much drinesse; and so likewise, much heat and much moisture, to a large quantitie: and for this cause, a man may haue a great vnderstanding and a great imagination, & much memorie with much imagination: and verely, it is a miracle to find a man of great imagination, who hath a good vnderstanding, and a sound memorie. And the cause thereof behooues to be, for that the vnderstanding requires that the braine be made of parts very subtile and delicat, as we haue prooued heretofore out of *Galen*, and much heat frets and consumes what is delicat, and leaues behind the parts grosse and earthly. For the like reason, a good imagination cannot be vnited with much memorie; for excessiue heat resolueth the moisture of the braine, and leaueth it hard and drie, by means whereof it cannot easily receiue the figures. In sort that in man there are no more but three generall differences of wits, for there are no more but three qualities whence they may grow. But vnder these three vniuersall differences, there are contained many other particulars, by means of degrees of accesse which heat, moisture and drinesse may haue.

Any distemperature whatsoeuer, cannot any long time endure alone.

Notwithstanding there springs a difference in wits from euery degree of these three qualities, for the drie, the hot, and the moist, may exceed in so high a degree, that it may altogether disturbe the animal power, conformable to that sentence of *Galen*, Euery excessiue distemperature resolues the forces; and so it is. For albeit

drinesse

drineſſe giue helpe to the vnderſtanding, yet it may be that the ſame ſhal conſume his operations. Which *Galen* and the antient Philoſophers would not admit, but affirme, that if old mens brains grew not cold, they ſhould neuer decay, though they became drie in the fourth degree. But they haue no reaſon for this, as we will prooue in the imaginatiue: for albeit his operations be performed with heat, yet if it paſſe the third degree, foorthwith the ſame begins to reſolue, and the like doth the memorie through ouer-much moiſture.

How many differences of wits grow by means of the ſuperabounding of each of theſe three qualities, cannot for this preſent be particularly recited, except tofore we recount all the operations and actions of the vnderſtanding, the imagination, and the memorie. But the whileſt we are to know that the principall works of the vnderſtanding are three: the firſt, to diſcourſe; the ſecond, to diſtinguiſh; and the third, to chuſe. Hence comes it that they place alſo three differences in the vnderſtanding: into three other is the memorie deuided: one receiues with eaſe, and ſuddenly forgetteth; another is ſlow to receiue, but a long time retaineth; and the laſt receiueth with eaſe, and is very ſlow to forget.

The imagination containeth many more differences, for he hath three, no leſſe than the vnderſtanding and memorie, and from each degree ariſeth three other. Of theſe we will more diſtinctly diſcourſe hereafter, when we ſhall aſſigne to each, the ſcience which anſwereth it in particular.

But he that will conſider three other differences of wit, ſhall find that there are habilities in thoſe who ſtudie, ſome which haue a diſpoſition for the cleare and eaſie contemplations of the art which they learne, but if

you set them about matters obscure and very difficult, it will prooue a lost labour for the teacher to shape them a figure therof by fit examples, or that they frame themselues the like by their owne imagination, for they want the capacitie.

In this degree are all the bad scholers of whatsoeuer facultie, who being demaunded touching the easie points of their art, answer to the purpose, but comming to matters of more curiousnesse, they will tell you a hundred follies. Other wits aduaunce themselues one degree higher, for they are pliant and easie in learning things, and they can imprint in themselues all the rules and considerations of art, plaine, obscure, easie, and difficult; but as for doctrine, argument, doubting, answering, and distinguishing, they are all matters, wherewith they may in no wise be combred. These need to learne sciences at the hands of good teachers, well skilled in knowledge, and to haue plentie of bookes, and to studie them hard, for so much the lesse shall their knowledge be, as they forbeare to reade and take paines. Of these may be verefied that so famous sentence of *Aristotle*, Our vnderstanding is like a plaine table, wherin nothing is pourtraied. For whatsoeuer they are to know and attaine, it behooues that first they heare the same of some other, and are barren of all inuention themselues. In the third degree, nature maketh some wits so perfect, that they stand not in need of teachers to instruct them, nor to direct in what sort they are to philosophise, for out of one consideration, endicted to them by their schoolmaister, they will gather a hundred, and without that ought be bestowed vnto them, they fill their wit with science and knowledge. These wits beguiled *Plato*, and made him to say, That our knowledge is a certaine spice of

Of these differences of wits, Aristotle said in this manner: He verely is best, who vnderstandeth euery thing by himselfe: and he also is good, who obeith him that sayth well.

of remembrance, when he heard them speake and say that which neuer fell into consideration with other men.

To such, it is allowable that they write bookes, and to others not: for the order and concert which is to be held, to the end that sciences may dayly receiue increase and greater perfection, is to ioine the new inuention of our selues, who liue now, with that which the auntients left written in their bookes. For dealing after this manner, each in his time, shall adde an increase to the arts, and men who are yet vnborne, shall enioy the inuention and trauaile of such as liued before. As for such who want inuention, the common wealth should not consent that they make bookes, nor suffer them to be printed, because they do nought else saue heape vp matters alreadie deliuered, and sentences of graue authours, returning to repeat the selfe things, stealing one from hence, and taking another from thence; and there is no man, but after such a fashion may make a booke.

The inuention of arts, and the making of bookes (saith Galen) is performed with the vnderstãding and with the memorie, or with the imaginatiue: but he that writes for that he hath many things in his mind, cannot ad any new inuention.

Wits full of inuention, are by the *Tuscanes* called goatish, for the likenesse which they haue with a goate, in their demeanure and proceeding. These neuer take pleasure in the plains, but euer delight to walke alone thorow dangerous and high places, and to appproch neere steepe down-fals, for they will not follow any beaten path, nor go in companie. A propertie like this, is found in the reasonable soule when it possesseth a braine well instrumentalized and tempered, for it neuer resteth setled in any contemplation, but fareth forthwith vnquiet, seeking to know and vnderstand new matters. Of such a soule is verefied the saying of *Hippocrates*, The going of the soule is the thought of men. For there are some, who neuer passe out of one contemplation, and thinke

This difference of wits is very dangerous for Diuinitie, where the vnderstãding ought to abide bound to that which the Catholike church doth resolue.

not that the whole world can discouer another such. These haue the propertie of a beast, who neuer forsakes the beaten path, nor careth to walke through desert and vnhaunted places, but only in the high market way, and with a guide before him. Both these diuersities of wits, are ordinarie amongst professors of learning. Some others there are of high searching capacities, and estranged from the common course of opinions, they iudge and entreat of matters with a particular fashion, they are franke in deliuering their opinion, and tie not themselues to that of any other. Some sorts are close, moist, and very quiet, distrusting themselues, and relying vpon the iudgement of some graue man whom they follow, whose sayings and sentences, they repute as sciences and demonstrations, and al things contrarying the same they reckon vanitie and leasings.

This difference of wits serueth very well for Diuinitie, where it behoueth to ensue the diuine authoritie, declared by the holy Councels and sacred Doctors.

These two differences of wits are very profitable if they be vnited; for as amongst a great droue of cattell, the heardsmen accustome to mingle some dozen of goats to lead them and make them trot apace, to enioy new pastures, that they may not suffer scarcitie; so also it behoueth, that in humane learning, there be some goat-like wits, who may discouer to the cattell like vnderstandings, thorow secrets of nature, and deliuer vnto them contemplations not heard of, wherein they may exercise themselues, for after this manner, arts take increase, and men dayly know more and more.

CHAP. VI.

Certaine doubts and arguments are propounded against the doctrine of the last chapter, and their answer.

One

ONe of the cauſes for which the wiſdome of *Socrates* hath bene ſo famous till this day, is, for that after he was adiudged by the oracle of *Apollo*, to be the wiſeſt man of the world, he ſayd thus : *I know this only, that I know nothing at all:* which ſentence, al thoſe that haue ſeene and read, paſſed it ouer as ſpoken by *Socrates*, for that he was a man of great humbleneſſe, a deſpiſer of worldly things, and one to whome, in reſpect of diuine matters, all elſe ſeemed of no valure. But they verely are beguiled, for none of the antient Philoſophers poſſeſſed the vertue of humilitie, nor knew what thing it was, vntill God came into the world and taught the ſame.

The meaning of *Socrates* was, to giue to vnderſtand how little certaintie is contained in humane ſciences, and how vnſetled and fearfull the vnderſtanding of a Philoſopher is in that which he knoweth, ſeeing by experience, that all is full of doubts and arguments, and that we can yeeld aſſent to nothing, without fearing that it may be contrary. For it was ſaid, The thoughts of men are doubtfull, and our foreſeeings vncertaine. And he who will attaine the true knowledge of things, it behooues that he reſt ſetled and quiet without feare or doubt of being deceiued, and the Philoſopher who is not thus wiſe grounded, may with much truth affirme that he knoweth nothing.

This ſame conſideration had *Galen*, when he ſayd, Science is a conuenient and firme notice, which neuer departeth from reaſon; therefore thou ſhalt not find it amongſt the Philoſophers, eſpecially when they conſi-

der the nature of things: but verely much lesse in matters of Phisicke, nay rather (to speake all in one word) it neuer makes his full arriuall where men are.

Hereby it seemeth that the true notice of things fails to come this way, and to man arriueth only a certaine opinion, which makes him to walke vncertaine, and with feare whether the matter which he affirmeth be so or no. But that which *Galen* noteth more particularly, touching this, is, that Philosophie and Phisicke, are the most vncertaine of all those wherewith men are to deale. And if this be true, what shall we say touching the Philosophie wherof we now intreat, where with the vnderstanding, we make an anotomie of a matter so obscure and difficult, as are the powers and faculties of the reasonable soule? In which point are offered so many doubts and arguments, that there remains no cleare doctrine vpon which we may relie.

I One of which, and the principall, is, that we haue made the Vnderstanding an instrumentall power, as the Imagination, and the Memorie: and haue giuen drinesse to the braine, as an instrument with which it may worke; a thing far repugnant to the doctrine of *Aristotle* and all his followers, who placing the vnderstanding seuered from the bodily instrument, prooue easily the immortalitie of the reasonable soule, and that the same issuing out of the body, endureth for euer. Now the contrarie opinion being disputable, the way hereby is stopped vp, so that this cannot be prooued. Moreouer, the reasons on which *Aristotle* groundeth himselfe, to proue that the vnderstanding is not an instrumentall power, carrie such efficacie, as other than that cannot be concluded. For to this power appertaineth the knowing and vnderstanding the nature and being of whatsoeuer materiall

teriall things in the world, and if the ſame ſhould be conioined with any bodily thing, that ſelfe would hinder the knowledge of the reſidue: as we ſee in the outward ſences, that if the taſt be bitter, all the things which the tongue toucheth, partake the ſame ſauour; and if the chriſtalline humour be greene or yellow, all that the eye ſeeth, it iudgeth to be of the ſame colour. The reaſon of this is, for that the thing within breeds an impediment to that without.

Ariſtotle ſayth moreouer, That if the vnderſtanding were mingled with any bodily inſtrument, it would retaine ſome qualitie, for whatſoeuer vniteth it ſelfe with heat or cold, it is of force that it partake of the ſame qualitie. But to ſay that the vnderſtanding is hot, cold, moiſt, or drie, is to vtter a matter abhominable to the ears of all naturall Philoſophers.

The ſecond principall doubt is, that *Ariſtotle* and all the *Peripateticks*, bring in two other powers beſides the Vnderſtanding, the Imaginatiõ, & the Memorie: namely, Remembrance, and Common ſence, grounding vpon that rule, That the powers are knowne by way of the actions. They ſayd, That beſides the operations of the Vnderſtanding, the Imagination, & the Memorie, there are alſo two other different. So then the wit of man taketh his originall from fiue powers, and not from three only, as we did proue. 2

We ſayd alſo in the laſt chapter, after the opinion of *Galen*, that the memorie doth none other worke in the braine, ſaue only to preſerue the ſhapes and figures of things, in ſuch ſort as a cheſt preſerueth and keepeth apparell and what ſo elſe is put thereinto. And if by ſuch a compariſon, we are to vnderſtand the office of this power, it is requiſit alſo to prooue another reaſonable fa- 3

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cultie, which may fetch out the figures from the memorie, and represent them to the vnderstanding, euen as it is necessarie that there be one to open the chest, and to take out what hath bene layd vp therein.

4 Besides this, we sayd that the vnderstanding and the memorie are contrarie powers, and that the one chaceth away the other, for the one loueth great drinesse, and the other much moisture, and a suppleness of the braine. And if this be true, wherefore sayd *Aristotle* and *Plato*, That men who haue their flesh tender, enioy great vnderstanding, seeing this supplenes is an effect of moisture.

5 We sayd also, that for effecting that a memorie may be good, it was necessary the braine should be endowed with moisture, for the figures ought to be printed therein by way of compression, and the same being hard, they cannot so easily make a signe therein. True it is, that to receiue figures with readinesse, it requireth that the braine be pliant, but to preserue the shapes some long time, all affirme that it is necessarie the same be hard and drie, as it appeareth in outward things, where the figure printed in a pliant substance, is easily cancelled, but in the drie and hard, it neuer perisheth. Wherethrough we see many men who con by heart with great readinesse, but forget againe very speedily. Of which, *Galen* rendering a reason, sayth that such through much moisture, haue the substance of their braine tender and not setled, for the figure is soone cancelled, as if it were sealed in water. And contrariwise, other learne by heart with difficultie, but what they haue once learned, they neuer forget againe. Wherethrough it seemeth a matter impossible, that there should be that difference of memorie which we speake of, which should learne with ease,

and

and preſerue a long time.

It is alſo hard to vnderſtand how it is poſſible that ſo many figures being ſealed together in the braine, the one ſhould not cancell the other, for if in a peece of ſoftned wax, there be printed many ſeales of diuers figures, it fals out certaine, that ſome cancell other ſome, by the intermingling of theſe figures. 6

And that which breedeth no leſſe difficultie, is, to know whence it proceedeth, that the memorie by exerciſing it ſelfe, becommeth the more eaſie to receiue figures, it being certaine, that not only bodily exerciſe, but ſpirituall much more, drieth and ſoketh the fleſh. 7

It is alſo hard to conceiue, in what ſort the imagination is contrary to the vnderſtanding, if there be none other more vrgent cauſe, than to ſay, That exceſſiue heat reſolueth the ſubtile parts of the braine, leauing an earthly and groſſe remnant, ſeeing that Melancholy, is one of the groſſeſt and earthlieſt humours of our body. And *Ariſtotle* ſayth, That the vnderſtanding vſeth the ſeruice of none ſo much, as of that. And this difficultie is encreaſed, conſidering that melancholie is a groſſe humor, cold and drie; and choler is of a delicat ſubſtance, and of temperature hot and drie, and yet for all this, melancholy is more appropriat to the vnderſtanding than choler. Which ſeemeth repugnant to reaſon, for this humour aideth the vnderſtanding with two qualities, and gainſetteth it ſelfe only with one, which is heat. But melancholie aydeth it with his drineſſe, and with none other, and oppoſeth it ſelfe by his cold, and by his groſſe ſubſtance, which is a thing that the vnderſtanding moſt abhorreth. For which cauſe, *Galen* aſſigneth more wit and prudence to choler, than to melãcholy, ſaying thus; Readineſſe and Prudence, ſpring from the humour of 8

choler,

choler, and the melancholicke humour is author of integritie and conſtancie.

9 Laſtly, the cauſe may be demaunded, whence it may grow, that toiling, and continuall contemplation of ſtudie maketh many wiſe, in whome at the beginning, the good nature of theſe qualities, which we ſpeake of, was wanting: and ſo by giuing and receiuing with the imagination, they come to make themſelues capable of many verities, which tofore they knew not, nor had the temperature which thereto was requiſit. For if they had poſſeſſed the ſame, ſo much labour ſhould not haue ben needfull.

All theſe difficulties, and many other beſides, are contrarie to the doctrine of the laſt chapter. For natural Philoſophie hath not ſo certaine principles as the Mathematicall ſciences, wherein, the Phiſition and the Philopher (if he be alſo a Mathematician) may alwaies make demonſtration: but comming afterwards to the cure which is conformable to the art of Phiſicke, he ſhall commit therein many errours, and yet not alwaies thorow his own fault (ſithens in the Mathematicks he alwaies followed a certaintie) but through the little aſſurance of the art, for which cauſe, *Ariſtotle* ſaid, The Phiſition though he alwaies cure not, is not therefore a bad one, prouided that he foreſlow not to performe any of thoſe points which appertaine to the art. But if he ſhould commit any errour in the Mathematicks, he would be void of excuſe. For performing in this ſcience all the diligences which it requireth, it is impoſſible that the truth ſhould not appeare. In ſort, that albeit we yeeld not a manifeſt demonſtration of this doctrine, yet the whole fault is not to be layd on our want of capacitie, neither may it ſtraightwaies be recounted as falſe that

we

we deliuer.

To the first principal doubt, we answer, that if the vnderstanding were seuered frō the body, and had nought to do with heat, cold, moist, and drie, nor with the other bodily qualities, it would follow that al men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But we see by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another, then this groweth, for that the vnderstāding is an instrumentall power, and better disposed in one than in another, and not from any other occasion. For all reasonable soules and their vnderstandings (sundered from the body) are of equall perfection and knowledge. Those who follow *Aristotles* doctrine, seeing by experience, that some discourse better than othersome, haue found an excuse in apparence, saying; That the discoursing of one better than another, is not caused, for that the vnderstanding is an instrumentall power, & that the braine is better disposed in some than in othersome: but for that the vnderstanding (whilst the reasonable soule remaineth in the body) standeth in need of the fantasmes and figures which are in the imagination, and in the memorie. Through default whereof, the vnderstanding fals to discourse illy, and not through his own fault, nor for that it is ioyned with a matter badly instrumentalized. But this answer is contrary to the doctrine of *Aristotle* himselfe, who proueth, that by how much the memorie is the woorse, by so much the vnderstanding is the better; and by how much the memorie is bettered, by so much the vnderstanding is impaired; and the same we haue heretofore prooued as touching the imagination, in confirmation of that which *Aristotle* demaundeth, What the cause is, that we waxing old, haue

so

ſo bad a memorie,and ſo good an vnderſtanding : and when we are yoong,it fals out contrarie,that we poſſeſſe a great memorie and ſmall vnderſtanding. Hereof, in one thing we ſee the experience,and *Galen* noteth it,that when in a diſeaſe,the temperature and good diſpoſition of the braine is impaired,many times the operations of the vnderſtanding are thereby loſt,and yet thoſe of the memorie and the imagination remaine ſound , which could not come to paſſe, if the vnderſtanding enioyed not a particular inſtrument for it ſelfe beſides this which the other powers do partake.

To this I know not what may be yeelded in anſwer, vnleſſe it be by ſome metaphyſicall relation, compounded of action and power , which neither themſelues know what it meaneth, nor is there any other man that vnderſtands it . Nothing more endammageth mans knowledge than to confound the ſciences:and what belongs to the Metaphyſicks, to entreat thereof in naturall Philoſophie;and matters of naturall Philoſophie in the Metaphyſicks.

The reaſons wherevpon *Ariſtotle* grounded himſelfe are of ſmall moment ; for the conſequence followeth not,to ſay that the vnderſtanding, becauſe it muſt know materiall things,ſhould not therefore enioy a bodily inſtrument: for the bodily qualities which ſerue for the compoſition of the inſtrument, make no alteration of the power ; nor from them do the fantaſmes ariſe, euen as the ſenſible,placed aboue the ſence, cauſeth not the ſelfe ſence. This is plainly ſeene in touching, for notwithſtanding that the ſame is compounded of four materiall qualities: and that the ſame hath in it quantitie, and hardneſſe or ſoftneſſe ; for all this , the hand diſcerneth whether a thing be hot or cold, hard or ſoft, great

or

or little. And if you aske in what sort the naturall heat which is in the hand, hindereth not the touching that it may discerne the heat which is in the stoue; we answer, that the qualities which serue for the composition of the instrument, do not alter the instrument it selfe, neither from them do there issue any shapes whereby to know them. Euen as it appertaineth to the eye to know all figures and qualities of things, and yet we see that the eye it selfe hath his proper figure and quantitie, and of the humours and skins which go to his composition, some haue colours, and some are *diaphane* and trasparant, all which hindereth not; but that we with our sight may discerne the figures and quantities of all the things which shall appeare before vs: and the reason is, for that the humours, the skins, the figure, and the quantitie, serue for the composition of the eye, and such thinges cannot alter the sightfull power, and therefore trouble not nor hinder the knowledge of the outward figures. The like we affirme of the vnderstanding, that his proper instrument (though the same be materiall and ioyned with it) cannot enlarge it, for from it issue no vnderstandable shapes, which haue force to alter it: and the reason is, For that the vnderstandable placed aboue the vnderstanding, causeth not the vnderstanding; & so it remaineth at libertie to vnderstand all the outward materiall thinges, without that it encounter ought to hinder the same. The second reason wherein *Aristotle* grounded himselfe, is of lesse importance than the former, for neither the vnderstanding, nor any other accident, can be qualiti-like, for of themselues, they cannot be the subiect of any qualitie. For which cause, it litle skilleth that the vnderstanding possesse the braine for an instrument togither with the temperature of the 4. first qualities, that

therefore

therfore it may be called qualitie-like, inaſmuch as the braine and not the vnderſtanding, is the ſubiect of the heat, the cold, the moyſt, and the drie.

To the third difficulty which the *Peripateticks* alleage, ſaying, That by making the vnderſtanding an inſtrumẽtall power, we reaue one of thoſe principles, which ſerue to prooue the immortality of the reaſonable ſoule: we anſwere, That there are other argumentes of more ſoundneſſe, whereby to prooue the ſame, whereof wee will treat in the chapter following.

To the ſecond argument, we anſwere that not euery difference of operations argueth a diuerſitie of powers: for (as we will prooue heereafter) the imaginatiue performeth matter ſo ſtrange, that if this *maxime* were true in ſort as the vulgar Philoſophers had it, or admitting the interpretation which they giue it, there ſhould be in the braine, ten or twelue powers more. But becauſe all theſe operations, are to be marſhalled vnder one generall reaſon, they argue no more than one imaginatiue, which is afterwardes diuided into many particular differences, by the meanes of the ſundry operations which it performeth: the compoſing of the ſhapes, in the preſence or the abſence of the obiects, not onely argueth not a diuerſitie of the generall powers (as are the common ſenſe, and the imaginatiue) but euen not of the verie particulars.

To the third argument we anſwere, that the memory is nothing els but a tenderneſſe of the braine, diſpoſed with a certaine kinde of moiſture, to receiue and preſerue that, which the imaginatiue apprehendeth: with the like proportion, that white or blew paper holdes with him who writeth: for as the writer, writeth in the paper the things which he would not forget, and

after

after he hath writtten them, returnes to read them; euen ſo we ought to conceiue, that the imagination writeth in the memorie, the figures of the things knowen by the fiue ſenſes, and by the vnderſtanding, as alſo ſome others of his own framing: and when it will remember ought (ſaith *Ariſt.*) it returneth to behold & contemplat them. With this maner of compariſon *Plato* ſerued himſelfe, when he ſaid that fearing the weake memorie of old age, he haſtened to make another of paper (namely bookes) to the end his trauailes ought not to be loſt, but that hee might haue that which might repreſent them vnto him, when he liſt to read them. This ſelfe doth the imaginatiue, of writing in the memorie, and returning to read it when it would remember the ſame. The firſt who vttered this point was *Ariſtotle*, and the ſecond *Galen* who ſaid thus, Foraſmuch as that part of the ſoule, which imagineth, whatſoeuer the ſame be, ſeemeth to be the ſelfe that alſo remembreth. And ſo verily it ſeemeth to be, for the things which we imagine with long thinking, are well fixed in the memorie, and that which we handle with light conſideration, alſo ſoone we forget the ſame againe. And as the writer, when he writeth faire, the better aſſureth it to be read: ſo it befalles to the imaginatiue, that if it ſeale with force, the figure remaineth well imprinted in the braine: otherwiſe it can skarſly be diſcerned. The like alſo chanceth in old deedes, which being ſound in part, and in part periſhed by time, cannot well be read, vnleſſe we gather much by reaſon and coniecture. So doth the imaginatiue, when in the memorie, ſome figures remaine, and ſome are periſhed, where *Ariſtotles* errour had his originall, who for this cauſe conceiued that remembrance was a different power from the memorie. Moreouer, he affirmed, that

thoſe

thoſe wh o haue great remembrance, are likewiſe of great vnderſtanding, which is alſo falſe: for the imaginatiue, which is that that makes the remembrance, is contrarie to the vnderſtanding; in ſort, that to gather memory of things, and to remember them after they are knowne, is a worke of the imagination: as to write and returne to read it, is a worke of the Scriuener, and not of the paper. Whereby it falleth out that the memorie remayneth a power paſſiue, and not actiue: euen as the blew and the white of the paper, is none other than a commoditie whereby to write.

To the fourth doubt may be anſwered, That it maketh little to the purpoſe, as touching the wit, whether the fleſh be hard or tender, if the braine partake not alſo the ſame qualitie, the which we ſee many times hath a diſtinct temperature from al the other parts of the body. But when they concur in one ſelfe tenderneſſe, it is an euill token for the vnderſtanding, and no leſſe for the imagination. And if we conſider the fleſh of women and children, we ſhall find that in tenderneſſe it exceedeth that of men, and this notwithſtanding, commonly men haue a better wit than women: and the naturall reaſon heereof is, For that the humours, which make the fleſh tender, are fleagme and bloud, becauſe they are both moiſt (as we haue aboue ſpecified) and of them *Galen* ſaid, That they make men ſimple & dullards: and contrariwiſe, the humours which harden the fleſh, are choler and melancholie: and hence grow the prudence and ſapience which are found in man. In ſort, that it is rather an ill token, to haue the fleſh tender, than drie and hard. And ſo in men who haue an equall temperature throughout their whole bodie, it is an eaſie matter to gather the qualitie of their wit by the tenderneſſe or hard-

The ſmooth, white, and groſſe perſons, haue no melancholicke humour.

Amongſt brute beaſts, there is none which approcheth neerer to mans wiſdome than the Oliphãt, and there is none of a fleſh ſo rough and hard.

hardnes of their fleſh: For if it be hard & rough, it giueth token either of a good vnderſtanding or a good imagination; and if ſmooth and ſupple, of the contrary, namely of good memory, and ſmall vnderſtanding, and leſſe imagination: and to vnderſtand whether the brain haue correſpondence, it behoooueth to conſider the haire, which being big, blacke, rough, and thicke, yeeldeth token of a good imagination, or a good vnderſtanding: and if ſoft and ſmooth, they are a ſigne of much memorie and nothing els. But who ſo will diſtinguiſh and know, whether the ſame be vnderſtanding, or imagination (when the haire is of this ſort) it muſt be conſidered of what forme the childe is in the act of laughter: for this paſſion diſcouereth much, of what qualitie he is in the imagination.

What the reaſon and cauſe of laughter ſhould be, many Philoſophers haue laboured to conceiue, and none of them hath deliuered ought that may well be vnderſtood, but all agree that the bloud is an humour, which prouoketh a man to laugh, albeit none expreſſe with what qualitie this humour is indewed more than the reſt, why it ſhould make a man addicted to laughter. The follies which are committed with laughing, are leſſe dangerous: but thoſe which are done with labour are more perillous: as if he ſhould ſay, When the diſeaſed become giddie and doting do laugh, they reſt in more ſafetie, than if they were in toyle and anguiſh: for the former commeth of bloud, which is a moſt mild humour, and the ſecond of melancholie: but we grounding vpon the doctrine, whereof we intreat, ſhall eaſily vnderſtand all that, which in this caſe may be deſired to be knowen. The cauſe of laughter (in my iudgement) is nought els, but an approoouing, which is made by the

imagination, ſeeing or hearing ſomewhat done or ſaid, which accordeth very well: and this power remaineth in the braine, when any of theſe things giue it contentment, ſodainly it mooueth the ſame, and after it all the muſcles of the body, and ſo, manie times we do allow of wittie ſayings, by bowing downe of the head. When then the imagination is verie good, it contents not it ſelfe with euery ſpeech, but onely with thoſe which pleaſe verie well: and if they haue ſome litle correſpondence, and nothing els, the ſame receiueth thereby rather paine than gladneſſe: Hence it groweth that men of great imagination, laugh verie ſeldome, and the point moſt worthie of noting, is, that ieaſters, and naturall counterfeiters neuer laugh at their own meriments, nor at that which they heare others to vtter: for they haue an imagination ſo delicat, that not euen their own pleaſanteries, can yeeld that correſpondence which they require.

Heereto may be added, that merimentes (beſides that they muſt haue a good proportion, and be vttered to the purpoſe) muſt be new, and not tofore heard or ſeene. And this is the propertie not onely of the imagination, but alſo of all the other powers which gouerne man: for which cauſe we ſee, that the ſtomacke when it hath twiſe fed vpon one kinde of meate, ſtraightwaies loatheth the ſame: ſo doth the ſight one ſelfe ſhape and colour; the hearing one concordance, how good ſoeuer; and the vnderſtanding one ſelfe contemplation. Hence alſo it proceedeth, that the pleaſant conceited man, laugheth not at the ieaſtes which himſelfe vttereth: for before he ſend them forth from his lips, he knew what he would ſpeake: Whence I conclude, that thoſe who laugh much, are all defectiue in their imagi-

nation,

nation, where-through whatsoeuer merriment & pleasanterie, (how cold soeuer) with them carrieth a verie good correspondencie: And because the bloud partaketh much moisture (wherof we said before, that it breedeth dammage to the imagination:) those who are very sanguine, are also great laughers. Moisture holdeth this propertie, that because the same is tender and gentle, it abateth the force of heate, and makes that it burne not ouermuch. For which cause, it partakes better agreement with drinesse, because it sharpneth his operations. Besides this, where there is much moisture, it is a signe that the heat is remisse, seeing it cannot resolue nor consume the same: and the imagination cannot performe his operations with a heate so weake. Hence we gather also, that men of great vnderstanding, are much giuen to laughter, for that they haue defect of imagination, as we read of that great Philosopher *Democritus*, and many others whom my selfe haue seene and noted. Then by meanes of this laughter we shall know, if that which men or boyes haue of flesh hard and tough, and of haire blacke, thicke, hard, and rough, betoken either the imagination, or the vnderstanding. In sort, that *Aristotle* in this doctrine, was somwhat out of the way.

To the fifth argument we answer, that there are two kindes of moisture in the braine, one which groweth of the aire (when this element predominateth in the mixture) and another of the water, with which the other elements are amassed. If the braine be tender by the first moisture, the memory shall be verie good: easie to receiue, and mightie to reteine the figures for a long time. For the moisture of the aire, is verie supple and full of fatnesse, on which the shapes are tacked with sure holdfast, as we see in pictures, which are lymned in oyle,

who being ſet againſt the ſunne and the water, receiue thereby no dammage at all: and if we caſt oyle vpon any writing, it will neuer be wiped out, but marreth the ſame: and that which cannot be read, with oyle is made legible, by yeelding thereto a brightneſſe and tranſparence. But if the difference of the braine, ſpring from the ſecond kinde of moiſture, the argument frameth verie well: For if it receiue with facilitie, with the ſame readineſſe, it turneth again to cancell the figure, becauſe the moiſture of the water, hath no fatneſſe, wherein the figures may faſten themſelues. Theſe two moiſtures are knowen by the haire. For that which ſprings from the aire maketh them to prooue vnctious and ful of oyle and fat: and the water maketh them moyſt and verie ſupple.

To the ſixth argument may be anſwered, that the figures of things are not printed in the braine, as the figure of the ſeale is in waxe, but they pearce thereinto to remaine there affixed, in ſort as the ſparrowes are attached to birdlime, or the flies ſticke in honnie: For theſe figures are bodileſſe, and cannot be mingled nor corrupt one the other.

To the ſeuenth difficultie we anſwer, that the figures amaſſe and mollifie the ſubſtance of the braine, in ſuch ſort, as waxe groweth ſoft by plying the ſame betweene our fingers: beſides that the vitall ſpirites haue vertue to make tender and ſupple the hard and drie members, as the outward heate doth the yron. And that the vitall ſpirites aſcend to the braine, when any thing is learned by heart, we haue prooued heeretofore, And euery bodily and ſpirituall exerciſe, doth not drie: yea the Phiſitions affirme, th at the moderate fatteneth.

To the eighth argument we anſwer, that there are

two

two ſpices of melancholy: one naturall, which is the droſſe of the blood, whoſe temperature is cold and drie, accompanied with a ſubſtance very groſſe, this ſerues not of any value for the wit, but maketh men blockiſh, ſluggards, and grynnars, becauſe they want imagination. There is another ſort which is called *choler ad-uſt*, or *atra bile*, of which *Ariſtotle* ſayd, That it made men exceeding wiſe: whoſe temperature is diuers, as that of vinegre. Sometimes it performeth the effects of heat, lightning the earth; and ſometimes it cooleth, but alwaies it is drie and of a very delicat ſubſtance. *Cicero* confeſſeth that he was ſlow witted, becauſe he was not melancholike aduſt, and he ſayd true, for if he had bene ſuch, he ſhould not haue poſſeſſed ſo rare a gift of eloquence. For the melancholicke aduſt want memorie, to which appertaineth the ſpeaking with great preparation. It hath another qualitie which much aideth the vnderſtanding, namely, that it is cleere like the Agat ſtone, with which cleereneſſe it giueth light within to the braine, and maketh the ſame to diſcerne well the figures. And of this opinion was *Heraclitus* when he ſayd, *A drie cleereneſſe maketh a moſt wiſe mind*, with which cleereneſſe, naturall melancholy is not endowed, but his blacke is deadly: and that the reaſonable ſoule there within the braine, ſtandeth in need of light to diſcern the figures & the ſhapes, we will prooue hereafter.

To the ninth argument we anſwer, that the prudence and readineſſe of the mind which *Galen* ſpeaketh of, appertaineth to the imagination, whereby we know that which is to come, whence *Cicero* ſayd, Memorie is of things paſſed, and Prudence of thoſe to come. The readineſſe of the mind is that, which commonly they call a ſharpeneſſe in imagining, and by other names, craftines,

ſubtiltie, cauelling, wilineſſe: wherefore *Cicero* ſayd, Prudence is a ſubtiltie which with a certaine reaſon, can make choiſe of good things and of euill. This ſort of Prudence and readineſſe, men of great vnderſtanding do want, becauſe they lack imagination. For which reaſon we ſee by experience in great ſcholers in this ſort of learning, which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, that taking them from their bookes, they are not woorth a ruſh to yeeld or receiue in trafficke of worldly affaires. This ſpice of Prudence, *Galen* ſayd very well, that it came of choler, for *Hippocrates* recounting to *Damagetus* his friend, in what caſe he found *Democritus*, when he went to viſit him for curing him, writeth that he lay in the field, vnder a plane tree, bare legged, and without breeches, leaning againſt a ſtone with a booke in his hand, and compaſſed about with brute beaſts, dead and diſmembred. Whereat *Hippocrates* maruailing, asked him whereto thoſe beaſts of that faſhion ſerued, and he then anſwered, that he was about to ſearch what humour it was, which made a man to be headlong, craftie, readie, double, and cauillous, & had found (by making an anotomie of thoſe wild beaſts) that choler was the cauſe of ſo diſcommendable a propertie: and that to reuenge himſelfe of craftie perſons, he would handle them as he had done the fox, the ſerpent and the ape. This manner of Prudence is not only odious to men, but alſo S. *Paule* ſayth of it, The wiſedome of the fleſh is enemie to God. The cauſe is aſſigned by *Plato*, who affirmeth that knowledge which is remooued from iuſtice, ought rather to be tearmed ſubtiltie than prudence, as if he ſhould haue ſayd: It is no reaſon that a knowledge which is ſeuered from iuſtice, ſhould be called wiſedome, but rather craft, or maliciouſneſſe. Of this, the diuell euermore ſerueth himſelfe

Note that men of great vnderſtanding, take no care for attiring their bodie, but are ordinarily ill apparelled & ſlouenly, and hereof we yeeld the reaſon in the 8. cha. and 14.

himſelfe to do men dammage, and S. *Iames* ſaid, that this wiſedome came not from heauen, but is earthly, beaſtly, and diueliſh.

There is found another ſpice of wiſedome, conioyned with reaſon and ſimplicitie, and by this, men know the good and ſhun the euill: the which, *Galen* affirmeth doth appertaine to the vnderſtanding, for this power is not capable of maliciouſneſſe, doubleneſſe, nor ſubtilty, nor hath the skill how to do naught, but is wholly vpright, iuſt, gentle, and plaine. A man endowed with this ſort of wit, is called vpright and ſimple, wherethrough when *Demoſthenes* went about to creepe into the good liking of the iudges in an oration which he made againſt *Eſchines*, he tearmed them vpright and ſimple, in reſpect of the ſimplicitie of their dutie: concerning which, *Cicero* ſayth, Dutie is ſimple, and the only cauſe of all good things. For this ſort of wiſedome, the cold and drie of melancholic is a ſeruing inſtrument, but it behooueth that the ſame be compoſed of parts very ſubtile and delicat.

To the laſt doubt may be anſwered, that when a man ſetteth himſelfe to contemplat ſome truth, which he would faine know, and cannot by and by find it out, the ſame groweth for that the braine wanteth his conuenient temperature; but when a man ſtandeth rauiſhed in a contemplation, the naturall heat that is in the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall blood, run foorthwith to the head, and the temperature of the braine enhaunceth it ſelfe, vntill the ſame arriue to the tearme behooffull. True it is, that much muſing, to ſome dooth good, and to ſome harme: for if the brain want but a little to arriue to that point of conuenient heat, it is requiſit that he make but ſmall ſtay in the contemplation, and if it paſſe that point

ſtraightwaies the vnderſtanding is driuen into a garboile, by the ouer plentifull preſence of the vitall ſpirits, and ſo he cannot attaine to the notice of the trueth. For which cauſe, we ſee many men, who vpon the ſodaine ſpeake verie well: but with aduiſement are nothing worth. Others haue their vnderſtanding ſo baſe, either through too much coldnes, or too much drouth, that it is requiſite the naturall heate abide along time in the head, to the end the temperature may lift it ſelfe vp to the degrees which are wanting, where-through they ſpeake better vpon deliberation then on the ſodaine.

CHAP. VII.

It is ſhewed, that though the reaſonable ſoule haue need of the temperature of the foure firſt qualities, aſwell for his abiding in the bodie, as alſo to diſcourſe and ſyllogize, Yet for all this, it followeth not, that the ſame is corruptible and mortall.

PLato held it for a matter verie certaine, that the reaſonable ſoule is a ſubſtance bodileſſe, and ſpirituall: not ſubiect to corruption or mortalitie, as that of brute beaſts: the which departing from the bodie, poſſeſſeth another better and more quiet life. But this is to be vnderſtood (ſaith *Plato*) if a man haue led his life conformable to reaſon, for otherwiſe, it were better that the ſoule had remained ſtill in the body, there to ſuffer the tormentes, with which God chaſtiſeth the wicked. This concluſion is ſo notable and catholicke, that if he attained

ned the knowledge thereof by the happineſſe of his wit, with a iuſt title he came to be called the diuine *Plato*. But albeit the ſame is ſuch as we ſee, yet for all this, *Galen* could neuer bring within his conceit, that it was true, but held it alwaies doubtfull, ſeeing a wiſe man through the heat of his braine, to dote, and by applying cold medicines vnto him, he commeth to his wits againe. In reſpect whereof, he ſayd he could wiſh that *Plato* were now liuing, to the end he might aske him how it was poſſible that the reaſonable ſoule ſhould be immortall, ſeeing it altered ſo eaſily with heat, with cold, with moiſture, & with drouth: & principally, conſidering that the ſame departs from the body through ouermuch heat, or when a man giueth ouer himſelfe exceſſiuely to laſciuiouſneſſe, or is forced to drinke poiſon, and ſuch other bodily alterations, which accuſtomably bereaue the life. For if it were bodileſſe and ſpirituall (as *Plato* affirmeth) heat, being a materiall qualitie, could not make the ſame to leeſe his powers, nor ſet his operations in a garboile.

Theſe reaſons, brought *Galen* into a confuſion, and made him wiſh that ſome *Platoniſt* would reſolue him theſe doubts, and I beleeue, that in his life time he met not with any, but after his death experience ſhewed him that which his vnderſtanding could not conceiue. For it is a thing certaine, that the infallible certayntie of our immortall ſoule, is not gathered from humane reaſons, or from arguments which prooue that it is corruptible, for to the one and the other, an anſwer may eaſily be ſhaped, it is only our fayth which maketh vs certaine and aſſured, that the ſame endureth for euer. But *Galen* had ſmall reaſon, to intricate himſelfe in arguments of ſo ſlight

Galen dying, went to hell, and ſaw by experiẽce that materiall fire burned the ſoules, and could not conſume thẽ: this Phyſition had knowledge of that Euangelicall doctrine, and could not receiue it.

conſequence

conſequence, for the workes which ſeeme to be performed by meanes of ſome inſtrument, it cannot well be gathered in naturall Philoſophie, that it proceedeth from a defect in the principal agent, if they take not perfection. That painter who portraieth well when he hath a penſill requiſit for his art, falleth not in blame, if with a bad penſill he draw ill fauoured ſhapes, and of bad delineation: and it is no good argument to ſay, that the writer had an imperfection in his hand, when through default of a well made penne, he is forced to write with a ſticke. *Galen* conſidering the maruellous works which are in the vniuerſe, and the wiſedome and prouidence by which they were made and ordained, concluded thereof, that in the world there was a God, though we behold him not with our corporall eyes, of whome hee vttered theſe words; God was not made at any time, in as much as he is euerlaſtingly vnbegotten. And in another place he ſayth, That the frame and compoſition of mans body was not made by the reaſonable ſoule, nor by the naturall heat, but by God, or by ſome very wiſe vnderſtanding.

Out of which there may be framed an argument againſt *Galen*, and his falſe conſequence be ouerthrowne, and it is thus: Thou haſt ſuſpected that the reaſonable ſoule is corruptible, becauſe if the braine be well tempered, it fitteth well to diſcourſe and philoſophiſe, and if the ſame grow hot or cold beyond due, it doteth, and vttereth a thouſand follies; the ſame may be inferred, conſidering the workes which thou ſpeakeſt of, as touching God: for if he make a man in places temperat (where the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie) he produceth him very wittie and diſcreet, and if the countrie be vntemperat, he breedeth thē all fooles

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and doltiſh. For the ſame *Galen* affirmeth that it is a miracle to find a wiſe man in *Scythia*, and in *Athens* they are all borne Philoſophers. To ſuſpect then that God is corruptible, becauſe with one qualitie he performeth theſe workes well, and with the contrary they proue ill, *Galen* himſelfe would not confeſſe, for as much as he ſayd before, that God was euerlaſting.

Plato held another way of more certainty, ſaying, That albeit God be euerlaſting, almightie, and of infinite wiſdome: yet he proceedeth in his workes as a naturall agent, & makes himſelfe ſubiect to the diſpoſition of the foure firſt qualities: in ſort, that to beget a man verie wiſe, and like to himſelfe, it behooueth that he prouide a place the moſt temperate of the whole world, where the heate of the aire may not exceed the cold, nor the moyſt the drie, and therefore he ſaid, But God as deſirous of warre, and of wiſedome, hauing choſen a place which ſhould produce men like vnto himſelfe, would that the ſame ſhould be firſt inhabited: And though God would ſhape a man of great wiſedome in *Scithia*, or in any other intemperate countrey, and did not herein imploy his omnipotencie, he ſhould of neceſſitie yet prooue a foole, through the contrarietie of the firſt qualities. But *Plato* would not haue inferred (as *Galen* did) that God was alterable and corruptible: for that the heate and coldneſſe would haue brought an impediment to his worke. The ſame may be collected, when a reaſonable ſoule, for that it is ſeated in a braine inflamed, cannot vſe his diſcretion and wiſdome, and not to thinke that in reſpect thereof, the ſame is ſubiect to mortalitie and corruption. The departure out of the bodie, and the not being able to ſupport the great heate, nor the other alterations which are woont to kil men, ſhew-

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eth plainly that the ſame is an act and ſubſtantiall form of mans bodie, and that to abide therein, it requireth certain materiall diſpoſitions, fitted to the being, which it hath of the ſoule, and that the inſtruments with which it muſt worke, be wel compoſed, and well vnited, and of that temperature, which is requiſite for his operations, all which failing, it behooueth of force, that it erre in them, and depart from the bodie.

The error of *Galen* conſiſted, in that he would verifie by the principles of naturall Philoſophie, whether the reaſonable ſoule, iſſuing out of the bodie, do forthwith die or not: this being a queſtion, which appertaineth to another ſuperiour ſcience, and of more certaine principles, in which we will prooue, that it is no good argument nor concludeth well, that the ſoule of man is corruptible, becauſe the ſame dwelleth quietly in a bodie endowed with theſe qualities, and departeth when they do fayle. Neither is this difficult to be prooued: for other ſpirituall ſubſtances, of greater perfection than the reaſonable ſoule do make choice of place, altered with materiall qualities, in which it ſeemeth, they take abode with their content: and if there ſucceed any contrarie diſpoſitions, forthwith they depart, becauſe they cannot endure it: for it is a thing certaine, that there are to be found ſome diſpoſitions in a mans bodie, which the diuell coueteth with ſo great egerneſſe, as to enioy thē, he entereth into the man where they reſted, wherethrough he becommeth poſſeſſed: but the ſame being corrupted and chaunged by contrarie medicines, and an alteration being wrought in theſe blacke, filthy, and ſtincking humours, he naturally comes to depart. This is plainly diſcerned by experience: for if there be in a houſe, great, darke, foule, putrified, melancholicke, and

void

void of dwellers to make abode therin, the diuels ſoone take it vp for their lodging : but if the ſame be clenſed, the windowes opened, and the ſunne-beames admitted to enter, by and by they get them packing, and ſpecially if it be inhabited by much companie, and that there be meetings and paſtimes, and playing on muſicall inſtrumentes : how greatly harmonie and good proportion offendeth the diuell, is apparantly ſeene by the authoritie of the diuine ſcripture, where we finde recounted, that *Dauid* taking a Harpe, and playing thereupon, ſtraightwaies made the diuels runne away, and depart out of *Saul* his body, And albeit this matter haue his ſpirituall vnderſtanding : yet I conceiue thereby, that muſicke naturally moleſteth the diuell, where-through he cannot in any ſort endure it. The people of *Iſrael* knew before by experience, that the diuell was enemie to muſicke : and becauſe they had notice heereof. *Saules* ſeruants ſpake theſe wordes : Behold, the euill ſpirit of the Lord tormenteth thee : let my Lord the king therefore command, that thy ſeruants, who wait in thy preſence, ſearch out a man who can play on the citherne, to the end, that when the euill ſpirite of the Lord taketh thee, he may play with his hand, and thou thereby mayſt receiue eaſe. In the ſelfe maner, as there are found out wordes and coniurations, which make the diuell to tremble; and not to heare them : he abandoneth the place which he choſe for his habitation. So *Ioſeph* recounteth that *Salomon* left in writing, certaine maners of coniuration, by which he not onely chaſed away the diuell for the preſent, but he neuer had the hardineſſe to returne againe to that body, from whence he was once ſo expelled, The ſame *Salomon* ſhewed alſo a roote of ſo abhominable ſauour in the diuels noſe,

that

that if it were applied to the nosthrils of the possessed, he would forthwith shake his eares and runne away. The diuell is so slouinly, so malancholike, and so much an enemie to things neat, cheerefull, and cleere, that when *Christ* entered into the region of *Genezaret*, *S. Mathew* recounteth, how certaine diuels met him in dead carcases, which they had caught out of their graues, crying, and saying, *Iesu* thou sonne of *Dauid*, what hast thou to do with vs, that thou art come before hand to torment vs? we pray thee that if thou be to driue vs out of this place where we are, thou wilt yet let vs enter into that Heard of swine which is yonder. For which reason, the holy Scripture tearmeth them vncleane spirites: Whence we plainly discerne, that not onely the reasonable soule, requireth such dispositions in the body, that they may informe it, and be the beginning of all his operations, but also hath need to soiourne therein, as in a place befitting his nature.

The diuels then (being a substance of more perfection) abhorre some bodily qualities, and in the contrarie take pleasure and contentment. In sort, that this of *Galen* is no good argument, The reasonable soule through excesse of heate departs from the body, *ergo* it is corruptible, inasmuch as the diuel doth the like (as we haue said) and yet for all this is not mortall.

But that which to this purpose deserueth most note, is, that the diuell not onely coueteth places alterable with bodily qualities, to soiourne there at his pleasure: but also when he will worke any thing, which much importeth him, he serues himselfe with such bodily qualities, as are aidable to that effect. For if I should demand now, wherein the diuell grounded himselfe, when minding to beguile *Eue*, he entered rather into a venemous

serpent,

ſerpent, than into a horſe, a beare, a woolfe, or any other beaſt, which were not of ſo ghaſtly ſhape? I wot not what might be giuen in anſwere: well I know that *Galen* admitteth not the ſentences of *Moſes*, nor of Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe (ſaith he) they both ſpeake without making demonſtration: but I haue alwaies deſired to learne from ſome Catholike, the ſolution of this doubt, and none hath yet ſatisfied me.

This is certaine (as alreadie we haue prooued) that burnt and inflamed choler, is an humour which teacheth the reaſonable ſoule in what ſort to practiſe treaſons and trecheries; and amongſt brute beaſts, there is none which ſo much partaketh of this humour as the ſerpent, wherethrough more than all the reſt (ſayth the ſcripture) he is crafty and guilefull. The reaſonable ſoule although it be the meaneſt of all the intelligences, partakes yet the ſame nature with the diuell and the angels. And in like manner: as there it takes the ſeruice of venemous choler, to make a man wily and ſuttle: ſo the diuell (being entered into the body of this cruell beaſt) made himſelfe the more cunning and deceitfull. This manner of Philoſophiſing will not ſticke much in the naturall Philoſophers ſtomacks, becauſe the ſame carrieth ſome apparance that it may be ſo: but that which will breed them more aſtoniſhment, is, that when God would draw the world out of errour, and eaſily teach them the truth (a worke contrary to that which the diuell went about) he came in the ſhape of a doue, and not of an eagle, nor a peacocke, nor of any other birds of fairer figure: and the cauſe knowne, is this, that the doue partaketh much of the humour which enclineth to vprightneſſe, to plainneſſe, to truth, and to ſimplicitie, and wanteth choler, the inſtrument of guile & malicioufnes.

But the ſerpent was the wilieſt beaſt of the earth, amongſt all thoſe whome God hath made.

None

None of these things are admitted by *Galen*, nor by the naturall Philosophers: for they cannot conceiue, how the reasonable soule, and the diuell (being spirituall substances) can be altered by materiall qualities, as are heat, coldnesse, moisture, and drouth. For if fire bring in heate to the wood, it is because they both possesse a body, & a quantitie, wherof they are the subiect: the which faileth in spirituall substances, and admit (as a thing yet impossible) that bodily qualities, might alter a spirituall substance, what eies hath the diuell, or the reasonable soule, wherwith to see the colours and shapes of things? or what smelling, to receiue sauours, or what hearing for musicke? or what feeling, to rest offended with much heat, seeing that for all these, bodily instruments are behooffull. And if the reasonable soule, being seuered from the bodie, remaine agreeued, and receiue anguish and sadnesse, it is not possible that his nature should rest free from alteration, or not come to corruption. These difficulties and argumentes, perplexed *Galen* and the other Philosophers of our times, but with me they conclude nothing. For when *Aristotle* affirmed, that the chiefest propertie which substance had, was to be subiect to accidents: he restrained the same, neither to bodily nor to spirituall: for the propertie of the generall is equally partaked by the special, and so he said, that the accidentes of the bodie passe to the substance of the reasonable soule, and those of the soule, to the body: on which principle he grounded himselfe, to write all that which he vttered as touching *Phisnomy*, especially, that the accidents by which the powers receiue alteration, are all spirituall, without body, and without quantitie, or matter: and so they grow to multiplie in a moment, through their mean, and passe through a glasse window, with-

without breaking the ſame, And two contrarie accidents, may be extended in one ſelfe ſubiect, aſmuch as poſſibly they can be. In reſpect of which ſelfe qualitie, *Galen* tcarmeth them vndiuidable, and the vulgar Philoſophers intentionall: and the matter being in this ſort, they may be verie well proportioned with the ſpirituall ſubſtance.

I cannot forgoe to thinke that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the body, as alſo the diuell, hath a power ſightfull, ſmelling, hearing, and feeling. The which (me ſeemeth) is eaſie to be prooued: For if it be true, that their powers be known by meanes of their actions, it is a thing certain, that the diuell had a ſmelling power, when he ſmelled that roote, which *Salomon* commaunded, ſhould be applied to the noſthrils of the poſſeſſed, And likewiſe that he had a hearing power, ſeeing he heard the muſicke which *Dauid* made to *Saul*. To ſay then, that the diuell receiued theſe qualities by his vnderſtanding, it is a matter not auouchable, in the doctrine of the vulgar Philoſophers: For this power is ſpiritual, and the obiects of the fiue ſenſes are material: and ſo it behooueth, to ſeeke out ſome other powers in the reaſonable ſoule, and in the diuell, to which they may carrie proportion. And if not, put caſe that the ſoule of the rich *Glutton*, had obtained at the handes of *Abraham*, that the ſoule of *Lazarus* ſhould returne to the world, to preach to his brethren, and perſuade them that they ſhould become honeſt men, to the end they might not paſſe to that place of torments, where himſelfe abode. I demand now, in what maner the ſoule of *Lazarus* ſhould haue knowen to go to the citie, and to thoſe mens houſes, and if the ſame had met them by the way, in company with others, whether it could haue

known them by ſight, and been able to diuerſifie them, from thoſe who came with them? and if thoſe brethren of the rich glutton, had inquired of the ſame who it was, and who had ſent it: whether the ſame did partake anie power to heare their words? The ſame may be demãded of the diuel when he folowed after *Chriſt* our redeemer, hearing him to preach, & ſeeing the myracles which he did, and in that diſputation which they had togither in the wilderneſſe, with what eares the diuell receiued the words, and the anſweres which *Chriſt* gaue vnto him.

Verily, it betokens a want of vnderſtanding, to think that the diuell, or the reaſonable ſoule (ſundered from the bodie) cannot know the obiects of the fiue ſenſes, albeit they want the bodily inſtruments. For by the ſame reaſon, I will prooue vnto them, that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the bodie, cannot vnderſtand, imagine, nor performe the actions of memorie. For if whileſt the ſame abideth in the body, it cannot ſee being depriued of eies: neither can it diſcourſe or remember, if the braine be inflamed. To ſay then, that the reaſonable ſoule, ſeuered from the body, cannot diſcourſe, becauſe it hath no braine, is a follie verie great, the which is proued by the ſelfe hiſtory of *Abraham*. Sonne remember, that thou haſt enioyed good things in thy life time, and *Lazarus* likewiſe euill, but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented. And beſides all this, there is placed betwixt you and vs, a great *Chaos*, in ſort that thoſe who would paſſe from hence to you, cannot, nor from you to vs. And he ſaid, I pray thee then O father, that thou wilt ſend to my fathers houſe, for I haue fiue brothers, that he may yeeld teſtimony vnto them, ſo as they come not alſo to this place of tormentes.

Whence

Whence I conclude, that as theſe two ſoules diſcourſed betweene themſelues, and the rich glutton remembred, that he had fiue brothers in his fathers houſe, and *Abraham* brought to his remembrance, the delicious life which he had liued in the world, togither with *Lazarus* penance, and this without vſe of the braine: ſo alſo the ſoules can ſee without bodily eyes, heare without eares, taſte without a tongue, ſmell without noſthrils, and touch without ſinewes and without fleſh, and that much better beyond compariſon. The like may be vnderſtoode of the diuell, for he partaketh the ſame nature with the reaſonable ſoule.

All theſe doubts, the ſoule of the rich glutton will very well reſolue: of whom *S. Luke* recounteth, that being in hell, he lifted vp his eies, and beheld *Lazarus*, who was in *Abrahams* boſome, and with a loud voice ſayd: Father *Abraham*, haue mercie on me, ſend *Lazarus*, that he may dip the point of his finger in water, and coole my tongue, for I am tormented in this flame. Out of the paſſed doctrine, and out of that which is there red, we gather, that the fire of hell burneth the ſoules, and is materiall as this of ours, and that the ſame annoied the rich glutton and the other ſoules (by Gods ordinance) with his heat, and that if *Lazarus* had carried to him a pitcher of freſh water, he ſhould haue taken great refreſhment thereof: and the reaſon is verie plaine, for if that ſoule could not endure to abide in the bodie, through exceſſiue heate of the Feuer, and when the ſame dranke freſh water, the ſoule felt refreſhment, why may not we conceiue the like, when the ſoule is vnited with the flames of the fire infernall? The rich Gluttons lifting vp of his eies, his thirſtie tongue, & *Lazarus* finger, are all names of the powers of the ſoule, that ſo the ſcriptures might

expreſſe them. Thoſe who walke not in this path, and ground not themſelues on naturall philoſophie, vtter a thouſand follies: but yet hence it cannot be concluded, that if the reaſonable ſoule partake griefe and ſorrow (for that his nature is altered by contrarie qualities) therefore the ſame is corruptible, or mortall: For aſhes, though they be compounded of the foure elementes, and of action and power: yet there is no naturall agent in the world, which can corrupt thē, or take from them, the qualities that are agreeable to their nature. The naturall temperature of aſhes, we all know to be cold and drie, but though we caſt them neuer ſo much into the fire, they will not leeſe their radicall coldneſſe which they enioy: and albeit they remaine 100000. yeeres in the water, it is impoſſible that (being taken thence) they hold any naturall moiſture of their owne: and yet for all this, we cannot but grant that by fire they receiue heat, and by water moiſture. But theſe two qualities are ſuperficial in the aſhes, and endure a ſmall time in the ſubiect; for taken from the fire, forthwith they become cold, and from the water, they abide not moyſt an houre.

But there is offered a doubt, in this diſcourſe and reaſoning of the rich Glutton with *Abraham*, and that is, How the ſoule of *Abraham* was indowed with better reaſon, than that of the rich man: it being alleaged before, that all reaſonable ſoules (iſſued out of the bodie) are of equall perfection and knowledge? whereto we may anſwere in one of theſe two manners. The firſt is, that the Science and knowledge, which the ſoule purchaſeth, whileſt it remaineth in the bodie, is not loſt when a man dieth, but rather groweth more perfect, for he is freed from ſome errors. The ſoule of *Abraham*, departed out of this life, repleniſhed with wiſedome, and

with

with many reuelations, and ſecrets which God communicated vnto him, as his very friend: but that of the rich glutton, it behooued that of neceſſitie it ſhould depart away ignorant: firſt, by reaſon of his ſinne, which createth ignorance in a man: and next, for that riches heerein worke a contrarie effect vnto pouertie: this giueth a man wit, as heereafter we may well prooue, and proſperitie reaueth it away. There may alſo another anſwere be giuen after our doctrine, and it is this, that the matter of which theſe two ſoules diſputed, was ſchoole diuinitie: For to know whether abiding in hell, there were place for mercie, and whether *Lazarus* might paſſe vnto hell, and whether it were conuenient to ſend a deceaſed perſon to the world, who ſhould giue notice to the liuing, of the torments which the damned there indured; are all ſchoole-points, whoſe deciſion appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, as heereafter I will make proofe, and amongſt the firſt qualities, there is none which ſo much garboileth this power, as exceſſiue heat, with which the rich Glutton was ſo tormented: But the ſoule of *Abraham*, made his abode in a place moſt temperate, where it inioyed great delight and refreſhment: and therefore it bred no great woonder, that the ſame was better able to diſpute. I concluding then that the reaſonable ſoule, and the diuell, in their operations, vſe the ſeruice of materiall qualities, and that by ſome they reſt agreeued, and by other ſome they receiue contentment. And for this reaſon, they couet to make abode in ſome places, and flie from ſome other, and yet notwithſtanding are not corruptible.

CHAP. VIII.

How there may be assigned to euerie difference of wit, his Science, which shalbe correspondent to him in particular: and that which is repugnant and contrarie, be abandoned.

ALl artes (saith *Cicero*) are placed vnder certaine vniuersall principles, which being learned with studie and trauaile, finally we so grow to attaine vnto them: but the art of poesie is in this so speciall, as if God or nature make not a man a Poet: little auailes it, to deliuer him the precepts and rules of versifieng. For which cause he said thus, The studying and learning of other matters consisteth in precepts and in artes: but a Poet taketh the course of nature it selfe, and is stirred vp by the forces of the minde, and as it were inflamed by a certaine diuine spirit. But heerein *Cicero* swarued from reason: for verily there is no Science or Art, deuised in the commonwealth, which if a man wanting capacitie for himselfe to apply, he shall reape anie profit thereof; albeit he toyle all the daies of his life in the precepts and rules of the same: But if he applie himselfe to that which is agreeable with his naturall abilitie, we see that he will learne in two daies. The like we say of Poesie without any difference, that if hee who hath anie answerable nature, giue himselfe to make verses, he performeth the same with great perfection, and if otherwise, he shall neuer be good Poet.

This being so, it seemeth now high time, to learne by way

way of Art what difference of Science, is anſwerable in particular, to what difference of wit: to the end, that euerie one may vnderſtand with diſtinction (after he is acquainted with his owne nature) to what Art he hath a naturall diſpoſition. The Arts and Sciences which are gotten by the memorie, are theſe following, *Latine, Grammer*, or of whatſoeuer other language, the *Theoricke* of the lawes, Diuinitie poſitiue, *Coſmography*, and *Arithmeticke*.

Thoſe which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, are Schoole diuinitie, the *Theoricke of Phiſicke, logicke, natural and morall Philoſophy*, and the practicke of the lawes, which we tearme pleading. From a good imagination, ſpring all the Arts and Sciences, which conſiſt in figure, correſpondence, harmonie, and proportion: ſuch are Poetrie, Eloquence, Muſicke, and the skill of preaching: the practiſe of Phiſicke, the Mathematicals, Aſtrologie, and the gouerning of a Common-wealth, the art of Warfare, Paynting, drawing, writing, reading, to be a man gratious, pleaſant, neat, wittie in managing, & & all the engins & deuiſes which artificers make: beſides a certain ſpeciall gift, whereat the vulgar maruelleth, and that is, to endite diuers matters, vnto foure, who write togither, and yet all to be penned in good ſort. Of all this, we cannot make euident demonſtration, nor proue euerie point by it ſelfe: For it were an infinite peece of worke, notwithſtanding by making proofe thereof in three or foure Sciences, the ſame reaſon will afterwardes preuaile for the reſt.

In the catalogue of Sciences, which we ſaid appertained to the memorie, we placed the *latine tongue*, and ſuch other, as all the nations in the world do ſpeake: the which no wiſe man wil denie: for tongues were deuiſed

by men, that they might communicate amongſt themſelues, and expreſſe one to another their conceits, without that in them there lie hid any other miſtery or naturall principles: for that the firſt deuiſers agreed togither, and after their beſt liking, (as *Ariſtotle* ſaith) framed the words, and gaue to euerie ech his ſignification. From hence aroſe ſo great a number of wordes, and ſo manie maners of ſpeech ſo farre beſides rule and reaſon, that if a man had not a good memorie, it were impoſſible to learne them with any other power. How little the vnderſtanding and the imagination make for the purpoſe, to learne languages and manners of ſpeech, is eaſily prooued by childhood, which being the age wherein man moſt wanteth theſe two powers, yet (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) children learne any language more readily than elder men, though theſe are endowed with a better diſcourſe of reaſon. And without farther ſpeech, experience plainly prooueth this, for ſo much as we ſee, that if a Biſcane of 30. or 40. yeeres age, come to dwell in *Caſtilia*, he will neuer learn this language: but if he be but a boy, within two or three yeares you would thinke him born in *Toledo*. The ſame befalles in the *latine* tongue, and in thoſe of all the reſt of the world: for all languages hold one ſelfe conſideration. Then if in the age when memorie chiefly raigneth, and the vnderſtanding and the imagination leaſt, languages are better learned, than when there growes defect of memorie, & an encreaſe of vnderſtanding, it falles out apparent that they are purchaſed by the memorie, and by none other power. Languages (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) cannot be gathered out by reaſon, nor conſiſt in diſcourſe or diſputations, for which cauſe, it is neceſſarie to heare the word from another, and the ſignification which it beareth, and to keepe the

ſame

ſame in mind,and ſo he prooueth that if a man be borne deaffe,it followes of neceſſitie that he be alſo dumbe,for he cannot heare from another , the articulation of the names,nor the ſignification which was giuen them by the firſt deuiſer.

That languages are at pleaſure,and a conceit of mens brains,and nought elſe,is plainly prooued ; for in them all,may the ſciences be taught,and in each is to be ſayd and expreſſed, that which by the other is inferred. Therfore none of the graue authors attended the learning of ſtrange tongues,thereby to deliuer their conceits : but the Greekes wrot in Greeke,the Romans in Latine, the Hebrues in the Hebrue language , and the Moores in Arabique , and ſo do I in my Spaniſh , becauſe I know this better than any other The Romans as lords of the world , finding it was neceſſarie to haue one common language,by which all nations might haue commerce together,and themſelues be able to heare & vnderſtand ſuch as came to demaund iuſtice, and things appertayning to their gouernment,commanded that in all places of there empire their ſhould ſchooles be kept,where the Latine tongue might be taught , and ſo this vſage hath endured euen to our time.

Schoole-diuinitie,it is a matter certaine that it appertaineth to the vnderſtanding,preſuppoſing that the operations of this power, are to diſtinguiſh , conclude, diſcourſe,iudge,& make choiſe;for nothing is done in this facultie,which is not to doubt for inconueniences , to anſwer with diſtinction, and againſt the anſwer to conclude that,which is gathered in good conſequence, and to returne to replication, vntill the vnderſtanding find where to ſettle . But the greateſt proofe which in this caſe may be made , is to giue to vnderſtand with

how

how great difficultie the *latine* tongue is ioyned with *Schoole diuinitie*, and how ordinarily it falleth not out, that one ſelf man is a good *latiniſt*, and a profound ſcholer: at which effect ſome curious heads, who haue lighted hereon, much maruelling procured to ſearch out the cauſe from whence the ſame might ſpring, and by their conceit, found that *Schoole diuinitie*, being written in an eaſie and common language, and the great *latiniſts*, hauing accuſtomed their eare, to the well ſounding and fine ſtile of *Cicero*: they cannot apply themſelues to this other. But well ſhould it fall out for the *latiniſts*, if this were the cauſe: For, forcing their hearing by vſe, they ſhould meet with a remedie for this infirmitie: but to ſpeake trueth, it is rather an head-ach than an eare-ſore. Such as are skilfull in the *latine* tongue, it is neceſſarie that they haue a great memorie: for otherwiſe, they can neuer become ſo perfect in a tõgue which is not theirs: and becauſe a great and happie memorie is as it were cõtrarie to a great and high raiſed vnderſtanding, in one ſubiect, where the one is placed, the other is chaſed away.

Hence remaineth it, that he who hath not ſo deepe, and loftie an vnderſtanding (a power whereto appertaineth, to diſtinguiſh, conclude, diſcourſe, iudge, and chooſe) cannot ſoone attaine the skil of *Schoole diuinitie*. Let him that will not allow this reaſon for currant payment, read *S. Thomas*, *Scot*, *Durand*, and *Caietane*, who are the principall in this facultie, and in them he ſhall finde manie excellent points, endited and written, in a ſtile very eaſie and common. And this proceeded from none other cauſe, than that theſe graue authours, had from their childhood a feeble memorie, for profiting in the *latine* tongue. But comming to *logicke*, *metaphiſicke*, and

Schoole

Schoole diuinitie, they reaped that great fruite, which we ſee, becauſe they had great vnderſtanding.

I can ſpeake of a *ſchoole diuine* (and manie other can verifie the ſame, that knew and conuerſed with him) who being a principall man in this facultie: not onely ſpake not finely, nor with well ſhaped ſentences, in imitation of *Cicero*, but whileſt he red in a chaire, his ſcholers noted in him, that he had leſſe than a meane knowledge in the *latine* tongue: Therefore they councelled him (as men ignorant of this doctrine) that he ſhould ſecretly, ſteale ſome houre of the day from *Schoole diuinitie*, and employ the ſame in reading of *Cicero*. Who knowing this coũſell to proceed from his good friends, not onely procured to remedie it priuilie, but alſo publickly, after he had red the matter of the trinitie, & how the diuine word might take fleſh, he meant to heare a lecture of the latine tongue, and it fell out a matter worthy conſideration, that in the long time while he did ſo, he not onely learned nothing of new, but grew welneere, to leeſe that little latine which he had before, and ſo at laſt was driuen to read in the vulgar. *Pius* the fourth, enquiring what diuines were of moſt ſpeciall note at the councell of *Trent*, he was told of a moſt ſingular *Spaniſh* diuine, whoſe ſolutions, anſweres, argumentes, and diſtinctions, were worthy of admiration: the Pope therefore, deſirous to ſee and know ſo rare a man: ſent word vnto him, that he ſhould come to *Rome*, & render him accompt of what was done in the Councell. He came, and the Pope did him many fauours, amongſt the reſt, commaunded him to be couered, and taking him by the hand, led him walking to *Caſtle* S. *Angelo*, & ſpeaking verie good latine, ſhewed him his deuiſe, touching certain fortifications, which he was then

about

about to make the Caſtle ſtronger, asking his opinion in ſome particulars: but he anſwered the Pope ſo intricatly, for that he could not ſpeake latine, that the *Spaniſh* Embaſſadour, who at that time was *Don Lewes de Requeſens*, great Commander of *Caſtilia*, was faine to ſtep forth to grace him with his latine, and to turne the Popes diſcourſe into another matter. Finally, the Pope ſaid to his Chamberlains, it was not poſſible that this man had ſo much skill in diuinitie, as they made report, ſeeing he had ſo little knowledge in the latine tongue. But if as he proued him in this toung, which is a work of memorie, and in platforming, and building, which belong to the imagination, ſo he had tried him in a matter appertaining to the vnderſtanding, he would haue vttered diuine conſiderations. In the Catalogue of Sciences, which appertaine to the imagination, we placed poetry amongſt the firſt, and that not by chance nor for want of conſideration, but thereby to giue notice, how farre off, thoſe who haue a ſpeciall gift in poetry, are from vnderſtanding. For we ſhall finde that the ſelfe difficultie, which the latine tongue holdeth in vniting with *Schoole diuinitie*, is alſo found (yea and beyond compariſon farre greater) betweene this facultie, and the art of verſifiyng: and the ſame is ſo contrary to the vnderſtanding, that by the ſelfreaſon, for which man is likely to proue ſingular therein, he may take his leaue of all the other ſciences, which appertaine to this power, and alſo to the latine tongue through the contrarietie, which a good imagination beareth to a great memorie.

For the firſt of theſe two, *Ariſtotle* found not the reaſon, but yet confirmed mine opinion by experience, ſaying: *Marke*, a Citizen of *Siracuſa*, was beſt Poet, when he loſt his vnderſtanding, and the cauſe is, for that the

the difference of the imagination, to which Poetrie belõgeth, is that which requireth three degrees of heat, and this qualitie ſo extended (as wee haue before expreſſed) breedes an vtter loſſe of the vnderſtanding, the which was obſerued by the ſame *Ariſtotle*. For he affirmeth, that this *Marke* the *Siracuſane*, growing to more temperature, enioyed a better vnderſtanding, but yet he attained not to verſifie ſo well, through default of heat, with which, this difference of the imagination worketh. And this, *Cicero* wanted when going about to deſcribe in verſe, the heroicall actions of his conſulſhip, and the happie birth of Rome, in that ſhe was gouerned by him: he ſaid thus, *O fortunatam natam me conſule Romam*. For which cauſe, *Iuuenall* not conceiuing, that to a man endowed with ſo rare a wit, as *Cicero*, poetrie was a matter repugnant, did Satirically nip him, ſaying, If thou hadſt rehearſed the *Philippicks* againſt *Marck Antony*, anſwerable to the tune of ſo bad a verſe, it ſhould not haue coſt thy life.

But worſe did *Plato* vnderſtand the ſame, when hee ſaid, that Poetrie was no humane Science, but a diuine reuelation. For if the Poets were not rauiſhed beſides themſelues, or full of God, they could not make nor vtter any thing worthy regard. And he prooueth it by a reaſon, auouching, that whileſt a man abideth in his ſound iudgement, he cannot verſifie. But *Ariſtotle* reprooueth him, for affirming that the art of Poetrie is not an abilitie of man, but a reuelation of God: And he admitteth, that a wiſe man, and who is free poſſeſſed of his iudgement, cannot be a poet: and the reaſon is, becauſe where there reſteth much vnderſtanding, it behoueth of force, that there befall want of the imagination, whereto appertaineth the Art of verſifieng: which may

the

the more apparently be prooued, knowing that *Socrates* after he had learned the art of Poetrie, for all his precepts and rules, could not make so much as one verse: and yet notwithstanding, he was by the oracle of *Apollo* adiudged the wisest man of the world.

I hold it then for certaine, that the boy who will prooue of a notable vaine for versifieng, and to whom, vpon euerie sleight consideration, consonances offer themselues, shall ordinarily incurre hazard not to learn well the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philosophie, Phisicke, Schoole-diuinitie, and the other artes and sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding, and to the memorie. For which cause, we see by experience, that if we charge such a boy, to forme a *nominatiue* without booke, he will not learne it in two or three daies: but if there be a leafe of paper written in verse, to be recited in any comedie, in two turnes, he fixeth them in his memorie. These loose themselues by reading bookes of chiualrie: *Orlando*, *Boccace*, *Diana of Monte maggior*, and such other deuises: for all these are workes of the imagination. What shall we say then of the harmonie of the Organs, and of the singing men of the Chappell, whose wits are most vnprofitable for the latine tongue, and for all other Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderstanding and to the memorie? the like reason serueth in playing on instruments, and all sorts of musicke. By these three examples, which we haue yeelded, of the Latine, of Schoole-diuinitie, and of Poetrie, we shall vnderstand this doctrine to be true, and that we haue duely made this partition, albeit we make not the like mention in the other arts.

Writing also, discouereth the imagination, and so we see, that few men of good vnderstanding, doe write a faire

faire hand, and to this purpoſe I haue noted many examples: and ſpecially I haue knowen a moſt learned Schoole-diuine, who ſhaming at himſelfe to ſee how bad a hand he wrote, durſt not write a letter to any man, nor to anſwere thoſe which were ſent to him: ſo as he determined with himſelfe, to get a Scriuener ſecretly to his houſe, who ſhould teach him to frame a reaſonable letter that might paſſe, and hauing for many daies taken paines heerein, it prooued loſt labour, and he reaped no profit thereby. Wherefore, as tyred out, he forſooke the practiſe: & the teacher, who had taken him in hand, grew aſtoniſhed, to ſee a man ſo learned in his profeſſion, to be ſo vntoward for writing. But my ſelfe, who reſt well aſſured that writing is a worke of the imagination, held the ſame for a naturall effect. And if anie man be deſirous to ſee and note it, let him conſider the Schollers, who get their liuings in the Vniuerſities, by copying out of writings in good forme, and hee ſhall finde, that they can little skill of Grammer, Logicke, and Philoſophy, and if they ſtudie Phiſick or Diuinitie, they fiſh nothing neere the bottome. The boy then, who with his pen can tricke a horſe to the life, and a man in good ſhape, and can make a good paire of it ſerues little to employ him in anie ſort of learning, but will do beſt, to ſet him to ſome painter, who by art may bring forward his nature.

To reade well and with readineſſe, diſcouereth alſo a certaine ſpice of the imagination, and if the ſame be verie effectuall, it booteth little to ſpend much time at his booke, but ſhall do better, to ſet him to get his liuing by reading of proceſſes. Heere a thing note-worthy, offereth it ſelfe, and that is, that the difference of the imagination, which maketh men eloquent and pleaſant, is

contrary

contrarie to that, which is behoofful for a man to reade with facilitie, where-through none, who is prompt-witted, can learne to reade without ſtumbling, and putting too ſomewhat of his owne head.

To play well at *Primero*, and to face and vie, and to hold and giue ouer when time ſerueth, and by conie-ctures to know his aduerſaries game, and the skill of diſcarding, are all workes of the imagination. The like we ſay of playing at *Cent*, & at Triumph, though not ſo farforth as the *Primero* of *Almaigne*, and the ſame, not only maketh proofe & demonſtration of the difference of the wit, but alſo diſcouereth al the vertues and vices in a man. For at euery moment, there are offered occaſions in this play, by which a man ſhall diſcouer, what hee would do in matters of great importance, if oportunitie ſerued.

Cheſſe-play, is one of the things, which beſt diſcouereth the imagination: for he that makes ten or twelue faire draughts one after another on the Cheſſe-boord, giues an euill token of profiting in the Sciences which belong to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie, vnleſſe it fall out, that he make an vnion of two or three powers, as we haue already noted. And if a very learned Schoole-diuine (of mine acquaintance) had been skilled in this doctrine, he ſhould haue got notice of a matter, which made him verie doubtfull. He vſed to play often with a ſeruant of his, and lighting moſtly on the loſſe, told him, much mooued: Sirha, how comes it to paſſe, that thou who canſt skill neither of Latine, nor Logicke, nor Diuinitie, though thou haſt ſtudied it, yet beateſt me that am full of *Scot* and S. *Thomas*? Is it poſſible that thou ſhouldſt haue a better wit than I? verily I cannot beleeue it, except the diuell reueale vnto thee what

draughts

draughts thou ſhouldſt make: and the miſterie was, that he had great vnderſtanding, with which he attained the delicacies of *Scot* and *Thomas*, but wanted that difference of imagination, which ſerueth for Cheſſe-play, whereas his ſeruant, had an ill vnderſtanding, and a bad memorie, but a good imagination. The Schollers, who haue their bookes well righted, and their chamber well dreſſed, and cleane kept, euerie thing in his due place & order, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrarie to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie.

Such a like wit, haue men who go neat, and handſomly apparelled, who looke all about their cape for a mote, & take diſlike at any one wry plait of their garmēt, this (aſſuredly) ſpringeth from their imagination. For if a man, that had no skill in verſifieng, nor towardlineſſe thereunto, chance to fall in loue, ſodainly (ſaith *Plato*) he becomes a Poet, and verie trim and handſome: for loue heateth and drieth his braine, and theſe are qualities which quicken the imagination: the like (as *Iuuenal* noteth) anger doth effect, which paſſion heateth alſo the braine:

Anger makes verſe, if nature but denie.

Gracious talkers, and imitaters, and ſuch as can hold at bay, haue a certaine difference of imagination, verie contrarie to the vnderſtanding, and to the memorie. For which cauſe they neuer prooue learned in Grammer, Logicke, Schoole-diuinitie, Phiſicke, or the lawes. If then they be wittie in managing, toward for euery matter they take in hand, ready in ſpeech, and anſwering to the purpoſe: theſe are fit to ſerue in Courts of iuſtice, for ſollicitors, atturnies, merchants, and factors to buy and ſell, bur not for learning. Heerein the vulgar is much deceiued ſeeing them ſo readie at all handes, and them

ſeemeth, that if ſuch gaue themſelues to learning, they would prooue notable fellowes: but in ſubſtance there is no wit more repugnant to matters of learning, than theſe. Children that are ſlow of ſpeech, haue a moiſtnes in their tongue and alſo in their braine, but that wearing away, in proceſſe of time they become verie eloquent, and great talkers, through the great memorie which they get when that moiſture is tempered.

This we know by the things tofore rehearſed, befell that famous Orator *Demoſthenes*, of whome we ſaid, that *Cicero* maruelled how being ſo blunt of ſpeech when he was a boy, growing greater he became ſo eloquēt. Children alſo, who haue a good voice, and warble in the throat, are moſt vntoward for all Sciences, and the reaſon is, for that they are cold and moiſt. The which two qualities, being vnited, we ſaid before, that they breed a dammage in the reaſonable part. Schollers, who learn their leſſon in ſuch maner as their maiſter deliuereth it, and ſo recite the ſame, it ſhewes a token of a good memorie, but the vnderſtanding ſhall abie the bargaine. There are offered in this doctrine, ſome problemes and doubts: the anſwere wherunto, will perhaps yeeld more light, to conceiue, that what we haue propounded, doth carie trueth. The firſt is, whence it groweth that great Latiniſts are more arrogant and preſumptuous on their knowledge, than men very well skilled in that kind of learning which appertaineth to the vnderſtanding? in ſort, that the prouerbe, to let vs know what maner of fellow a Grammarian is, ſayth; That a Grammarian is arrogancie it ſelfe. The ſecond is, whence it commeth that the Latine tongue, is ſo repugnant to the Spaniſh capacities, and ſo naturall to the French, Italian, Dutch, Engliſh, and other northernly nations, as we ſee in their

workes

workes, which by their good Latine phraſe, ſtraightwaies proue the authour to haue been a ſtranger, and by the barbarouſneſſe and ill compoſition, we know the ſame for a *Spaniards*. The third is, for what reaſon the things that are ſpoken and written in the Latine tongue, ſound better, carrie a more loftineſſe, and haue greater delicacie, than anie other language how good ſoeuer? we hauing auouched before, that all languages, are nought els, but a conceit at pleaſure, of thoſe who firſt deuiſed them, without holding anie foundation in nature. The fourth doubt is, ſeeing all Sciences, which appertaine to the vnderſtanding, are written in Latine, how it can frame, that ſuch as want memorie, may read and ſtudie them in thoſe books, whileſt the Latine is (by this reaſon) ſo repugnant vnto them.

To the firſt probleme we anſwere, that to know whether a man haue defect of vnderſtanding, there fals out no token more certaine, than to ſee him loftie, big looked, preſumptuous, deſirous of honour, ſtanding on termes, and full of ceremonies: And the reaſon is, for that all theſe be workes, of a difference of the imagination, which requireth no more but one degree of heat, wherwith the much moiſture (which is requiſite for the memorie) accordeth verie fitly: for it wanteth force to reſolue the ſame. Contrariwiſe it is an infallible token, that if a man be naturallie lowly, deſpiſer of himſelfe, and his own matters, and that not only he vanteth not, nor praiſeth himſelf, but feels diſpleaſure at the commẽdations giuen him by others, and takes ſhame of places and ceremonies pertaining to honour, ſuch a one may well be pointed at for a man of great vnderſtanding, but of ſmall imagination and memorie. I ſaid naturally lowly: for if he be ſo by cũning, this is no certain

ſigne. Hence it commeth, that as the Grammarians are men of great memorie, and make an vnion with this difference of the imagination: ſo it is of force, that they faile in vnderſtanding, and be ſuch as the prouerb paints them forth.

To the ſecond probleme may be anſwered, that *Galen* enquiring out the wit of men by way of the temperature of the region where they inhabit, ſaith, that thoſe who make abode vnder the North, haue all of thē want of vnderſtanding: but thoſe who are ſeated between the North and the burned Zone, are of great wiſedome, Which ſituation, anſwereth directly to our region. And verily ſo it is: for *Spaine* is not ſo cold as the places ſubiected to the Pole, nor ſo hot as the burned Zone. The ſame ſentence doth *Ariſtotle* produce, demanding, for what cauſe, ſuch as inhabit verie cold regions partake leſſe vnderſtanding than thoſe who are born in the hotter, and in the anſwere he verie homely handles the *Flemmiſh*, *Dutch*, *Engliſh*, and *French*, ſaying that their wits are like thoſe of drunkards: for which cauſe they cannot ſearch out, nor vnderſtand the nature of things, & this is occaſioned by the much moiſture, wherwith their brain is repleniſhed, and the other parts of the bodie: the which is knowen by the whiteneſſe of the face, and the golden colour of the haire, and by that it is a miracle, to find a *Dutchman* bald: and aboue this they are generally great, and of tall ſtature, through the much moiſture, which breedeth encreaſe of fleſh. But in the *Spaniards*, we diſcerne the quite contrarie: they are ſomwhat browne, they haue blacke haire, of meane ſtature, and for the moſt part, we ſee them bald, Which diſpoſition (ſaith *Galen*) groweth, for that the braine is hot and drie. And if this be true, it behoooueth of force, that they

be

be endowed with a bad memorie, and a good vnderſtanding, but the *Dutchmen* poſſeſſe a great memorie, & ſmall vnderſtanding. For which cauſe, the one can no skill of Latine, and the other eaſily learne the ſame. The reaſon which *Ariſtotle* alleaged, to proue the ſlender vnderſtanding of thoſe who dwell vnder the North, is, that the much cold of the country calleth backe the naturall heate inward, by counterpoſition, and ſuffereth not the ſame to ſpread abroad: for which cauſe, it partaketh much moyſture, and much heate, and theſe vnite a great memorie for the languages, and a good imagination; with which they make clocks, bring the water to Toledo, deuiſe engins, and workes of rare skill, which the *Spaniards* through defect of imagination cannot frame themſelues vnto: But ſet them to Logicke, to Philoſophie, to Schoole-diuinitie, to Phiſicke, or to the Lawes, and beyond compariſon a *Spaniſh* wit, with his barbarous termes, will deliuer more rare points than a ſtranger. For if you take from them this fineneſſe and quaint phraſe of writing, there is nothing in them of rare inuention or exquiſite choice.

For confirmation of this doctrine, *Galen* ſaid that in *Scithia*, one onely man became a Philoſopher: but in *Athens* there were many ſuch: as if he ſhould ſay, that in *Scithia*, which is a Prouince vnder the North, it grew a myracle to ſee a Philoſopher, but in *Athens* they were all borne wiſe and skilfull. But albeit Philoſophie and the other Sciences rehearſed by vs, be repugnant to the Northren people; yet they profit well in the Mathematicals, and in Aſtrologie, becauſe they haue a good imagination.

The anſwere of the third probleme dependeth vpon a queſtion, much hammered between *Plato* & *Ariſtotle*:

the one ſaith that there are proper names, which by their nature carrie ſignification of things, and that much wit is requiſite to deuiſe them. And this opinion is fauoured by the diuine ſcripture, which affirmeth that *Adam* gaue euerie of thoſe things which God ſet before him, the proper name that beſt was fitting for them. But *Ariſtotle* wil not grant, that in any toung there can be found any name, or maner of ſpeech, which can ſignifie ought of it own nature, for that all names are deuiſed and ſhaped after the conceit of men. Whence we ſee by experience, that wine hath aboue 60. names, and bread as manie, in euerie language his, & of none we can auouch that the ſame is naturall and agreeable thereunto, for then all in the world would vſe but that. But for all this, the ſentence of *Plato* is truer: for put caſe that the firſt deuiſers fained the words at their pleaſure and will, yet was the ſame by a reaſonable inſtinct, communicated with the eare, with the nature of the thing, & with the good grace and well ſounding of the pronunciation, not making the wordes ouer ſhort or long, nor enforcing an vnſeemly framing of the mouth in time of vtterance, ſetling the accent in his conuenient place, and obſeruing the other conditions, which a tongue ſhould poſſeſſe, to be fine, and not barbarous.

Of this ſelfe opinion with *Plato*, was a *Spaniſh* gentleman; who made it his paſtime to write books of chiualrie, becauſe he had a certain kind of imagination, which entiſeth men to fayning and leaſings. Of him it is reported, that being to bring into his works a furious Gyant, he went manie daies deuiſing a name, which might in al points be anſwerable to his fierceneſſe: neither could he light vpon any, vntill playing one day at cardes in his friends houſe, he heard the owner of the houſe ſay, Ho

ſirha,

sirha, boy, *tra qui tantos*, the Gentleman so soone as he heard this name *Traquitantos*, sodainly he took the same for a word of ful sound in the eare, and without any longer looking arose, saying; gentlemen I wil play no more, for many dayes are past sithence I haue gone seeking out a name, which might fit well with a furious Gyant, whom I bring into those volumes which I now am making, and I could not find the same, vntill I came to this house, where euer I receiue all courtesie. The curiositie of this gentleman in calling the Gyant *Traquitantos*, had also those first men, who deuised the Latine tongue, in that they found out a language of so good sound to the eare. Therefore we need not maruell that the things which are spoken and written in Latine, doe sound so well, and in other tongues so ill: for their first inuenters were barbarous.

Tra qui tantos signifieth, Bring hither tokens, or counters.

The last doubt I haue been forced to alleage, for satisfieng of diuers who haue stũbled theron, though the solution be very easie; for those who haue great vnderstanding are not vtterly depriued of memorie, in asmuch as if they wanted the same, it would fall out impossible that the vnderstanding could discourse or frame reasons; for this power is that which keepeth in hand the matter and the fantasies, whereon it behoqueth to vse speculation. But for that the same is weake of three degrees of perfection, whereto men may attaine in the Latine tongue (namely, to vnderstand, to write, and to speake the same perfitly) it can hardly passe the first without fault and stumbling.

CHAP. IX.

How it may be prooued that the eloquence and fineneſſe of ſpeech cannot find place in men of great vnderſtanding.

Cicero ſaith that the honour of man is to haue wit, and of wit to be applied to eloquence.

ONe of the graces by which the vulgar is beſt perſuaded, and thinketh that a man hath much knowledge and wiſdome, is, to heare him ſpeake with great eloquence, to haue a ſmooth tongue, plentie of ſweet and pleaſant words, and to alleage many examples fit for the purpoſe that is in hand: but this (verily) ſpringeth from an vnion, which the memorie maketh with the imagination, in a degree and meaſure of heat, that cannot reſolue the moiſture of the brain, and ſerueth to lift vp the figures, and cauſe them to boile, where-through are diſcouered many conceits and points to be vttered. In this vnion it is impoſſible that diſcourſe may be found; for we haue alreadie ſaid and prooued heeretofore, that this power greatly abhorreth heat, and moiſture cannot ſupport it. Which doctrine, if the *Athenians* had knowen, they would not ſo much haue maruelled to ſee ſo wiſe a man as *Socrates* not to haue the gift of vtterance; of whom, thoſe who vnderſtood how great his knowledge was, ſaid, that his words & his ſentences, were like a wodden cheſt knobby and nothing trimmed on the outſide, but that in opening the ſame, within it held liniamentes and portraitures of rare admiration. In the ſame ignorance reſt they, who attempting to render a reaſon of *Ariſtotles* bad ſtile and obſcurenes, ſayd:

This is recounted by Plato in his dialogue of knowledge, and in his banquet.

That

That of ſet purpoſe, & becauſe he would that his works ſhould carrie authoritie, hé wrot vnder riddles, & with ſo ſlender ornament of words,and ſimple manner of deliuerance. And if we conſider alſo the ſo harſh proceeding of *Plato*, and the breefneſſe with which he writeth, the obſcuritie of his reaſons, and the ill placing of the parts of his tale,we ſhall find that nought elſe ſaue this, occaſioned the ſame.For ſuch alſo we find the works of *Hippocrates*,the thefts which he committeth of Nowns and Verbs, the ill diſpoſition of his ſentences, and the weake foundation of his reaſons,to ſtuffe out the empty places of his doctrine . What will you more? vnleſſe, that when he would yeeld a very particular reckoning to his friend *Damagetus*, how *Artaxerxſes* king of *Perſia*, had ſent for him, promiſing him as much gold and ſiluer as he liſt himſelfe,and to make him one of the great ones of his kingdome : hauing plenty of anſwers to ſo many demaunds,he writ only thus ; The king of *Perſia* hath ſent for me,not knowing that with me the reſpect of wiſedome is greater than that of gold, Farewell. Which matter,if it had paſſed through the hands of any other man of good imagination and memorie, a whole leafe of paper would not haue ſufficed to ſet it forth.

Cicero praiſing the eloquence of Plato,ſayd: That if Iupiter ſhould haue ſpoken Greeke,he would haue ſpoken as Plato did.

But who would haue bene ſo hardie to alleage for the purpoſe of this doctrine,the example of S.*Paule*,and to affirme,that he was a man of great vnderſtanding and little memorie,and that with theſe his forces, he could not skill of toungs, nor deliuer his mind in them poliſhedly and with gracefulneſſe , if himſelfe had not ſo ſayd ; I reckon not my ſelfe to haue done leſſe than the greateſt Apoſtles,for though I be ignoraunt of ſpeech, yet am I not ſo in vnderſtanding : as if he ſhould ſay ; I confeſſe that I haue not the gift of vtterance, but for ſci-

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ence and knowledge, none of the greateſt Apoſtles goeth beyond me. Which difference of wit was ſo appropriat to the preaching of the Goſpell, that choice could not be made of a better, for, that a preacher ſhould be eloquent, and haue great furniture of queint tearms, is not a matter conuenient: for the force of the Orators of thoſe daies, appeared in making the hearers repute things falſe for true; and what the vulgar held for good and behooffull, they, vſing the precepts of their art, perſuaded the contrary, and maintained that it was better to be poore than rich, ſicke than whole, fond than wiſe, and other points manifeſtly repugnant to the opinion of the vulgar. For which cauſe the Hebrues tearmed them *Geragnin*, that is to ſay, Deceiuers. Of the ſame opinion was *Cato* the more, and held the abode of theſe in Rome for very dangerous, in as much as the forces of the Romane empire, were grounded on arms: & they began then to perſuade that the Romane youth ſhould abandon thoſe, and giue themſelues to this kind of wiſedome; therefore (in breefe) he procured them to be baniſhed out of Rome, forbidding them euer to returne againe. If God then had ſought out an eloquent preacher, who ſhould haue vſed ornament of ſpeech, & that he had entered into Athens or Rome, auouching that in Hieruſalem the Iewes had crucified a man, who was very God, and that he died of his owne accord to redeeme ſinners, and roſe againe the third day, and aſcended into heauen, where he now ſitteth; what would the hearers haue thought, ſaue that theſe things were ſome of thoſe follies and vanities which the Orators were woont to perſuade by the force of their art? For which cauſe, S. *Paule* ſaid: For Chriſt ſent me not to baptiſe, but to preach the goſpel, and that not in wiſdome of words,

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leaſt the croſſe of Chriſt might prooue in vaine. The wit of S. *Paule* was appropriat to this ſeruice, for he had a large diſcourſe to proue in the ſynagogues and amongſt the Gentils, That Ieſus Chriſt was the Meſſias promiſed in the law, and that it was bootleſſe to looke for any other: and herewithall he was of ſlender memorie, and therefore he could not skil to ſpeake with ornament and ſweet and well reliſhed tearms, and this was that which was behooffull for preaching of the goſpell. I will not maintaine (for all this) that S. *Paule* had not the gift of toungs, but that he could ſpeake all languages as he did his owne, neither am I of opinion, that to defend the name of Chriſt, the forces of his great vnderſtanding ſufficed, if there had not bene ioined therewithall the meane of grace, and a ſpeciall ayd which God to that purpoſe beſtowed vpon him: it ſufficeth me only to ſay That ſupernaturall gifts worke better, when they light vpon an apt diſpoſition, than if a man were of himſelfe vntoward and blockiſh. Hereto alludeth that doctrine of S. *Hierome*, which is found in his proem vpon *Eſay* and *Hieremie*; where asking what the cauſe is, that it being one ſelfe holy-ghoſt which ſpake by the mouth of *Hieremie* and of *Eſay*, one of them propounded the matters which he wrot with ſo great elegancie, and *Hieremie* ſcarſely wiſt how to ſpeake: to which doubt he anſwereth, that the holy-ghoſt applieth it ſelfe to the naturall manner of proceeding of each Prophet, without that his grace varrieth their nature, or teacheth thē the language wherein they are to publiſh their propheſie. Therefore we muſt vnderſtand, that *Eſay* was a noble gentleman brought vp in court, and in the citie of *Hieruſalem*, and for this cauſe, had ornament & poliſhedneſſe of ſpeech; But *Ieremie* was borne and reared in a village of *Hieruſa-*

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lem, called *Anathochites*, blunt and rude in behauiour, as a country perſon, and of ſuch a ſtile the holy ghoſt vſed the ſeruice in the prophecie which he commanded vnto him. The ſame may be ſaid of S. *Pauls* Epiſtles, that the holy Ghoſt dwelled in him, when he wrote them, to the end he might not erre, but the language and maner of ſpeech was S. *Pauls* natural, applied to the doctrin which he wrote; for the truth of Shool-diuinitie abhorreth manie words. But the practiſe of languages, and the ornament and poliſhment of ſpeech may verie well be ioyned with poſitiue diuinitie: for this facultie appertayneth to the memorie, and is nought els ſaue a maſſe of words and catholicke ſentences, taken out of the holie doctors, and the diuine Scripture, and preſerued in this power, as the *Grammarian* doth with the flowers of the Poets, *Virgill*, *Horace*, *Terence*, and other Latine authours whom he readeth: who meeting occaſion to rehearſe them, he comes out ſtraightwaies with a ſhred of *Cicero*, or *Quintilian*, whereby he makes his hearers know what he is able to do.

Thoſe that are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and of the memorie, and trauaile in gathering the fruit of whatſoeuer hath been ſaid or written in their profeſſion, and ſerue themſelues therewith at conuenient occaſions, with great ornament of words & gratious faſhions of ſpeech, for that ſo many things are alreadie found out in all the Sciences, it ſeemeth to them who know not this doctrin, that they are of great profoundneſſe; whereas in trueth they hold much of the Aſſe: for if you grow to trie them in the foũdations of that which they alleage and affirme, they then diſcouer their wants. And the reaſon is, becauſe ſo great a flowing of ſpeech cannot be vnited with the vnderſtanding, whereto appertaineth

pertaineth to ſearch out the bottome of the trueth. Of theſe the diuine ſcripture ſaid, Where there is plentie of words, there raigneth great ſcarſitie: as if he had ſaid, that a man of many words ordinarily wanteth vnderſtanding and wiſdome.

Thoſe who are endowed with this vnion of the imagination and memorie, enter with great courage to interpret the diuine ſcripture, it ſeeming to them, that becauſe they vnderſtand well the Hebrue, Greeke and Latine tongues, they haue the way made ſmooth to gather out the verie ſpirit of the letter: but verily they ruinate themſelues; firſt, becauſe the words of the diuine text and his maners of ſpeech, haue manie other ſignifications, beſides thoſe which *Cicero* vnderſtood in Latine. And then becauſe their vnderſtãding is defectiue, which power verifieth whether a ſenſe be Catholicke or depraued: and this is it which may make choice by the grace ſupernatural, of two or three ſenſes, that are gathered out of the letter, which is moſt true and catholicke.

Beguilings (ſaith *Plato*) neuer befall in things vnlike and verie different, but when manie things meet which carrie neere reſemblance, For if we ſet before a ſharpe ſight, a litle ſalt, ſugar, meale, and lyme, all well pounded and beaten to powder; and ech one ſeuerally by it ſelfe: what ſhould he doe who wanted taſt, if with his eyes he ſhould be ſet to diſcern euerie of theſe powders from other without erring? ſaying; this is ſalt, this ſugar, this meale, and this lyme. For my part I beleeue he would be deceiued through the great reſemblance, which theſe things haue betweene themſelues. But if there were a heape of ſalt, one of ſugar, one of corne, one of earth, and one of ſtones, it is certaine he would not be deceiued in giuing ech of theſe heapes his name, though his

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ſight were dimme, for ech is of a diuers figure. The ſame we ſee befalleth euerie day in the ſenſes and ſpirits, which the diuines giue to the holie ſcripture, of which two or three being looked on, at firſt ſight they all carrie a ſhew to be Catholicke, and to agree wel with the letter, but yet in trueth are not ſo, neither the holie Ghoſt ſo meant. To chuſe the beſt of theſe ſenſes, and to refuſe the bad, it is a thing aſſured that the diuine emploieth not his memory nor his imagination, but his vnderſtanding. Wherefore I auouch that the poſitiue diuine ought to conferre with the Schoole-man, and to enquire at his hands, that of theſe ſenſes he may chuſe that which ſhal appeare to be ſoundeſt, vnleſſe he wil be ſent to the holie houſe. For this cauſe doe heretickes ſo much abhorre Schoole-diuinitie, and learne to baniſh it out of the world: for by diſtinguiſhing, inferring, framing of reaſons, and iudging, we attaine to vnderſtand the trueth, and to diſcouer falſhood.

CHAP. X.

How it is prooued that the Theoricke of Diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, and preaching (which is his practiſe) to the imagination.

IT is a probleme often demanded, not onely by folke learned & wiſe, but alſo the vulgar will put in their oare, and euerie day bring in queſtion, For what cauſe a diuine being a great man in the Schooles, ſharp in diſputing, readie in anſwering, and in writing and lecturing of rare learning; yet getting

getting vp into the pulpit, cannot skill of preaching: and contrariwiſe if one prooue a gallant preacher, eloquent, gratious, and that drawes the people after him; it ſeemes a miracle if he be deeply ſeene in Schoole-diuinitie. Wherefore they admit not for a ſound conſequence: ſuch a one is a great Schoole-diuine; therfore he will prooue a good preacher: and contrariwiſe they will not grant; he is a good preacher, therefore he hath skill in Schoole-diuinitie. For to reuerſe the one and other of theſe conſequences, there may be alleaged for ech, more inſtances than are haires on our head.

No man hitherto hath been able to anſwer this demand, ſaue after the ordinarie guiſe, *vz.* to attribute the whole to God, and to the diſtribution of his graces: and to my liking they doe very well, in aſmuch as they know not any more particular occaſion thereof. The anſwere of this doubt (in ſome ſort) is giuen by vs in the foregoing chapter, but not ſo particularly as is requiſite; and it was, that School-diuinitie appertaineth to the vnderſtāding: but now we affirme and will prooue that preaching, and his practiſe, is a worke of the imagination. And as it falles out a difficult matter, to ioyne in one ſelf brain a good vnderſtanding and much imagination: ſo likewiſe it will hardly fall that one ſelfe man, be a great Schoole-diuine, & a famous preacher: and that School-diuinitie is a worke of the vnderſtanding, hath tofore been prooued when we proued the repugnancie which it carried to the Latine tongue. For which cauſe it ſhall not now be neceſſarie to prooue the ſame anew, onely it ſhall ſuffice to giue to vnderſtand, that the grace and delightfulneſſe which good preachers haue, whereby they draw their audience vnto them, and hold them well pleaſed, is altogither a worke of the imagination,

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and part thereof of a good memorie, and to the end I may better expound my ſelfe, and cauſe it as it were to be felt with the hand, it behoueth firſt to preſuppoſe that man is a liuing creature, capable of reaſon, of cõpanie, and of ciuilitie, and to the end that his nature might be the more abled by art, the ancient Philoſophers deuiſed Logicke to teach him how he might frame his reaſons with thoſe precepts and rules, how he ſhould define the nature of things, diſtinguiſh, deuide, conclude, argue, iudge, and chooſe, without which works it grows impoſſible, that the Artiſt can go forward: and that he might be companiable and ciuill; it behooued him to ſpeake, & to giue other men to weet the conceits which he framed in his mind. And for that he ſhould not deliuer them without diſpoſition and without order: they deuiſed another art which they termed Rhethoricke, which by his preceptes and rules might beautifie the ſpeech with poliſhed words, with fine phraſes, and with ſtirring affections and gratious colours. But as Logicke teacheth not a man to diſcourſe and to argue in one ſcience alone; but without difference in all alike: ſo alſo Rhethoricke inſtructeth how to ſpeake, in Diuinitie, in Phiſicke, in skill of the Lawes and in all other Sciences and conuerſations, which men entermedled withall. In ſort, that if we will faine a perfect Logician, or an accompliſhed Oratour, he cannot fall into due conſideration vnleſſe he be ſeen in all the Sciences, for they all appertaine to his iuriſdiction, and in which ſoeuer of them, he may exerciſe his rules without diſtinction: not as Phiſicke which hath his matter limited whereof it muſt intreat: and ſo likewiſe naturall Philoſophie, and morall, Metaphiſick, Aſtrologie, and the reſt: and therefore *Cicero* ſaid, The Oratour wherſoeuer he abideth,

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dwelleth in his own. And in another place he affirmeth, in a perfect Oratour is found all the knowledge of the Philosophers, and therefore the same *Cicero* auouched, that there is no art more difficult than that of a perfect Oratour: and with more reason he might so haue said, if he had known with how great hardnesse al the Sciences are vnited in one particular subiect.

Anciently the doctors of the law were adorned with the name of Oratour, for the perfection of pleading required the notice & furniture of al the arts in the world, for the lawes do iudge them all. Now to know the defence reserued for euerie art by it selfe, it was necessary to haue a particular knowledge of them all; for which cause *Cicero* said, No man ought to be reputed in the number of oratours, who is not well seen in all the arts. But seeing it was impossible to learne all Sciences: first, through the shortnesse of life, and then because mans wit is so bounded, they let them passe, and of necessitie held themselues contented to giue credit to the skilfull in that art whereof they made profession, and no farther.

After this maner of defending causes, straightwaies succeeded the euangelicall doctrine, which might haue been persuaded by the art of oratorie, better than all the Sciences of the world besides, for that the same is the most certaine and trueſt: but Christ our redeemer, charged S. *Paul*, that he should not preach it with wisdom of words, to the end the Gentiles should not think it was a well couched leasing, as are those which the oratours vse to persuade by the force of their art. But when the faith had been receiued, many yeares after it was allowed to preach with places of Rhetoricke, and to vse the seruice of eloquent speech; for that then the incon-

uenience fell not in consideration, which was extant when S. *Paul* preached. Yea we see that the preacher reapeth more fruit, who hath the conditions of a perfect orator, and is more haunted than he that wanteth them: and the reason is verie plaine. For if the ancient oratours gaue the people to vnderstand things false for true (vsing those their preceptes and rules) more easily shall the christian auditorie be drawen, when by art they are persuaded to that which alreadie they vnderstand and beleeue. Besides that the holy Scripture (after a sort) is all things; and to yeeld the same a true interpretation, it behooueth to haue all the Sciences conformable to that so oft said saw, He sent his damsels to call to the Castle. This fitteth not to be remembred to the preachers of our time, nor to aduise them that now they may do it: for their particular studie (besides the fruit which they pretend to bring with their doctrine) is to seeke out a good text, to whose purpose they may applie many fine sentences taken out of the diuine Scripture, the holy doctors, poets, historians, phisitians and lawyers, without forbearing anie Science, and speaking copiously with quietnesse and pleasant words; and with al these things they goe amplifying and stuffing their matter, an houre or two it need be, Of this saith *Cicero* the oratours of his time made profession: The force of an oratour (saith he) and the selfe art of well speaking, seemeth that it vndertaketh and promiseth to speake with copiousnesse and ornament, of whatsoeuer matter that shall be propounded. Then if we shall prooue that the graces and conditions which a perfect oratour ought to haue, do all appertaine to the imagination and to the memorie; we shall also know that the diuine, who is indowed with them will be an excellent preacher: but being set to

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the doctrin of S. *Thomas* and *Scotus* can litle skill therof, for that the ſame is a ſcience belonging to the vnderſtanding, in which power, of neceſſitie it holdeth litle force.

What the things be which appertaine to the imagination, and by what ſigns they are to be knowne, we haue heretofore made mention: now we will return to a replication of them, that they may the better be refreſhed to the memorie. All that which may be tearmed good figure, good purpoſe and prouiſion, comes from the grace of the imagination, as are merrie ieaſts, reſemblances, quips, and compariſons.

The firſt thing which a perfect Orator is to go about (hauing matter vnder hand) is to ſeeke out arguments and conuenient ſentences, whereby he may dilate and prooue, and that not with all ſorts of words, but with ſuch as giue a good conſonance to the eare: and therefore *Cicero* ſayd: I take him for an Orator, who can vſe in his diſcourſes, words well tuning with the eare, and ſentences conuenient for proofe. And this (for certain) appertaineth to the imagination, ſithens therin is a conſonance of well pleaſing words, and a good direction in the ſentences.

The ſecond grace which may not be wanting in a perfect Orator, is to poſſeſſe much inuention, or much reading, for if he reſt bound to dilate and confirme any matter whatſoeuer, with many ſpeeches and ſentences applied to the purpoſe, it behoooueth that he haue a very ſwift imagination, and that the ſame ſupplie (as it were) the place of a braach, to hunt and bring the game to his hand, and when he wants what to ſay, to deuiſe ſomewhat as if it were materiall. For this cauſe we ſayd before, that heat was an inſtrument with which the ima-

gination worketh, for this qualitie lifteth vp the figures and maketh them to boile. Here is discouered all that which in them may be seene, and if there fel out nought elſe to be conſidered, this imagination hath force not onely to compound a figure poſſible with another, but doth ioyne allo (after the order of nature) thoſe which are vnpoſſible, and of them growes to ſhape mountains of gold, and calues that flie. In lieu of their owne inuention, oratours may ſupply the ſame with much reading, foraſmuch as their imagination faileth them: but in cõcluſion whatſoeuer bookes teach, is bounded and limited; and the proper inuention is a good fountain which alwaies yeeldeth forth new and freſh water. For retaining the things which haue been read, it is requiſite to poſſeſſe much memorie, and to recite them in the preſence of the audience with readineſſe, cannot be done without the ſame power. For which cauſe *Cicero* ſaid, he ſhall (in mine opinion) be an oratour worthy of ſo important a name, who with wiſdome, with copiouſneſſe, and with ornament, can readily deliuer euerie matter that is worth the hearing. Heeretofore we haue ſaid and prooued that wiſdome appertaineth to the imagination, copiouſneſſe of words and ſentences to the memorie, ornament and poliſhment to the imagination: to recite ſo many things without faltring or ſtopping, for certain is atchieued by the goodneſſe of the memorie. To this purpoſe, *Cicero* auouched that the good oratour ought to rehearſe by heart, and not by booke. It falleth not beſides the matter to let you vnderſtand that M. *Antony* of Lebriſſa, through old age grew to ſuch a decay of memorie, that he read his Rhetoricke lecture to his ſchollers out of a paper, and for that he was ſo excellent in his profeſſion, and with good proofes confir-

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med his points propounded, it paſſed for currant; but that which might no way be tollerated, was, that where he died ſodainly of an apoplexie, the Vniuerſitie of *Alcala* recommended the making of his funerall oration to a famous preacher, who inuented and diſpoſed what he had to ſay the beſt he could: but time ſo preſſed him, as it grew impoſſible for him to con the ſame without booke: Wherefore getting vp into the pulpit with his paper in his hand, he began to ſpeake in this ſort. That which this notable man vſed to do whilſt he read to his ſchollers, I am now alſo reſolued to do in his imitation; for his death was ſo ſodaine, and the commandement to me of making his funerall ſermon ſo late, as I had neither place nor time to ſtudie what I might ſay, nor to con it by heart. Whatſoeuer I haue been able to gather with the trauell of this night, I bring heere written in this paper, and beſeech your maiſterſhips that you will heare the ſame with patience, and pardon my ſlender memorie.

This faſhion of rehearſing with paper in the hand ſo highly diſpleaſed the audience, as they did nought els than ſmile and murmure: Therefore verie well ſaid *Cicero*, that it behooued to rehearſe by heart and not by booke. This preacher verily was not endowed with any inuention of his own, but was driuen to fetch the ſame out of his books; and to performe this, great ſtudie and much memorie were requiſite. But thoſe who borrow their conceits out of their owne brain, ſtand not in need of ſtudie, time, or memorie: for they find all ready at their fingers ends. Such will preach to one ſelfe audience all their life long without reapeating any point touched in twentie yeares before; whereas thoſe that want inuention, in two Lents cull the flowers out of all

the bookes in a whole world, and ranſacke to the bottom all the writings that can be gotten; and at the third Lent muſt go and get themſelues a new auditory, except they will heare caſt in their teeth, This is the ſame which you preached vnto vs in the yeare before.

The third propertie that a good orator ought to haue, is that he know how to diſpoſe his matter, placing euerie word and ſentence in his fit roome, in ſort that the whole may carrie an anſwerable proportion, and one thing bring in another: And to this purpoſe *Cicero* ſaid, Diſpoſition is an order and diſtribution of things which ſheweth what ought in what places to be beſtowed; which grace when it is not naturall, accuſtomably breedeth much cumber to the preachers, For after they haue found in their bookes many things to deliuer, all of them cannot skill to apply this prouiſion readily to euerie point. This property of ordering and diſtributing, is for certaine a worke of the imagination, ſince (in effect) it is nought els, but figure and correſpondence.

The fourth propertie wherewith good oratours ſhould be endowed, and the moſt important of all, is action, wherwith they giue a being and life to the things which they ſpeake, and with the ſame do moue the hearers, and ſupple them to beleeue how that is true which they go about to perſuade. For which cauſe *Cicero* ſaid, Action is that which ought to be gouerned by the motion of the body, by the geſture, by the countenance, & by the confirmation and varietie of the voice. As if he ſhould ſay: action ought to be directed in making the motions and geſtures, which are requiſite for the things that are ſpoken, lifting vp and falling with the voice, growing paſſionate, and ſodainly turning to appeaſement; one while ſpeaking faſt, another-while leiſurely,

reproouing

reproouing, and cheriſhing, mouing the bodie, ſometimes to the one ſide, ſomtimes to the other, plucking in the armes, and ſtretching them out, laughing and weeping: and vpon ſome occaſions beating the hands togither. This grace is ſo important in preachers, that by the ſame alone (wanting both inuention and diſpoſition) of matters of ſmall value and ordinary, they make a ſermon which filleth the audience with aſtoniſhment, for that they haue this action, which otherwiſe is termed ſpirit or pronunciation. Heerein falleth a thing worth the marking, whereby is diſcouered how much this grace can preuaile; and it is, that the ſermons which through the much action and much ſpirite doe pleaſe much, when they be ſet downe in writing are nothing worth, nor will any wel-neer vouchſafe their reading: and this groweth becauſe with the pen it is impoſſible to pourtray thoſe motions and thoſe geſtures, which in the pulpit ſo far wan mens likings. Other ſermons ſhew verie well in paper; but at their preaching no man liſteth to giue eare becauſe that action is not giuẽ them, which is requiſite at euerie cloſe. And therefore *Plato* ſaid, that the ſtile wherewith we ſpeake, is far different from that which we write well, where-through we ſee manie men who can ſpeake very well, do yet endite but meanly, and others contrariwiſe, endite verie well, and diſcourſe but harſhly: all which is to be reduced to action, and action (for certaine) is a worke of the imagination, for all that which we haue vttered thereof, maketh figure, correſpondence, and good conſonance.

The fifth grace, is to know how to aſſemble & alleage good examples and compariſons, which better contenteth the hearers humour than any thing els: For by a fit example they eaſily vnderſtand the doctrine, and with-

out the ſame it ſoone ſlippeth out of their mind: whereon *Ariſtotle* propounded this queſtion, Whence it riſeth that men (in making ſpeeches) are better pleaſed with examples and fables than with conceits, as if he ſhould ſay, For what occaſion do ſuch as come to heare oratours, make more reckoning of the examples and fables which they alleage, to prooue the things that they ſtriue to perſuade, than of the arguments and reaſons which they frame? and to thoſe he anſwereth, That by examples & fables men learne beſt, becauſe it is a proofe which appertaineth to the ſenſe, but arguments and reaſons hold not the like reaſon, for that they are a worke whereto is requiſite much vnderſtanding. And for this cauſe Chriſt our redeemer in his ſermons vſed ſo many parables and compariſons, becauſe by them he gaue to vnderſtand many diuine ſecrets. This point of deuiſing fables and compariſons, it is a thing certaine that the ſame is performed by the imagination, for it is figure, and denoteth good correſpondence and ſimilitude.

The ſixth propertie of a good oratour, is, to haue a readie tongue of his owne, and not affected, choice words, and many gratious ſorts of vtterance: of which graces we haue entreated oftentimes heeretofore, prooving that the one part of them appertaineth to the imagination, and the other to a good memorie.

The ſeuenth propertie of a good oratour, is that which *Cicero* ſpeaketh of: furniſhed with voice, with action, and with comlineſſe, the voice full and ringing, pleaſing to the hearers, not harſh, not hoarſe, nor ſharp: and although it be true that this ſpringeth from the temperature of the breaſt and the throat, and not from the imagination: yet ſure it is that from the ſame temperature from which a good imagination groweth, namely

heat,

heat, a good voice alſo fetcheth his originall, & to know this, importeth much for our purpoſe: For the Schoole-diuines in that they are of a cold and drie complexion, cannot haue their voice a good inſtrument: and this is a great defect in a pulpit.

This ſame *Ariſtotle* alſo prooueth, alleaging the example of old men, by reaſon of their coldneſſe and dryneſſe. To haue a full and cleare voice, much heat is requiſit to enlarge the paſſages, and meaſurable moiſture which may ſupple and ſoften them. And alſo *Ariſtotle* demaundeth why al who by nature are hote, are alſo big voiced? For which cauſe we ſee the contrary in women and Eunuches, who through the much coldnes of their complexion (ſayth *Galen*) haue their throat and voice very delicat, in ſort, that when we heare a good voice, we can ſtraightwaies ſay, it comes of much heat and moiſture in the breſt: which two qualities, if they paſſe ſo far as the braine, make the vnderſtanding to decay, and the memorie and imagination to increaſe, which are the two powers wherof the good preacher ſerueth himſelfe to content his auditorie.

The eighth propertie of a good orator (ſayth *Cicero*) is to haue toung at will, ready, and well exerciſed, which grace cannot befall men of great vnderſtanding, for that it may be readie, it behooueth the ſame to partake much heat, and meane drouth. And this cannot light in the melancholicke, either naturall, or by aduſtion. *Ariſtotle* prooueth it, by asking this queſtion, Whence commeth it, that ſuch as haue an impediment in their ſpeech, are reputed to be of complexion melancholicke? To which probleme he anſwereth very vntowardly, ſaying, That the melancholicke haue a great imagination, and that the toung cannot haſt to vtter ſo faſt as the imagination

concei-

conceiueth, wherethrough they ſtammer and ſtumble: which yet proceedeth from nought elſe, ſaue that the melancholike haue euer their mouth full of froath and ſpittle, through which diſpoſition their toung is moiſt and ſlipper, which thing may euidently be diſcerned, conſidering the often ſpitting of ſuch. This ſelfe reaſon did *Ariſtotle* render, when he demaunded, Whence it groweth that ſome are ſo ſlow tounged? and he anſwereth, That ſuch haue their toung very cold and moiſt, which two qualities breed an impediment therein, and make it ſubiect to the palſie; and ſo you ſee his conceit of the imagination cannot follow: for this he yeeldeth a profitable remedie, *vz.* to drinke a little wine, or at firſt to hallow ſomwhat lowd, before they ſpeake in the preſence of their audience, for thereby the toung getteth heat, and drieth.

But *Ariſtotle* ſayth further, that not to ſpeake plaine, may grow from hauing the toung very hot, and very drie, and voucheth the example of cholericke perſons, who growing in choler, cannot ſpeake, and when they are void of paſſion and choler, they are very eloquent: the contrarie betideth to the flegmaticke, who being quiet, cannot talke, and when they are angred vtter ſpeeches of great eloquence. The reaſon of this is very manifeſt, for although it is true, that heat aideth the imagination, and the toung alſo, yet the ſame may alſo breed them dammage: firſt, for that they want ſupplie of replies and wittie ſentences, as alſo becauſe the toung cannot pronounce plainly, through ouer-much drineſſe; wherethrough we ſee, that after a man hath drunke a little water, he ſpeaketh better.

The cholericke (being quiet) deliuer very well, for they then retaine that point of heat which is requiſit for the

the toung,and the good imagination; but in anger, the heat groweth beyond due,and turneth the imagination topsie turuie. The flegmaticke vnincenſed, haue their braine very cold and moiſt,and therfore are ſet a ground what to ſay,and their toung is ouer ſlipper through too much moiſture; but when they are ſet on fire and in choler,the heat foorthwith getteth vp,and ſo lifteth vp the imagination; by which means there comes to their mind much what to deliuer, and the toung giueth no hinderance for that it is heated: theſe haue no great vaine in verſifieng,for that they are cold of braine, who yet(once angred)do then make verſes beſt, and with moſt facilitie,againſt ſuch as haue ſtirred them, and to this purpoſe *Iuuenal* ſayd:

Anger makes verſe,if nature but denie,

Through the defect of toung,men of great vnderſtanding cannot be good orators or preachers, and ſpecially for that action requireth a ſpeech ſometimes high, and ſometimes low,and thoſe who are ſlow tounged, cannot pronounce but with loud voice,and in a maner crying out, & this is one of the things which ſooneſt cloieth the hearers: whereon *Ariſtotle* mooueth this doubt, Whence it ſpringeth, that men of ſlow toung cannot ſpeake ſoft. To which probleme he anſwereth very well, ſaying, that faſtened to the toung which is the roofe of the mouth, by reaſon of much moiſture,is better looſened with a force, than if you put therto but little might, as if one would lift vp a launce, taking the ſame by the point,he ſhal ſooner raiſe it at one puſh and with a force, then taking it vp by little and little.

Me ſeemeth,I haue ſufficiently proued that the good naturall qualities which a perfect Orator ought to haue, ſpring for the moſt part from a good imagination, and

ſome

ſome from the memorie. And if it be true that the good preachers of our time content their audience, becauſe they haue theſe gifts; it followeth very well, that whoſoeuer is a great preacher can ſmall skill of Schoole-diuinitie, and a great ſcholler will hardly away with preaching, through the contrarietie, which the vnderſtanding carieth to the imagination and to the memorie. Well knew *Ariſtotle* by experience, that although the oratour learned Naturall and Morall Philoſophy, Phiſicke, Metaphiſicke, the Lawes, the Mathematicals, Aſtrologie, and al the arts and ſciences; notwithſtanding he was ſeen of all theſe, but in the flowers and choice ſentences, without pearcing to the roote of the reaſon & occaſion of any of them: But he thought that this not knowing the Diuinitie, nor the cauſe of things which is termed *Propter quid*, grew, for that they bent not themſelues thereunto, and therfore propounded this demand. Why do we imagine that a Philoſopher is different from an oratour? To which probleme he anſwereth, that the Philoſopher placeth all his ſtudie in knowing the reaſon and cauſe of euerie effect, and the oratour in knowing the effect and no farther. And verily it proceedeth from nought els, than for that naturall Philoſophy appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, which power the oratours do want; and therefore in Philoſophy they can pearce no farther than into the vpper skin of things. This ſelfe difference there is between the Schoole-diuine and the poſitiue, that the one knoweth the cauſe of whatſoeuer importeth his faculty; and the other the propoſitions which are verefied, & no more. The caſe then ſtanding thus, it falleth out a dangerous matter that the preacher enioyeth an office and authoritie to inſtruct Chriſtian people in the trueth, and that their auditorie is

bound

bound to beleeue them, and yet they want that power, through which the trueth is digged vp from the roote, we may say of them (without lying) those wordes of Christ our redeemer, Let them go, they are blinde, and do guide the blinde; and if the blind guide the blind, both fall into the ditch. It is a thing intollerable to behold with how great audacity such set themselues to preach, who cannot one iote of Schoole-diuinitie, nor haue anie naturall abilitie to learne the same.

Of such S. *Paul* greatly cõplaineth; saying, But the end of the commandement is charitie from a pure heart and good conscience, & faith vnfained: from which (verily) some straying, haue turned aside to vain babling: who would be doctors in the Law and yet vnderstand not the things which they speake, nor which they auouch.

Besides this we haue prooued tofore, that those who haue much imagination, are cholericke, subtle, malignant, and cauillers, and alwaies enclined to euill, which they can compasse with much readinesse & craft. Touching the oratours of his time, *Aristotle* propoundeth this demand, why we vse to call an oratour craftie, and giue not this name to a musitian, nor to a comical poet? And more would this difficulty haue growen, if *Aristotle* had vnderstood that musicke and the stage appertain to the imaginatiõ. To which probleme he answereth, That Musitions and stage-plaiers shoot at none other Butte, than to delight the hearers; but the oratour goes about to purchase somewhat for himselfe, and therfore it behooueth him to vse rules and readinesse, to the end the hearers may not smell out his fetch and bent.

Such properties as these be had those false preachers, of whom *S. Paul* spake, writing to the Corinthians, But I feare that as the serpent beguiled *Eue* with his subtletie;

so

ſo their ſenſes are led aſtraie: for theſe falſe Apoſtles are guilefull workmen, who transforme themſelues into the Apoſtles of Chriſt: and this is no wonder, for Sathan transformed himſelfe into an Angel of light, and therefore it is no great matter for his miniſters to transforme themſelues as miniſters of iuſtice, whoſe end ſhall be their worke: as if he ſhould ſay; I haue great feare (my brethren) that as the ſerpent beguiled *Eue* with his ſubtletie and malice, ſo they alſo intricate their iudgment and perſeuerance: for theſe falſe Apoſtles are like pottage made of a foxe. Preachers who ſpeake vnder wiles, repreſent verie perfectly a kinde of holineſſe, ſeeme the Apoſtles of Ieſus Chriſt, and yet are diſciples of the diuell, who can skill ſo well to repreſent an Angel of light, that there needeth not a ſupernaturall gift to diſcouer what he is: and ſince the maiſter can play his part ſo well, it is not ſtrange that they alſo who haue learned his doctrine practiſe the ſemblable, whoſe end ſhall be none other than their works. All theſe properties are well knowen to appertaine to the imagination, and that *Ariſtotle* ſaid very wel, that oratours are ſubtle and readie, becauſe they are euer in hand to get ſomewhat for themſelues.

Such as poſſeſſe a forcible imagination we ſaid before, that they are of complexion verie hote, and from this quality ſpring three principall vices in a man; Pride, Gluttonie, and Lecherie: for which cauſe the Apoſtle ſaid, Such ſerued not our Lord Ieſus Chriſt, but their bellie.

And that theſe three euill inclinations ſpring from heat, and the contrarie vertues from cold: *Ariſtotle* prooueth, ſaying thus: and therfore it holdeth the ſame force to ſhape conditions, for heat and cold (more than anie

thing

thing els which is in the bodie) do ſeaſon maners, and therefore printeth and worketh in vs the qualities of maners: as if he ſhould ſay, from heat and cold ſpring all the conditions of man: for theſe two qualities do more alter our nature than any other: For which cauſe men of great imagination are ordinarily bad and vitious: for they abandon themſelues to be guided by their natural inclination, and haue wit and ability to do lewdly. For which cauſe the ſame *Ariſtotle* asketh, Whence it groweth, that a man being ſo much inſtructed, is yet the moſt vniuſt of all liuing creatures? to which probleme he maketh anſwere that man hath much wit, and a great imagination, and for this he findeth manie waies to do ill, and (as by his nature he coueteth delights, and to be ſuperiour to all and of great happineſſe) it is of force that he offend: for theſe things cannot be atchieued, but by doing wrong to many: but *Ariſtotle* wiſt not how to frame this probleme, nor to yeeld a fitting anſwere.

Better might he haue enquired for what cauſe the worſt people are commonly of greateſt wit, & amongſt thoſe, ſuch as are beſt furniſhed with abilitie, commit the lewdeſt prancks: whereas of dew, a good wit and ſufficiencie ſhould rather encline a man to vertue and godlineſſe than to vices and miſdoing. The anſwere heereto is, for that thoſe who partake much heate, are men of great imagination, and the ſame qualitie which maketh them wittie, traineth them to be naughtie & vicious. But when the vnderſtanding ouerruleth, it ordinarily inclineth a man to vertue, becauſe this power is founded on cold and drie: From which two qualities, bud many vertues, as are Continencie, Humilitie, Temperance, and from heat the contrarie. And if *Ariſtotle* had knowen this point of Philoſophy, he ſhould haue

been

been able to answer this probleme which saith, Whence may it proceed that that sort of men whō we call craftsmen of *Bacchus* or stage-plaiers, are for the most part ill conditioned? as if he should say: for what cause are such as gaine their liuing on the stage, In-keepers and Butchers, and those whose seruice is vsed about feastes and banquets to order the cates, ordinarily naught and vitious? To which probleme he answereth, saying; that such by being occupied in these belly-cheere offices, leaue themselues no leisure to studie, and therefore passe ouer their life in incontinencie. And heereto is pouerty also aiding, which accustomably bringeth with it manie euils: but (verily) this is not the reason; but playing on the stage and ordering of feasts springeth from the difference of the imagination, which inuiteth a man to this maner of life. And because this difference of imagination consisteth in heate, all of them haue verie good stomackes and great appetite to eate and drinke. These although they gaue themselues to learning, should therby reape little fruit; and had they been neuer so wealthie, yet would they (howsoeuer) haue cast their affection to these seruices, were they euen baser than they are: for the wit and abilitie draweth euery one to that art, which answereth it in proportion.

For this cause *Aristotle* demanded what the reason was, why there are men who more willingly addict thēselues to the professiō of which they haue made choice, (though somwhiles vnworthy) than to the more honorable? As for example, to be rather a iugler, a stage-plaier, or a trumpeter, than an Astrologer or an Orator? To which probleme he answereth verie well, saying; that a man soon discerneth to what art he is disposed, and inclined of his owne nature, because he hath somewhat within

within that teacheth him, and nature can doe ſo much with her pricks, that albeit the art and office be vnſeemly for the calling of the learner, yet he cleaueth vnto that and not to others of greater eſtimation. But ſithence we haue put by this manner of wits from the function of preaching, and that we are bound to giue and beſtow vpon euerie difference of abilitie that ſort of learning, which is anſwerable thereto in particuler: we muſt likewiſe determin what ſort of wit he ought to be endowed withall, vnto whoſe charge the function of preaching is to be committed, which is the thing that moſt importeth the chriſtian commonwealth: For we muſt conceiue that albeit we haue prooued heertofore, that it is a matter repugnant in nature to find a great wit accompanied with much imagination and memorie. Notwithſtanding this rule holdeth not ſo vniuerſally in all arts, but that it admitteth his exceptions and ſomtimes commeth ſhort.

In the laſt chapter of this worke ſaue one, we will proue at full, that if nature be poſſeſſed of her due force, and haue no impediment caſt athwart to ſtop her, ſhe maketh ſo perfect a difference of wit, as the ſame vniteth in one ſelfe ſubiect a great vnderſtanding, with much imagination and memorie, as if they were not contrary, nor held any naturall oppoſition.

This ſhould be a fitting abilitie, and conuenient for the function of preaching, if there could be found many ſubiects to be endowed therewith; but (as we will ſhew in the place alleaged) they are ſo few, that of 100000. whom I haue meaſured, I can meet but with one of the ſize. Therefore it behoooueth to ſeeke out another more familiar difference of wit, though not ſo far ſtept in perfection as the former. We muſt then weet, that between

the Phiſitians and Philoſophers riſeth a great diuerſity in opinions, for reſoluing the temperature and the qualitie of vineger, of choler aduſt, and of aſhes; inaſmuch as theſe things ſometimes worke the effect of heat, and ſomtimes of cold; and thereon they deuided themſelues into diuers ſects : but the trueth is, that all theſe things which ſuffer adſtiuon, and are conſumed and burned by the fire, haue a variable temperature. The greater part of the ſubiect is cold and drie , but there are alſo other parts entermingled, ſo ſubtle and delicate, and of ſuch feruencie and heat, that albeit they contain litle in quantitie, yet they carie more efficacie in working than al the reſt of the ſubiect.

So we ſee that vineger and melancholie through aduſtion open & leauen the earth by meanes of the heat, and cloſe it not though the more part of theſe humours be cold. Hence is gathered that the melancholicke by aduſtion, accompanie great vnderſtanding with much imagination; but they are all weake of memorie, for the much aduſtion much alſo drieth & hardneth the braine. Theſe are good preachers, or (at leaſt) the beſt that may be found, ſauing thoſe perfect ones of whom we ſpake: for although memorie faile them, they enioy of themſelues ſuch inuention that the verie imagination ſerueth them in ſtead of memorie and remembrance; and miniſtreth vnto them figures and ſentences to deliuer, without that they ſtand in need of ought beſides. Which theſe cannot bring about who haue conned boſome ſermons , and ſwaruing from that bias are ſtraight ſet a ground, without hauing the furniture of any ſecond meanes, to bring themſelues aflote again. And that melancholie by aduſtion hath this varietie of temperature, namely; cold and dry, for the vnderſtanding , and heate

for

for the imagination, *Aristotle* declareth in these wordes, Melancholike men are variable and vnequall: for the force of choler aduſt is variable and vnequall; as if the ſame might be greatly both hot and cold, & as if he had ſaid, Melancholike men by aduſtion are variable and vnequall in their complexion: for that choler aduſt is verie vnequall, inaſmuch as ſomtimes it is exceeding hot, and ſomtimes cold beyond meaſure.

The ſigns by which men of this temperature may be knowne, are very manifeſt: they haue the colour of their countenaunce a darke greene, or ſallow, their eies very fierie; of whom it was ſayd, he is a man that hath blood in his eyes, their haire blacke and bald, their fleſh leane, rough and hairie, their vains big, they are of very good conuerſation, and affable, but letcherous, proud, ſtately, blaſphemers, wily, double, iniurious, friends of ill dooing, and deſirous of reuenge: this is to be vnderſtood when melancholie is kindled, but if it be cooled, foorthwith there grow in them the contrary vertues, chaſtitie, humilitie, feare and reuerence of God, charitie, mercie, and great acknowledgmẽt of their ſinnes, with ſighings and tears, for which cauſe they liue in continuall warre and ſtrife, without euer enioying eaſe or reſt. Somtimes vice preuaileth in them, ſometimes vertue, but with all theſe defects, they are wittieſt, and moſt able for the function of preaching, & for all matters of wiſdome which befall in the world; for they haue an vnderſtanding to know the truth, and a great imagination to be able to perſuade the ſame.

Wherethrough, we ſee that which God did when he would faſhion a man in his mothers wombe, to the end that he might be able to diſcouer to the world, the comming of his ſonne, and haue the way to prooue and per-

ſuade, That Chriſt was the Meſſias and promiſed in the law. For making him of great vnderſtanding, & of much imagination, it fell out of neceſſitie (keeping the naturall order) that he ſhould alſo make him cholericke and aduſt. And that this is true, may eaſily be vnderſtood by him, who conſidereth the great fire & furie, with which he perſecuted the church, the greefe conceiued by the ſynagogues, when they ſaw him conuerted, as they who had forgone a man of high importance, and of whom the contrarie partie had made a gainfull purchace. It is alſo knowen by the tokens of the reaſonable choler, with which he ſpake and anſwered the deputy, Conſuls, and the Iudges who had arreſted him: defending his owne perſon and the name of Chriſt, with ſo great art and readineſſe, as he conuinced them all: yet he had an imperfection in his tongue, and was not very prompt of ſpeech, which *Ariſtotle* affirmeth to be a property of the melancholicke by aduſtion. The vices wherto he confeſſed himſelfe to be ſubiect before his conuerſion, ſhew him to haue been of this temperature: he was a blaſphemer, a wrong doer, and a perſecutor: all which ſpringeth from abundance of heat. But the moſt euident ſigne which ſhewed that he was cholericke aduſt, is gathered from that battaile which himſelfe confeſſeth he had within himſelfe, betwixt his part ſuperiour & inferiour, ſaying; I ſee another law in my members ſtriuing againſt the law of my minde, which leadeth me into the bondage of ſinne. And this ſelfe contention haue we prooued (by the mind of *Ariſtotle*) to be in the melancholicke by aduſtion.

Paule.

True it is that ſome expound (very well) that this battaile groweth from the diſorder which originall ſinne made betweene the ſpirit and the fleſh; albeit being ſuch

and

and ſo great, I beleue alſo that it ſprings from the choler aduſt, which he had in his naturall conſtitution: for the roiall prophet *Dauid* participated equally of original ſin, and yet complained not ſo much as did *S. Paul*; but ſaith, that he found the inferiour portion accorded with his reaſon, when he would reioice with God: My heart (ſaith he) and my fleſh ioyed in the liuing God, and (as we will touch in the laſt chapter ſaue one) *Dauid* poſſeſſed the beſt temperature that nature could frame: and heereof we will make proofe by the opinion of all the Philoſophers, that the ſame ordinarily enclineth a man to be vertuous without any great gainſtriuing of the fleſh. The wits then which are to be ſorted out for preachers, are firſt thoſe who vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination and memorie, whoſe ſignes ſhalbe expreſſed in the laſt chapter ſaue one. Where ſuch want, there ſucceede in their roome the melancholicke by aduſtion. Thoſe vnite a great vnderſtanding with much imagination, but ſuffer defect of memorie; wherthrough, they are not ſtored with copie of words, nor can preach with full ſtore in preſence of the people.

In the third rancke ſucceed men of great vnderſtanding, but defectiue in their imagination and memorie. Theſe ſhall haue but a bad grace in preaching; yet will preach ſound doctrine. The laſt whom I would not charge with preaching at all, are ſuch as vnite much memorie with much imagination, and haue defect of vnderſtanding. Theſe draw the auditorie after them, and hold them in ſuſpenſe and well pleaſed: but when they leaſt miſdoubt it, they fetch a turne to the holy houſe: for by way of their ſweet diſcourſes and bleſſings, they beguile the innocent.

CHAP. XI.

That the Theoricke of the lawes appertaineth to the memorie, and pleading and iudging (which are their practiſe) to the vnderſtanding, and the gouerning of a common-wealth to the imagination.

IN the Spaniſh toung, it is not void of a myſterie, that this word (Lettered) being a common tearme for all men of letters or learning, as well Diuines, as Lawyers, Phiſitions, Logicians, Philoſophers, Orators, Mathematicians, and Aſtrologers, yet in ſaying that ſuch a one is learned, we all vnderſtand it by common ſence, that he maketh profeſſion of the lawes, as if this were their proper and peculiar title, and not of the reſidue.

The aunſwer of this doubt, though it be eaſie, yet to yeeld the ſame ſuch as is requiſit, it behoueth firſt to be acquainted what law is, and wherevnto they are bound, who ſet themſelues to ſtudie that profeſſion, that afterwards they may imploie the ſame to vſe, when they are iudges or pleaders. The law (who ſo well conſidereth thereof) is nought elſe, but a reaſonable will of the law maker, by which he declareth, in what ſort he will that the caſes which happen dayly in the common wealth, be decided, for preſeruing the ſubiects in peace, and directing them in what ſort they are to liue, & what things they are to refraine.

I ſayd, a reaſonable will, becauſe it ſufficeth not, that the king or emperour (who are the efficient cauſe of the lawes) declaring his will in what ſort ſoeuer, doth thereby

by make it a law, for if the ſame be not iuſt, and grounded vpon reaſon, it cannot be called a law, neither is it: euen as he cannot be tearmed a man who wanteth a reaſonable ſoule. Therefore it is a matter eſtabliſhed by common accord, that kings enact their lawes with aſſent of men very wiſe and of ſound iudgement, to the end they may be right, iuſt, and good, and that the ſubiects may receiue them with good will, and be the more bound to obſerue and obey them. The materiall cauſe of the law is, that it conſiſt of ſuch caſes as accuſtomably befall in the common wealth, according to the order of nature, and not of things impoſſible or ſuch as betide very ſildome. The finall cauſe is, to order the life of man and to direct him what he is to do, and what to forbeare, to the end that being conformed to reaſon, the common wealth may be preſerued in peace. For this cauſe we ſee that the lawes are written in plaine words, not doubtfull, nor obſcure, nor of double vnderſtanding, without ciphers, and without abbreuiations, and ſo eaſie and manifeſt, that whoſoeuer ſhall read them, may readily vnderſtand and retaine them in memorie. And becauſe no man ſhould pretend ignorance, they are publikely proclaymed, that whoſoeuer afterward breaketh them, may be chaſtiſed.

In reſpect therefore of the care and diligence which the good law makers vſe, that their lawes may be iuſt and plaine, they haue giuen in charge to the iudges and pleaders, that in actions or iudgements, none of them follow his owne ſence, but ſuffer himſelfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes, as if they ſhould ſay, We commaund that no iudge or aduocat, imploy his conceit, nor intermeddle in deciding, whether the law be iuſt or vniuſt, nor yeeld it any other ſence than that that

is contained in the text of the letter. So it followeth that the lawyers are to construe the text of the law, and to take that sense which is gathered out of the construction thereof, and none other.

This doctrine thus presupposed, it falleth out a matter very manifest, for what reason the lawyers are termed lettered, and other men of learning not so, for this name is deriued from the word letter, which is to say, a man who is not licenced to follow the capacitie of his owne vnderstanding, but is enforced to ensue the sense of the very letter. And for that the well practised in this profession haue so construed it, they dare not denie or affirme any thing which appertaineth to the determination of any case whatsoeuer, vnles they haue lying before them some law which in expresse tearms decideth the same. And if sometimes they speake of their owne head, interterlacing their conceit and reason, without grounding vpon some law, they do it with feare and bashfulnesse, for which cause it is a much worne prouerbe, We blush when we speake without law. Diuines cannot call themselues lettered in this signification, for in the holy scripture the letter killeth, and the spirit giueth life; it is full of mysteries, repleniſhed with figures and cyphers, obscure, and not vnderstood by all readers, the vowels and phrases of speech hold a very different significatiõ from that which the vulgar and three-tounged men do know. Therefore whosoeuer shall set himselfe to construe the letter, and take the sence which riseth of that Grammaticall construction, shall fall into many errours.

The Phisitions also haue no letter whereto to submit themselues, for if *Hippocrates* and *Galen*, and the other graue authors of this facultie, say and affirme one thing, and that experience and reason approue the contrarie, they

they are not bound to follow them: for in Phiſicke, experience beareth more ſway than reaſon, and reaſon more than authoritie: but in the lawes it betideth quite contrary, for their authoritie and that which they determine, is of more force and vigour than all the reaſons that may be alleaged to the contrary. Which being ſo, we haue the way layd open before vs, to aſſigne what wit is requiſit for the lawes. For if a Lawyer haue his vnderſtanding and imagination tied to follow that which the law auouched, without adding or diminiſhing, it falleth out apparent, that this facultie appertaineth to the memorie, and that the thing wherein they muſt labour, is to know the number of the lawes, and of the rules which are in the text, and to call to remembrance ech of them in particular, & to rehearſe at large his ſentence and determination, to the end that when occaſion is miniſtred, we may know there is a law which giueth deciſion, and in what forme and maner. Therefore to my ſeeming it is a better difference of wit for a lawyer to haue much memory and litle vnderſtanding, than much vnderſtanding and litle memorie. For if there fall out no occaſion of employing his wit and abilitie, and that he muſt haue at his fingers ends ſo great a number of lawes as are extant, and ſo far different from the other; with ſo manie exceptions, limitations, & enlargements, it ſerues better to know by heart what hath been determined in the lawes for euerie point which ſhall come in queſtion, than to diſcourſe with the vnderſtanding in what ſort the ſame might haue been determined: for the one of theſe is neceſſaric, & the other impertinent, ſince none other opinion than the verie determination of the law muſt beare the ſtroke.

So it falles out for certaine, that the Theorick of the law

law appertaineth to the memorie and not to the vnderſtanding, nor to the imagination: for which reaſon, and for that the lawes are ſo poſitiue, and that becauſe the lawyers haue their vnderſtanding ſo tied to the will of the law-maker, and cannot entermingle their own reſolution, ſaue in caſe where they reſt vncertaine of the determination of the law, when any client ſeeketh their iudgement, they haue authoritie and licence to ſay, I wil looke for the caſe in my booke: which if the Phiſition ſhould anſwer when he is asked a remedie for ſome diſeaſe, or the Diuine in caſes of conſcience; we would repute them for men, but ſimply ſeen in the facultie wherof they make profeſſion. And the reaſon heereof is, that thoſe ſciences haue certain vniuerſall principles and definitions, vnder which the particuler caſes are contained; but in the law-facultie euery law containeth a ſeuerall particular caſe, without hauing anie affinitie with the next, though they both be placed vnder one title. In reſpect whereof, it is neceſſarie to haue a notice of al the lawes, and to ſtudie ech one in particuler, and diſtinctly to lay them vp in memorie. But heere againſt *Plato* noteth a thing worthy of great conſideration; and that is, how in his time a learned man was held in ſuſpition that he knew many lawes by heart, ſeeing by experience that ſuch were not ſo skilfull iudges & pleaders, as this their vaunt ſeemed to pretend. Of which effect it appeareth he could not find out the cauſe, ſeeing in a place ſo conuenient he did not report the ſame; onely he ſaw by experience that Lawyers endowed with good memorie, being ſet to defend a cauſe, or to giue a ſentence, applied not their reaſons ſo well as was conuenient.

The reaſon of this effect may eaſily be rendered in my doctrine, preſuppoſing that memorie is contrarie to the

the vnderſtanding, & that the true interpretation of the lawes, to amplifie, reſtraine,and compound them, with their contraries and oppoſitions,is done by diſtinguiſhing,concluding, arguing, iudging, and chuſing: which workes we haue often ſaid heeretofore belong to diſcourſe, and the learned man poſſeſſing much memorie cannot by poſſibilitie enioy them.

We haue alſo noted heeretofore that memorie ſupplieth none other office in the head than faithfully to preſerue the figures and fantaſies of things: but the vnderſtanding and the imagination, are thoſe which work therewithall.

And if a learned man haue the whole art of memory, and yet want vnderſtanding and imagination, he hath no more ſufficiencie to iudge or plead, than the verie *Code* or *Digeſt*,which cõpaſſing within them all the laws and rules of reaſon, for all that cannot write one letter. Moreouer,albeit it be true that the law ought to be ſuch as we haue mentioned in his definition; yet it falleth out a miracle to finde thinges with all the perfections, which the vnderſtanding attributeth vnto them: that the law be iuſt and reaſonable, and that it proceed fullie to all that which may happen, that it be written in plain termes,void of doubt & oppoſitions, and that it receiue not diuerſe conſtructions, we ſee not alwaies accompliſhed: for in concluſion,it was eſtabliſhed by mans coũſell,and that is not of force ſufficient to giue order for al that may betide:and this is daily ſeen by experience,for after a law hath bin enacted with great aduiſement and counſell, the ſame (in ſhort ſpace) is abrogated againe; for when it is once publiſhed and put in practiſe,a thouſand inconueniences diſcouer themſelues: whereof (when it was perſuaded) no man took regard:and therfore

fore kings and emperours are aduiſed by the ſame laws, that they ſhame not to amend and correct their lawes: for, in a word, men they are, and maruell there is none if they commit an error, ſo much the rather, for that no law can comprehend in wordes and ſentences all the circumſtances of the caſe which it decideth: for the craft of bad people is more wily to finde holes than that of good men to foreſee how they are to be gouerned; and therefore it was ſaid, Neither the lawes nor the reſolutions of the Senate can be ſet down in writing in ſuch ſort, that all the caſes which ſeuerally chance may be compriſed therein; but it ſufficeth to comprehend the things which fall out oftener: and if other caſes ſucceed afterward, for which no law is enacted, it decideth them in proper termes.

The law facultie is not ſo bare of rules and principles, but that if the iudge or pleader haue a good diſcourſe, to know how to applie them; they may find their true determination and defence, and whence to gather the ſame. In ſort that if the caſes be more in number than the lawes, it behooueth that in the iudge and in the pleader there be much diſcourſe to make new laws, and that not at all aduentures: but ſuch as reaſon (by his conſonance) may receiue them without contradiction. This the lawyers of much memorie cannot doe: for if the caſes which the law thruſteth into their mouth, be not ſquared and chewed to their hands, they are to ſeek what to doe. We are woont to reſemble a lawyer, who can rehearſe many lawes by heart, to a regrater or hoſier that hath many paires of hoſen ready made in his ſhop, who, to deliuer you one that may fit you, muſt make you to aſſay them all: and if none agree with the buiers meaſure, he muſt ſend him away hoſeleſſe. But a learned

learned man of good vnderſtanding, is like a good taiſer, who hath his ſheeres in his hand, and his peece a cloth on the table, and taking meaſure, cutteth his hoſen after his ſtature that demandeth them.

The ſheeres of a good pleader is his ſharp vnderſtanding, with which he taketh meaſure of the caſe, and apparelleth the ſame with that law which may decide it: and if he finde not a whole one that may determine it in expreſſe termes, he maketh one of many peeces, and therewith vſeth the beſt defence that he may. The lawyers who are endowed with ſuch a wit and abilitie, are not to be termed lettered: for they conſtrue not the letter, neither bind themſelues to the formall words of the law; but it ſeemeth they are law-makers, or counſellors at law: of whom the lawes themſelues enquire and demand how they ſhall determine: for if they haue power & authoritie to interpret them, to reaue, to adde, and to gather out of them exceptions, and fallacies, and that they may correct and amend them, it was not vnfitly ſaid, That they ſeem to be law-makers.

Of this ſort of knowledge it was ſpoken: by the knowledge of the lawes it is not meant to con their wordes by rote; but to take notice of their force and power, as if he ſhould ſay, Let no man thinke that to know the lawes is to beare in minde the formall words with which they are written; but to vnderſtand how far their forces extend, and what the point is which they may decide: for their reaſon is ſubiect to manie varieties, by meanes of the circumſtances as well of time as of perſon, of place, of maner, of matter, of cauſe, and of the thing it ſelfe. All which breedeth an alteration in the deciſion of the law, and if the iudge or pleader be not endowed with diſcourſe, to gather out of the law, or to take

take away or adioine that which the law ſelfe doth not expreſſe in words, he ſhall commit manie errors in following the letter: for it hath been ſaid that the words of the law are not to be taken after the Iewiſh manner, that is, to conſture onely the letter, and ſo take the ſenſe thereof.

On the things alreadie alleaged, we conclude that pleading is a worke of diſcourſe, and that if the learned in the lawes poſſeſſe much memorie, he ſhalbe vntoward to iudge or plead through the repugnancie of theſe two powers. And this is the cauſe for which the learned of ſo ripe memorie (whom *Plato* mentioneth) could not defend well their clients cauſes, nor apply the lawes. But in this doctrin there preſents it ſelfe a doubt, and that (in mine opinion) not of the lighteſt: for if the diſcourſe be that which putteth the caſe in the law, and which determineth the ſame by diſtinguiſhing, limiting, amplifieng, inferring, and anſwering the arguments of the contrarie party, how is it poſſible that the diſcourſe may compaſſe all this, if the memorie ſet not downe all the lawes before it? for (as we haue aboue remembred) it is commanded that no man in actions or iudgements ſhall vſe his owne ſenſe, but leaue himſelfe to be guided by the authoritie of the lawes. Conformable heereunto, it behoooueth firſt to know all the lawes and rules of the law facultie, ere we can take hold of that which maketh to the purpoſe of our caſe. For albeit we haue ſaid that the pleader (of good vnderſtāding) is lord of the lawes: yet it is requiſit that all his reaſons and arguments be grounded on the principles of this facultie, without which they are of none effect or valure. And to be able to do this it behooueth to haue much memorie that may preſerue and retaine ſo great a number of laws

which

which are written in the books.

This argument prooueth it to be neceſſarie, to the end a pleader may be accompliſhed, that there be vnited in him a great diſcourſe and much memorie. All which I confeſſe, but that which I would ſay is, that ſince we cannot finde great diſcourſe vnited with much memorie, through the repugnancie which they carrie ech to other, it is requiſit that the pleader haue much diſcourſe, and litle memory, rather than much memory & litle diſcourſe: for to the default of memory are found many remedies; as books, tables, alphabets, & other things deuiſed by men: but if diſcourſe faile, there can nothing be found to remedie the ſame.

Beſides this, *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that men of great diſcourſe though they haue a feeble memory, yet they haue much remembrance, by which they retaine a certaine diffuſe notice of things, they haue ſeen, heard, and read: wherupon diſcourſing, they cal them to memorie. And albeit they had not ſo many remedies to preſent vnto the vnderſtanding the whole bodie of the ciuill law: yet the lawes are grounded on ſo great reaſon, as *Plato* reporteth, that the ancients termed the law, Wiſdom & Reaſon. Therefore the iudge or pleader, of great diſcourſe, though iudging or counſelling he haue not the law before him; yet ſeldome ſhall he commit an error: for he hath with him the inſtrument, with which the Emperors made the lawes. Whence oftentimes it falleth out that a Iudge of good wit, giueth a ſentence without knowing the deciſion of the law; and afterwards findeth the ſame ſo ruled in his books: and the like we ſee ſomtimes betideth the pleaders when they giue their iudgement in a caſe without ſtudying. The lawes and rules of reaſon, whoſoeuer well marketh them, are the fountaine

taine and originall, whence the pleaders gather their arguments and reaſons to prooue what they vndertake. And this worke (for certaine) is performed by the diſcourſe: which power if the pleader want, he ſhall neuer skill to ſhape an argument though he haue the whole ciuill law at his fingers ends. This we ſee plainly to befall in ſuch as ſtudie the art of oratorie, when the aptneſſe thereunto is failing: for though they learne by art the Topicks of *Cicero*, being the ſpring from which flow the arguments that may be inuented to prooue euerie probleme, both on the affirmatiue and the negatiue part: yet they cannot thereout ſhape a reaſon. Againe, there come others of great wit and towardnes; who without looking in booke or ſtudying the Topicks, make 1000 arguments ſeruing for the purpoſe, as occaſion requireth.

This ſelfe falleth out in the lawyers of good memorie, who will recite you a whole text very perfectly, and yet of ſo great a multitude of lawes, as are compriſed therein, cannot collect ſo much as one argument to prooue their intention. And contrariwiſe, others who haue ſtudied ſimply without books, and without allowance, worke miracles in pleading of cauſes. Hence we know how much it importeth the common wealth, that there may be ſuch an election and examination of wits for the ſciences; inaſmuch as ſome without art know and vnderſtand what they are to effect: and others loden with precepts and rules, for that they want a conuenient towardlineſſe for practiſe, commit a thouſand abſurdities, which verie ill beſeeme them. So then, if to iudge & plead, be effected by diſtinguiſhing, inferring, arguing, & chuſing, it ſtandeth with reaſon that whoſoeuer ſetteth himſelfe to ſtudie the lawes, enioy a good vnder-

vnderſtanding, ſeeing that ſuch actions appertain to this power, and not to the memorie or to the imagination. How we may finde whether a child be endowed with this difference of wit or no, it would do well to vnderſtand: but firſt it behooueth to lay downe what are the qualities of diſcourſe, & how many differences it compriſeth in it ſelfe, to the end we may likewiſe know with diſtinction, to which of theſe the lawes appertaine: for the firſt, we muſt weet, that albeit the vnderſtanding be the moſt noble power, and of greateſt dignitie in man: yet there is none which is more eaſily led into errour (as touching the trueth) than the vnderſtanding. This *Ariſtotle* attempted to prooue when he ſaid, That the ſenſe is euer true, but the vnderſtanding (for the moſt part) diſcourſeth badly; the which is plainly ſeen by experience: for if it were not ſo amongſt the Diuines, the Phiſitions, the Philoſophers, and the Lawyers, there would not fall out ſo manie waightie diſſentions, ſo diuers opinions, and ſo many iudgements and conceits vpon euery point, ſeeing the trueth is neuer more than one. Whence it groweth, that the ſenſes hold ſo great acertaintie in their obiects, and the vnderſtanding is ſo eaſily beguiled in his, may well be conceiued if we conſider that the obiects of the fiue ſenſes, and the ſpices by which they are known, haue their being, reall, firme, and ſtable by nature before they are knowen. But that truth which is to be contemplated by the vnderſtanding, if it ſelfe do not frame and faſhion the ſame, it hath no formall being of his owne; but is wholly ſcattered and loſe in his materials, as a houſe conuerted into ſtones, earth, timber & tiles, with which ſo many errors may be committed in building, as there ſhall men ſet themſelues to build with ill imagination.

Lib. 3. de Anima. ca. 3.

The like befalleth in the building which the vnderſtanding raiſeth when it frameth a trueth : for if the wit be not good, all the reſidue wil worke a thouſand follies with the ſelfe ſame principles. Hence ſprings it that amongſt men there are ſo ſundrie opinions touching one ſelfe matter: for euery one maketh the compoſition and figure ſuch as is his vnderſtanding.

From theſe errours and opinions are the fiue ſenſes free: for neither the eies make the colour, nor the taſt the ſauours, nor the feeling the palpable qualities; but the whole is made and compounded by nature before anie of them be acquainted with his obiect. Men becauſe they carrie not regard to this bad operation of the vnderſtanding, take hardineſſe to deliuer confidently their owne opinion, without knowing (in certaintie) of what ſort their wit is, and whither it can a faſhion a truth well or ill. And if we be not reſolued heerein, let vs ask ſome of theſe learned mẽ, who after they haue ſet down in writing, and confirmed their opinions with many arguments and reaſons, and haue another time changed their opinions and conceit, when or how they can aſſure themſelues, that (now at laſt) they haue hit the nail on the head? themſelues will not denie, but that they erred the firſt time, ſeeing they vnſay what they ſaid tofore.

Secondly, I auouch that they ought to haue the leſſe confidence in their vnderſtanding, becauſe the power which once ill compoundeth the trueth, whileſt his patrone placed ſo much aſſurance in his argumentes and reaſons, ſhould therefore the ſooner take ſuſpect, that he may once again ſlide into error whileſt he worketh with the ſelfe ſame inſtrument of reaſon; and ſo much the rather for that it hath been ſeen by experience, that the

firſt

firſt opinion hath borne moſt trueth,and afterwards he hath relied vpon a worſe,and of leſſe probabilitie. They hold it for a ſufficient token, that the vnderſtanding compoundeth well a trueth, when they ſee it inamored of ſuch a figure; and that there are arguments & reaſons which moue it to conclude in that ſort: and verily they miſſe their cuſhion, for the ſame vnderſtanding carrieth the ſame proportion to his falſe opinions, that the inferiour powers haue ech with the differences of their obiect: for if we demand of the Phiſitions, what meat is beſt and moſt ſauoury of al that men accuſtomably feed vpon; I beleeue they will anſwere, that for men who are diſtémpered and of weake ſtomacke, there is none abſolutely good or euill, but ſuch as the ſtomacke is that ſhal receiue it: for there are ſtomacks (ſaith *Galen*) which better brooke beefe than hennes or cracknels, and otherſome abhorre egges and milke: and others againe haue a longing after them, and in the maner of vſing meates: ſome like roſt,and ſome boild: and in roſt, ſome loue to haue the bloud run in the diſh, and ſome to haue it browne and burned, And (which is more worthie of conſideration) that meat which this day is ſauourly eaten, and with good appetite, to morrow will be lothed, and a farre worſe longed for in his roome. All this is vnderſtood when the ſtomacke is good and ſound: but if it fall into a certain infirmitie, which the Phiſitions call Pica,or Malacia, then ariſe longings after things, which mans nature abhorreth: ſo as they eate earth, coles,and lime, with greater appetite than hennes or trouts. If we paſſe on to the facultie generatiue, we ſhall find as many appetites & varieties: for ſome men loue a foule womā, and abhorre a faire: others caſt better liking to a foole than her that is wiſe: a fat wench is ful ſome,and a leane

hath their liking, ſilks & braue attire offend ſome mens fancies, who leeſe themſelues after one that totters in her ragges. This is vnderſtood when the genitall partes are in their ſoundneſſe: but if they fall into their infirmitie of ſtomacke, which is termed Malacia, they couet deteſtable beaſtlineſſe. The ſame befalleth in the facultie ſenſitiue: for of the palpable qualities hard and ſoft, rough and ſmooth, hot and cold, moiſt and drie, there is none of them which can content euery ones feeling: for there are men who take better reſt on a hard bed than a ſoft, & other ſom better on a ſoft than a hard. All this varietie of ſtrange taſts & appetites, is found in the compoſitions, framed by the vnderſtanding: for if we aſſemble 100 men of learning and propound a particular queſtion, each of them deliuereth a ſeuerall iudgement, and diſcourſeth thereof in different maner. One ſelfe argument to one ſeemeth a ſophiſticall reaſon, to another probable; and ſome you ſhall meet with, to whoſe capacitie it concludeth as if it were a demonſtration. And this is not onely true in diuerſe vnderſtandings, but we ſee alſo by experience that one ſelfe reaſon concludeth to one ſelfe vnderſtanding, at one time thus-wiſe, and at another time otherwiſe: ſo much that euerie day men varie in opinion; ſome by proceſſe of time purging their vnderſtanding, know the default of reaſon, which firſt ſwaied them, and others leeſing the good temperature of their braine, abhorre the trueth, and giue allowance to a leaſing. But if the braine fall into the infirmitie, which is termed *Malacia*, then we ſhal ſee ſtrange iudgements and compoſitions, arguments falſe and weake to prooue more forcibly than ſuch as carrie ſtrength and trueth; to good arguments, an anſwere ſhaped, and to bad a condeſcēding: from the premiſſes, whence a right

conclu-

conclusion may be collected, they gather a wrong, and by strange arguments, and fond reasons, they prooue their bad imaginations. This, graue and learned men duely aduising, labour to deliuer their opinion, concealing the reasons whereon they ground: for men persuade themselues, that so farre mans authoritie auaileth, as the reason is of force on which he buildeth, and the arguments resting so indifferent for cõcluding through the diuersitie of vnderstandings, euerie man giueth a iudgement of the reason conformably to the wit which he possesseth: for which cause it is reputed greater grauitie to say, This is mine opinion, for certaine reasons which moue me so to thinke, than to display the arguments whereon he relieth. But if they be enforced to render a reason of their opinion, they ouerslip not anie argument, how slight soeuer: for that which they least valued, with some concludeth and worketh more effect, than the most vrgent. Wherein the great miserie of our vnderstanding is discouered, which compoundeth, and diuideth, argueth, and reasoneth, and at last (when it is growen to a conclusion) is void of proofe or light, which may make it discerne whether his opinion be true or no.

This selfe vncertaintie haue the diuines in matters which appertaine not to the faith: for after they haue argued at full, they cannot then assure themselues of anie infallible proofe or euident successe that may discouer, which reasons carried greatest waight, and so eurie diuine casteth how he may best ground himself, and answer with most apparence to the aduerse parties arguments, his owne reputation saued, and this is all whereabouts he must bestow his endeuour. But the charge of a Phisition, and a Generall in the field, after he hath with

discoursed and refuted the grounds of the contrary parte, is to marke the successe, which if it be good, he shall be held for discreet; if bad, all men will know that he relied vpon guilefull reasons.

Take heed you receiue no hurt for leauing out the Pope.

In matters of faith propounded by the Church, there can befall none error: for God, best weeting how vncertaine mens reasons are, and with how great facilitie they runne headlong to be deceiued, contenteth not that matters so high and of so waighty importance, should rest vpon our onely determination: but when two or three are gathered together in his name, into the solemnitie of the Church, he forthwith entreth into the midst of them, as president of the action, and so giueth allowance to that which they say well, and reuealeth their errours, and of himself reuealeth that, to whose notice by humane forces we can not attaine. Two proofes then, which the reasons formed in matters of faith must beare, is to aduise well whether they proue or inferre the same, which the Catholicke church saith and declareth: for if they collect ought to the contrarie, then (without doubt) they are faulty. But in other questions, where the vnderstanding hath liberty of diuise, there hath not yet any maner bin deuised to know what reasons conclude, nor when the vnderstanding doth well compound a truth: only we relie vpon the good consonance which they make, and that is in argument which may erre for many false points can beare apparance and likelier proofe to obtrude, than the true themselues.

Phisitions, and such as command in martiall affaits, haue successe and experience for proofe of their reasons. For if a Captaine prouide by many reasons, that it is best to goe into Barbarie, and so many (in the Ocean sea) defend

the contrarie, that which succedeth, will confirme the one opinion, and conuince the other. And if two Phisitions dispute whether the patient shall die or liue, after he is cured or deceased, it will appeare whose reason was best. But for all this, the successe is yet no sufficient proofe, for whereas an effect hath many causes, it may very well betide happily for one cause, and yet the reasons (perhaps) were grounded on a contrary. *Aristotle* moreouer affirmeth, that to know what reasons conclude, it is good to ensue the common opinion; for if many wisemen say and affirme one selfe thing, and all conclude with the same reasons, it is a signe (though topicall) that they are concluding, and that they compounde well the truth. But whoso taketh this into due consideration, shall find it a proofe subiect also vnto beguiling; for in the forces of the vnderstanding, waight is of more preheminence than number: for it faieth not in this, as in bodily forces, that when many ioine together to lift vp a waight, they preuaile much; and when few, but little: but to attaine to the notice of a truth deepely hidden, one high vnderstanding is of more value, than 10000 which are not comparable thereunto; and the reason is, because the vnderstandings helpe not each other, neither of many make one, as it fals out in bodily powers. Therefore well layd the wise man, Haue many peace-makers, but take one of a thousand to be thy counsellor; as if he should say, Keepe for thy selfe many friends who may defend thee when thou shalt be driuen to come to hand-strokes, but to aske counsell, chuse onely one amongst a thousand. Which sentence was also expressed by *Heraclitus*, who layd, One with me is worth a thousand. In contentions and causes, euery learned man bethinketh how he may best ground himselfe on

on reason, but after he hath well reuolued euery thing, there is no art which can make him know with assurance whether his vnderstanding haue made that composition which in iustice is requisit; for if one pleader proue with law in hand, that reason standeth on the demandants side, and another by way also of the law, prooueth the like for the defendant, what remedie shall we deuise, to know which of the two pleaders hath formed his reasons best? The sentence of the Iudge maketh no demonstration of true iustice, neither can the same be termed a successe, for his sentence (also) is but an opinion, & he doth none other than cleaue to one of the two pleaders: and to increase the number of learned men in one selfe opinion, is no argument to perswade that what they resolue vpon is therefore true, for we haue alreadie affirmed and prooued, that many weake capacities (though they ioine in one to discouer some darke conceiued truth) shall neuer arriue to the power and force of some one alone, if the same be an vnderstãding of high reach. And that the sentence of the Iudge maketh no demonstration, is plainly seene, in that at another higher seat of iustice they reuerse the same and giue a diuerse iudgement, and (which is woorst) it may so fall, that the inferiour iudge, was of an abler capacitie than the superior, and his opinion more conformable vnto reason. And that the sentence of the superiour iudge, is not a sufficient proofe of iustice neither, it is a matter very manifest, for in the same actions, and from the same iudges, without adding or reauing any one iot, we see dayly contrarie sentences to issue. And he that once is deceiued by placing confidence in his owne reasons, falleth duly into suspect, that he may be deceiued of new. Wherethrough we should the lesse relie vpon his opinion, For

he that is once naught (sayth the wiseman) chace him from thee. Pleaders, seeing the great varietie of vnderstandings which possesse the iudges, and that each of them is affectionat to the reason which best squareth with his wit, and that sometime they take satisfaction at one argument, & sometimes assent to the contrary, they thereupon boldly thrust themselues foorth to defend euery cause in controuersie, both on the part affirmatiue and the negatiue; and this so much the rather, because they see by experience, that in the one maner and the other, they haue a sentence in their fauour, and so that coms very rightly to be verefied, which wisedome sayd, The thoughts of mortall men are timerous, and their foresights vncertaine. The remedie then which we haue against this, seeing the reasons of the lawyer faile in proofe and experience, shall be, to make choise of men of great vnderstanding, who may be iudges and pleaders; For the reasons and arguments of such (sayth *Aristotle*) are no lesse certaine and firme, than experience it selfe. And by making this choice, it seemeth that the cõmon wealth resteth assured that her officers shall administer iustice. But if they giue them all scope, to enter without making trial of their wit, as the vse is at this day, the inconueniences (which we haue noted) will euermore befall.

By what signs it may be knowne, that he who shall studie the lawes, hath the difference of wit requisit to this facultie, heretofore (after a sort) we haue expressed, but yet, to renew it to the memorie, and to prooue the same more at large, we must know, that the child who being set to read, soone learneth to know his letters, and can pronounce euery one with facilitie, according as they be placed in the A B C, giueth token that he shal be endowed

endowed with much memorie, for such a worke as this (for certaine) is not performed by the vnderstanding, nor by the imagination, but it appertaineth vnto the office of the memorie, to preserue the figures of things, and to report the natures of each, when occasion so requireth, and where much memorie dwelleth, we haue prooued before, that default of vnderstanding also raigneth.

To write also with speed, and a faire hand, we sayd that it bewraid an imagination, wherethrough the child who in few daies wil frame his hand, and write his lines right, and his letters euen and with good forme and figure, yeeldeth signe of meane vnderstanding, for this worke is performed by the imagination, and these two powers encounter in that contrarietie which we haue alreadie spoken of and noted.

And if being set to Grammer he learne the same with little labour, and in short time make good Latines, and write fine epistles, with the well ruled closes of *Cicero*, he shall neuer be good iudge nor pleader, for it is a signe that he hath much memorie, and (saue by great miracle) he will be of slender discourse. But if such a one wax obstinat in plodding at the lawes, and spend much time in the schooles, he will proue a famous reader, and shall haue a stint of many hearers, for the latine tongue is very gratious in chaires, and to read with great show, there are requisit many allegations, and to fardell vp in euery law, whatsoeuer hath bene written touching the same; and to this purpose, memorie is of more necessitie than discourse. And albeit it is true, that in the chaire he be to distinguish, inferre, argue, iudge and chuse, to gather the true sense of the law; yet in the end he putteth the case as best liketh himselfe, he mooues doubts, maketh

obiections,

obiections, and giueth sentence after his own will, without that any gainsaie him: for which a meane discourse is sufficient. But when one pleader speaketh for the plaintife, and another for the defendant, and a third lawyer supplieth the iudges place; this is a true controuersie, & men cannot speake so at random, as when they skirmish without an aduersarie. And if the childe profit slenderly in Grammer, we may thereby gather, that he hath a good discourse, I say we may so coniecture, because it followeth not of necessitie, that whosoeuer cannot learne Latine, hath therefore straightwaies a good discourse, seeing we haue prooued before, that children of good imagination neuer greatly profit in the Latine tongue; but that which may best discouer this, is Logicke: for this science carieth the same proportion with the vnderstanding, as the touchstone with gold. Wherethrough it falleth out certaine, that if he who taketh lesson in the arts, begin not within a month or two to discourse and to cast doubts; and if there come not in his head arguments and answers in the matter which is treated of, he is void of discourse: but if he proceede towardly in his science, it is an infallible argument that he is endued with a good vnderstanding for the lawes, and so he may forthwith addict himself to studie them without longer tarying. Albeit I would hold it better done, first to run through the arts, because Logicke, in respect of the vnderstanding, is nought els than those shackles which we clap on the legs of an vntrained Mule, which going with them many daies, taketh a steddie & seemlie place. Such a march doth the vnderstanding make in his disputations, when it first bindeth the same with the rules and precepts of Logicke. But if this child, whom we go thus about examining, reape no profit in the La-

tine tongue; neither can come away with Logicke as were requisite, it behoooeth to trie whether he possesse a good imagination, ere we take him from the laws; for herein is lapped vp a verie great secret, and it is good that the common-wealth be done to ware thereof; and it is, that there are some lawyers, who getting vp into the chaire, work miracles in interpreting the texts, & others in pleading: but if you put the staffe of iustice into their hands, they haue no more abilitie to gouerne, than as if the lawes had neuer been enacted to any such end. And contrariwise, some other there are who with three misvnderstood lawes, which they haue learned at all aduentures, being placed in anie gouernment, there cannot more be desired at any mans handes than they will performe. At which effect, some curious wits take wonder, because they sinck not into the depth of the cause, from whence it may grow. And the reason is, that gouernment appertaineth to the imagination, and not to the vnderstanding nor the memorie. And that this is so, the matter may verie manifestly be prooued, considering that the common-wealth is to be compounded with order & concert, with euery thing in his due place, which all put togither maketh good figure & correspondence. And this (sundrie times heeretofore) we haue prooued to be a worke of the imagination: and it shall prooue nought els to place a great lawyer to be a gouernour, than to make a deafe man a Iudge in musicke; but this is ordinarily to be vnderstood, & not as an vniuersall rule: for we haue alreadie prooued it is possible that nature can vnite great vnderstanding with much imagination: so shall there follow no repugnancie to be a good pleader and a famous gouernour: and we heeretofore discouered, that nature being endowed with all the forces

which

which ſhe may poſſeſſe, and with matter well ſeaſoned, will make a man of great memorie, and of great vnderſtanding, and of much imagination; who ſtudying the lawes, will prooue a famous reader, a great pleader, and no leſſe gouernor, but nature makes ſo few ſuch, as this cannot paſſe for a generall rule.

CHAP. XII.

How it may be prooued, that of Theoricall Phiſicke, part appertaineth to the memorie, and part to the vnderſtanding, and the practicke to the imagination.

WHat time the *Arabian* Phiſicke floriſhed, there was a Phiſition very famous, aſwell in reading, as in writing, arguing, diſtinguiſhing, anſwering, and concluding; who, men would thinke in reſpect of his profound knowledge, were able to reuiue the dead, and to heale any diſeaſe whatſoeuer, and yet the contrarie came to paſſe: for he neuer tooke anie patient in cure, who miſcarried not vnder his handes. Wherat greatly ſhaming, and quite out of countenance, he went and made himſelfe a frier, complaining on his euill fortune, and not able to conceiue the cauſe how he came ſo to miſſe. And becauſe the freſheſt examples affoord ſureſt proof, and do moſt ſway the vnderſtanding, it was held by many graue Phiſitions, that *Iohn Argentier*, a phiſition of our time, farre ſurpaſſed *Galen* in reducing the art of phiſicke to a better method: and yet for all this it is reported of him, that he was ſo infortunate in practiſe, as no patient of his countrey durſt take phiſicke

at

at his hands, fearing ſome diſmall ſucceſſe. Hereat it ſeemeth the vulgar haue good reaſon to maruell, ſeeing by experience (not onely in thoſe rehearſed by vs: but alſo in many others with whom men haue dayly to deale) that if the Phiſition be a great clearke: for the ſame reaſon he is vnfit to miniſter.

Of this effect *Ariſtotle* procured to render a reaſon, but could not find it out. He thought that the cauſe why the reaſonable Phiſitions of his time failed in curing, grew for that ſuch men had only a generall notice, and knew not euerie particular complexion, contrarie to the Empiricks, whoſe principal ſtudy bent it ſelf to know the properties of euerly ſeuerall perſon, and let paſſe the generall; but he was void of reaſon, for both the one and the other exerciſed themſelues about particular cures, & endeuoured (ſo much as in them lay) to know ech ones nature ſingly by it ſelfe. The difficultie then conſiſteth in nothing els than to know, for what cauſe ſo well learned phiſitions, though they exerciſe themſelues all their life long in curing; yet neuer grow skilfull in practiſe, and yet other ſimple ſoules with three or foure rules, learned verie ſoone: and the ſchollers can more skill of miniſtring than they.

The true anſwere of this doubt holdeth no little difficultie, ſeeing that *Ariſtotle* could not finde it out, nor render (at leaſt in ſome ſort) any part therof. But grounding on the principles of our doctrine, we will deliuer the ſame: for we muſt know that the perfection of a phiſition conſiſteth in two things, no leſſe neceſſarie to attaine the end of his art, than two legges are to go without halting. The firſt is, to weet by way of method, the precepts and rules of curing men in generall, without deſcending to particulars. The ſecond, to be long time

exerciſed

exercised in practise, and to haue visited many patients: for men are not so different ech from other, but that in diuers things they agree; neither so conioyned, but that there rest in them particularities of such condition, as they can neither be deliuered by speech, nor written, nor taught, nor so collected, as that they may be reduced into art: but to know them, is onely granted to him, who hath often seen and had them in handling. Which may easily be conceiued, considering that mans face, being composed of so small a number of parts, as are two eies, a nose, two cheeks, a mouth, & a forehead, nature shapeth yet therein so manie compositions and combinations, as if you assemble togither 100000 men, ech one hath a countenance so different from other, and proper to himselfe, that it falleth out a miracle, to find two who do altogither resemble. The like betideth in the foure elements, & in the 4. first qualities, hot, cold, moist, and drie, by the harmonie of which, the life and health of man is compounded: and of so slender a number of parts, nature maketh so many proportions, that if a 100000 men be begotten, ech of them comes to the world with a health so peculier and proper to himselfe, that if God should on the sodaine miraculously change their proportion of these first qualities, they would all become sicke, except some two or three, that by great disposition had the like consonance and proportion. Whence two conclusions are necessarilie inferred. The first is, that euerie man who falleth sicke, ought to be cured conformable to his particular proportiõ; in sort, that if the phisition restore him not to his first consonance of humours, he cannot recouer. The second that to performe this as it ought, is requisite the phisition haue first seen & dealt with the patient sundry times in his health,

by feeling his pulſe, peruſing his ſtate, and what maner countenance and complexion he is of, to the end that when he ſhall fall ſicke, he may iudge how farre he is from his health, and in miniſtring vnto him, may know to what point he is to reſtore him. For the firſt, (namely to weet and vnderſtand the Theorick and compoſition of the art) ſaith *Galen*, it is neceſſarie to be endowed with great diſcourſe and much memorie: for the one part of phiſick conſiſteth in reaſon, and the other in experience and hiſtorie. To the firſt is vnderſtanding requiſite, and to the other memorie, and it reſting a matter of ſo great difficultie, to vnite theſe two powers in a large degree; it followeth of force that the phiſition become vnapt for the Theorick. Where-through we behold many Phiſitions, learned in the Greeke & Latine tongue, and great Anotomiſts and Simpliciſts (all workes of the memory) who brought to arguing or diſputations, or to finde out the cauſe of anie effect that appertaineth to the vnderſtanding, can ſmall skill thereof.

The contrarie befalleth in others, who ſhew great wit and ſufficiencie in the Logicke and Philoſophie of this art: but being ſet to the Latine and Greeke tongue, touching ſimples and anotomies, can do little, becauſe memorie in them is wanting: for this cauſe *Galen* ſaid verie wel, That it is no marueil, if among ſo great a multitude of men, who practiſe the exercile and ſtudie of the art of Phiſicke and Philoſophie, ſo few are found to profit therein, and yeelding the reaſon, he ſaith, It requires a great toile to find out a wit requiſite for this Science; or a maiſter who can teach the ſame with perfection, or can ſtudie it with diligence and attention. But with all theſe reaſons *Galen* goeth groping, for he could not hit the cauſe whence it comes to paſſe, that few perſons profit

in

in Phiſick. Yet in ſaying it was a great labour to find out a wit requiſit for this ſcience; he ſpake truth; albeit he did not ſo far-forth ſpecifie the ſame, as we will; namely, for that it is ſo difficult a matter to vnite a great vnderſtanding with much memorie, no man attaineth to the depth of Theoricall phiſick. And for that there is found a repugnancie between the vnderſtanding and the imagination (whereunto we will now prooue, that practiſe and the skill to cure with certaintie appertaineth) it is a miracle to find out a Phiſition, who is both a great *Theoriſt*, and withall a great practitioner, or contrariwiſe a great practitioner, and verie well ſeen in Theorick. And that the imagination, and not the vnderſtanding is the power, wherof the phiſition is to ſerue himſelf, in knowing and curing the diſeaſes of particular perſons, may eaſily be prooued.

Firſt of all preſuppoſing the doctrine of *Ariſtotle*, who affirmeth, That the vnderſtanding cãnot know particulars; neither diſtinguiſh the one from the other, nor diſcerne the time and place, & other particularities which make men different ech from other: and that euery one is to be cured after a diuers maner; and the reaſon is (as the vulgar Philoſophers auouch) for that the vnderſtanding is a ſpiritall power, and cannot be altered by the particulars which are repleniſhed with matter. And for this cauſe *Ariſtotle* ſaid, That the ſenſe is of particulars, and the vnderſtanding of vniuerſals.

If then medicines are to worke in particulars, and not in vniuerſals (which are vnbegotten, and vncorruptible) the vnderſtanding falleth out to be a power impertinent for curing. Now the difficultie conſiſteth in diſcerning why men of great vnderſtanding, cãnot poſſeſſe good outward ſenſes for the particulars, they be-

ing powers ſo repugnant; And the reaſon is verie plain, and this is it, that the outward ſenſes cannot well performe their operations, vnleſſe they be aſſiſted with a good imagination, and this we are to prooue by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*, who going about to expreſſe what the imagination was, ſaith it is a motion cauſed by the outward ſenſe, in ſort as the colour, which multiplieth by the thing coloured, doth alter the eie. And ſo it fareth that this ſelfe colour, which is in the chriſtallin humour, paſſeth farther into the imagination, and maketh therin the ſame figure which was in the eie. And if you demād of which of theſe two kindes the notice of the particular is made, all philoſophers auouch (and that verie truely) that the ſecond figure is it which altereth the imagination, and by them both is the notice cauſed, conformable to that ſo commō ſpeech, From the obiect, and from the power the notice ſpringeth. But from the firſt which is in the chriſtallin humour, & from the ſightfull power, groweth no notice, if the imagination be not attentiue thereunto, which the phiſitions do plainly prooue, ſaying, That if they lance or ſear the fleſh of a diſeaſed perſon, who for al that feeleth no pain, it ſhews a token that his imagination is diſtracted into ſome profound contemplation: whence we ſee alſo by experience in the ſound, that if they be raught into ſome imagination, they ſee not the things before them, nor heare though they be called, nor taſt meat ſauorie or vnſauory, though they haue it in their mouth. Wherefore it is a thing certaine, that not the vnderſtanding or outward ſenſes, but the imagination, is that which maketh the iudgement, and taketh notice of particular things.

It followeth then, that the phiſition, who is well ſeen in Theoricke, for that he is indowed with great vnderſtanding

ſtanding, or great memory, muſt of force prooue a bad practitioner, as hauing defect in his imagination. And contrariwiſe, he that prooueth a good practitioner, muſt of force be a bad Theoriſt: for much imagination cannot be vnited with much vnderſtanding and much memorie. And this is the cauſe for which ſo few are thoroughly ſeen in phiſicke, or commit but ſmall errors in curing: for, not to halt in the worke, it behooueth to know the art, and to poſſeſſe a good imagination, for putting the ſame in practiſe, and we haue prooued that theſe two cannot ſtick togither.

The Phiſition neuer goeth to know and cure a diſeaſe, but that ſecretly to himſelfe he frameth a *Syllogiſme in Darij*, though he be neuer ſo well experienced, and the prooſe of his firſt proportion belongeth to the vnderſtanding, and of the ſecond to the imagination: for which cauſe, the great Theoriſts doe ordinarily erre in the *minor*, and the great practitioners in the *maior*: as if we ſhould ſpeake after this maner, Euerie feuer which ſpringeth from cold and moiſt humours, ought to be cured with medicins hot and drie. (Taking the tokening of the cauſe) this feuer which the man endureth, dependeth on humors cold and moiſt: therefore the ſame is to be cured with medicines hot and drie. The vnderſtanding will ſufficiently prooue the truth of the *maior*, becauſe it is an vniuerſall, ſaying; That cold & moiſt require for their temperature hot and drie: for euerie qualitie is abated by his contrarie. But comming to prooue the *minor*, there the vnderſtanding is of no value: for that the ſame is particular and of another iuriſdiction whoſe notice appertaineth to the imagination, borowing the proper and particular tokens of the diſeaſe, from the fiue outward ſenſes.

And if the tokening is to be taken from the feuer, or from his cauſe, the vnderſtanding cannot reach therunto: onely it teacheth the tokening is to be taken from that which ſheweth greateſt perill; but which of thoſe tokenings is greateſt, is only known to the imagination, by counting the damages which the feuer produceth, with thoſe of the *Syntomes* of the euill, and the cauſe and the ſmall or much force of the power. To attain this notice, the imagination poſſeſſeth certain vnutterable properties, with which the ſame cleereth matters that cannot be expreſſed nor conceiued, neither is there found any art to teach them. Where-through, we ſee a phiſition enter to viſit a patient, and by meanes of his ſight, his hearing, his ſmelling, and his feeling, he knoweth things which ſeem impoſſible. In ſort that if we demand of the ſame phiſition, how he could come by ſo readie a knowledge, himſelfe cannot tell the reaſon: for it is a grace which ſpringeth from the fruitfulneſſe of the imagination, which by another name is termed a readineſſe of capacitie, which by common ſignes, and by vncertain coniectures, and of ſmall importance, in the twinckling of an eie knoweth 1000 differẽces of things, wherein the force of curing and prognoſticating with certaintie conſiſteth. *Solertia.*

This ſpice of promptneſſe, men of great vnderſtanding do want, for that it is a part of the imagination: for which cauſe, hauing the tokens before their eies (which giue them notice how the diſeaſe fareth) it worketh no maner alteration in their ſenſes, for that they want imagination. A phiſition once asked me in great ſecreſie, what the cauſe was, that he hauing ſtudied with much curioſitie all the rules and conſiderations of the art prognoſticatiue; & being therin throughly inſtructed, yet

yet could neuer hit the truth in any prognoſtication which he made. To whom (I remember) I yeelded this anſwer that the art of Phiſick is learned with one power, and put in execution with another. This man had a verie good vnderſtanding, but wanted imagination: but in this doctrin there ariſeth a difficultie verie great, and that is, how phiſitions of great imagination, can learn the art of phiſicke, ſeeing they want that of vnderſtanding: and if it be true that ſuch were better than thoſe who were well learned, to what end ſerueth it to ſpend time in the ſchooles? to this may be anſwered, that firſt to know the art of phiſicke is a matter verie important: for in two or three yeares, a man may learn al that which the ancients haue bin getting in two or three thouſand. And if a man ſhould heerin aſcertain himſelfe by experience, it were requiſit that he liued ſome thouſands of yeeres, and in experimenting of medicines, he ſhould kill an infinit number of perſons before he could attain to the knowledge of their qualities: from whence we are freed, by reading the books of reaſonable experienced phiſitions, who giue aduertiſment of that in writing, which they found out in the whole courſe of their liues; to the end that the phiſitions of theſe daies may miniſter ſome receits with aſſurance, and take heed of other-ſome as venomous.

Beſides this, we are to weet that the common & vulgar points of al arts are verie plain and eaſie to learn, and yet the moſt important of the whole worke. And contrariwiſe, the moſt curious and ſubtile, are the moſt obſcure, and of leaſt neceſſitie for curing. And men of great imagination, are not altogither depriued of vnderſtanding, nor of memorie. Wher-through, by hauing theſe two powers in ſome meaſure they are able to learn the

moſt neceſſarie points of Phiſicke : for that they are plaineſt, and with the good imagination which they haue, can better looke into the diſeaſe and the cauſe thereof, than the cunningeſt doctors. Beſides that the imagination is it which findeth out the occaſion of the remedie that ought to be applied, in which grace the greateſt part of practiſe conſiſteth : for which cauſe *Galen* ſaid, that the proper name of a phiſition, was The finder out of occaſion.

Now to be able to know the place, the time, and the occaſion, for certain, is a worke of the imagination, ſince it toucheth figure and correſpondence ; but the difficultie conſiſteth in knowing (amongſt ſo many differences as there are of the imagination) to which of them the practiſe of Phiſicke appertaineth, for it is certaine, that they all agree not in one ſelfe particular reaſon, which contemplation hath giuen me much more toile and labour of ſpirit than all the reſidue : and yet for all that, I cannot as yet yeeld the ſame a fitting name, vnleſſe it ſpring from a leſſe degree of heat which partaketh that difference of imagination, wherewith verſes and ſongs are endited. Neither do I relie altogether on this, for the reaſon whereon I ground my ſelfe, is, that ſuch as I haue marked to be good practitioners, do all piddle ſomwhat in the art of verſifieng, and raiſe not vp their contemplation very high, and their verſes are not of any rare excellencie, which may alſo betide, for that their heat exceedeth that tearme which is requiſit for poetrie : and if it ſo come to paſſe for this reaſon, the heat ought to hold ſuch qualitie, as it ſomewhat drie the ſubſtance of the braine, and yet much reſolue not the naturall heat, albeit (if the ſame paſſe further) it breedeth no euill difference of the wit for Phiſicke, for it vniteth the vnderſtanding

derſtanding to the imagination by aduſtion. But the imagination is not ſo good for curing, as this which I ſeeke, which inuiteth a man to be a witch, ſuperſtitious, a magician, a deceiuer, a palmiſter, a fortune teller, and a calker: for the diſeaſes of men are ſo hidden, and deliuer their motions with ſo great ſecrecie, that it behoooueth alwaies to go calking what the matter is.

This difference of imagination may hardly be found in Spaine, for tofore we haue prooued that the inhabitants of this region want memory and imagination, and haue good diſcourſe: neither yet the imaginatiõ of ſuch as dwell towards the North, is of auaile in Phiſicke, for it is very ſlow and ſlacke, only the ſame is towardly to make clocks, pictures, poppets, & other ribaldries which are impertinent for mans ſeruice.

Aegypt alone is the region which ingendereth in his inhabitants this differẽce of imagination, wherthrough the Hiſtoriens neuer make an end of telling, how great enchaunters the Aegyptians are, and how readie for obtaining things, and finding remedies to their neceſſities. *Ioſeph* to exaggerat the wiſedome of *Salomon*, ſayd in this manner, So great was the knowledge and wiſedome which *Salomon* receiued of God, that he outpaſſed al the ancients, and euen the very Egyptians, who were reputed the wiſeſt of all others. And *Plato* alſo ſayd, that the Aegyptians exceeded all the men of the world in skill how to get their liuing; which abilitie appertaineth to the imagination. And that this is true, may plainly appeare, for that all the ſciences belonging to the imagination, were firſt deuiſed in Aegypt, as the Mathemati cks, Aſtrologie, Arithmeticke, Perſpectiue, Iudiciarie, and the reſt. But the argument which moſt ouer-ruleth me in this behalfe, is, that whẽ *Francis* of *Valois* king of France,

was moleſted by a long infirmitie, and ſaw that the Phiſitions of his houſhold and court, could yeeld him no remedy, he would ſay euery time when his feuer increaſed, It was not poſſible that any Chriſtiã Phiſition could cure him, neither at their hands did he euer hope for recouerie: wherethrough one time agreeued to ſee himſelfe thus vexed with this feuer, he diſpatched a poſt into Spaine, praieng the emperour *Charles* the fifth, that he would ſend him a Iew Phiſition, the beſt of his court, touching whom he had vnderſtood, that he was able to yeeld him remedie for his ſickneſſe, if by art it might be effected. At this requeſt the Spaniards made much game, and all of them concluded it was an humorous conceit of a man, whoſe brains were turmoiled with the feuer. But for all this, the Emperour gaue commandement that ſuch a Phiſition ſhould be ſought out, if anie there were, though to find him they ſhould be driuen to ſend out of his dominions; and whē none could be met withall, he ſent a Phiſition newly made a Chriſtian, ſuppoſing that he might ſerue to ſatisfie the kings humour. But the Phiſition being arriued in France, and brought to the kings preſence; there paſſed between them a gratious diſcourſe, in which it appeared that the Phiſition was a Chriſtian: and therefore the king would receiue no phiſicke at his hands. The king with opinion which he had conceiued of the phiſition, that he was an Hebrue, by way of paſſing the time, asked him whether he were not as yet weary in looking for the Meſſias promiſed in the law? The phiſition anſwered; Sir I expect not any Meſſias promiſed in the Iews law. You are verie wiſe in that (replied the king): for the tokens which were deliuered in the diuine ſcripture, whereby to know his comming, are all fulfilled many daies ago.

This

This number of daies (reioyned the phiſition) we Chriſtians do well reckon : for there are now finiſhed 1542 yeares, that he came and conuerſed in the world 33 yeares; in the end of which he died on the croſſe, and the third day roſe again, and afterwards aſcended into heauen, where he now remaineth. Why then quoth the king you are a Chriſtian? yea Sir, by the grace of God, I am a Chriſtian (quoth the phiſition) then (anſwered the king) return you home to your own dwelling in good time: for in mine owne houſe and court I haue Chriſtian phiſitions very excellent, and I held you for a Iew, who (in mine opinion) are thoſe that haue beſt naturall abilitie to cure my diſeaſe. After this maner he licenced him without once ſuffering him to feele his pulſe, or ſee his ſtate, or telling him one word of his griefe. And forthwith he ſent to Conſtantinople for a Iew, who healed him with the onely milke of a ſhe Aſſe.

This imagination of king *Francis* (as I think) was verie true, and I haue ſo conceiued it to be, for that in the great hot diſtemperatures of the brain, I haue prooued tofore, how the imagination findeth out that, which (the partie being ſound) could neuer haue done. And becauſe it ſhall not ſeem that I haue ſpoken in ieſt, and without relying herein vpon a materiall ground, you ſhall vnderſtand that the varieties of men, aſwell in the compoſitions of the body, as of the wit and conditions of the ſoule, ſpring from their inhabiting countries of different temperature, from drinking diuers waters, and from not vſing all of them one kind of food! Wherein *Plato* ſaid, Some through variable windes and heats, are amongſt themſelues diuers in maners and kinds: others through the waters and food which ſpring of the earth,

who

who not only in their bodies, but in their minds alſo, can skill to do things better and woorſe, as if he ſhould ſay, ſome men are different from others, either by reaſon of the contrarie aire, or through drinking ſeuerall waters, or for that they feed not all vpon one kind of meat, and this difference is diſcerned not only in the countenaunce and demeanure of the body, but alſo in the wit of the ſoule.

If I then ſhall now prooue, that the people of Iſraell dwelt many yeares in Aegypt, and that departing from thence, they did eat & drinke waters & meats, which are appropriat to make this difference of imagination, I ſhal then yeeld a demonſtration for the opinion of the king of France, and by conſequence we ſhall vnderſtand what wits of men are in Spaine to be made choice of, for ſtudieng the art of Phiſicke. As touching the firſt, we muſt know, that *Abraham* asking tokens whereby to be aſſured that he or his deſcendents ſhould poſſeſſe the land of promiſe, the text ſayth, that whileſt he ſlept, God made him anſwer ſaying, Know that thy ſeed ſhall bee a ſtranger in a countrie not his owne, and they ſhall make them vnderlings in bondage, and afflict them for 400 yeares, notwithſtanding I will iudge that nation whom they ſerue, and after this, they ſhall depart from thence with great ſubſtance; which Propheſie was accompliſhed: albeit God for certaine reſpects, added therevnto 30 yeares more, for which cauſe the ſcripture ſayth, But the aboad of the children of Iſraell in Aegypt was 430 yeares, which being finiſhed, that very day the whole armie of the Lord departed out of the land of Aegypt. But although this text ſay manifeſtly, that the people of Iſraell abode in Aegypt 400 yeares, a gloſſe declareth, that theſe yeares were the whole time which Iſraell went on pilgri-

pi lgrimage, vntill he poſſeſſed his own countrie. In as m uch as he remained in Aegypt but 210 yeates, which de claration agreeth not well with that which S. *Stephen* the Prothomartyr made, in his diſcourſe to the Iewes, namely that the people of Iſraell was 430 yeares in the bondage of Aegypt.

And albeit the abode of 210 yeares ſuffiſed, that the qu alities of Aegy pt might take hold in the people of Iſrae ll, yet the time whiles they liued abroad, was no loſt ſeaſon, in reſpect of that which appertaineth to the wit, for thoſe who liue in bondage, in miſerie, in affliction, and in ſtrange countries, engender much choler aduſt, becauſe they want libertie of ſpeech, and of reuenging their iniuries: and this humour, when the ſame is grown drie, becommeth the inſtrument of ſubtiltie, of craft, and of malice: whence we ſee by experience, that if a man rake hell for bad maners and conditions, he cannot find woorſe than in a ſlaue, whoſe imagination alwaies occupieth it ſelfe in deuiſing how to procure dammage to his maiſter, and freedome to himſelfe. Moreouer the land which the people of Iſraell walked through, was not much eſtranged nor different from the qualities of Aegypt: for in reſpect of the miſerie thereof, God promiſed *Abraham* to giue him another, much more aboundant and fruitfull. And this is a matter greatly verefied, as well in good naturall Philoſophie, as in experience, that barraine and beggerly regions, not fat, nor plentifull of fruit, engender men of very ſharpe wit. And contrariwiſe abundant and fertile ſoils, bring foorth perſons big limmed, couragious, and of great bodily forces, but very ſlow of wit.

Touching Greece, the Hiſtoriens neuer make an end to recount, how appropriat that region is to breed men

of

of great habilitie, and particularly *Galen* auoucheth, that it is held a miracle for a man to find a foole in Athens. And we muſt note that this was a citie the moſt miſerable, and moſt barren of all the reſt in Greece. Whence we collect, that through the qualities of Egipt, and of the Prouinces where the Hebrue people liued, they grew verie quick of capacitie. But it behoooeth likewiſe to vnderſtand for what cauſe the temperature of Aegypt produceth this difference of imagination. And this wil fall out a plain matter when you are done to ware, that in this region, the ſunne yeeldeth a feruent heat: and therfore the inhabitants haue their brain dried, and choler aduſt, the inſtrument of wilineſſe and aptneſſe: In which ſenſe, *Ariſtotle* demandeth why the men of Aethiopia & Aegypt, haue their feet crooked, & are commonly curlpated and flat noſed? to which probleme he anſwereth, that the much heat of the countrey roſteth the ſubſtance of theſe members, and wrieth them, as it draweth togither a peece of leather ſet by the fire; and for the ſame cauſe, their haire curleth, and themſelues alſo are wily. And that ſuch as inhabit hot countries, are wiſer than thoſe who are born in cold regions, we haue alreadie prooued by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*: who demandeth whence it grows, that men are wiſer in hot climats than in cold? But he wiſt not to anſwer this probleme, nor make diſtinction of wiſdome: for we haue prooued heretofore, that in man there reſt two ſorts of wiſdome; one whereof *Plato* ſaid, Knowledge which is ſeuered from Iuſtice, ought rather to be termed craft than wiſdome: another there is found accompanied with iuſtice and ſimplicity, without doubleneſſe, and without wiles; and this is properly called Wiſdome: for it goeth alwaies guided by iuſtice and dutie. They who inhabit

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very hot countries, are wise in the first kind of wisedom, and such are those of Aegypt.

Now let vs see when the people of Israel was departed out of Aegypt, and come into the desart, what meat they did eat, what water they dranke, and of what temperature the aire was where they trauailed? that we may know whether vpon this occasion, the wit with which they issued out of bondage, took exchange; or whether the same were more confirmed in them? Fortie yeares (saith the text) God maintaind this people with Manna, a meat so delicat and sauoury, as any might be, that euer men tasted in the world. In sort that *Moses* seeing the delicacie and goodnesse therof, commanded his brother *Aaron* to fill a vessell, and place the same in the Arke of confederacie, to the end the descendents of this people, when they were setled in the land of promise, might see the bread with which God had fed their fathers, whiles they liued in the wildernesse, and how bad paiment they yeelded him in exchange of such cherishments. And to the end that we who haue not seen this meat, may know of what maner the same was: it will do well that we describe the Manna which nature maketh; and so adioining therunto the conceit of a great delicacie, we may wholly imagine his goodnesse. The materiall cause of which Manna is engendred, is a very delicat vapour, which the sunne, with the force of his heat, draweth vp from the earth; the which taking stay aloft, is concocted and made perfect: and then the cold of the night cõming on, it congealeth, and through his waightinesse, turneth to fall vpon the trees and stones, where men gather the same, and preserue it in vessels to serue for food. It is called Deawy, and Airy honny, through the resemblance which it beareth to the deaw, and for

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that it is made in the aire. His colour is white, his ſauour ſweet as honny: his figure like that of Coriander, which ſignes the holy Scripture placeth alſo in the Manna, which the people of Iſrael did eat: and therfore I carry an imagination, that both were ſemblable in nature. But if that which God created were of more delicat ſubſtance, ſo much the better ſhall we confirme our opinion. But I am euer of opinion that God applied himſelf to naturall means, when with them he could performe what he meant; and where nature wanted, his omnipotencie ſupplied. This I ſay, becauſe to giue them Manna to eat in the deſart (beſides that which heerby he would ſignifie) me ſeemeth was founded in the ſelfe diſpoſition of the earth, which (euen at this day) produceth the beſt Manna in the world: through which *Galen* affirmeth, that on Mount Libanus (which is not far diſtant frō this place) there is great and very choice abundance: in ſort, that the countrie people are wont to ſing in their paſtimes, That *Iupiter* raineth honny in that region. And though it be true, that God miraculouſly created that Manna in ſuch quantitie, at ſuch time, and on ſpeciall daies: yet it may be that it partaked the ſame nature with ours, as had alſo the water which *Moſes* drew forth of the rocke; and the fire which *Elias* with his word cauſed to rain from heauen; all of them naturall things, though miraculouſly brought to paſſe.

The Manna deſcribed by the holy Scripture, it ſaith was as deaw, & as the ſeed of Coriander, white, & in taſt like honny, which conditions are alſo in the Manna produced by nature. The temperature of this meat, the Phiſitions ſay, is hot, and conſiſting of ſubtile and verie delicat parts, which compoſition the Manna eaten by the Iews, ſhould alſo ſeeme to haue: whereon (complaining

ning of his tenderneſſe) they ſaid in this maner, Our ſoule hath a fulſomneſſe at this ſlight meat; as if they ſhould ſay, that they could no longer endure nor brook ſo light a meat in their ſtomacke: and the Philoſophie of this was, that their ſtomacks had been made ſtrong by onions, chibals, and leeks; and comming to eat a meat of ſo ſmall reſiſtance, it wholly with them turned into choler. And for this cauſe, *Galen* gaue the charge that men endowed with much naturall heat, ſhould forbeare to eat honny or other light meats: for they would turne to corruption, and in ſteed of digeſtion, would partch vp like ſoot.

The like heereof befell to the Hebrues, as touching Manna, which with them wholly turned into choler aduſt, and therefore they were altogither drie and thin: for this meat had no corpulencie to fatten them. Our ſoule (ſaid they) is drie, and our eies ſee nothing but Manna. The water which they dranke after this meat, was ſuch as they would deſire; and if they could not find any ſuch, God ſhewed to *Moſes* a wood of ſo diuine vertue, that dipping the ſame in groſſe and ſalt waters, it made them to become delicat and of good ſauor: and when they had no ſort of water at all, *Moſes* took the rod, with which he had parted the red Sea, and ſtriking therewith the rocks, there iſſued ſprings of waters ſo delicat and ſauourie, as their taſt could deſire. In ſort, that S. *Paul* ſaith, The rocke followed them, as if he ſhould ſay, The water of the rocke ſeconded their taſt, iſſuing delicat, ſweet, and ſauourie. And they had accuſtomed their ſtomacks before, to drinke waters thicke and briniſh: for in Aegypt (ſaith *Galen*) they boiled them ere they could ſerue for drinke, for that they were naughty and corrupt, ſo as afterwards drinking waters ſo delicat,

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it could not fall out otherwiſe, but that they ſhould turn into choler, for that they found ſmall reſiſtance. Water requireth the ſame qualities, to digeſt well in our ſtomacke (ſaith *Galen*) & not to corrupt, that the meat hath wheron we accuſtomably feed. If the ſtomack be ſtrong, it behooueth to giue the ſame ſtrong meat, which may anſwer in proportion: if the ſame be weake and delicat, ſuch alſo the meat ought to be. The like regard is to be held as touching the water: where-through we ſee by experience, that if a man vſe to drinke groſſe water; he neuer quencheth his thirſt with the purer: neither feeleth it in his ſtomacke. Rather the ſame encreaſeth his thirſt: for the exceſſiue heat of the ſtomacke burneth and reſolueth it ſo ſoon as it is receiued, becauſe therein is no reſiſtance.

The aire which they enioyed in the deſert, we may alſo ſay, that it was ſubtile and delicat: for iourneng ouer mountains, and through vninhabited places, they had the ſame alwaies freſh, clenſed, and without anie corruption: for they neuer made long ſtay in any one place. So did it alwaies carrie a temperature: for by day a cloud was ſet before the ſunne, which ſuffered him not to ſcorch ouer vehemently; and by night, a piller of fire which moderated the ſame. And to enioy an aire of this maner (*Ariſtotle* affirmeth) doth much quicken the wit. VVe may conſider then that the men of this folke muſt needs haue a ſeed verie delicat and aduſt, eating ſuch meat as Manna was, and drinking the waters before ſpecified, and breathing and enioying an aire ſo clenſed and pleaſant, as alſo that the Hebrue women bred flowers very ſubtile and delicat.

Againe, let vs call to mind, that which *Ariſtotle* ſaid, that the flowres being ſubtile and delicat, the child who

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is bred of them, ſhalbe a man of great capacitie. How much it importeth, that for begetting children of great ſufficiencie, the fathers do feed on delicat meats, we wil prooue at large in the laſt chapter of this worke. And becauſe all the Hebrues did eat of one ſelfe ſo ſpirituall and delicat meat, and dranke of one ſelfe water, all their children and poſteritie prooued ſharp and great of wit in matters appertaining to this world.

Now then, when the people of Iſrael came into the land of promiſe, with ſo great a wit as we haue expreſſed, there befell vnto them afterwards ſo many trauails, dearths, ſiedges of enimies, ſubiections, bondages, and ill intreatings: that though they had not brought from Aegypt and the wilderneſſe, that temperature, hot, drie, and aduſt before ſpecified: they would yet haue made it ſo by this diſmall life: for continuall ſadneſſe and toil, vniteth the vitall ſpirits, and the arteriall bloud, in the brain, in the liuer, and in the heart: and there ſtaying one aboue another, they grow to drineſſe and aduſtion. Where-through, oft times they procure the feuer, and their ordinarie is to make melancholie by aduſtiō, wherof they (in maner) do all partake euen to this day, in reſpect of that (which *Hippocrates* ſaith) Feare and ſadneſſe continuing a long time, ſignifieth melancholie. This choler aduſt (we ſaid before) to be the inſtrument of promptneſſe, craftineſſe, ſharpneſſe, ſubtiltie, and maliciouſneſſe. And this is applied to the coniectures of Phiſicke, and by the ſame a man getteth notice of the diſeaſes, their cauſes and remedies. Wherfore king *Francis* vnderſtood this maruellous well, and it was no lightneſſe of the brain, or inuention of the diuell, which he vttered. But through his great feuer, laſting ſo manie daies, and with the ſadneſſe to find himſelfe ſicke and

without remedy, his brain grew dry, and his imagination roſe to ſuch a point, of which we made proofe tofore, that if it haue the temperature behooffull, a man will on a ſodain deliuer that which he neuer learned. But there preſents it ſelfe a dufficultie very great againſt all theſe things rehearſed by vs, and that is, that if the children or nephews of thoſe who were in Aegypt, and enioyed the Manna, the waters, and the ſubtle aire of the wilderneſſe, had been made choice of for phiſitions, it might ſeeme, that king *Francis* opinion were in ſome part probable, for the reaſons by vs reported. But that their poſteritie ſhould preſerue till our daies thoſe diſpoſitions of the Manna, the water, the aire, the afflictions, and the trauails, which their anceſtors endured in the priſon of Babilon, it is a matter hard to be conceiued: for if in 430 yeares, during which the people of Iſrael liued in Aegypt, and 40 in the deſart, their ſeed could purchaſe thoſe diſpoſitions of abilitie, better, and with more facilitie could they leeſe it again in 2000 yeares, whileſt they haue been abſent. And ſpecially ſithence their comming into Spain, a region ſo contrarie to Aegypt, and where they haue fed vpon different meats, and druncke waters of nothing ſo good temperature and ſubſtance as thoſe other.

This is agreeable to the nature of man, and whatſoother liuing creature and plant, which forthwith partaketh the conditions of the earth where they liue, and leeſe thoſe which they brought with thē from elſwhere. And whatſoeuer inſtance they can alleage, the like will betide it within few daies beyond all gainſaying.

Hippocrates recounteth of a certain ſort of men, who to be different from the vulgar, choſe for a token of their nobilitie, to haue their head like a ſugar-loafe. And to

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ſhape this figure by art, when the child was born, the mid-wiues tooke care to bind their heads with ſweaths, and bands, vntill they were faſhioned to the forme. And this artificialneſſe grew to ſuch force, as it was conuerted into nature: for in proceſſe of time, all the children that were born of nobilitie, had their head ſharp from their mothers womb. So from thenceforth, the art and diligence of the mid-wiues heerin, became ſuperfluous. But ſo ſoon as they left nature to her liberty, and her owne ordering, without oppreſſing her any longer with art, ſhe turned by little and little to recouer again the figure which ſhe had before.

In like ſort might it befall the children of Iſrael, who notwithſtanding the region of Aegypt, the Manna, the delicat waters, and their ſorrowfulneſſe, wrought thoſe diſpoſitions of wit in that ſeed: yet thoſe reaſons and reſpects ſurceaſing, and other contrary growing on, it is certain that by little and little the qualities of the Manna would haue worn away, and other far different therefrom haue grown on, conformable to the countrey where they inhabited, to the meats which they fed vpon, to the waters which they dranke, & to the aire which they breathed. This doubt in naturall philoſophy holdeth little difficultie: for there are ſome accidents to be found, which are brought in at a moment, & afterwards endure for euer in the ſubiect, without poſſibility of corrupting. Others there are, which waſt aſmuch time in vndoing, as they occupied in engrafting, & ſome more, ſome leſſe, according to the action of the agent, and the diſpoſition of the patient. For example of the firſt, we muſt know, That a certain man through a great feare wher-into he was driuen, reſted ſo transformed and changed in colour, that he ſeemed dead; and the ſame

laſted not only during all the time of his owne life, but alſo the children which he begat had the ſame colour: without that he could find any remedie to take it away. Conformable heerunto, it may be, that in 430 yeares, whileſt the people of Iſrael led their liues in Aegypt, 40 in the wilderneſſe, and 60 in the bondage of Babilon there needed more than 3000 yeares, that this ſeed of *Abraham* ſhould take a full loſſe of their diſpoſition of wit, occaſioned by this Manna, ſeeing to reforme the bad colour, ſetled vpon a ſodain through feare, more than 100 yeares were requiſit. But becauſe the truth of this doctrin may be vnderſtood from the root, it behoueth to reſolue two doubts which ſerue to the purpoſe, and as yet I haue not cleered. The firſt is, whence it commeth, that meats, by how much the more delicat and ſauoury they are, as hennes, and partridge, ſo much the ſooner the ſtomacke doth abhorre and lothe them? and contrariwiſe, we ſee that a man eateth beefe all the yeare long without receiuing any annoiance thereby, and if he eat hennes fleſh but three or foure daies togither, the fifth he cannot abide the ſauour thereof; but that it will turne his ſtomacke vpſide-downe. The ſecond is, whence it commeth, that bread of wheat, and fleſh of mutton, not being of ſubſtance ſo good and ſauoury, as hen and partridge; yet the ſtomacke neuer loatheth them, though we feed theron all our liues long? But wanting bread we cannot eat other meats, neither do they content vs.

He that can ſhape an anſwer to theſe two doubts, ſhal eaſily vnderſtand for what cauſe the deſcendents of the people of Iſrael, haue not yet loſt the diſpoſitions & accidents which Manna brought into that ſeed: neither will the promptneſſe of wit, and ſubtletie wherof they

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then poſſeſſed themſelues, ſo ſoon take an end. Two certain and very true principles there are in naturall philoſophy, on which the anſwer and reſolution of theſe doubts dependeth. The firſt is, That al powers, (whatſoeuer) which gouern man, are naked and depriued of the conditions and qualities which reſt in their obiect, to the end that they may know and giue iudgement of all the differences. The eies partake this property, who being to receiue into themſelues all figures and colours, it was of neceſſitie, vtterly to depriue them of figures and colours. For if they were pale, as in thoſe who are ouercome with the yellow iandize, all things wheron they looked would appeare to them of the ſame colour. So the tongue, which is the inſtrument of taſt, ought to be void of all ſauours: and if the ſame be ſweet or bitter, we know by experience, that whatſoeuer we eat or drinke hath the like taſt. And the ſame may be auouched of hearing, of ſmelling, and of feeling. The ſecond principle is, that all things created, naturally couet their preſeruation, and labour to endure for euer, and that the being which God and nature haue giuen them, may neuer take end: notwithſtanding that afterward they are to poſſeſſe a better nature. By this principle, all naturall things endowed with knowledge and ſenſe, abhorre and flie from that which altereth and corrupteth their naturall compoſition.

The ſtomacke is naked and depriued of the ſubſtance and qualities of all meats in the world, as the eye is of colours and figures, and when we eat ought, though the ſtomacke ouercome it, yet the meat turneth againſt the ſtomacke, for that the ſame is of a contrary principle, and altereth and corrupteth his temperature and ſubſtance, for no agent is of ſuch force, but that in doing, it

alſo ſuffereth. Meats that are very delicat and pleaſing doe much alter the ſtomacke; firſt, becauſe it digeſteth and embraceth them with great appetit and liking, and then, through their being ſo ſuttle and void of excrements, they pierce into the ſubſtance of the ſtomacke, from whence they cannot depart againe: the ſtomacke then feeling that this meat altereth his nature, and taketh away the proportion which he carrieth to other meats, groweth to abhor the ſame, and if he muſt needs feed thereon, it behoueth to vſe many ſallets and ſeaſonings, thereby to beguile him.

All this, Manna had euen from the beginning, for though the ſame were a meat of ſuch delicaſie and pleaſing reliſh, yet in the end, the people of Iſraell found it fulſome, and therefore ſayd, Our ſoule loatheth this ouer light meat. A complaint far vnworthie of a people ſo ſpecially fauoured by God, who had pretended a remedie in that behalfe, which was, that Manna had thoſe reliſhes and taſts which well agreed with them, to the end they might eat thereof. Thou ſenteſt them bread from heauen, which had in it all pleaſingneſſe; for which cauſe many amongſt them fed thereon with good appetite, for they had their bones, their ſinewes, and their fleſh, ſo imbewed with Manna and his qualities, that by means of the reſemblance from each to other, they longed after nothing elſe. The like betalleth in bread of wheat, and weathers fleſh, whereon we accuſtomably feed.

Groſſe meats and of good ſubſtance, as beefe, haue much excrements, and the ſtomacke receiueth them not with ſuch deſire, as thoſe that are delicat and of good reliſh, and therefore is longer ere the ſame take alteration by them. Hence commeth it, that to corrupt the alterati-

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on which Manna made in one day, it behooueth to feed a whole moneth vpon contrarie meats. And (after this reckoning) to deface the qualities that Manna brought into the ſeed in the ſpace of 40 yeares, there need 4000 and vpward. And if any man will not herewith reſt ſatiſfied, let vs ſay, that as God brought out of Aegypt the 12 tribes of Iſraell, ſo he had taken then 12 male, and 12 female Moores of *Aethiopia*, and had placed them in our countrie, in how many yeares thinke we, would theſe Moores and their poſteritie, linger to leaue their natiue colour, not mixing themſelues the while with white perſons? to me it ſeemeth a long ſpace of yeares would be requiſit. For though 200 yeares haue paſſed ouer our heads, ſithens the firſt Aegyptians came out of Aegypt into Spaine, yet their poſteritie haue not forlorne that their delicacie of wit and promptneſſe, nor yet that roſted colour which their aunceſtors brought with them from Aegypt. Such is the force of mans ſeed when it receiueth thereinto any well rooted qualitie. And as in Spaine the Moores communicat the colour of their elders, by means of their ſeed, though they be out of Aethiopia, ſo alſo the people of Iſrael comming frō thence, may communicat to their deſcendents their ſharpeneſſe of wit, without remaining in Aegypt, or eating Manna: for to be ignorant or wiſe, is as well an accident in man, as to be blacke or white. True it is, that they are not now ſo quicke and prompt, as they were a thouſand yeares ſince: for from the time that they left to eat Manna, their poſterity haue euer leſſened hitherto, becauſe they vſed contrarie meats, and inhabited countries different from Aegypt: neither dranke waters of ſuch delicacie as in the wilderneſſe. As alſo by mingling with thoſe who deſcended from the Gentils, who wanted this difference

of wit: but that which cannot be denied them, is, that as yet they haue not loſt it altogither.

CHAP. XIII.

By what meanes it may be ſhewed, to what difference of abilitie the art of warfare appertaineth, and by what ſignes the man may be knowen, who is endowed with this maner of wit.

WHat is the cauſe (ſaith *Ariſtotle*) that ſeeing Fortitude is not the greateſt of all vertues, but Iuſtice and Prudence are greater than it: yet the commonwealth, and in a maner all men with a common conſent do make greater accompt, and within themſelues, do more honour a valiant man than either the iuſt or wiſe; though placed in neuer ſo high callings or offices. To this probleme *Ariſtotle* anſwereth, ſaying; there is no king in the world who doth not either make war, or maintain war againſt ſome other: and for ſomuch as the valiant procure them glorie and empire, take reuenge on their enemies, and preſerue their eſtate, they yeeld chiefeſt honour, not to the principall vertue, which is Iuſtice, but to that by which they reap moſt profit and aduantage. For if they did not in this wiſe intreat the valiant, how were it poſſible, that kings ſhould find captains and ſouldiours, who would willingly ieopard their liues to defend their goods and eſtates?

Of the Aſiaticans it is recounted, that there was a people inhabiting a part therof, who bare themſelues verie couragiouſly; and being asked why they had neither king nor law: they made anſwer, that laws made

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men cowards, and seeing it was necessarie to vndergoe the hazard of the wars, for depriuing another of his estate, they made choice to fight for their own behoofe, and themselues to reap the benefit of the victorie. But this was an answer rather of barbarous men than reasonable people, who well know, that without a king, without a common-wealth, and without lawes, it is impossible to preserue men in peace. That which *Aristotle* said, serueth verie well to the purpose, though there be a better answer to be framed, namely, That when Rome honoured her captains with those triumphs and solemnities, she did not only reward the courage of the triumpher, but also the iustice with which he maintained his armie in peace and concord, the wisdome with which he performed his enterprises, and their temperancy vsed in abstaining from wine, women, and meat, which trouble the iudgement, and turne counsels into error. Yea wisdome is more highly to be regarded and rewarded in a generall, than courage and manlinesse: for as *Vegetius* well said, Few ouer-couragious captains bring their enterprises to luckie passe. Which groweth for that wisdome is more necessarie in warre, than courage in bickering: but *Vegetius* could neuer attain to the notice what maner of wisdom this is: neither could plot down, with what difference of wit he ought to be endowed, who taketh charge in war. Neither do I ought maruell thereat: for the maner of philosophie wheron this dependeth, was not then deuised. True it is, that to verefie this point, answereth not our first intent, which purporteth to make choice of apt wits for learning. But martiall affaires are so dangerous, and of so deep counsell: and it falleth out a matter so important for a king to know well vnto whom he credit his power and state, that we

shall

ſhall perform no leſſe thanks worthie a part of ſeruice to the common wealth, to teach this difference of wit and his ſigns, than in the other which we haue alreadie deſcribed. For which cauſe we muſt note, that *Malitia* and *Militia*, *vz.* martiall matters, and malice, haue as it were one ſelfe name, and likewiſe one ſelfe definition. For changing *a* into *i*, of *malitia* you make *militia*, and of *militia*, *malitia*, with great facilitie. What the nature and propertie of malice is, *Cicero* teacheth, ſaieng, Malice is a way of hurting, craftie, and full of guile. In warre (likewiſe) nothing falleth ſo much into cõſideration, as how to offend the enimie, and defend our ſelues from his entrappings. Therefore the beſt propertie whereof a Generall can be poſſeſſed, is to be malicious with his enemie, and neuer to conſtrue any his demeanures to a good ſenſe, but to the worſt that may be, and to ſtand on his guard.

Beleeue not (ſayth *Eccleſiaſticus*) thine enimie, with his lips he ſweetneth, and in his hart he betraieth thee, to make thee fall into the dike: he weepeth with his eies, and if he light vpon a fit occaſion, he will not be ſatisfied with thy blood. Hereof we find a manifeſt example in the holy ſcripture; for the people of Iſrael being beſieged in Bethulia, and ſtraightned with hunger and thirſt, that famous lady *Iudith*, iſſued out with a reſolution to kill *Holofernes*, and going towards the armie of the Aſſirians, ſhe was taken by the ſentinels and guards, and being asked whether ſhe was bound, made anſwere with a two-fold mind; I am a daughter of the Hebrues, whom you hold beſieged, and flie onto you, for I haue learned that they ſhall fall into your hands, and that you ſhall euill intreat them, becauſe they would not yeeld themſelues to your mercy: therefore I determined to flie vn-

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to *Holofernes*, and to diſcouer vnto him the ſecrets of this obſtinat people, ſhewing him how he may enter without the loſſe of any one ſouldier.

So *Iudith* being brought to *Holofernes* preſence, threw her ſelfe downe to the ground, and with cloſed hands began to worſhip him and vtter words full of deceit, the moſt craftily that might be, in ſort that *Holofernes* and all his counſell, verely beleeued ſhe ſayd nothing but truth: but ſhe not forgetfull what in heart ſhe had purpoſed, found a conuenient occaſion, and chopped off his head.

Contrary hereunto are the conditions of a friend, and therefore it behooueth euer to yeeld him credit, wherethrough *Holofernes* ſhould haue done better to beleeue *Achior*, ſeeing he was his friend, and on zeale that he ſhould not leaue the ſiege with diſhonour, ſayd vnto him, Sir, firſt informe your ſelfe whether this people haue ſinned againſt God, for if it be ſo, himſelfe will deliuer them into your hands, without that you ſhall need to conquer them; but if he hold them in grace, know for certaine, that he will defend them, and we ſhall not be able to vanquiſh them. *Holofernes* conceiued diſpleaſure at this aduertiſement, as a man confident, laſciuious and a wine-bibber, which three things turne topſie turuie that counſell which is requiſit for the art of war. For which cauſe *Plato* ſayd, he liked very well of a law which the Carthagineans had; by which they commaunded, that the Generall whilſt he had charge of the armie, ſhould drinke no wine, for this licour (as *Ariſtotle* affirmeth) maketh a man of wit be quite burned vp with choler (as *Holofernes* ſhewed in thoſe ſo furious words which he ſpake to *Achior*.)

Now that wit which is requiſit for ambuſhes and ſtratagems,

tagems, aſwell to prepare them as to perceiue them, and to find out ſuch remedie as appertaineth, *Cicero* deſcribeth, drawing his diſcẽt from this nown *verſutia*, which he ſaith is deriued from this verb *verſor*: for thoſe who are winding, craftie, double, and cauillers, vpon a ſodain contriue their wiles, and employ their conceit with facilitie: and ſo the ſame *Cicero* exemplified it, ſaying; *Chriſippus* a man doubtleſſe winding and craftie. I call thoſe winding whoſe mind is ſodainly winded about. This propertie to attain ſodainly the means is *ſolertia* (quickneſſe) and appertaineth to the imagination: for the powers which conſiſt in heat performe ſpeedily their worke. And for this cauſe men of great vnderſtanding are little worth for the war, for this power is very ſlow in his operation and a friend of vprightneſſe, of plainneſſe, of ſimplicitie and mercie: all which is woont to breed much dammage in war. Theſe are good to treat with friends, with whom the wiſdome of the imagination is not needfull; but only the rightfulneſſe and ſinglenеſſe of the vnderſtanding, which admitteth no doubleneſſe, nor doth any wrong: therfore with the enemy it booteth nothing, for he alwaies ſtudieth to offend with wiles, and ſuch wit is requiſit wherwith to counter-gard our ſelues. And ſo Chriſt our redeemer aduiſed his diſciples, ſaying; Behold I ſend you as ſheep amongſt woolfes: be you therfore wiſe as ſerpents, and ſimple as dooues. With our enimies we muſt practiſe wiſdome, and with our friends plainneſſe and ſimplicitie.

Now if the captain be not to giue credit to his enimy, but is alwaies to miſdoubt that he will go beyond him, it is neccſſarie that he hold a difference of imagination, forecaſtfull, warie, and which can skill to diſcern the

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wiles which come vailed with anie couerture: for the ſelfe power which finds them out can only deuiſe the remedies which are behooffull in that behalfe: that ſeemeth to be another difference of the imagination which deuiſeth the engins and war-like inſtruments, wherby vnuincible fortreſſes are won, which pitcheth the camp and marſhalleth euerie ſquadron in his due place, and which knoweth the occaſions of ioyning and retiring; which plotteth treaties, conſortments and capitulations with the enemie: for all which the vnderſtanding is impertinent as are the eares to ſee withall. And therefore I nothing doubt, but that the art of warre appertaineth to the imagination, for all whatſoeuer a good captain is to performe importeth conſonance, figure and correſpondence.

Now the difficulty reſteth to ſet down with what difference of the imagination in particular, war is to be mannaged. And in this I cannot reſolue with certaintie, becauſe the knowing therof is verie nice: yet I coniecture that it requireth a degree more of heat than the practiſe of phiſicke, and that it allay choler but not vtterlie quench it.

This is verie manifeſt: for thoſe captains who are ful of promptneſſe and ſubtletie, are not verie couragious, nor deſirous of bickering, neither couet to come to handyſtrokes; but by ſtratagems & fetches, without aduenturing a broken pate, do bring their purpoſes to paſſe. Which property, better pleaſed *Vegetius* than any other. Good captains (ſaith he) not by open war, in which the perill is common, but by ſecret practiſes, euer aſſay with the ſafetie of their owne ſouldiers, to cut their enemies in peeces, or at leaſt to make them afraid. The fruit of this maner of wit, the Romain Senat verie wiſely looked into:

into: for though they had manie famous captains, who atchieued ſundry warres, yet returning to Rome to receiue the triumph and glorie due to their enterpriſe, ſo great were the plaints which the parents made for their children, the children for the parents, the wiues for their husbands, and brothers for brethren, that through the ſorrow for them who periſhed in the warres, they could take little pleaſure in the ſports and paſtimes. Wherfore the Senat took a reſolution, not to ſeeke out ſo couragious captains, wholly deſirous to come to hand ſtrokes: but men ſomwhat timorous, & verie ready, as *Q. Fabius*, of whom it is written, that it was a wonder to ſee him offer a pitched battaile in the open field, and ſpeciallie when he was far from Rome, wherby in ill ſucceſſes he could not readily be releeued, and he did nought-els but giue way to the enemie, and deuiſe ſtratagems and wiles, with which he exploited great enterpriſes, and obtained many victories, without the loſſe of any one ſouldiour. He was receiued into Rome with great ioy of all men: for if he carried forth 100000 ſouldiours, he returned with as many, vnleſſe ſome perhaps miſcarried by ſickneſſe. The ſhout which the people gaue at his returne was (as *Ennius* reporteth) of this tenour:

One man by lingring, only vs releeu'd.

As if they had ſaid, This man with giuing way to our enemies, hath made vs lords of the world, and brought backe our ſouldiours to their houſes in ſafetie. Some captains haue ſince that time endeuoured to imitate him: but becauſe they wanted his wit and readineſſe, they ſundry times let ſlip many fit occaſions of fighting, whence greater dammages and inconueniences aroſe, than if they had ſpeedily ioyned battaile. We may alſo take example of that famous Carthaginian captain, of whom

whom *Plutarch* writeth theſe words, *Anniball* after he had attained this ſo great a victorie, commanded that manie Italian priſoners ſhould freely be ſet at libertie without ranſom, to the end the fame of his courteſie and pardoning might be diſperſed among the people; albeit of diſpoſition he were very wide from this vertue: for of his owne nature he was fell and vnmercifull, and in ſuch ſort was trained vp from the tender yeares of his youth, that he neuer learned laws or ciuil conditions, but wars, ſlaughters, and betrayings of the enemy. Wher-through he grew to be a captain verie cruel, and malicious in beguiling men, and alwaies deuiſing how he might entrap his enemie. And when he ſaw he could not preuaile by open war, he fought to get the vpper hand by pollicies, as was plainly ſeen in this deed of arms by vs rehearſed, and by the battaile which he fought againſt *Sempronius*, neer the riuer *Trebia*. The tokens to know a man that is poſſeſſed of this difference of wit, are verie ſtrange and well worthy of contemplation. VVher-through *Plato* ſaith, that the man who is verie wiſe (in this ſort of abilitie which we trace out) cannot be couragious nor wel conditioned: for *Ariſtotle* ſaith, That wiſdom conſiſteth in cold, and ſtomacke and manlineſſe in heat. Therfore theſe two qualities being repugnant and contrarie, it is impoſſible that a man be verie full of hardineſſe, and alſo of wiſdome therewithall. For which cauſe it is neceſſarie that choler be burned, and become choler aduſt, to the end that a man may prooue wiſe: but where this ſpice of melancholie is found, inaſmuch as the ſame is cold, feare & cowardize are ſtraightwaies entertained. In ſort, that craft and readineſſe require heat, for that the ſame is a worke of the imagination, but not in ſuch degree as courage, where-through they repugne ech to o-

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ther in extenſion. But heerin befalleth a matter worth the noting, that of the foure morall vertues, Iuſtice, Prudence, Fortitude, and Temperance; the two firſt require a wit and good temperature, to the end thatthey may be put in practiſe: for if a Iudge be not endowed with vnderſtanding, to make himſelfe capable of the point of iuſtice, little auails it that he carrie a good will to render euery man his due. Since this his good meaning may wander out of the way, and wrong the true proprietarie. The like is to be vnderſtood of wiſdome: for if the only will ſufficed to ſet things in good order, then in no work good or euill, ſhould any error be committed. There is no theefe whatſoeuer, who ſeeketh not to rob in ſuch manner as he may not be eſpied, and there is no captain, who deſireth not to be owner of ſo much wiſdome, as may ſerue to vanquiſh his enemie. But a theefe that is not his craftſmaiſter in filching, ſoon falleth to be diſcouered; and the captain that wanteth imagination, ere long is ouercome. Fortitude, and Temperance are two vertues, which men carrie in their fiſt, though they want a naturall diſpoſition: for if a man be diſpoſed to ſet little of his life, and ſhow hardineſſe, he may well do it: but if he be couragious of his owne naturall diſpoſition, *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* affirme verie trulie, it is not poſſible that he can be wiſe though he would. In ſort, that by this reaſon, there groweth no repugnancie to vnite the wiſdome of the minde with courage: for a wiſe and skilful man, hath the vnderſtanding to hazard his honour in reſpect of his ſoule, and his life in reſpect of his honour, and his goods in reſpect of his life, and ſo he doth. Hence it comes, that gentlemen for that they are ſo much honored, are ſo couragious; and there is none who will endure more hardneſſe in the wars, for

that

that they are brought vp in ſo many pleaſures, to the end they may not be termed ribalds. Heeron is that by-word grounded, God keep me from a Gent. by day, and a theefe by night; for the one, becauſe he is ſeen, and the other that he may not be known, do fight with double reſolution: on this ſelfe reaſon, is the religion of *Malta* grounded, who knowing how much it importeth nobilitie, to be a man of valure, haue a firme law, that all thoſe of their order ſhalbe iſſued from gentilitie, both on the fathers ſide and the mothers: for ſo ech of them muſt in the combat ſhew himſelfe worth two of a baſer progenie. But if a gentleman had the charge giuen him, to encamp an army, and the order whereby he ſhould put the enemy in rout, if he had not a wit appropriat heerunto, he would commit and vtter a thouſand diſorders: for wiſdome lieth not in mens diſpoſition. But if there were recómended vnto him the guard of a gate: they might ſoundly ſleep on his eies, although by nature he were a baggage. The ſentence of *Plato* is to be conſtrued, when a wiſe man followeth his owne natural inclination, and doth not correct the ſame by reaſon. And in that ſort it is true, that a verie wiſe man cannot of his naturall diſpoſition be couragious: for choler aduſt (which maketh him wiſe) maketh him alſo ſaith *Hippocrates* timorous and fearfull. The ſecond propertie, wherewith a man poſſeſſed of this difference of wit cannot be endowed, is to be pleaſant and of quaint behauiour: for with his imagination he frameth many plots, and weeteth that whatſoeuer error or negligéce, are the way to caſt away an army, wher-through he euer carieth an eie to the maine chance. But people of little worth, call carefulneſſe a toil, chaſtiſment crueltie, and mercie ſoftneſſe, ſuffering and diſſembling of leud parts a good

diſpoſition. And this verily ſpringeth, becauſe men are ſots, who pierce not into the true value of things, nor in what ſort they ought to be managed: but the wiſe and skilfull cannot hold patience, nor beare to ſee matters ill handled, though they nothing appertain vnto themſelues, and therfore liue a ſmall while, and with much trouble of ſpirit. Whence *Salomon* ſaid, I gaue alſo my mind to vnderſtand wiſdom, doctrine, errors, and folly; and found that in theſe alſo, there is wearineſſe and affliction of ſpirit: for into much wiſdome entreth much diſpleaſure, and who ſo attaineth Science, getteth ſorrow. In which words it ſeemeth that *Salomon* gaue vs to vnderſtand, that he liued better contented being ignorant, than after he had receiued wiſdome. And ſo verily it came to paſſe: for the ignorant liue moſt careleſſe; inaſmuch as nothing giueth them pain nor vexation, and they litle reck who haue a better capcaſe than thẽſelues. The vulgar accuſtometh to call ſuch the Angels of heauen: for they ſee how they take nothing at heart; neither find fault with any thing ill done, but let all paſſe: but if they conſidered the wiſdome and condition of the Angels, they ſhould ſee it were a word that carried euill conſonance, and a caſe for the inquiſition houſe: for from the day when we receiue the vſe of reaſon, vntill that of our death, they doe nought els ſaue reprooue vs for all our euill doings, and aduiſe vs to that which we ought to do. And if as they ſpeake to vs in their ſpiritual language, by mouing our imagination, ſo they ſhould deliuer vs their opinion in material words, we would hold them importunate and vnmannerly brought vp. And he that beleeueth not this, let him marke that the Angel (of whom S *Mathew* maketh mention) ſeemed ſuch a one to *Herod*, and to the wife of his brother

S. Iohn Baptiſt was an angell in his office.

brother *Philp*, ſeeing (becauſe they would not heare his fault-findings) they faire and well chopped off his head. Better were it, that theſe men, who by the vulgar are fondly termed Angels of heauen, were called Aſſes of the earth: for amongſt brute beaſts (ſaith *Galen*) there is none more blunt, or of leſſe wit than the Aſſe: although in memory he out-reach all the reſt. He refuſeth no burden, he goeth whither he is driuen without any gainſtriuing, he winceth not, he biteth not, he is not fugitiue, not iadiſh conditioned; if he be laboured with a cudgell, he ſetteth not by it, he is wholly made to the wel-liking and ſeruice of him that is to vſe him: theſe ſelfe properties do thoſe men partake, whom the vulgar terme Angels of heauen; which ſport-making, ſpringeth in them, for that they are blockheads and void of imagination, and haue their wrathfull power verie remiſſe, which tokeneth a great defect in a man, and argueth that he is ill compounded.

There was neuer Angel nor man in the world, better conditioned than Chriſt our redeemer, and he entring one day into the temple, belaboured welfauoredly thoſe whom he found there ſelling of merchandize: and this he did becauſe the iraſcible is the chaſtice geuer, and ſword of reaſon, & the man who reproueth not things ill done, either ſheweth himſelfe but a foole, or is depriued of the wrathfull power. In ſort, that it falles out a miracle to ſee a wiſe man of that gentleneſſe or conditions, which are beſt liking to lewd mens fancies: wherethrough ſuch as ſet down in writing the actions of *Iulius Cæſar*, maruelled to ſee how his ſouldiers could ſupport a man ſo rough and ſeuere, and this grew in him, becauſe he lighted vpon a wit requiſit for the warres. The third propertie of thoſe who are endowed with this differẽce

of wit is, to be reckleſſe touching the attiring of their perſon, and in a maner all of them are ſlouinly, homely, with their hoſen hanging about their heels, ful of wrinckles, their cap ſitting vpō the one ſide, with ſome threed-bare gabberdine on their backe, & neuer long to change ſuits.

This propertie, *Lucius Florus* recounteth, had that famous captain *Viriatus*, by nation a Portuguiſe, of whom (exaggerating his great humility) he ſaith and affirmeth, that he deſpiſed ſo much all ornament of his perſon, as there was no priuat ſouldier in his army, that wēt worſe apparelled than himſelfe. And verily this was no vertue, neither did he the ſame artificially, but it is a natural effect of thoſe, who are poſſeſſed with that difference of imagination after which we enquire.

This rechleſneſſe in *Iulius Cæſar*, greatly deceiued *Cicero*: for being asked (after the battell) the cauſe which mooued him to follow the party of *Pompey*; he anſwered (as *Macrobius* recounteth) His girding deceiued me: as if he had ſaid, It was my beholding of *Iulius Cæſar* to be a man ſomwhat ſlouinly, and who neuer wore his girdle handſomly, whom his ſouldiers in ſcoffe called, Looſe-coat. But this ſhould haue mooued and made him to know, that he was endowed with a wit requiſit to the counſell of warre. Rightly did *Silla* hit the naile on the head, who (as *Suetonius Tranquillus* reporteth) ſeeing the rechleſneſſe of *Iulius Cæſar* in his apparrelling himſelfe when he was a boy, aduertiſed the Romains, ſaying; take heed of this ill girded yong fellow. The Hiſtorians buſie themſelues much, in recounting how careleſly *Hanniball* bare him touching his apparell, and how little he reaked to go neat and handſome. To grow in great diſlike at motes on the cape, to take much care that his

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ſtockings ſit cleane, and his cloke handſome, without plaits, appertaineth to a difference of the imagination of very baſe alloy, and gainſaith the vnderſtanding, and that imagination which the warre requireth. The fourth ſigne is to haue a bald head, and the reaſon heerof may ſoon be learned: for this difference of imagination, reſideth in the forepart of the head, as doe all the reſt, and exceſſiue heat burneth the skin of the head, and cloſeth the poares, through which the haire is to paſſe. Beſides that the matter wherof the haire is engendered (as the phiſitions auouch) are thoſe excremẽts which the brain expelleth in time of his nouriſhing, and by the great fire that there is, they are conſumed and burned vp, and ſo the matter faileth wherof they may breed. And if *Iulius Cæſar* had been ſeen in this point of philoſophy, he would not ſo much haue ſhamed at his baldhead, as that to couer the ſame, he cauſed the hinder part of his haire which ſhould hang down on his necke to be featly turned towards his forehead. And *Suetonius* maketh mention, that nothing ſo much contented him, as when the Senat enacted that he might weare a laurell garland on his head, and that on none other ground than becauſe thereby he might couer his baldneſſe. Another ſort of baldneſſe groweth from hauing the haire hard & earthly, and of a groſſe compoſition, but that betokeneth a man void of vnderſtanding, imagination and memory. The fifth ſigne, wherby thoſe are known who haue this difference of imagination is, that ſuch are ſpare in words and full of ſentences, and the reaſon importeth becauſe the brain being hard, it followeth of neceſſitie, that they ſuffer a defect in memorie, to which copie of words appertaineth. To find much what to ſay, ſpringeth from a coniunction, which the memorie maketh with the ima-

gination, in his first degree of heat. Such as haue this conioyning of both powers, are ordinarily great liers, and neuer want words and tales, though you stand harkening vnto them a whole day togither.

The sixt propertie of those who haue this difference of imagination is, to be honest, and to take great dislike at filthie and baudie talke: and therefore *Cicero* saith, that men very reasonable, do imitate the honestie of nature, who hath hidden the vnseemly and shamefull parts, which she made to prouide for the necessity of mankind and not to adorne it, and she consenteth not to fasten the eyes on these, nor that the eares should once heare them named. This we might well attribut to the imagination, and say that the same resteth offended at the euil representation of these parts, but in the last chapter we rendered a reason of this effect, and reduced the same to the vnderstanding, and we adiudged him defectiue in this power, who tooke not offense at such dishonestie. And because to the difference of imagination appurtenant to the art militarie, there is ioyned this discourse, therefore are good captains very honest. Wherthrough, in the historie of *Iulius Cæsar*, we find an action of the greatest honestie that might be, and that is, whilst they murthered him with daggers in the Senat-house, he (perceiuing it was impossible to escape death) gaue himselfe to fall to the ground, and so fitted his imperiall robe about him, that after his death they found him couched with great honestie, with his legs and other parts couered, that might any way offend the sight.

The seuenth propertie, and of greatest importance, is that the Generall haue good fortune and be luckie, by which signe we shall perfectly find, that he is seized of the wit and habilitie behooffull for the art martiall, for in

substance

ſubſtance and truth, there is nothing which ordinarily maketh men vnfortunat, and that their enterpriſes do not alwaies take ſucceſſe after their deſire, ſaue that they are depriued of wiſedome, and lay not hold on the conuenient means for achieuing their exploits. For that *Iulius Cæſar* ſhewed ſuch wiſedome in the affairs which he managed, he bare away the bell (in reſpect of fortuneneſſe) from all other captains of the world, ſo as in perils of importance, he encouraged his ſouldiors, ſaieng; Feare not, for you haue *Cæſars* good fortune to fight on your partie.

The Stoicks held opinion, that as there was a firſt cauſe, euerlaſting, almightie, and of infinit wiſedome, knowne by the order and concert of his maruellous works; ſo alſo there was another vnwiſe and vnconcerted, whoſe workes prooued without order, without reaſon, and void of diſcretion: for with an affection no way reaſonable, it giueth and reaueth from men riches, dignitie, and honour. This they tearmed Fortune, ſeeing hir a friend to men who performe their buſineſſe by hap haſard, without forecaſting, without wiſedome, and without ſubmitting themſelues to the gouernmẽt of reaſon. They pourtraied her (the better to make her manners and malice knowne) in fourme of a woman, a roiall ſcepter in her hand, her eyes vailed, her feet vpon a round ball, accompanied with perſons ſottiſh and void of all trade of liuing. By painting her like a woman, they noted her great lightneſſe and little diſcretion; by her roiall ſcepter, they acknowledged her ſoueraigntie ouer riches and honour; her veiled eyes, gaue to vnderſtand the ill faſhion which ſhe held in diſtributing her gifts; her feet ſtanding on the round ball, betokened the ſmall firmeneſſe in the fauours which ſhe imparted, for ſhe ſnat-

cheth them away with the like facilitie that ſhe reacheth them foorth, without keeping ſtedfaſtneſſe in ought whatſoeuer: but the worſt part they found in her, was that ſhe fauoureth the wicked, and perſecuteth the vertuous; loueth the fooliſh, and abhorreth the wiſe; abaſeth the noble, & aduanceth the baſe: what is foule pleaſeth her, and what is faire worketh her annoiance. Many men, placing cõfidence in theſe properties, becauſe they know their owne good fortune, take hardineſſe to vndertake fond and headlong enterpriſes, which yet proſper with them very luckily, and yet other men, very wiſe and aduiſed, dare not aduenture to execute thoſe enterpriſes, which they haue begun with great diſcretion, finding by experience that ſuch find worſt ſucceſſe. How great a friend Fortune ſheweth her ſelfe to bad people, *Ariſtotle* maketh knowne by this probleme, Whence groweth it, that riches (for the moſt part) are poſſeſſed rather by the wicked than by men of worth? Whereto he ſhapeth anſwer, Perhaps becauſe Fortune being blind cannot know nor make choice of what is beſt. But this is an anſwer vnworthy of ſo great a philoſopher: for it is not Fortune that beſtoweth wealth on men, and though it were, yet he yeeldeth no reaſon, why ſhe alwaies cheriſheth the bad, and abandoneth the good. The true ſolution of this demand is, that the lewd ſort are verie witty, and haue a gallant imagination, to beguile in buying and ſelling, and can profit in bargaining, and employing their ſtocke where occaſion of gaine is offered. But honeſt men want this imagination: many of whom haue endeuoured to imitate theſe bad fellowes, and by trafficquing & trucking, within few daies haue loſt their principall.

This, Chriſt our redeemer pointed at, conſidering

the ſufficiencie of that ſteward, whom his maiſter called to accompt, who reſeruing a good portion of the goods to his owne behoofe, ſalued vp all his reckonings, and got his *quietus eſt.* Which wiſdome (though it were faultie) yet God commended, ſaying; The children of this world are more wiſe in their kinde, than the children of light: for theſe ordinarily enioy a good vnderſtanding, with which power they place their affection on their law, and haue want of imagination, whereto the knowledge how to liue in this world appertaineth; wherethrough many are morally good, becauſe they lacke the wit how to be naught. This maner of anſwering is more eaſie and apparent. The naturall philoſophers, becauſe they could not reach ſo farre, deuiſed ſo fond and ill iointed a cauſe, as lady Fortune, to whoſe power they might impute good and bad ſucceſſes, & not to the vnskilfulneſſe and little knowledge of men.

Foure ſorts of people there are in euerie commonwealth, if a man liſt to marke them. For ſome men are wiſe, and ſeeme not ſo; others ſeeme ſo, and are not; others, neither are, nor ſeem; and ſome both are, and ſeem ſo. Some men there are ſilent, ſlow in ſpeech, ſtaid in anſwering, not curious nor copious of words: yet they retain hidden within them, a naturall power appertaining to the imagination, whereby they know the fit time and occaſion to bring their purpoſe to paſſe, and how they are therein to demeane themſelues without communicating or imparting their minde to any other. Theſe by the vulgar are called happy and luckie, them ſeeming that with little knowledge, and leſſe wit, euery thing falleth into their lap.

Others, contrariwiſe are of much eloquence in words and diſcourſe, great cōuerſers, men that take vpon them

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to gouerne the whole world, who go about hunting how with ſmall expenſe they may reape great gains, and therein (after the vulgars conceit) no man in iudgement can ſtep an acc beyond them, and yet, comming to the effect, all falleth to the ground betweene their hands. Theſe crie out vpon fortune, and cal her blind buzzard, and iade, for the matters which they diſſeigne & worke with much wiſdome, ſhe ſuffereth not to take good effect: but if there were a Fortune who might plead her own defence, ſhe would tell them, Your ſelues are the buzzards, the ſots, and the doo-noughts, whome you ſpeake of, that being vnskilful, hold your ſelues wiſe, and vſing vnfit means, would yet reape good ſucceſſes. This ſort of people haue a kind of imagination which decketh vp and ſetteth foorth their words and reaſons, and maketh them ſeeme to be what in deed they are not. Wheron I conclude, that the Generall who is endowed with a wit requiſit for the art militarie, and doth duly forecaſt what he is to exploit, ſhall be fortunate and happie, otherwiſe it is loſt labour to looke that he euer preuaile to victorie, vnleſſe God do fight for him, as he did for the armies of Iſraell, and yet withall, they choſe the wiſeſt and skilfulleſt amongſt them to be commaunders, for we muſt not leaue all vpon Gods hands, neither yet may a man wholy affie on his own wit and ſufficiencie, but it will do beſt to ioine both together; for there is no other Fortune, ſaue God and a mans own good indeuour.

He who firſt deuiſed Cheſſe-play, made a modell of the art militarie, repreſenting therein all the occurrents and contemplations of war, without leauing any one behind: and as in this game Fortune beareth no ſtroke, neither can the plaier who beateth the aduerſe party be ter-

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med fortunat, nor he who is beaten vnfortunat. So the captain that ouercõmeth ought to be called wise, and the vanquished, ignorant; and not the one happie, or the other vnhappie. The first thing which he ordained in this play was, that when the king is mated, the contrary partie is vanquisher, thereby to let vs vnderstand, that the cheefe force of an armie, consisteth in a good commaunder to gouern and direct the same: and for proofe hereof, he lotted as many cheefe men to the one side as to the other, to the end that whosoeuer lost, might be ascertained, it so fell out through default of his owne knowledge, and not of fortune. And this is more apparantly seene, if we consider, that a skilfull plaier will spare halfe his men to the other partie, and yet for all that get the game. And this was it which *Vegetius* noted, that often few souldiers and weake, vanquish many & valiant, if they be gouerned by a generall who can skill in ambushes and stratagems. He ordained also that the pawnes might not turne backe, thereby to aduise the commaunder that he duly forecast all chances, ere he send foorth his souldiers to the seruice, because if any mischaunce alight, it behooues rather that they be cut in peeces wher they were placed, than to turne their backs, for the souldier is not to know, when time serueth to flie or to fight saue by direction of his captaine, and therefore so long as his life lasteth, he is to keepe his place, vnder paine of becomming infamous. Hereunto he adioined another law, that the pawne which had made seuen draughts without being taken, should be made a queene, & might make any draught at pleasure, and be placed next the king, as one set at libertie; and endowed with nobility; whereby he gaue vs to vnderstand, how in the warre it importeth greatly for making the souldior valiant, to

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proclaime aduantages, free camps, and preferments, for such as shal haue done any speciall peece of seruice. And principally, that the honour and profit passe to their posteritie: for then they will exploit with greater courage, and gallantnesse. For which cause *Aristotle* affirmeth that a man maketh more reake to be chiefe of his linage, than of his owne proper life. This *Saul* well perceiued when he caused to be proclaimed in the army, Whosoeuer shal strike that man (meaning kill the Giant *Golias*) shall be made rich by the king, and shall haue his daughter to wife, and his house shalbe enfranchised in Israel from all maner tribute. Conformable vnto this proclamation, there was a court in Spain, which ordained, that whatsoeuer souldier, by his good vsage, deserued to receiue for his pay 500 Soldi (this was the greatest stipend allowed in the warres) should himselfe and his posteritie, be discharged for euer from all taxes and seruices. The Moores (as they are great plaiers at chesse) haue in their plaies set seuen degrees in imitation of the 7 draughts, which the pawn must make to be a queene, and so they enlarge the play from one to the second, and from the second to the third, vntill they arriue to seuen, answerable to the proofe that the souldier shall giue of himselfe: & if she be so gallant as to enlarge his pay to the seuenth, they yeeld him the same: and for this cause they are termed Septerniers, or Seuenstears. These haue large liberties and exemptions, as in Spain those gentlemen who are called *Hidalgos*. The reason hereof, in naturall philosophy is verie plain: for there is no facultie of all those that gouern man, which will willingly worke, vnlesse there be some interest to moue the same: which *Aristotle* proueth in the generatiue power, and the selfe reason swaieth in the residue. The obiect of the wrathfull

full facultie (as we haue aboue ſpecified) is honour and aduantage: and if this ceaſe, ſtraightwaies courage and ſtomacke decay: by all this may be conceiued the great ſignification which it carrieth to make that pawne a queene, who hath made ſeuen draughts without taking: for whatſoeuer the greateſt nobilitie in the world, that hath been or ſhalbe, hath ſprung and ſhall ſpring from pawns, and priuat men, who by the valour of their perſon haue done ſuch exploits, as they deſerued for themſelues and their poſteritie, the title of gentlemen, knights, noblemen, earls, marqueſſes, dukes and kings. True it is, that ſome are ſo ignorant and void of conſideration as they will not grant, that their nobilitie had a beginning; but that the ſame is euerlaſting, and grown into their bloud, not by the grace of ſome particular king, but by the ſupernaturall and diuine reaſon. To the bent of this purpoſe (though we ſhall thereby ſomwhat lengthen our matter) I cannot but recount a verie wittie diſcourſe, which paſſed between our Lord the Prince *Don Carlos*, and the doctor *Suares* of Toledo, who was iudge of the Court in Alcala of Heuares. Prince: Doctor what thinke you of this people? Doctor. Verie well (my Lord) for here is the beſt aire, and the beſt ſoile of any place in Spain. *P.* For ſuch the phiſitions made choice of to recouer my health: haue you ſeen the Vniuerſitie? *D.* No my *L.* *P.* See it then: for it is very ſpeciall; and where they tell me the Sciences are verie learnedly red. *D.* Verily, for a colledge and particular ſtudie, it carrieth great fame, and ſhould be ſuch in effect, as your highneſſe ſpeaketh of. *P.* Where did you ſtudie? *D.* In Salamanca, my lord. *P.* And did you proceed doctor in Salamanca? *D.* My lord, no. *P.* That me ſeemeth was euill done to ſtudie in one Vniuerſitie, and

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take degree in another. *D.* May it pleaſe your highneſſe, that the charges of taking degrees in Salamanca, are exceſſiue; and therefore we poore men flie the ſame, and get vs to ſome other Vniuerſitie, knowing that we receiue our ſufficiencie and learning, not from the degree, but from our ſtudie and pains, albeit my parents were not ſo poore, but if them liſted might haue borne the charge of my proceeding in Salamanca: but your highneſſe well knoweth, that the doctors of this Vniuerſitie haue the like franchiſes, as the gentlemen of Spain, and to vs who are ſuch by nature, this exemption doth harm, at leaſt to our poſteritie. *P.* Which of the kings mine anceſtors gaue this nobility to your linage? *D.* None. And to this end your highneſſe muſt vnderſtand, there are two ſorts of gentlemen in Spain; ſome of bloud, & ſome by priuiledge. Thoſe in bloud (as my ſelfe) haue not receiued their nobility at the kings hand, but thoſe by priuiledge haue. *P.* This matter is very hard for me to conceiue, and I would gladly that you expreſſed it in plainer termes: for if my bloud royall, reckoning from my ſelfe to my father; and from him to my grandfather; and ſo by order from ech to other commeth to finiſh in *Pelagius*: to whom by the death of the king *Don Rodericke*, the kingdome was giuen, before which time he was not king, if we reckon vp after this ſort your pedigree, ſhall we not come at laſt to end in one who was no gentleman? *D.* This diſcourſe cannot be denied, for all things haue had a beginning. *P.* I aske you then, from whence that firſt man had his nobilitie, who gaue beginning to your nobilitie? he could not enfranchiſe himſelfe, nor plucke out his own necke from the yoke of tributes and ſeruices, which before time he paied to the kings my predeceſſors: for this were a kind of theft, and a preferring

ring himſelfe by force with the kings patrimony, and it ſoundeth not with reaſon, that gentlemen of bloud ſhould haue ſo bad an originall as this: therefore it falleth out plain, that the king gaue him freedom, and yeelded him the grace of that nobilitie. Now tell me from whom he had it. *D.* Your highneſſe concludeth verie well, and it is true, that there is no true nobilitie ſaue of the kings grant: but we terme thoſe noble of bloud, of whoſe originall there is no memorie, neither is it ſpecified by writing, when the ſame began, nor what king yeelded them this fauour. And this obſcurenes is receiued in the common-wealth, for more honourable than diſtinctly to know the contrarie. The common-wealth alſo maketh gentlemen: for when a man groweth valorous, of great vertue, and rich: it dareth not to challenge ſuch a one, as ſeeming thereby to doe him wrong, and that it is fit a man of that worth do liue in al franchize. This reputation paſſing to the children, & to the nephews, groweth to nobilitie, & ſo they get a pretence againſt the king. Theſe are not therefore gentlemen, becauſe they receiue 500 Soldi of pay; but when the contrarie cannot be prooued, they paſſe for ſuch. That Spaniard, who deuiſed this name of a gentleman, *Hiſiodalgos*, gaue verie well to vnderſtand this doctrine which we haue ſet down: for by his opinion, men haue two kinds of birth: the one natuiall, in which all are equall, the other ſpirituall. When a man performeth any heroicall enterpriſe, or any vertue or extraordinarie worke, then is he new borne, and procureth for himſelfe other new parents, and leeſeth that being which he had tofore. Yeſterday he was called the ſonne of *Peter*, and nephew of *Sanchius*, and now he is named the ſonne of his owne actions. Hence had that Caſtilian prouerb

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his original which ſaith, Euery man is the ſon of his own works. And becauſe the good and vertuous works, are in the holy ſcripture termed ſomwhat, & in the Spaniſh tongue it ſignifieth *algo*, and vices & ſins nothing, which in the Spaniſh is termed *nada*. This Spaniard compoũded this word *hijo dalgo* therof, which importeth nought els, but that ſuch a one is deſcended of him, who performed ſome notorious and vertuous action: for which he deſerued to be rewarded by the king or commonwealth, togither with all his poſteritie for euer. The law of the *Partita* ſaith, that *hiio dalgo*, ſignifieth the ſonne of goods: But if we vnderſtand the ſame of temporall goods, the reaſon was not good; for there are infinit gentlemen poore, and infinit rich men, who are no gentlemen: but if he meane the ſonne of goods; that is to ſay of good qualities, it carrieth the ſame ſenſe which we before expreſſed.

Of the ſecond birth which men ought to haue beſides their naturall, there is affoorded vs a natural example in the ſcripture, where Chriſt our redeemer reprehendeth *Nichodemus*, becauſe he (being a doctor of the law) wiſt not yet, it was neceſſarie that a man ſhould be borne of new, therby to obtain a better being, and more honourable parents than his naturall: for which cauſe, all the time that a man performeth no heroicall enterpriſe, in this ſenſe he is called *hiio de nada*, to weet the ſonne of nothing; although by his anceſtors he beare the name of *hiio dalgo*, that is the ſonne of ſomwhat; or a gentleman. To the purpoſe of this doctrine, I will recite vnto you a diſcourſe which paſſed between a very honourable Captain, and a Caualiero, who ſtood much on the pantophles of his gentilitie. Whereby ſhall be diſcouered in what the honor of this ſecond birth conſiſteth.

ſiſteth. This captaine then falling in compánie with a knot of Caualieros, and diſcourſing of the largeſſe & liberty, which ſouldiers enioy in Italie, in a certaine demand, which one of them made him, he gaue him the *you*, becauſe he was natiue of that place, and the ſonne of meane parents, born in a village of ſome few houſes: but the captain (agreeued therat) anſwered ſaying; Signore your ſignory ſhall vnderſtand, that ſouldiers who haue enioyed the libertie of Italy, cannot content themſelues to make abode in Spain, becauſe of the many laws which are here enacted againſt ſuch as ſet hand to their ſword.

The other Caualieros, hearing him vſe the terme of *Signoria*, could not forbeare laughter. The Caualiero bluſhing hereat, vſed theſe words, Your *Mercedi* may weet, that in Italy, to ſay *Signoria*, importeth ſo much as in Spain to ſay *mercede*, and this Signor Capitano, being accuſtomed to the vſe and maner of that country, giueth the terme of *Signoria*, where he ſhould doe that of *mercede*. Hereto the captain anſwered, ſaying; let not your Signory hold me to be a man ſo ſimple, but that I know when I am in Italy, to apply my ſelfe to the language of Italy, and in Spain, to that of Spain: but he that in Spain talking with me, may giue me the *you*, it behoooueth at leaſt that he haue a Signory in Spain; & yet ſo I can ſcarſe take it wel, the Caualiero ſomwhat affrõted made reply, ſaying; why Signor Capitano are you not natiue in ſuch a place, and ſonne to ſuch a man? And know you not again who I am, and what mine anceſtors haue been? Signore (anſwered the captain) I know right-well, that your Signory is a good Caualiero, and ſuch haue been your elders: but I and my right arme (which now I acknowledge for my father) are better than you & all your

linage. This captain meant to allude to the ſecond birth, when he ſaid I and my right arme, which now I acknowledge to be my father; and that not vnduly: for with his right arme, and with his ſword he had performed ſuch actions, as the valour of his perſon was equall to the nobility of that Caualiero. For the moſt part, the laws and nature (ſaith *Plato*) are contrary: for a man ſomtimes iſſueth out of natures hands, with a minde verie wiſe, excellent, noble, franke, and with a wit apt to command a whole world: yet becauſe his hap was to be borne in the houſe of *Amiclas*, a baſe peaſant; by the laws he remaineth depriued of that honour and liberty, wherin nature placed him. And contrariwiſe we ſee others, whoſe wit & faſhions were ordained to be ſlaues; and yet for that they were borne in noble houſes, they come by force of the laws to be great Lords. But one thing hath been noted many ages ago, which is worthy of conſideration, that thoſe who are born in villages and thatched houſes, prooue more ſufficient men, and of greater towardneſſe for the Sciences & arms, than ſuch as haue great Cities for their birth-place. Yet is the vulgar ſo ſubiect to ignorance, as they gather a conſequence to the contrary, from birth in meane places: hereof the ſacred ſcripture affoordeth as an example, where it is read, that the people of Iſrael much wondering at the great works of our ſauiour Chriſt, ſaid; is it poſſible, that out of Nazareth can come ought that is good? But to return to the wit of this captain, of whō we haue diſcourſed; he ought to be endowed with much vnderſtanding, and with the difference of imagination, which is requiſit for the art of war. Wher through, in this treatiſe we deliuer much doctrine, whence we may gather wherin the valour of men conſiſteth, that they may reap

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eſtimation in the common-wealth.

Six things (me ſeemeth) a man ought to haue, to the end he may be termed honourable, and which of them ſoeuer want, his being is thereby impaired: but yet all of them are not placed in one ſelfe degree, nor partake a like valew, or the ſelfe qualities.

The firſt and principall, is the valour of a mans owne perſon, as touching his wiſdome, iuſtice, mind, and courage. This maketh riches and birth-right, from hence grow honourable titles; from this beginning all the nobilitie in the world fetcheth his originall. And if any be ſetled in a contrary opinion, let him go to the great houſes in Spain, and he ſhall find that they all deriue their originall from particular men, who by the valour of their perſons, attained to that, which now by their ſucceſſions is poſſeſſed.

The ſecond thing which honoureth a man, next to the valour of his perſon is ſubſtance, without which we find not, that any man carrieth eſtimation in the common-wealth.

The third is, the nobilitie and antiquitie of his anceſtors, to be well born, and of honourable bloud, is a thing verie precious: but yet retaineth in it ſelfe a great defect: for by it ſelfe alone, it yeeldeth a ſlender auaile, aſwell in regard of the gentleman himſelfe, as of others who ſtand in need therof: for a man can neither eat nor drinke the ſame, nor apparrell himſelfe therewithall, nor giue nor beſtow the ſame: but it maketh a man to liue as dying, by depriuing him of the remedies, which he might otherwiſe procure to ſupplie his neceſſities; but let him vnite the ſame with riches, and by no degree of honour it can be counteruailed. Some are wont to reſemble nobilitie, to a cipher in numbring, which of it

ſelfe beareth no value, but vnited with another number, multiplieth the ſame.

The fourth point which maketh a man to be of accompt, is to haue ſome dignitie or honourable office; and contrariwiſe nothing ſo much abaſeth a man, as to get his liuing by ſome handy-craft.

The fifth thing which honoureth a man, is to be called by a good ſurname, and a gratious chriſtian name, which may deliuer a pleaſing conſonance to the eare, & not to be termed paſty, or peſtell, as ſome that I know. We read in the generall hiſtorie of Spaine, that there came two Embaſſadours out of France, vnto king *Alfonſe* the ninth, to demand one of his daughters in marriage for their ſoueraigne king *Philip*: one of which ladies was verie faire, and named *Vrraca*, the other nothing ſo gratious, and called *Blanche*. They both comming in preſence of the Embaſſadours, all men held it as a matter reſolued, that the choice would light vpon *Vrraca*, as the elder, and fairer, and better adorned: but the Embaſſadours, enquiring ech of their names, tooke offence at the name of *Vrraca*, and made choice of the lady *Blanche*: ſaying, that her name would be better receiued in France than the other.

The ſixth thing which honoureth a man, is the ſeemly ornament of his perſon, & his going well apparelled, and attended with manie waiters. The good diſcent of the Spaniſh nobilitie, is of ſuch as through the valour of their perſon, and through their honourable enterpriſes atchieued, grew in the wars to the pay of 500 Soldi. The originall wherof our late writers cannot verifie: for if they find not their matter laid down in writing, and expreſſed to their hands by others, they are vnable to ſupplie the ſame, with anie inuention of their own. The dif-

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ference which *Aristotle* placeth betwixt memory and remembrance is, that if the memorie haue lost anie of those things which at first it knew, it cãnot call the same to mind, without new learning thereof: but remembrance enioieth this special grace, that if it forget ought, by stopping a while to discourse thereupon, it turneth to find out that which was before lost. Which may be the Court that speaketh in fauour of good souldiours, we find at this day recorded neither in books, nor in the memorie of men, but there are left as reliques these words, *hijo dalgo*, in those that receiue 500 Soldi of pay, after the Court of Spain, and their known wages. By making discourse, and arguing wheron, it wil fall out an easie matter to find out their associats. *Antony* of Lebrissa giuing the signification of this verbe, *vendico, cas*: saith the same signifieth, to draw vnto it that which is due for pay, or by reason, as we say now a daies by a new phrase of speech, to take pay from the king. And it is a thing so vsed in Castilia the old, to say such a one hath well impaied his trauaile, when he is well paied, that amongst the ciuiller sort, there is no maner of speech more ordinarie.

From this signification, the word *vindicare* fetched his originall, namely, when anie one would stirre at the wrong offered him by another: for iniury metaphorically is termed debt. After this sort when we now say, such a one is *hiio dalgo, de vengar quincentos sueldos*, that is, a gentleman of the pay of 500 Soldi, we meane that he is descended from a souldier so valiant, as for his prowesse he deserued to receiue so large a pay, as is that of 500 Soldi. VVho by the court of Spain was (with all his posteritie) enfranchised from paying any tallages or seruices to the king. This known pay, is nought els saue the

entrance which ſuch a ſouldiour made into the number of thoſe, whoſe ſtipend was 500 Soldi: for then were regiſtred in the kings booke, the name of the ſouldiour, the countrey where he was born, and who were his parents, and progenitors: for the more certaintie to him who receiued this benefit and ſtipend. Euen as at this day we read in the book of *Bezerro*, which is kept at Salamanca, where are foũd written, the beginning of welneere all the Spaniſh nobilitie. The ſemblable diligence vſed *Saul*, when *Dauid* ſlew *Golias*: for forthwith he ſent *Abner* his captain, to take information of what ſtock the yong man was deſcended. Antiently they termed *Solaro*, the houſe of the villaine, aſwell as of the gentleman.

But ſithens we haue ſtepped aſide into this digreſſion, it behooueth to make returne to our purpoſe from whence we parted, and to know whence it groweth, that in play at cheſſe, which we tearmed a counterfeit of war, a man ſhameth more to looſe, than at any other game, albeit the ſame turne him to no dammage, neither is the play for monie: and whence it may ſpring that the lookers on ſee more draughts than the plaiers themſelues, though they are leſſe ſeene in the play? and that which moſt importeth is, that ſome gamſters play beſt faſting, and ſome better after meat. The firſt doubt holdeth like difficultie, for we haue auouched, that in warre and in cheſſe play fortune hath nought to do, neither may we be allowed to ſay, Who would euer haue thought this? but all is ignorance and careleſneſſe in him that leeſeth, and wiſedome and cunning in him that getteth. And when a man is ouercome in matters of wit & ſufficiencie, and is cut off from all allegations of excuſe or pretence, other than his own ignorance, it

followeth

followeth a matter of neceſſitie that he wax aſhamed: for man is reaſonable, and a friend to his reputation, and cannot brooke that in the works of this power, any other ſhould ſtep a foot before him. For which cauſe *Ariſtotle* demaundeth what the reaſon may be, why the antients conſented not that ſpeciall rewards ſhould be aſſigned to thoſe, who ſurpaſſed the reſt in the Sciences, & yet ordained ſome for the beſt leaper, runner, thrower of the barre, and wreſtler? To which he frameth anſwer, That in wreſtling and bodily contentions, it is tollerated that there be Iudges aſſigned, who ſhall cenſure how far one man exceedeth another, to the end they may iuſtly yeeld prize to the vanquiſher, it falling out a matter of no difficultie for the eye to diſcerne who leapeth moſt ground, or runneth with greateſt ſwiftneſſe: but in matters of ſcience it prooueth very hard to trie by the vnderſtanding, which exceedeth other, for that it is a thing appertaining to the ſpirit, and of much queintneſſe; and if the iudge liſt to giue the prize maliciouſly, all men cannot looke thereunto, for it is a iudgement much eſtranged from the ſence of the beholders. Beſides this anſwer, *Ariſtotle* giueth another which is better, ſaying, That men make no great recke to be ouercome in throwing, wraſtling, running, and leaping, for that they are graces wherein the very brute beaſts outpaſſe vs. But that which we cannot endure with patience, is, to haue another adiudged more wiſe and aduiſed than our ſelues, wherethrough they grow in hatred with the iudges, and ſeeke to be reuenged of them, thinking that of malice they went about to ſhame thē. Therfore to ſhun theſe incōueniences, they would not yeeld conſent, that in works appertaining to the reaſonable part, men ſhould be allowed either iudges or rewards.

Whence is gathered, that the Vniuersities do ill who assigne iudges and rewards of the first, second, and third degree, in licencing those that prooue best at the examinations.

For besides that the inconueniences alleaged by *Aristotle* do betide, it is repugnant to the doctrine of the gospell, that men grow into contention who should be cheefe. And that this is true, we see manifestly, for that the disciples of our sauiour Christ, comming one day from a certain voiage, treated amongst themselues, who should be the greatest, and being now ariued at their lodging, their maister asked them whereof they had reasoned vpon the way? but they (though somwhat blunt) well vnderstood how this question was not allowable, wherthrough the text saith, that they durst not tell him, but because from God nothing can be concealed, he spake vnto them in this maner, If any will be chiefe amongst you, he shalbe the last of all, and seruant to the rest. The Pharisies were abhorred by Christ our redeemer, because they loued the highest seats at feasts, and the principall chaires in the Sinagogues. The chiefe reason wheron they rely, who bestow degrees after this maner, is, that when schollers know ech of them shalbe rewarded according to the triall which they shall giue of themselues, they will skantly affoord themselues time frō their studie, to sleep or eat. Which would cease, were there not a reward for him that taketh pains, or chastisment for him that addicteth himselfe to loosnesse and loitering. But this is a slender reason, and so only in apparence, and presupposeth a great falshood, which is, that knowledge may be gotten by continuall plodding at the booke, and by hearing of good maisters, and neuer leesing a lesson. And they marke not, that if a schol-

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ler want the wit and abilitie requisit for the learning which he applieth, it falleth out a lost labour, to beat his head day and night at his books. And the error is such, that if differences of wits, so far distant as these, do enter into competencie, the one through his quicke capacity, without studying or poaring in books, getteth learning in a trice, and the other, for that he is block-headed and dull, after he hath toiled all his life long, can small skill in the matter.

Now the Iudges come, as men to giue the first price to him, who was enabled by nature, and tooke no trauell, and the last to him who was born void of capacitie, yet neuer gaue ouer studying; as if the one had gotten learning by turning ouer his books, and the other lost the same through his owne sluggishnesse. And it fareth as if they ordained prices for two horses, of which the one had his legs sound and nimble, and the other halted down right. If the Vniuersities did admit to the studie of the Sciences, none but such as had a wit capable ther-of, and were all equall, it should seeme a thing well done to ordaine reward and punishment: for whosoeuer knew most, it would therby appeare that he pained himselfe most, and who knew least, had giuen himselfe more to his ease.

To the second doubt we answer, that as the eies stand in need of light, and cleernesse, to see figures and colours, so the imagination hath need of light in the brain, to see the fantasies which are in the memory. This cleernesse, the sunne giueth not, nor any lamp or candle, but the vitall spirits which are bred in the heart, and dispersed throughout the body. Herewithall it is requisit to know that feare gathereth all the vitall spirits to the heart, and leaueth the braine darcke, and all the other parts of the

body

body cold. Whereupon *Ariſtotle* maketh this demaund, Whence commeth it, that who ſo feareth, his voice, his hands, and his nether lip do tremble? whereto he anſwereth, that through this feare, the naturall heat hieth to the heart, and leaueth all the reſidue of the body a-cold, and the cold (as is before touched) by *Galens* mind, hindereth all the powers and faculties of the ſoule, and ſuffereth not them to worke.

Hence beginneth the anſwer of this ſecond doubt, and it is, that thoſe who play at Cheſſe, conceiue feare to looſe, becauſe the game ſtandeth vpon termes of reputation and diſgrace, and for that Fortune hath no ſtroke therein, ſo the vitall ſpirits aſſembling to the heart, the imagination is foreſlowed by the cold, and the fantaſms in the darke, for which two reaſons, he who plaieth cannot bring his purpoſe to effect. But the lookers on, in as much as this no way importeth them, neither ſtand in feare of looſing through want of skill, do behold more draughts, for that their imagination retaineth his heat, and his figures are enlightened by the light of the vitall ſpirits. True it is, that much light reaueth alſo the light of the imagination, and it befalleth what time the player waxeth aſhamed and out of countenaunce to ſee his aduerſarie beat him; then through this aggreeuednes, the naturall heat encreaſeth, and enlighteneth more than is requiſit, of all which he that ſtandeth by is deuoid. From hence iſſueth an effect very vſual in the world, that what time a man endeuoreth to make the beſt muſter of himſelfe, and his learning and ſufficiencie moſt knowne, it prooueth worſt with him: with others againe the contrarie betideth, who being brought to their triall, make a great ſhow, and paſſed out of the liſts, appeare of little woorth, and of all this, the reaſon is very manifeſt, for he

whoſe

whoſe head is filled with much naturall heat, if you appoint him to do an exerciſe of learning or diſputation, within foure and twentie hours after, a part of that exceſſiue heat which he hath, flieth to the heart, and ſo the brain remaineth temperat, and in this diſpoſition (as we wil prooue in the chapter enſuing) many points woorth the vtterance, preſent themſelues to a mans remembrance. But he who is very wiſe and endowed with a great vnderſtanding, being brought to triall, by means of feare, cannot retaine the naturall heat in his head, whereon through default of light, he findeth not in his memorie what to deliuer.

If this fell into their conſideration, who take vpon them to controll the Generals of armies, blaming their actions, and the order which they ſet down in the field, they ſhould diſcerne how great a difference reſteth betweene the giuing a looking on the fight out at a window, or the breaking of a launce therein, and the feare to leeſe an armie whoſe charge their ſoueraigne hath committed to their hands.

No leſſe dammage doth feare procure the Phyſition in curing, for his practiſe (as we haue prooued heretofore) appertaineth to the imagination, which reſteth more annoied by cold than any other power, for that his operation conſiſteth in heat. Whence we ſee by experience, that Phyſitions can ſooner cure the vulgar ſort, than Princes and great perſonages. A counſellor at law one day asked me (knowing that I handled this matter) what the cauſe might be, that in the affairs where he was well payd, many caſes and points of learning came to his memorie, but with ſuch as yeelded not to his trauell what was due, it ſeemed that all his knowledge was ſhrunke out of his braine: whome I anſwered, that matters

ters of intereſt appertained to the wrathfull faculties which maketh his reſidence in the heart, and if the ſame receiue not contentment, it doth not willingly ſend forth the vitall ſpirits, by whoſe light, the figures which reſt in the memorie may be diſcerned. But when that findeth ſatisfaction, it cheerfully affoordeth naturall heat. VVherthrough the reaſonable ſoule obtaineth ſufficient cleerneſſe to ſee whatſoeuer is written in the head. This defect do men of great vnderſtanding partake, who are pinching, and relie much on their intereſt and in ſuch is the propertie of that counſellor beſt diſcerned. But who ſo falleth into due conſideration hereof, ſhall obſerue it to be an action of Iuſtice, that he who laboureth in another mans vineyard be well paied his wages.

The like reaſon is currant for the phiſitions, to whom (when they are wel hired) many remedies preſent themſelues: otherwiſe, the art (aſwell in them as the lawyer) ſlippeth out of their fingers. But here a matter verie important is to be noted, namely; that the good imagination of the phiſition, diſcouereth on a ſodain what is neceſſarie to be done. And if he take leiſure and farther conſideration, a thouſand inconueniences come into his fancie, which hold him in ſuſpenſe, and this-while the occaſion of the remedie paſſeth away. Therefore it is neuer good, to aduiſe the phiſition to conſider well what he hath in hand, but that he forthwith execute what firſt he purpoſed. For we haue prooued heretofore, that much ſpeculation maketh the naturall heat to auoid out of the head, and again the ſame may encreaſe ſo far forth, as to turmoile the imagination. But the phiſition in whom it is ſlacke, ſhall not doe amiſſe to vſe long contemplation: for the heat aduancing it ſelfe vp

to

to the braine, ſhall come to attaine that point, which to this power is behooffull.

The third doubt in the matters alreadie rehearſed, hath his anſwer verie manifeſt: for the difference of the imagination, with which we play at cheſſe, requireth a certaine point of heat, to ſee the draughts, and he that plaieth well faſting, hath then the degree of heat requiſit thereunto. But through the heat of the meat, the ſame exceedeth that point which was neceſſarie, and ſo he plaieth worſe. The contrarie befalleth to ſuch as play well after meales, for the heat riſing vp togither with the meat and the wine, arriueth to the point, which wanted whiles he was faſting. It is therefore needfull to amend a place in *Plato*, who ſaith, that nature hath with great wiſdome diſioyned the liuer from the braine, to the end the meat with his vapours, ſhould not trouble the contemplation of the reaſonable ſoule. But here if he mean thoſe operations which appertain to the vnderſtanding, he ſpeaketh very well, but it can take no place in anie of the differences of the imagination. Which is ſeen by experience in feaſts and banquets: for when the gueſts are come to mid meale, they begin to tell pleaſant tales, merriments, and ſimilitudes; where at the beginning, none had a word to ſay; but at the end of the feaſt, their tongue faileth them, for the heat is paſſed beyond the bound, requiſit for the imagination. Such as need to eat and drinke a little, to the end the imagination may lift vp it ſelfe, are melancholicke by aduſtion: for ſuch haue their brain like hot lime, which taken vp into your hand, is cold and drie in feeling: but if you bath the ſame in any liquor, you cannot endure the heat which groweth therof.

We muſt alſo correct that law of the Carthagineans, which

which *Plato* alleageth, whereby they forbad their Captains to drinke wine, when they went to their wars, and likewiſe their gouernours, during the yeare of their office. And albeit *Plato* held the ſame for a verie iuſt law, and neuer maketh an end of commending the ſame; yet it behooueth to make a diſtinction: we haue alleaged heretofore, that the worke of iudging appertaineth to diſcourſe, and that this power abhorreth heat, and therfore receiueth much dammage by wine: but to gouern a common-wealth, (which is a diſtinct matter from taking into your hand a proceſſe, & giuing ſentence therupon) belongeth to the imagination, and that requireth heat. And the gouernor not arriuing to the point, which is requiſit, may well drinke a little wine, ſo to attaine the ſame. The like may be ſaid touching the generall of an army, whoſe counſell partaketh alſo with the imagination. And if the naturall heat be by any hot thing to be aduanced, none performeth it ſo well as wine; but it is requiſit, that the ſame be temperatly taken, for there is no nouriſhment which ſo giueth and reaueth a mans wit, as this liquor. VVherefore it behooueth the Generall, to know the maner of his imagination, whether the ſame be of thoſe which need meat and drinke to ſupply the heat that wanteth, or to abide faſting: for in this onely, conſiſteth how to mannage his affaires well or euill.

CHAP. XIIII.

How we may know to what difference of abilitie the office of a king appertaineth, and what ſignes he ought to haue, who enioyeth this maner of wit.

VVhen

WHen *Salomon* was choſen king and head of ſo great and numberfull a people, as that of Iſraell; the text ſaith, that for gouerning and ruling them, he craued wiſdom from heauen, and nothing beſides. VVhich demand ſo much pleaſed God, as in reward of hauing asked ſo well, he made him the wiſeſt king of the world, and not ſo contented, he gaue him great riches and glorie, euermore holding his requeſt in better price. VVhence is manifeſtly gathered, that the greateſt wiſdome and knowledge which may poſſibly be in the world, is that foundation, vpon which the office of a king relieth. VVhich concluſion is ſo certaine and true, as it were but loſt labour to ſpend time in the proofe therof. Only it behooueth to ſhew to what difference of wit the art of being a king, and ſuch a one as is requiſit for the common-wealth, appertaineth: and to vnfold the tokens, whereby the man may be known who is indowed with this wit and abilitie. VVherethrough it is certaine, that as the office of a king exceedeth all the arts in the world; ſo the ſame requireth a perfection of wit in the largeſt meaſure that nature can deuiſe. What the ſame is we haue not as yet defined: for we haue been occupied in diſtributing to the other arts, their differences & maners. But ſince we now haue the ſame in handling, it muſt be vnderſtood that of nine temperatures, which are in mankind, one onely (ſaith *Galen*) maketh a man ſo ſurpaſſing wiſe, as by nature he can be. VVherin the firſt qualities are in ſuch waight and meaſure, that the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie; but are found in ſuch equalitie and conformitie, as if really they were not contraries, nor had any naturall oppoſition. VVhence reſulteth an inſtrument

ſtrument ſo appliable to the operations of the reaſonaſoule, that man commeth to poſſeſſe a perfect memorie of things paſſed, and a great imagination to ſee what is to come, and a great vnderſtanding, to diſtinguiſh, inferre, argue, iudge, and make choice. The other differences of wit (by vs recounted) haue not anie one amongſt them of ſound perfection: for if a man poſſeſſe great vnderſtanding, he cannot (by means of much drineſſe) compriſe the ſciences which appertain to the imagination and the memorie; and if he be of great imagination, by reaſon of much heat, he remaineth vnſufficient for the ſciences of the vnderſtanding and the memorie, and if he enioy a great memorie, we haue tofore expreſſed how vnable thoſe of much memory (through their exceſſiue moiſture) do prooue for all the other ſciences. Only this difference of wit, which we now are a ſearching is that, which anſwereth all the arts in proportion. How much dammage the vnableneſſe of adioyning the reſt, breedeth to any one knowledge, *Plato* noteth, ſaying; That the perfection of ech in particular, dependeth on the notice and knowledge of them all in generall.

No ſort of knowledge is found ſo diſtinctly and ſeuered from another, but that the skill in the one much aideth to the others perfection. But how ſhall we do, if hauing ſought for this difference of wit with great diligence in all Spaine, I can find but one ſuch? Whereby I conceiue, that *Galen* ſaid verie well, That out of Greece, nature not ſo much as in a dream, maketh any man temperat, or with a wit requiſit for the ſciences. And the ſame *Galen* alleageth the reaſon hereof, ſaying; That Greece is the moſt temperat region of the world. Where the heate of the aire exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt

(No doubt your owne king.)

moiſt the dry. VVhich temperature, maketh men very wiſe and able for all the Sciences, as appeareth, conſidering the great number of famous mẽ, who thence haue iſſued, as *Socrates, Plato, Ariſtotle, Hippocrates, Galen, Theophraſtus, Demoſthenes, Homer, Thales Mileſius, Diogenes Cynicus, Solon*, and infinit other wiſe men mentioned in hiſtories, whoſe works we find repleniſhed with all ſciences. Not as the writers of other prouinces, who if they treat of phiſicke, or any other ſcience, it prooues a miracle, for them to alleage any other ſort of ſcience in their aid or fauour. All of them are beggerly and without furniture, as wanting a wit capable of all the arts. But which we may moſt maruell at in Greece is, that whereas the wit of women is found ſo repugnant vnto learning (as hereafter we will prooue) yet there haue been ſo many ſhe Greekes, ſo ſpecially ſeen in the ſciences, as they haue grown into competencie with the ſufficienteſt men: as namely *Leontia*, a moſt wiſe woman, who wrote againſt *Theophraſtus*, the greateſt Philoſopher of his time, reproouing him for many errors in philoſophy. But if we looke into other Prouinces of the world, hardly ſhall we find ſprung vp any one wit that was notable. VVhich groweth for that they inhabit places diſtempered, where men become brutiſh, ſlow of capacitie, and ill conditioned.

For this cauſe *Ariſtotle* moueth a doubt, ſaying; VVhat meaneth it, that thoſe who inhabit a country, either ouer cold, or ouer hot, are fierce and fell in countenance and conditions, To which probleme he anſwereth verie well, ſaying; that a good temperature, not only maketh a good grace in the body, but alſo aideth the wit and abilitie. And as the exceſſes of heat & cold do hinder nature, that ſhe cannot ſhape a man in good figure;

So (also for the like reason) the harmonie of the soule is turned topsie turuie, and the wit prooueth slow and dull.

This the Greeks well wist, inasmuch as they termed all the nations of the world Barbarians, considering their slender sufficiencie and little knowledge. VVhence we see, that of so many that are borne and studie out of Greece, if they be Philosophers, none of them arriueth to the perfection of *Plato*, and *Aristotle*: if Phisitions, to *Hippocrates* and *Galen*: if orators, to *Demosthenes*: if Poets, to *Homer*: and so in the residue of the sciences parts, the Greeks haue euer held the formost ranke beyond al contradiction. At least the probleme of *Aristotle* is verie well verified in the Greeks: for verily they are the men of most sufficiencie and loftiest capacity in the world: were it not that they liue in disgrace, oppressed by force of armes in bondage, and all hardly intreated, by the comming of the Turks, who banished all learning, and caused the Vniuersitie of Athens, to passe vnto Paris in France, where at this day the same cõtinueth. And (thus through want of manurance) so many gallant wits (as we haue before reported) are vtterly perished. In the other regions out of Greece, though schools and exercise of learning are planted, yet no man hath proued in them of any rare excellency.

The Phisition holdeth he hath waded very far, if with his wit he can attain to that which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* deliuered, and the naturall Philosopher reckoneth him selfe so full of knowledge, as he can be capable of no more, if he once grow to the vnderstanding of *Aristotle*. But this notwithstanding, it goeth not for an vniuersall rule, that all such as haue Greece for their birth-place, must of force be temperate and wise, and all the residue distem-

diſtemperat and ignorant: for the ſame *Galen* recounteth of *Anacharſis*, who was born in Scythia, that he carried the reputation of a rare wit amongſt the Grecians, though himſelfe a Barbarian. A Philoſopher, borne in Athens, falling in contention with him, ſaid vnto him; get thee hence thou Barbarian. Then *Anacharſis* anſwered, My countrey is to me a ſhame, and ſo art thou to thine: for Scythia, being a region ſo diſtemperat, and where ſo many ignorant perſons liue, my ſelf am grown to knowledge, and thou being borne in Athens, a place of wit and wiſdome, wert neuer other than an Aſſe. In ſort, that we need not vtterly deſpaire in regard of the temperature: neither thinke it a caſe of impoſſibilitie, to meet herewithall out of Greece, and eſpecially in Spain, a region not verie diſtemperat: for as I haue found one of theſe differences in Spaine, ſo it may well be, that there are many others not yet come to knowledge, and which I haue not been able to find out. It ſhall doe well therefore, to intreat of the tokens, by which a temperat man may be diſcerned, to the end where ſuch a one is, he may not be hidden.

Many ſignes haue the Phiſitions laid down to diſcouer this difference of wit, but the moſt principall, and which affoord beſt notice, are theſe following.

The firſt (ſaith *Galen*) is to haue his haire abourne, a colour between white and red; and that paſſing from age to age, they euer become more golden. And the reaſon is verie cleere: for the materiall cauſe whereof they haire conſiſteth, the Phiſitions ſay, is a groſſe vapour, which ariſeth from the digeſtion, that the brain maketh at the time of his nouriſhment; and looke what colour is of the member, ſuch alſo is that of his excrements. If the braine in his compoſition partake much of fleagme,

the haire in growth is white, if much choler, ſaffron coloured: but if theſe two humours reſt equally mingled, the braine becommeth temperat, hot, cold, moiſt, and dry; and the haire abourne, partaking both the extremes. True it is *Hippocrates* ſaith, that this colour in men, who liue vnder the North, as are the Engliſh, Flemmiſh, and Almains ſpringeth, for that their whitneſſe is parched vp with much cold, and not for the reaſon by vs alleaged. Wherfore in this token it behooueth to be wel aduiſed: otherwiſe we may ſoon ſlip into error.

The ſecond token which a man, who ſhalbe endowed with this difference of wit, muſt haue, is, ſaith *Galen*, to be well ſhaped, of good countenance, of ſeemly grace, and cheerfull: in ſort, that the ſight may take delight to behold him, as a figure of rare perfection. And the reaſon is very plain: for if nature haue much force, and a ſeed well ſeaſoned, ſhe alwaies formeth of things poſſible, the beſt and moſt perfect in his kind: but being purueied of forces, moſtly ſhe placeth her ſtudie in faſhioning the braine, for that amongſt all other parts of the bodie, the ſame is the principal ſeat of the reaſonable ſoul: whence we ſee many men to be great and foule, and yet of an excellent wit.

The quantitie of body, which a temperat man ought to haue (ſaith *Galen*) is not reſolutely determined by nature, for he may be long, ſhort, and of mean ſtature, conformable to the quantitie of the temperat ſeed, which it had when it was ſhaped. But as touching that which appertaineth to the wit in temperat perſons, a mean ſtature is better than either a great or little. And if we muſt lean to either of the extreames, it is better to encline to the little than to the great: for the bones and ſuperfluous fleſh (as we haue prooued heeretofore, by the opinion

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of *Plato* and *Aristotle*) bring great dammage to the wit. Agreeable hereunto, the natural Philosophers are wont to demand, whence it proceedeth, that men of small stature, are ordinarily more wise, than those of long stature. And for proofe hereof, they cite *Homer*, who saith that *Vlisses* was very wise, and little of bodie; and contrariwise *Aiax* very foolish, and in stature tall. To this question they make verie simple answer, saying, that the reasonable soule gathered into a narrow roome, hath therby more force to worke conformably to that old saw, Vertue is of more force vnited than dispersed: and contrariwise making abode in a body long and large, it wanteth sufficient vertue to moue and animat the same. But this is not the reason thereof: for we should rather say, that long men haue much moisture in their composition, which extendeth out their flesh, and ableth the same to that increase which the naturall heat doth euer procure. The contrarie betideth in little bodies: for through their much drinesse, the flesh cannot take his course, nor the naturall heat enlarge or stretch it out, and therefore they remaine of short stature. And we haue cast proued that amongst the first qualities, none bringeth so great dammage to the operations of the reasonable soule, as much moisture, and that none so farre quickneth the vnderstanding, as drinesse.

The third signe (saith *Galen*) by which a temperat man may be known, is, that he be vertuous and of good conditions: for if he be lewd and vitious, *Plato* affirmeth it groweth for that in man there is some distemperat qualitie, which vrgeth him to offend: and if such a one will practise that which is agreeable to vertue, it behooueth, that first he renounce his owne naturall inclination. But whosoeuer is absolutely temperat, standeth not in need

of any ſuch diligence, for the inferiour powers require nothing at his hands, that is contrarie to reaſon. Therefore *Galen* ſaith, that to a man who is poſſeſſed of this temperature, we need preſcribe no diet what he ſhall eat and drinke: for he neuer exceedeth the quantitie and meaſure which phiſicke would aſſigne him. And *Galen* contenteth not himſelfe to terme them moſt temperat: but moreouer auoucheth, that it is not neceſſary to moderat their other paſſions of the ſoule: for his anger, his ſadneſſe, his pleaſure, and his mirth, are alwaies meaſured by reaſon. Whence it followeth, that they are euermore healthful and neuer diſeaſed, and this is the fourth figure.

But herein *Galen* ſwarueth from reaſon: for it is impoſſible to frame a man, that ſhalbe perfect in all his powers, as the body is temperat, and that his wrathfull and concupiſcentiall power, get not the ſoueraigntie ouer reaſon, and incite him to ſin. For it is not fitting to ſuffer any man (how temperat ſoeuer) to follow alwaies his owne naturall inclination without gainſetting and correcting him by reaſon. This is eaſily vnderſtood, conſidering the temperature which the braine ought to haue, to the end the ſame may be made a conuenient inſtrument for the reaſonable facultie: and that which the heart ſhould hold, to the end the wrathfull power may couet glorie, empire, victorie, and ſoueraigntie ouer all: and that which the liuer ought to haue for diſgeſting the meats, and that which ought to reſt in the colds, to be able to preſerue mankind, and to increaſe the ſame. Of the brain, we haue ſaid ſundry times tofore, that it ſhould retaine moiſture, for memory; drineſſe, for diſcourſe; and heat, for the imagination. But for all this, his naturall temperature is cold and moiſt; and by reaſon of the

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more or leſſe of theſe two qualities, ſomtimes we terme it hot, and ſomtimes cold; now moiſt, then drie: but the cold and moiſt grow to predominat. The liuer, wherein the facultie of concupiſcence reſideth, hath for his naturall temperature, heat and moiſture to predominate; and from this it neuer altereth, ſo long as a man liueth. And if ſomtimes we ſay it is cold, it groweth, for that the ſame hath not all the degrees of heat requiſit to his owne operations. As touching the heart, which is the inſtrument of the wrathfull facultie, *Galen* affirmeth it of his owne nature to be ſo hot, as if (while a creature liueth) we put our finger into his hollowneſſe, it will grow impoſſible to hold the ſame there one moment without burning. And albeit ſomtime we terme it cold; yet we may not conceiue, that the ſame doth predominate: for this is a caſe impoſſible, but that the ſame conſiſteth not in ſuch degree of heat, as to his operations is behooffull.

In the cods, where the other part of the concupiſcible maketh abode: the like reaſon taketh place, for the predomination of his naturall temperature, is hot and drie. And if ſomtimes we ſay, that a mans cods are cold, we muſt not abſolutly ſo vnderſtand the ſame: neither to predomination: but that the degree of heat, requiſit for the generatiue vertue is wanting. Hereon we plainly inferre, that if a man be well compounded and inſtrumentalized, it behooueth of force, that he haue exceſſiue heat in his heart: for otherwiſe the wrathfull facultie would grow verie remiſſe; and if the liuer be not exceeding hot, it cannot diſgeſt the meat, nor make bloud for nouriſhment: and if the cods haue not more heat than cold, a man will prooue impotent, and without power of begetting. Wherefore theſe two members

(being of ſuch force as we haue ſaid) it followeth of neceſſitie, that the braine take alteration through much heat, which is one of the qualities that moſt pai:eth reaſon; and which is worſt, the will being free, inciteth and inclineth it ſelfe to condiſcend to the appetites of the lower portion.

By this reckoning it appeareth, that nature cannot faſhion ſuch a man as may be perfect in al his powers, nor produce him inclined to vertue. How repugnant it is vnto the nature of man, that he become inclined to vertue, is eaſily prooued, conſidering the compoſition of the firſt man, which though the moſt perfect that euer mankind enioyed ſauing that of Chriſt our redeemer, and ſhaped by the hands of ſo great an artificer : yet if God had not infuſed into him a ſupernaturall qualitie, which might keepe down his inferiour part; it was impoſſible (abiding in the principles of his owne nature) that he ſhould not be enclined to euill. And that God made *Adam* of a perfect power to wrath and concupiſcence, is well to be vnderſtood, in that he ſaid and commanded him; Encreaſe and multiply, and to repleniſh the earth. It is certaine that he gaue them an able power for procreation, & made them not of a cold complexion, inaſmuch as he commanded him that he ſhould people the earth with men; which worke cannot be accompliſhed without abundance of heat. And no leſſe heat did he beſtow vpon the facultie nutritiue : with which he was to reſtore his conſumed ſubſtance, and renew another in lieu thereof. Seeing that he ſaid to the man and the woman, Behold, I haue giuen you euerie heath, that bringeth forth ſeed vpon the earth, & whatſoeuer trees haue ſeed of their kind, to the end they may ſerue you for food : for if God had giuen them a ſtomacke

macke and liuer, cold and of little heat, for certain they could not haue digeſted their meat, nor preſerue themſelues 900 yeares aliue in the world. He fortified alſo the heart, and gaue the ſame a wrathfull facultie, which might yeeld him apt to be a king and lord, and to command the whole world, and ſaid vnto them, Do you ſubdue the earth, and command ouer the fiſhes of the ſea, and the foules of the aire, and all the beaſts that mooue on the face of the earth. But if he had not giuen them much heat, they had not partaken ſo much viuacitie, nor authoritie of ſoueraigntie, of commandement, of glory, of maieſtie, and of honour.

How much it endamageth a prince, to haue his wrathfull power remiſſe, cannot ſufficiently be expreſſed: for through this only cauſe it befalleth, that he is not feared nor obeied, nor reuerenced by his ſubiects. After hauing fortified the wrathfull and concupiſcible powers, giuing vnto the forementioned members ſo much heat, he paſſed to the facultie reaſonable, and ſhaped for the ſame a braine cold and moiſt, in ſuch degree, and of a ſubſtance ſo delicat, that the ſoule might with the ſame diſcourſe, and philoſophize, and vſe his infuſed knowledge. For we haue alreadie auouched, and heretofore prooued, that God to beſtow a ſupernaturall knowledge vpon men, Firſt ordereth their wit, and maketh them capable, by way of the naturall diſpoſitions deliuered by his hand, that they may receiue the ſame: for which cauſe, the text of the holy ſcripture affirmeth, that he gaue them a heart to conceiue, and repleniſhed them with the diſcipline of vnderſtanding. The wrathful and concupiſcentiall powers, being then ſo mighty through great heat, and the reaſonable ſo weake and remiſſe to reſiſt, God made prouiſion of a ſupernaturall qualitie,

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and this is tearmed by the Diuines Originall Iuſtice, by which they come to repreſſe the brunts of the inferiour portion, and the part reaſonable remaineth ſuperiour, and enclined to vertue. But when our firſt parents offended, they loſt this qualitie, and the iraſcible and concupiſcible remained in their nature, and ſuperiour to reaſon, in reſpect of the ſtrength of the three members that we ſpake of, and man reſted readie euen from his youth, vnto euill.

Adam was created in the age of youth, which (after the Phyſitions) is the moſt temperat of all the reſidue, and from that age foorth, he was enclined to euilnes, ſauing that little time, whilſt he preſerued himſelfe in grace by originall iuſtice. From this doctrine we gather in good naturall Philoſophie, that if a man be to performe any action of vertue to the gainſaieng of the fleſh, it is impoſſible that he can put the ſame in execution, without outward ayd of grace; for the qualities with which the inferiour power worketh, are of greater efficacie. I ſayd, with gainſaying of the fleſh, becauſe there are many vertues in man, which grow for that he hath his powers of wrath and concupiſcence feeble, as chaſtitie in a cold perſon, but this is rather an impotencie of operation, than a vertue: for which cauſe, had not the catholicke church taught vs, that without the ſpeciall aid of God, we could not haue ouercome our owne nature, Philoſophie naturall would ſo haue learned vs, namely, that grace comforteth our wil. That then which *Galen* would haue ſayd, was, that a temperat man exceedeth in vertue all others who want this good temperature, for the ſame is leſſe prouoked by the inferiour part.

The fifth propertie which thoſe of this temperature poſſeſſe, is to be very long liued, for they are ſtrong to

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reſiſt the cauſes and occaſions which engender diſeaſes; and this was that which the roiall prophet *Dauid* meant, The daies of our age in themſelues are ſeuentie yeares, but if in the potentates there be eightie or more, it is their paine and ſorrow: as if he ſhould ſay, The number of yeares which men ordinarily do liue, arriue vnto ſeuentie, and if potentates reach vnto eightie, thoſe once paſſed, they are dead on their feet. He tearmeth thoſe men potentates, who are of this temperature, for more than any other they reſiſt the cauſes which abridge the life. *Galen* layeth downe the laſt token, ſayeng, that they are very wiſe, of great memorie for things paſſed, of great imagination to foreſee thoſe to come, and of great vnderſtanding to find out the truth of all matters. They are not malicious, not wily, not cauillers, for theſe ſpring from a temperature that is vitious Such a wit as this aſſuredly, was not framed by nature to addict it ſelfe vnto the ſtudie of the Latine tongue, Logicke, Philoſophie, Phiſicke, Diuinitie, or the Lawes: for put caſe he might eaſily attaine theſe ſciences, yet none of them can fully repleniſh his capacitie; only the office of a king is in proportion anſwerable therevnto, and in ruling and gouerning ought the ſame ſolely to be imploied. This ſhal eaſilie be ſeene if you run ouer the tokens and properties of a temperat man, which we haue laid downe, by taking into conſideration, how fitly ech of them ſquareth with the roiall ſcepter, and how impertinent they ſhew for the other arts and ſciences.

That a king be faire and gratious, is one of the things which moſt inuiteth his ſubiects to loue him and wiſh him well; For the obiect of loue (ſaith *Plato*) is beautie and a ſeemly proportion: and if a king be hardly fauoured, and badly ſhaped, it is impoſſible that his ſubiects

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can beare him affection, rather they reake it a ſhame, that a man vnperfect and void of the gifts of nature, ſhould haue ſway and commaundement ouer them. To be vertuous and of good conditions, eaſily may we gather how greatly it importeth; for he who ought to order the liues of his ſubiects, and deliuer vnto them rules and lawes to liue conformably to reaſon, it is requiſit that he performe the ſame alſo in his owne perſon: for as the king is, ſuch are the great, the meane, and the inferiour perſons.

Moreouer, by this means he ſhall make his commandements the more authenticall, and with the better title may chaſtiſe ſuch as do not obſerue them. To enioy a perfection in all the powers which gouern man, namely; the generatiue, nutritiue, wrathfull and reaſonable, is more neceſſarie in a king, than any artiſte whatſoeuer. For (as *Plato* deliuereth) in a well ordered common-wealth, there ſhould be appointed certain ſurueiours who might with skill looke into the qualities of ſuch perſons as are to be married, and giue to him a wife anſwerable vnto him in proportion, and to euerie wife a conuenient husband. Through this diligence, the principall end of matrimonie ſhould not become vaine; for we ſee by experience, that a woman who could not conceiue of her firſt husbād, marrying another, ſtraghtwaies beareth children; and many men haue no children by their firſt wife, taking another, ſpeedily come to be fathers.

Now this skill (ſaith *Plato*) is principally behooffull in the marriage of kings: for it being a matter of ſuch importance, for the peace and quiet of the kingdome, that the Prince haue lawfull children to ſucceed in the eſtate, it may ſo fall, that the king marrying at all aduentures, ſhall

ſhall take a barraine woman to wife, with whom he ſhal be combred all daies of his life, without hope of iſſue. And if he deceaſe without heires of his body, ſtraightwaies it muſt be decided by ciuill wars, who ſhall command next after him. But *Hippocrates* ſaith, this art is neceſſarie for men that are diſtemperat, and not for thoſe who partake this perfect temperature by vs deſcribed. Theſe need no ſpecial choice in their wife, nor to ſearch out which may anſwere them in proportion: for whom ſoeuer they marry withal (ſaith *Galen*) forthwith they beget iſſue, but this is vnderſtood, when the wife is ſound, and of the age wherein women by order of nature, may conceiue and bring forth: in ſort, that fruitfulneſſe is more requiſit in a king than in any artiſt whatſoeuer, for the reaſons toforealleaged.

The nutritiue power (ſaith *Galen*) if the ſame be gluttonous, greedy, and bibbing, it ſpringeth, for that the liuer and ſtomack want the temperature which is requiſit for their operations: and for this cauſe men become riotous and ſhort liued. But if theſe members poſſeſſe their due temperature and compoſition, the ſelfe *Galen* affirmeth, that they couet no greater quantitie of meat and drink than is conuenient for preſeruation of life. Which propertie is of ſo great importance for a king, that God holdeth that land for bleſſed, to whoſe lot ſuch a Prince befalleth. Bleſſed is the land (ſaith he in *Eccleſiaſticus*) whoſe king is noble, and whoſe princes feed in due times, for their refreſhment, and not for riotouſneſſe. Of the wrathful facultie if the ſame be extended or remiſſe, it is a token (ſaith *Galen*) that the heart is ill compoſed, and partaketh not that temperature, which is requiſit for his operations. From which two extreams, a king ought to be farther diſtant, than any other artiſt. For to ioine

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wrathfulneſſe with much power maketh ſmally for the ſubiects auaile. And as illy fitteth it for a king to haue his wrathfull power remiſſe: for if he ſlightly ſlip ouer bad parts and attempts in his kingdome, he groweth out of awe and reuerence amongſt his ſubiects; whence great dammages and verie difficult to be remedied, doe accuſtomably ariſe in the common-wealth. But the man who is temperat, groweth diſpleaſed vpon good groũd, and can pacifie himſelfe as is requiſit: which propertie is as neceſſarie to be ſetled in a king, as anie of thoſe which we haue before remembred. How much it importeth that the facultie reaſonable, the imagination, the memorie, and the vnderſtanding, be of greater perfection in a king than in any other, is eaſily to be prooued: for the other arts and ſciences (as it ſeemeth) may be obtained and put in practiſe by the force of mans wit: but to gouern a kingdome, and to preſerue the ſame in peace and concord, not only requireth, that the king be endowed with a natural wiſedom to execute the ſame: but it is alſo neceſſary, that God particularly aſſiſt him with his vnderſtanding, and aid him in gouerning: whence it was well noted in the ſcripture, The heart of the king is in the hand of God. To liue alſo many yeares, and to enioy continuall health, is a propertie more conuenient for a good king than for any other artiſan. For his induſtry and trauell, breedeth an vniuerſall good to all: and if he faile to hold out in healthfulneſſe, the common-wealth falleth to ruine.

All this doctrine here laid downe by vs, will be euidently confirmed, if we can find in any hiſtory, that at any time there was any king choſen, in whom anie of thoſe tokens and conditions by vs recited, were not wanting. And truth hath this as peculier to her nature,

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that ſhe neuer lacketh arguments, whereby to be confirmed.

The diuine ſcripture recounteth, that God falling in diſlike with *Saul*, for that he had ſpared *Amalecks* life; commanded *Samuel* that he ſhould go to Bethleem, and annoint for king of Iſrael, one of the eight ſons of *Ieſſe*. Now the holy man, preſuming that God had a liking to *Eliab*, for that he was tall of ſtature; demanded of him, Is this man, here in the preſence of my Lord, his Chriſt? to which queſtion he was anſwered in this maner, Take not regard to his countenance, nor to the talneſſe of his ſtature, for I haue refuſed him. I iudge not man by his looke: for man ſeeth the things outwardly apparent, but the Lord diſcerneth the heart; As if God ſhould ſay, Marke not (O *Samuel*) the high ſtature of *Eliab*, nor that manly countenance which thou beholdeſt: for I haue tried that in *Saul*. You men iudge by the outward ſignes, but I caſt mine eye vpon the iudgement and wiſedom, wherewith a people is to be gouerned.

Samuel miſtruſting his owne skill in chuſing, paſſed on farther in the charge which was commanded him; asking ſtill of God, vpon euery one, which of them he ſhould annoint for king: and becauſe God held himſelfe contented with none of them, he ſaid vnto *Ieſſe*; haſt thou yet no more ſonnes but thoſe who ſtand before vs? Who anſwered, ſaying; That he had yet one more, who kept his beaſts, but he was of little growth: him ſeeming, that therfore he was not ſufficient to weeld the royall ſcepter. But *Samuel* now wiſted, that a great ſtature was no ſure token, cauſed him to be ſent for. And it is a point worth the noting, that the holy Scripture, before it expreſſed how he was annointed king, ſaid in this maner; But he was abourne haired, and of a faire

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countenance, and a viſage well ſhaped, ariſe and annoint him, for this is he. In ſort, that *Dauid* had the two firſt tokens, of thoſe which we recounted, abourne haired, handſome ſhaped, and of a meane ſtature. To be vertuous and well conditioned, which is the third ſigne eaſily we may conceiue, that he was therwithall endowed, ſeeing that God ſaid, I haue found a man after my heart: for albeit he ſinned ſundry times, yet for all that, he loſt not the name and habite of vertue. Euen as one by habite vitious, though he performe ſome good morrall works, doth not therefore leeſe the name of lewd and vitious. That he led all the courſe of his life in health, it ſhould ſeeme may be prooued; becauſe in his whole hiſtorie, mention is made of his ſicknes but once (& this is a naturall diſpoſition, of all ſuch as are long lyued.) Now becauſe his naturall heat was reſolued, and that he could not take heat in his bed; to remedie this, they couched a verie faire lady by his ſide, who might foſter him with heat. And herethrough he liued ſo manie yeares, that the text ſaith, he deceaſed in a good age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie: as if it ſhould ſay, *Dauid* died in a good old age, full of daies, of riches, and of glorie: hauing endured ſo many trauails in the wars, and vndergone great penance for his tranſgreſſions And this grew, for that he was temperat, & of a good complexion: for he refuſed the occaſions, which accuſtomably breed infirmitie, and ſhortning of mans life. His great wiſdome and knowledge was noted by that ſeruant of *Saul*, when he ſaid; My lord, I know a cunning muſition, the ſon of *Ieſſe*, born in *Bethleem*, couragious in fight, wiſe in diſcourſe, and of ſeemly countenance. By which tokens (aboue ſpecified) it is manifeſt, that *Dauid* was a temperat man, and to ſuch is the royall ſcepter belonging,

ging: for his wit is of the beſt mould that nature could faſhion. But there preſenteth it ſelfe a verie great difficultie againſt this doctrine, namely; ſeeing God knew all the wits and abilities of Iſrael: and likewiſe wiſt, that temperat men are ſeized of the wiſdom and knowledge requiſit to the calling of a king: for what cauſe in the firſt election that he made, he ſought not out a man of this ſort? Nay the text auoucheth, that *Saul* was ſo tall of ſtature, as he paſſed all the reſidue of Iſrael, by the head & ſhoulders, And this ſigne is not only an euill token of wit in natural Philoſophy, but euen God himſelf (as we haue prooued) reprooued *Samuel*, becauſe (mooued by the high growth of *Eliab*) he thereupon would haue made him king. But this doubt declareth that to be true, which *Galen* ſaid, that out of Greece, we ſhall not (ſo much as in a dreame) find out a temperat man, Seeing in a people ſo large (as that of Iſrael) God could not find one to chuſe for a king: but it behooued him to tarrie, till *Dauid* was grown vp, and the whiles made choice of *Saul*. For the text ſaith, that he was the beſt of Iſrael: but verely it ſeemed he had more good nature than wiſdome, and that was not ſufficient to rule and gouern. Teach me (ſaith the *Pſalme*) goodnes, diſcipline, and knowledge. And this the royall Prophet *Dauid* ſpake, ſeeing that it auaileth not for a king to be good and vertuous, vnleſſe he ioyne wiſedom and knowldge therewithall. By this example of king *Dauid*, it ſeemeth we haue ſufficiently approoued our opinion.

A weake reaſon, rather God choſe Saule as a carnal man fit for the Iewes obſtinat asking, and Dauid as a ſpirituall man, the inſtrument of his mercie.

But there was alſo another king borne in Iſrael, of whom it was ſaid, Where is he that is borne king of the Iewes? And if we can prooue, that he was abourne haired, towardly, of meane bigneſſe, vertuous, healthfull, and of great wiſedom and knowledge, it will be no way

damageable to this our doctrin. The Euangelists busied not themselues, to report the disposition of Christ our redeemer: for it serued not to the purpose of that which they handled, but is a matter which may easily be vnderstood, supposing that for a man to be temperat, as is requisit, compriseth all the perfection, wherewith naturally he can be edowed. And seeing that the holy spirit compounded and instrumentalized him, it is certaine that as touching the materiall cause, of which he formed him, the distemperature of Nazareth could not resist him, nor make him erre in his worke, as do the other naturall agents: but he performed what him best pleased: for he wanted neither force, knowledge, nor will, to frame a man most perfect, and without any defect. And that so much the rather, for that his comming (as himselfe affirmed) was to endure trauels for mans sake, and to teach him the trueth. And this temperature (as we haue before prooued) is the best naturall instrument that can be found for these two things. Wherethrough I hold that relatiõ for true, which *Publius Lentulus*, Viceconsul, wrote from Hierusalem vnto the Roman Senat after this maner.

And I hold it vntrue, because the phrase vtterly differeth from the Latine toung as *Speciosus valde inter filios hominum.*

There hath been seen in our time, a man who yet liueth, of great vertue, called Iesus Christ, who by the Gentiles, is termed the prophet of truth, and his disciples say, that he is the sonne of God. He raiseth the deceased, and healeth the diseased, is a man of meane and proportionable stature, and of very faire countenance, his looke carrieth such a maiesty, as those who behold him, are enforced both to loue and feare him. He hath his haire coloured like a nut full ripe, reaching down to his eares, and from his eares to his shoulders; they are of waxe colour, but more bright: he hath in the middle

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of his forchead,a locke, after the maner of *Nazareth*. His forehead is plain,but very pleasing: his face void of spot or wrinckle, accompanied with a moderat colour: his nosthrils and mouth, cannot by any with reason be reproued: his beard thicke,and resembling his haire; not long, but forked: his countenance verie gratious and graue: his eies gracefull and cleere; and when he rebuketh, he daunteth; and when he admonisheth, he pleaseth: he maketh himselfe to be beloued,and is cheerfull with grauitie: he hath neuer been seen to laugh, but to weep diuers times: his hands and arms are verie faire: in his conuersation he contenteth verie greatly, but is seldom in company: but being in company, is very modest: in his countenance and port, he is the seemliest man that may be imagined. In this relation,are contained three or foure tokens of a temperat person.

The first that he had,his haire and beard of the colour of a nut fully ripe, which to him that considereth it well appeareth to be a browne abourne; which colour, God commanded they heifer should haue, which was to be sacrificed as a figure of Christ: and when he entred into heauen with that triumph and maiestie, which was requisit for such a Prince: some Angels who had not been enformed of his incarnation,said; Who is this that commeth from Edon,with his garments died in Bozra? as if they had said, Who is he that commeth from the red Land, with his garment stained in the same die, in respect of his haire & his red beard, and of the bloud with which he was tainted? The same letter also reporteth him to be the fairest man that euer was seen, and this is the second token of a temperat person,and so was it prophesied by the holy scripture as a signe wherby to know him. Of faire shape aboue all the children of men. And (Vnwritten Verities.)

in another place he ſaith, His eies are fairer than the wine, and his teeth whiter than milke. Which beautie and good diſpoſition of body, imported much to effect that all men ſhould beare him affection, and that there might be nothing in him worthy to be abhorred. For which cauſe, the letter deliuereth, that all men were enforced to loue him. It reciteth alſo that he was meane of perſonage, and that not becauſe the holy Ghoſt wanted matter to make him greater, if ſo it had ſeemed good: but (as we tofore haue prooued by the opinion of *Plato* and *Ariſtotle*) becauſe when the reaſonable ſoule is burdened with much bones and fleſh, the ſame incurreth great dammage in his wit.

The third ſigne, namely, to be vertuous and wel conditioned, is likewiſe expreſſed in this letter, and the Iews themſelues with al their falſe witneſſes, could not proue the contrarie, nor reply when he demanded of them, VVhich of you can reprooue me of ſinne? And *Ioſeph* (through the faithfulnes which he owed to his hiſtory) affirmed of him that he partaked of another nature aboue man, in reſpect of his goodneſſe & wiſedom. Only long life could not be verefied of Chriſt our redeemer, becauſe they put him to death being yong; where as if they had permitted him to finiſh his naturall courſe, the ſame would haue reached to 80 years and vpwards. For he who could abide in a wilderneſſe 40 daies, and 40 nights without meat or drinke, and not be ſicke nor dead therwithall, could better haue defended himſelfe from other lighter things, which had power to breed alteration or offence. Howbeit this action was reputed miraculous, and a matter which could not light within the compaſſe of nature.

Theſe two examples of kings, which we haue allea-

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ged, ſufficeth to make vnderſtood, that the ſcepter royal, is due to men that are temperate; and that ſuch are endowed with the wit and wiſdom requiſit for that office. But there was alſo another man, made by the proper hands of God, to the end he ſhould be king and Lord of all things created, & he made him faire, vertuous, ſound, of long life, and verie wiſe. And to prooue this, ſhal not be a miſſe for our purpoſe. *Plato* holdeth it for a matter impoſſible, that God or nature, can make a man temperat in a countrey diſtemperat: wherethrough he affirmeth that God, to create a man of great wiſdom & temperature, ſought out a place where the heat of the aire ſhould not exceed the cold, nor the moiſt the dry. And the diuine ſcripture, whence he borrowed this ſentence, ſaith not, that God created *Adam* in the earthly paradiſe, which was that moſt temperat place whereof he ſpeaketh; but that after he had ſhaped him, there he placed him. Then our Lord God (ſaith he) tooke man, and ſet him in the Paradiſe of pleaſure, to the end he might there worke and take it in charge. For the power of God being infinit, & his knowledge beyond meaſure, when he had a will to giue him all the naturall perfection that might be in mankinde; we muſt thinke that neither the peece of earth of which he was framed, nor the diſtemperature of the ſoile of Damaſcus where he was created, could ſo gainſay him, but that he made him temperat. The opinion of *Plato*, of *Ariſtotle*, and of *Galen*, take place in the works of nature: and euen ſhe alſo, can ſomtimes (euen in diſtemperat regions) engender a perſon that ſhalbe temperat. But that *Adam* had his haire and his beard abourne, which is the firſt token of a temperat man, manifeſtly appeareth. For in reſpect of this ſo notorious ſigne, he had that name *Adam*, which is to ſay (as

S.Hierom interpreteth it) a red man. That he was faire & wel faſhioned, which is the ſecond token, cannot in him be denied : for when God created him, the text ſaith; God ſaw all things which he had made, and they were verie good. Then it falleth out certaine, that he iſſued not from the hands of God, foule and ill ſhaped: for the works of God are perfect. And ſo much the more for that the trees (as the text ſaith) were faire to behold. Then what may we think of *Adam*, whom God created to this principall end, that he might be Lord and preſident of the world? That he was vertuous, wiſe, and well conditioned, (which are the third and ſixth ſignes) is gathered out of theſe words, Let vs make a man after our owne image and likeneſſe : for by the antient Philoſophers, the foundation on which the reſemblance that man hath with God is grounded, are vertue & wiſdome. Therfore *Plato* auoucheth, that one of the greateſt contentments which God receiueth in heauen, is to ſee a vertuous and wiſe man, praiſed and magnified vpon earth : for ſuch a one is his liuely purtraiture. And contrariwiſe, he groweth diſpleaſed, when ignorant and vitious perſons are held in eſtimation and honor: which ſpringeth from the vnlikeneſſe between God and them. That he liued healthfull and a long ſpace (which are the fourth and fifth tokens) is nothing difficult to prooue, inaſmuch as his daies were 930 yeares. Wherethrough I may now cõclude, that the man who is abourn haired, faire, of meane ſtature, vertuous, healthfull, and long lyued, muſt neceſſarily be verie wiſe, and endowed with a wit requiſit for the ſcepter royall.

(And ſuch a one if you miſtake not, is your king Philip.)

We haue alſo (as by the way) diſcloſed, in what ſort great vnderſtanding may be vnited with much imagination, and much memory, albeit this may alſo come to paſſe;

paſſe, and yet the man not be temperat. But nature ſhapeth ſo few after this modell, that I could neuer find but two amongſt all the wits that I haue tried: but how it can come to paſſe, that great vnderſtanding may vnite with much imagination and much memory, in a man not temperat, is a thing which eaſily may be conceiued, if you preſuppoſe the opinion of ſome Phiſitions, who affirme that the imagination reſideth in the forepart of the braine, the memorie in the hinder part, and the vnderſtanding in that of the middle. And the like may be ſaid in our imagination, but it is a worke of great labour, that the braine, being (when nature createth the ſame) of the bigneſſe of a graine of pepper, it ſhould make one ventricle of ſeed verie hot, another verie moiſt, and the middle moſt of verie dry: but in fine this is no impoſſible caſe.

(Your king and your ſelfe.)

CHAP. XV.

In what maner Parents may beget wiſe children, and of a wit fit for learning.

IT falleth out a matter worthie of maruaile, that nature being ſuch as we all know her, wiſe, wittie, and of great art, iudgement, and force, and mankind a worke of ſo ſpeciall regard, yet for one whome ſhe maketh skilfull and wiſe, ſhe produceth infinit depriued of wit. Of which effect my ſelfe ſearching the reaſon and naturall cauſes, haue found (in my iudgement) that parents apply not themſelues to the act of generation with that order and concert which is by nature

eſtabliſhed: neither know the conditions which ought to be obſerued, to the end their children may prooue of wiſedome and iudgement. For by the ſame reaſon, for which in any temperat or diſtemperat region, a man ſhould be borne very wittie (hauing alwaies regard to the ſelfe order of cauſes) there will 100000 prooue of ſlender capacitie: now if by art we may procure a remedie for this, we ſhall haue brought to the commonwealth the greateſt benefit that ſhe can receiue. But the knot of this matter conſiſteth, in that we cannot entreat hereof with tearms ſo ſeemly and modeſt, as to the naturall ſhamefaſtneſſe of man is requiſit: and if for this reaſon I ſhould forbeare to note any part or contemplation that is neceſſarie, for certaine the whole matter would be marred, in ſort that diuers graue Philoſophers hold opinion, how wiſe men ordinarily beget fooliſh children, becauſe in the act of copulation, for honeſties ſake, they abſtaine from certaine diligences which are of importance, that the ſonne may partake of his fathers wiſedome. Some antient Philoſophers haue laboured to ſearch out the naturall reaſon of this naturall ſhame, which the eyes conceiue when the inſtruments of generation are ſet before them; and why the eares take offence to heare them named: and they maruell to ſee, that nature hath framed thoſe parts with ſuch diligence and carefulneſſe, and for an end of ſuch importance, as the immortalizing of mankind, and yet the wiſer a man is, the more he groweth in diſlike to behold or heare them ſpoken of. Shame and honeſtie (ſayth *Ariſtotle*) is the proper paſſion of the vnderſtanding, and who ſo reſteth not offended at thoſe terms and actions of generation, giueth a ſure token of his wanting that power, as if we ſhould ſay, that he is blockiſh, who putting his hand

hand into the fire, doth not feele the same to burne. By this token, *Cato* the elder discouered, that *Manilius* (a noble man) was depriued of vnderstanding, because it was told him, that the other kissed his wife in presence of his daughter; for which cause he displaced him out of the Senat, and *Manilius* could neuer obtaine at his hands to be restored.

Out of this contemplation, *Aristotle* frameth a probleme, demaunding whence it grew, that men who desire to satisfie their venerous lusts, do yet greatly shame to confesse it, and yet coueting to liue, to eat, or to perform any other such action, they stagger not to acknowledge it? to which probleme he shapeth a very vntoward answer, saying; Perhaps it commeth, because the couetings of diuers things are necessary, and some of them kill if they be not accomplished, but the lust of venerous acts, floweth from excesse, and is token of abundance. But in effect this probleme is false, and the answer none other: for a man not only shameth to manifest the desire he carrieth to companie with a woman, but also to eat, to drinke, and to sleepe, and if a will take him to send foorth anie excrement, he dares not say it or do it, but with cumber & shamefastnesse, and so gets him to some secret place out of sight. Yea, we find men so shamefast, as though they haue a great will to make water, yet cannot do it if any looke vpon them, whereas if we leaue them alone, straight-waies the vrine taketh his issue. And these are the appetites to send foorth the superfluous things of the body, which if they were not effected, men should die, and that much sooner than with forbearing meat or drink. And if there be any (saith *Hippocrates*) who speaketh or actuateth this in the presence of another, he is not maister of his sound iudgement. *Galen* affirmeth,

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that the ſeed holdeth the ſemblable proportion with the ſeed-veſſels, as the vrine doth with the bladder, for as much vrine annoieth the bladder, ſo much ſeed endammageth the ſeed veſſels. And the opinion which *Ariſtotle* held, in denieng that man and woman incur no infirmitie or death by retaining of ſeed, is contrarie to the iudgement of all Phiſitions, and eſpecially of *Galen*, who ſaith and auoucheth, that many women remaining widowes in their youth, haue therthrough loſt their ſenſe, motion, breathing, and finally their life. And the ſelfe *Ariſtotle* reckoneth vp many diſeaſes whercunto continēt perſons are ſubiect in that behalfe. The true anſwer of this probleme cannot be yeelded in naturall Philoſophie, becauſe it is not marſhalled vnder her iuriſdiction; for it behooueth to paſſe to an higher, namely Metaphiſicke, wherein *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that the reaſonable ſoule is the loweſt of all the intelligences, and for that it partaketh of the ſame generall nature with the Angels, it ſhameth to behold it ſelfe placed in a body which hath fellowſhip with brute beaſts: wherethrough the diuine ſcripture noteth it as a myſterie, that the firſt man being naked, was not aſhamed, but ſo ſoone as he ſaw himſelfe to be ſo, forthwith he got a couering. At which time he knew that through his owne fault, he had loſt immortality, and that his body was become ſubiect to alteration and corruption, and thoſe inſtruments and parts giuen him for that of neceſſitie he muſt die, and leaue an other in his roome, and that to preſerue himſelfe in life, that ſmall ſpace which reſted, it behooued him to eat and drinke, and to expell thoſe noiſome and corrupt excrements. And principally he ſhamed, ſeeing that the Angels, with whom he had competence, were immortall and ſtood not in need of eating, drinking, or ſleeping:

An high ſpeculation.

ping, for preſeruation of their life : neither had the inſtruments of generation, but were created all at once, without matter, and without feare of corrupting. Of all theſe points were the eies and the eares naturally done to ware. Wherethrough, the reaſonable ſoule groweth, diſpleaſed and aſhamed, that theſe things giuen man to make him mortall and corruptible, are thus brought to his memory. And that this is a well fitting anſwere we euidently perceiue: for God to content the ſoule after the vniuerſall iudgement, and to beſtow vpon him intire glory, will cauſe that his body ſhall partake the properties of an Angell, beſtowing therupon ſubtleneſſe, lightneſſe, immortalitie, and brightneſſe: for which reaſon, he ſhal not ſtand in need to eat or drink as the brute beaſts. And when men ſhall thus-wiſe dwell in heauen, they will not ſhame to behold themſelues clothed with fleſh, euen as Chriſt our redeemer, and his mother, nothing ſhamed thereat. But it will breed an accidentall glory, to ſee that the vſe of thoſe parts, which were wont to offend the hearing and the eies, is now ſurceaſed. I therefore making due reckoning of this naturall modeſtie of the eare, haue endeuoured to ſalue the hard and rough termes of this matter, and to fetch certain, not ill pleaſing biaſſes of ſpeech, and where I cannot throughly performe it, the honeſt reader ſhall affoord me pardon. For to reduce to a perfect maner, the art which muſt be obſerued, to the end men may proue of rare capacities, is one of the things moſt requiſit for the commonwealth. Beſides that, by the ſame reaſon they ſhal proue vertuous, prompt, ſound, and long lyued.

Note here a ſign which ſheweth the immortalitie of the ſoule.

I haue thought good to ſeuer the matter of this chapter, into foure principall parts, that thereby I may make plaine what ſhalbe deliuered; and that the reader may not

not reſt in confuſion. The firſt is, to ſhew the naturall qualities and temperature which man & woman ought to poſſeſſe, to the end they may vſe generation. The ſecond, what diligence the parents ought to employ, that their children may be male and not female. The third, how they may become wiſe and not fooles. The fourth, how they are to be dealt withall after their birth, for preſeruation of their wit.

To come then to the firſt point we haue alreadie alleaged, that *Plato* laieth downe, how in a well ordered common-wealth, there ought to be aſſigned certain ſurueiors of marriages, who by art might skill, to looke into the qualities of the perſons that are to be married, and to giue ech one the wife which anſwereth him in proportion, & to euery wife her cõuenient husband. In which matter, *Hippocrates* and *Galen* began to take ſome pains, and preſcribed certain precepts and rules, to know what woman is fruitful, and who can beare no children; and what man is vnable for generation, and who able and likely to beget iſſue. But touching all this, they vttered verie little, and that not with ſuch diſtinction as was behooffull, at leaſt for the purpoſe which I haue in hand. Therefore it falleth out neceſſarie, to begin the art euen from his principles, and briefly to giue the ſame his due order and concert, that we ſo may make plaine and apparant, from what vnion of parents, wiſe children iſſue; and from what, fools and do-noughts: To which end it behoooueth firſt to know a particular point of Philoſophy, which although in regard of the practiſes of the art, it be verie manifeſt and true, yet the vulgar make little reake therof. And from the notice of this, dependeth all that, which as touching this firſt point is to be deliuered: and that is, that man (though it ſeem otherwiſe

wife in the compoſition which we ſee) is different from a woman in nought els (ſaith *Galen*) than only in hauing his genitall members without his body. For if we make anotomie of a woman, we ſhall find that ſhe hath within her two ſtones, two veſſels for ſeed; and her belly of the ſame frame as a mans member, without that any one part is therin wanting. And this is ſo very true, that if when nature hath finiſhed to forme a man in all perfection, ſhe would conuert him into a woman, there needeth nought els to be done, ſaue only to turne his inſtruments of generation inwards. And if ſhe haue ſhaped a woman, and would make a man of her, by taking forth her belly and her cods, it would quickly be performed. This hath chanced many times in nature, aſwell whiles the creature hath been in the mothers womb, as after the ſame was borne, wherof the hiſtories are full; but ſome haue held them only for fables, becauſe this is mentioned in the Poets, yet the thing carrieth meere truth: for diuers times nature hath made a female child, and ſhe hath ſo remained in her mothers belly for the ſpace of one or two months: and afterwards, plentie of heat growing in the genitall members, vpon ſome occaſion they haue iſſued forth, and ſhe become a male. To whom this transformation hath befallen in the mothers womb, is afterwards plainly diſcouered, by certain motions which they retaine, vnfitting for the maſculin ſex, being altogither womaniſh, & their voice ſhrill & ſweet. And ſuch perſons are enclined to perform womens actions, and fall ordinarily into vncouth offences. Contrariwiſe, nature hath ſundrie times made a male with his genetories outward, and cold growing on, they haue turned inward, and it became female. This is knowen after ſhe is borne, for ſhe retaineth a manniſh faſhion, aſ-

This is no chapter for maids to read in ſight of others.

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well in her words, as in all her motions and workings. This may ſeem difficult to be prooued, but conſidering that which many authenticall hiſtorians affirme, it is a matter not hard to be credited. And that women haue been turned into men, after they were borne, the verie vulgar doe not much maruell to heare ſpoke of: for beſides that which ſundrie our elders haue laid downe for trueth, It befell in Spain but few yeares ſince, and that wherof we find experience, is not to be called in queſtion or argument. What then the cauſe may be, that the genitall members are engendred within or without, and the creature becommeth male or female, will fall out a plain caſe, if we once know that heat extendeth and enlargeth all things, and cold retaineth and cloſeth them vp. Wherthrough, it is a concluſion of all Philoſophers and Phiſitions, that if the ſeed be cold and moiſt, a woman is begotten, and not a man; and if the ſame be hot and dry, a man is begotten and not a woman. Whence we apparently gather, that there is no man, who in reſpect of a woman, may be termed cold; nor woman hot, in reſpect of a man.

Ariſtotle ſaith, it is neceſſarie for a woman to be cold and moiſt, that ſhe may be likewiſe fruitfull: for if ſhe were not ſo, it would fall out impoſſible, that her monthly courſe ſhould flow, or ſhe haue milke to preſerue the child nine months, in her belly, and two yeares after it is borne, but that the ſame would ſoone waſt and conſume.

All Philoſophers and Phiſitions auouch, that the belly holdeth the ſame proportion with mans ſeed, that the earth doth with corne, and with any other graine. And we ſee, that if the earth want coldneſſe and moiſture, the husbandman dareth not ſow therein, neither will the

ſeed

ſeed proſper. But of ſoils, thoſe are moſt fruitfull and fertile in rendering fruit, which partake moſt of cold and moiſt, As we ſee by experience in the regions towards the North, As England, Flanders, and Almaine, whoſe abundance of all fruits, worketh aſtoniſhment in ſuch as know not the reaſon thereof. And in ſuch countries as theſe, no married woman was euer childleſſe; neither can they there tell, what barrenneſſe meaneth, but are all fruitfull, and breed children through their abundance of coldneſſe and moiſture. But though it is true that the woman ſhould be cold and moiſt for conception, Yet ſhe may abound ſo much therin, that it may choke the ſeed; euen as we ſee exceſſe of raine ſpoileth the corne, which cannot ripen in ouermuch coldneſſe. Whereon we muſt conceiue, that theſe two qualities ought to keep a certaine meaſurableneſſe, which when they exceed, or reach not vnto, the fruitfulneſſe is ſpoiled. *Hippocrates* holdeth that woman for fruitfull, whoſe womb is tempered in ſuch ſort, as the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie. VVherethrough he ſaith, that thoſe women who haue their belly cold, cannot conceiue, no more than ſuch as are very moiſt, or verie cold and dry. But ſo, for the ſame reaſon that a woman and her genitall parts ſhould be temperat; it were impoſſible that ſhe could conceiue, or be a woman. For if the ſeed, of which ſhe was firſt formed, had been temperat, the genitall members would haue iſſued forth, and ſhe haue been a man. So ſhould a beard grow on her chin, and her floures ſurceaſe, and ſhe become as perfect a man, as nature could produce. Likewiſe the womb in a woman cannot be predominatly hot: For if the ſeed whereof ſhe was engendred had been of that temperature, ſhe ſhould haue been born a man, and not a woman.

You are much miſtaken.

man. This is paſt all exception, that the qualities which yeeld a woman fruitfull, are cold and moiſture: for the nature of man, ſtandeth in need of much nouriſhment, that he may be able to vſe procreation, and continue his kind. Wherethrough we ſee, that amongſt all the females of brute beaſts, none haue their monthly courſes as a woman. Therefore it was requiſite to make her altogether cold and moiſt, and that in ſuch a degree, as that ſhe might breed much flegmatick bloud, and not be able to waſt or conſume the ſame. I ſaid flegmaticke bloud, becauſe this is ſeruiceable to the breeding of milke; by which *Hippocrates* and *Galen* auouch, the creature is releeued, all the time it remaineth in the mothers belly. Now if the ſame ſhould be temperat, it would produce much bloud, vnfit for the engendring of milke, and would wholly reſolue, as it doth in a temperat man, and ſo nothing be left for nouriſhing the babe. Therefore I hold it for certain, and verily it is impoſſibie that a woman can be temperat or hot; but they are all cold and moiſt. And if this be not ſo, let the Philoſopher or Phiſition tell me for what cauſe all women are beardleſſe, and haue their ſickneſſe whiles they are healthful, & for what cauſe the ſeed of which ſhe was formed, being temperat or hot, ſhe was borne a woman, & not a man? Howbeit, though it be true that they are al cold & moiſt: yet it followeth not, that they are all in one degree of coldneſſe and moiſture. For ſome are in the firſt, ſome in the ſecond, and ſome in the third; and in ech of theſe they may conceiue, if a man anſwere them in proportion of heat, as ſhall hereafter be expreſſed. By what tokens we may know theſe three degrees of coldneſſe and moiſture in a woman, and likewiſe weet who is in the firſt, who is in the ſecond, and who in the third:

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there is no Philoſopher or Phiſition, that as yet hath vnfolded. But conſidering the effects, which theſe qualities do worke in women, we may part them, by reaſon of their being extended, and ſo we ſhall eaſily get notice hereof. The firſt, by the wit and habilitie of the woman. The ſecond, by her maners and conditions. The third, by her voice big or ſmall. The fourth, by her fleſh, much, or little. The fifth, by her colour. The ſixth by her haire. The ſeuenth, by her faireneſſe or foulneſſe. As touching the firſt, we may know, that though it be true (as tofore we haue prooued) that the wit and abilitie of a woman, followeth the temperature of the brain, and of none other member: yet her womb and cods, are of ſo great force and vigour, to alter the whole body, that if theſe be hot and dry, or cold and moiſt, or of whatſoeuer other temperature, the other partes (ſaith *Galen*) will be of the ſame tenour: but the member which moſt partaketh the alterations of the belly, all Phiſitions ſay, is the brain, though they haue not ſet down the reaſon wheron they ground this correſpondencie. True it is *Galen* prooueth by experience, that by ſpeying a Sow, ſhe becommeth faire and fat, and her fleſh verie ſauory: and if ſhe haue her cods, ſhe taſteth little better than dogs fleſh. VVherby we conceiue, that the belly and the cods carrie great efficacie, to communicat their temperature to all the other parts of the body; eſpecially to the brain, for that the ſame is cold & moiſt like themſelues. Between which (through the reſemblance) the paſſage is eaſie.

Now if we conclude, that cold and moiſt, are the qualities which worke an impairement in the reaſonable part, and that his contraries; namely hot and drie, giue the ſame perfection and encreaſement, we ſhall find that

the woman who ſheweth much wit and ſufficiencie, partaketh of cold and moiſt in the firſt degree; and if ſhe be verie ſimple, it yeeldeth a ſigne that ſhe is in the third, the partaking between which two extreames, argueth the ſecond degree; for to thinke that a woman can be hot and drie, or endowed with a wit and abilitie conformable to theſe two qualities, is a verie great error; becauſe if the ſeed of which ſhe was formed, had been hot and dry in their domination, ſhe ſhould haue been born a man, and not a woman. But in that it was could and moiſt, ſhe was born a woman and not a man. The truth of this doctrine may cleerely be diſcerned, if you conſider the wit of the firſt woman, who liued in the world: for God hauing faſhioned her with his own hands, and that very accompliſhed, and perfect in her ſex, it is a concluſion infallibly true, that ſhe was poſſeſſed of much leſſe knowledge than *Adam*: which the diuell well weeting, got him to tempt her, and durſt not fall in diſputation with the man, fearing his great wit and wiſdome. Now to ſay, that *Eue* for her offence, was reft that knowledge which ſhe wanted, cannot be auouched, for as yet ſhe had not offended.

So then this defect of wit in the firſt woman grew, for that ſhe was by God created cold and moiſt: which temperature, is neceſſarie to make a woman fruitfull, and apt for childbirth, but enemy to knowledge: and if he had made her temperat like *Adam*, ſhe ſhould haue been very wiſe, but nothing fruitful, nor ſubiect to her monthly courſes, ſaue by ſome ſupernaturall meanes. On this nature S. *Paul* grounded himſelfe, when he ſaid, Let a woman learne in ſilence, with all ſubiection: neither would he allow the woman to teach, or gouerne the man, but to keep ſilence. But this is true, when a wo-

man hath not a ſpirit or greater grace, than her own naturall diſpoſition: but if ſhe obtaine any gift from aboue, ſhe may wel teach and ſpeake, for we know that the people of Iſrael, being oppreſſed and beſieged by the Aſſirians; *Iudith* (a very wiſe woman) ſent for the Prieſts of the *Cabeits* and *Carmits*, and reprooued them ſaying, How can it be endured, that *Oſias* ſhould ſay, if within fiue daies there come no ſuccour, he will yeeld the people of Iſrael to the Aſſirians? ſee you not, that theſe words rather prouoke God to wrath, than to mercie? how may it be, that men ſhould point out a limited time for the mercy of God, and in their mind aſſigne a day, at which he muſt ſuccour and deliuer them? And in the concluſion of this reproofe, ſhe told them in what ſort they might pleaſe God, and obtaine their demand. And no leſſe, *Elbora* (a woman of no leſſe wiſdome) taught the people of Iſrael, how they ſhould render thanks vnto God, for the great victories which ſhe had attained againſt their enemies. But whilſt a woman abideth in her naturall diſpoſition, all ſorts of learning and wiſdome, carrieth a kind of repugnancie to her wit. And for this cauſe, the Catholicke Church, vpon great reaſon hath forbidden, that no woman do preach, confeſſe, or inſtruct: for their ſex admitteth neither wiſdome nor diſcipline.

It is diſcouered alſo by the maners of a woman, and by her condition, in what degree of cold and moiſt her temperature conſiſteth: for if with a ſharp wit, ſhe be froward, curſt, & wayward, ſhe is in the firſt degree of cold and moiſt: it being true (as we haue proued tofore) that an ill condition, euermore accompanieth a good imagination. She who partaketh this degree of cold & moiſt, ſuffereth nothing to eſcape her hands; noteth all things,

findeth fault with all things, and ſo is inſupportable. Such are accuſtomably of amiable conuerſation, and feare not to looke men in the face, nor hold him ill mannered, who maketh loue vnto them. But on the other ſide, to be a woman of good conditions, and to be agreeued at nothing, to laugh vpon euery ſmall occaſiō, to let things paſſe as they come, and to ſleep ſoundly, deſcrieth the third degree of cold and moiſt: for much pleaſantneſſe of conceit, is ordinarily accompanied with little wit. She who partaketh of theſe two extreams, ſtandeth in the ſecond degree. A voice, hoarſe, big, and ſharp (ſaith *Galen*) is a token of much heat and drouth, and we haue alſo prooued it heretofore, by the opinion of *Ariſtotle*, wherthrough we may gain this notice, that if a woman haue a voice like a man, ſhe is cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, and if very delicat, in the third. And partaking betwixt both the extreames, ſhe ſhall haue the naturall voice of a woman, and be in the ſecond degree.

How much the voice dependeth on the temperature of the cods, ſhall ſhortly hereafter be prooued, where we entreat of the tokens appertaining to a man. Much fleſh alſo in women, is a ſigne of much cold and moiſt: for to be fat and big (ſay the Phiſitions) groweth in liuing creatures, from this occaſion. And contrariwiſe, to be leane and dry, is a token of little coldneſſe & moiſture. To be meanly fleſhed, that is, neither ouermuch, nor verie little; giueth euidence that a woman holdeth her ſelfe in the ſecond degree of cold and moiſt. Their pleaſantneſſe and curteſies, ſheweth the degrees of theſe two qualities: much moiſture maketh their fleſh ſupple, and little, rough and hard. The meane is the commendableſt part: The colour alſo of the face,

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and of the other parts of the body, diſcouereth the extended or remiſſe degrees, of theſe two qualities. When the woman is verie white, it boadeth (ſaith *Galen*) much cold and moiſt: and contrariwiſe, ſhe that is ſwart and browne, is in the firſt degree therof; of which two extreames, is framed the ſecond degree of white and well coloured.

To haue much haire, and a little ſhew of a beard, is an euident ſigne, to know the firſt degree of cold and moiſt: for all Phiſitions affirme, that the haire and beard are engendred of heat and drineſſe: and if they be blacke it greatly purporteth the ſame. A contrary temperature is betokened, when a woman is without haire. Now ſhe whoſe complexion conſiſteth in the ſecond degree of cold and moiſt, hath ſome haire; but the ſame reddiſh and golden. Foulneſſe moreouer, and fairencſſe help vs to iudge the degrees of cold and moiſt in women. It is a miracle to ſee a woman of the firſt degree very faire: for the ſeed whereof ſhe was formed being dry, hindereth that ſhe cannot be fairely countenanced. It behoooueth that clay be ſeaſoned with conuenient moiſture, to the end veſſels may be well framed, and ſerue to vſe. But when that ſame is hard & dry, the veſſell is foule and vnhandſom.

Ariſtotle farther auoucheth, that ouermuch cold and moiſt, maketh women by nature foule: for if the ſeed be cold and very moiſt, it can take no good figure, becauſe the ſame ſtandeth not togither, as we ſee, that of ouer ſoft clay, ill ſhaped veſſels are faſhioned. In the ſecond degree of cold and moiſt, women prooue verie faire: for they were formed of a ſubſtance well ſeaſoned, and pleaſant to nature: which token, of it ſelfe alone affordeth an euident argument, that the woman is fruit-

full: for it is certain that nature could do it, and we may iudge, that ſhe gaue her a temperature and compoſition, fit for bearing of children. Wherethrough ſhe anſwers in proportion (welneer) to al men, and all men do deſire to haue her.

In man, there is no power which hath tokens or ſignes, to deſcry the goodneſſe, or malice of his obiect. The ſtomacke knoweth the meat by way of taſt, of ſmelling, and of ſight, wherethrough the diuine ſcripture ſaith That *Eue* fixed her eies on the tree forbidden, and her ſeemed that it was ſweet in taſt. The facultie of generation, holdeth for a token of fruitfulneſſe, a womans beautie; and if ſhe be foule, it abhorreth her, conceiuing by this ſigne, that nature erred, and gaue her not a fit temperature, for bearing of children.

By what ſignes we may know, in what degree of hot and dry, euery man reſteth.

§ 1.

A Man hath not his temperature ſo limited as a woman, for he may be hot & drie (which temperature *Ariſtotle* & *Galen* held, was that which beſt agreed with his ſex) as alſo hot and moiſt and temperat; but cold & moiſt, and cold and drie, they would not admit whilſt a man was ſound and without impairment: for as you ſhall find no woman hot and drie, nor hot and moiſt, or temperat; ſo ſhall you find no man cold and moiſt, nor cold and drie, in compariſon of women, vnleſſe in caſe as I ſhal now expreſſe. A man hot and drie, and hote and moiſt, and temperat, holdeth the ſame degrees in his temperature, as doth a woman in cold and moiſt: and ſo it behoooueth to haue certain tokens,

kens, whereby to diſcerne what man is in what degree, that we may aſſigne him a wife anſwerable vnto him in proportion. We muſt therefore weet, that from the ſame principles, of which we gathered vnderſtanding what woman is hot and drie, and in what degree, from the ſelfe we muſt alſo make vſe to vnderſtand what man is hote and drie, and in what degree: and becauſe we ſayd, that from the wit and manners of a man we coniecture the temperature of his cods, it is requiſit that we take notice of a notable point, mentioned by *Galen*, namely, that to make vs vnderſtand the great vertue which a mans cods poſſeſſe, to giue firmneſſe and temperature to all the parts of the body, he affirmeth that they are of more importance than the heart: and he rendereth a reaſon, ſaying, that this member is the beginning of life, & nought elſe, but the cods are the beginning of liuing ſoundly and without infirmities. How much it endammageth a man to be depriued of thoſe parts (though ſo ſmall) there need not many reaſons to prooue, ſeeing we ſee by experience, that forthwith the haire and the beard pill away, and the big and ſhrill voice becommeth ſmall, and herewithall a man leeſeth his forces and naturall heat, and reſteth in far woorſe and more miſerable condition than if he had bene a woman. But the matter moſt worth the noting is, that if a man before his gelding had much wit and habilitie, ſo ſoone as his ſtones be cut away, he groweth to leeſe the ſame, ſo far foorth as if he had receiued ſome notable dammage in his very braine. And this is a manifeſt token, that the cods giue & reaue the temperature from all the other parts of the body, and he that will not yeeld credit hereunto, let him conſider (as my ſelfe haue done oftentimes) that of 1000 ſuch capons who addict themſelues to their booke, none at-

taineth to any perfection,and euen in muſicke (which is their ordinarie profeſſion) we manifeſtly ſee how blockiſh they are,which ſpringeth becauſe muſick is a worke of the imagination,& this power requireth much heat, whereas they are cold and moiſt.So it falleth out a matter certaine,that from the wit and habilitie we may gather the temperature of the cods: for which cauſe, the man who ſhoweth himſelfe prompt in the works of the imagination,ſhould be hot and drie in the third degree. And if a man be of no great reach,it tokeneth, that with his heat much moiſture is vnited,which alwaies endammageth the reaſonable part,and this is the more confirmed if he be good of memorie. The ordinarie conditions of men hot and dry in the third degree,are courage, pride, liberalitie, audacitie, and cheerefulneſſe, with a good grace and pleaſantneſſe, and in matter of women ſuch a one hath no bridle nor ho . The hote and moiſt are merry,giuen to laughter,louers of paſtime,faire conditioned,very courteous,ſhamefaſt,and not much addicted to women.

The voice and ſpeech much diſcouereth the temperature of the cods. That which is big and ſomwhat ſharp,giueth token that a man is hot and dry in the third degree:and if the ſame be pleaſant,amiable,and very delicat,it purporteth little heat and much moiſture, as appeareth in the gelded. A man who hath moiſt vnited with heat,will haue the ſame high, but pleaſant & ſhrill. Who ſo is hot and drie in the third degree, is ſlender, hard and rough fleſhed; the ſame compoſed of ſinews and arteries, and his veines big : contrariwiſe, to haue much fleſh, ſmooth and tender, is ſhew of much moiſture : by means wherof, it extendeth and enlargeth out the naturall heat. The colour of the skin, if the ſame be brown,

brown, burned, blackish greene, and like ashes, yeeldeth signe that a man is in the third degree of hot and dry: but if the flesh appeareth white, and well coloured, it argueth little heat and much moisture. The haire & beard are a marke also not to be ouerslipped: for these two approch very neere to the temperature of the cods. And if the haire be very blacke and big, and specially from the ribs down to the nauell, it deliuereth an infallible token that the cods partake much of hot and dry: and if there grow some haire also vpon the shoulders, the same is so much the more confirmed. But when the haire and beard are of chesse-nut colour, soft, delicat, and thin: it inferreth not so great plenty of heat and drinesse in the cods.

Men very hot and dry, are neuer faire, saue by miracle, but rather hard-fauored, and ill shaped: for the heat and drinesse (as *Aristotle* affirmeth of the Ethiopians) wrieth the proportion of the face, and so they become disfigured. Contrariwise, to be seemly and gratious, prooueth a measurable hot and moist: for which cause, the matter yeelded it selfe obedient whereto nature would employ it. Whence it is manifest, that much beautie in a man, is no token of much heat. Touching the signes of a temperat man, we haue sufficiently discoursed in the chapter foregoing, and therefore it shall not be needfull to reply the same againe. It sufficeth only to note that as the Phisitions place in euery degree of heat, three degrees of extention, so also in a temperat man, we are to set down the largenesse and amplenesse of three other. And he who standeth in the third, next to cold and moist, shalbe reputed cold and moyst: for when a degree passeth the meane, it resembleth the other, and that this is true, we manifestly find: for the

signes

ſigns which *Galen* deliuereth vs to know a man cold and moiſt, are the ſelfe ſame of the temperat man, but ſomewhat more remiſſe: ſo is he wiſe, of good conditions, and vertuous, he hath his voice cleare & ſweet, is white skinned, of fleſh good and ſupple, & without haire, and if it haue any, the ſame is little and yellow; ſuch are very well fauoured and faire of countinaunce, but *Galen* affirmeth that their ſeed is moiſt, and vnfit for generation: theſe are no great friends to women, nor women vnto them.

What women ought to marrie with what man, that they may haue children.

§. 2.

TO a woman who beareth not children when ſhe is married, *Hippocrates* commaundeth that two points of diligence be vſed, to know whether it be her defect, or that it grow becauſe the ſeed of her husband is vnable for generation. The firſt is to make her ſuffumigations with incenſe, or *Storax*, with a garment cloſe wrapped about her, which may hang downe on the ground, in ſort that no vapour or fume may iſſue out, and if within a while after ſhe feele the ſauour of the incenſe in her mouth, it yeeldeth a certaine token, that the barrenneſſe commeth not through her defect, in as much as the ſame found the paſſages of the bellie open, wherethrough it pearced vp to the noſthrils and the mouth.

The ſecond is, to take a garlicke head clean pilled, and put the ſame into the bellie, what time the woman goeth to ſleepe, and if the next day ſhe feele in her mouth the

the ſent of the garlicke, ſhe is of her ſelfe fruitful without any default.

But albeit theſe two proofs performe the effect which *Hippocrates* ſpeaketh of, namely, that the vapour pierce from the inner part vp to the mouth, yet the ſame argueth not an abſolute barrenneſſe in the husband, nor an intire fruitfulneſſe in the wife, but an vnapt corriſpondence of both, wherethrough ſhe proueth as barren for him, as he for her: which we ſee to fall out in dayly experience, for the man taking another wife begetteth children, and (which encreaſeth the maruell, in ſuch as are not ſeene in that point of naturall Philoſophie) is, that if theſe two ſeparat each from other vpon pretence of impotencie, and ſo he take another wife, and ſhe another husband, it hath bene found, that both haue had children. And this groweth, becauſe there are ſome men whoſe generatiue facultie is vnable, and not alterable for one woman, and yet for another is apt and begetteth iſſue. Euen as we ſee by experience in the ſtomacke, that to one kind of meat a man hath great appetite, and to another (though better) it is as dead. What the correſpondence ſhould be, which the man & wife ought to beare each to other, to the end they may bring forth children, is expreſſed by *Hippocrates* in theſe words, If the hot anſwer not the cold, and the drie the moiſt, with meaſure and equalitie, there can be no generation: as if he ſhould ſay, that if there vnite not in the womans wombe two ſeeds, the one hote, & the other cold, and the one moiſt and the other drie, extended in equall degree, they cannot beget children For a worke ſo maruellous as is the ſhaping of a man, ſtandeth in need of a temperature, where the hot may not exceed the cold, nor the moiſt the drie. For if a mans ſeed be hot, and the womans ſeed

hot

hot likewiſe, there will no engendring ſucceed. This doctrine thus preſuppoſed, Let vs now fit by way of example, a woman cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, whoſe ſignes we ſaid were, to be wily, ill conditioned, ſhrill voiced, ſpare fleſhed, and blacke and greene coloured, hairie and euill fauoured, ſhe ſhall eaſily conceiue by a man, that is ignorant, of good conditions, who hath a well ſounding and ſweet voice, much, white, and ſupple fleſh, little haire, and well coloured, and faire of countenance. She may alſo be giuē for wife to a temperat man, whoſe ſeed (following the opinion of *Galen*) we ſaid was moſt fruitfull and anſwerable to whatſoeuer woman: Prouided that ſhe be ſound and of age conuenient; but yet with all their incidents, it is verie difficult for her to conceiue child: and being conceiued (ſaith *Hippocrates*) within two months the ſame miſcarieth: for ſhe wanteth bloud, wherwith to maintain her ſelf and the babe, during the 9 months. Howbeit this will find an eaſie remedie, if the woman do bath her ſelfe before ſhe companie with her husband, and the baigne muſt conſiſt of water freſh and warme: the which (by *Hippocrates*) righteth her temperature to a good ſort. For it looſeneth and moiſtneth her fleſh, euen as the earth ought to be alike diſpoſed, that the graine may therin faſten it ſelf, and gather root.

Moreouer, it worketh a farther effect: for it encreaſeth the appetite to meat; it reſtraineth reſolution, & cauſeth a greater quantitie of naturall heat: wherthrough plenty of flegmaticke bloud is increaſed: by which the little creature, may thoſe nine months haue ſuſtenance. The tokens of a woman cold and moiſt in the third deree, are to be dull witted, well conditioned, to haue a very delicat voice, much fleſh, and the ſame ſoft and white, to

want

want haire and downe, and not to be ouer faire. Such a one, ſhould be wedded to a man hot and dry in the third degree: for his ſeed is of ſuch furie and feruency, as it behoooueth the ſame to fall into a place very cold and moiſt, that it may take hold and root. This man is of the qualitie of Creſſes, which will not grow ſaue in the water, and if he partaked leſſe hot and dry, his ſowing in ſo cold a belly were nought els, than to caſt graine into a poole.

Hippocrates giueth counſell that a woman of this ſort, ſhould firſt leſſen her ſelfe, and lay aſide her fleſh and her fat before ſhe marrie, but then ſhe need not to take to husband a man ſo hot and dry: for ſuch a temperature would not ſerue, nor ſhe conceiue. A woman cold and moiſt in the ſecond degree, retaineth a meane in all the tokens which I haue ſpecified, ſaue onely in beauty, which ſhe enioyeth in an high degree. Which yeeldeth an euident ſigne, that ſhe will be fruitfull, and beare children, and prooue gratious and cheerfull. She anſwereth in proportion wel-neer to all men.

Firſt to the hot and dry in the ſecond degree, and next to the temperat, and laſtly to the hot & moiſt. From all theſe vnions and conioynings of men and women, which we haue here laid down, may iſſue wiſe children, but from the firſt are the moſt ordinary. For put caſe that the ſeed of a man encline to cold and moiſt; yet the continuall drineſſe of the mother, and the giuing her ſo little meat, correcteth & amendeth the defect of the father. For that this maner of philoſophizing neuer heretofore came to light, it was not poſſible that all the naturall Philoſophers could ſhape an anſwere to this probleme, which asketh, Whence proceedeth it, that manie fools haue begotten wiſe children? Whereto they anſwer

swer, that sottish persons apply themselues affectionatly to the carnall act, and are not carried away to any other contemplation. But contrarily, men verie wise, euen in the copulation go imagining vpō matters nothing pertinent to that they haue in hand, and therethrough, weaken the seed, and make their children defectiue, aswell in the powers reasonall, as in the naturall. In the other conioynings it is requisit, to take heed that the woman be clensed, and dried by a ripe age, and marry not ouer yong: for hence it commeth, that children prooue simple and of little wit. The seed of yong parents is verie moist: for it is but a whiles since they were borne, and if a man be formed of a matter endowed with excessiue moisture, it followeth of force, that he prooue dull of capacitie.

What diligence ought to be vsed, that children male, and not female may be borne.

§. 3.

THose parents who seeke the comfort of hauing wise children, and such as are towards for learning, must endeuour that they may be borne male: for the female, through the cold and moist of their sex, cānot be endowed with any profound iudgment. Only we see, that they talke with some apparence of knowle.'ge, in slight and easie matters, with termes ordinary, and long studied, but being set to learning, they reach no farther than to some smacke of the Latine tongue, and this only through the help of memorie. For which dulnesse, themselues are not in blame, but that cold and moist, which made them women,

men, and theſe ſelfe qualities (we haue prooued heretofore) gainſay the wit and abilitie. *Salomon* conſidering how great ſcarcitie there was of wiſe men, and that no woman came to the world with a wit apt for knowledge, ſaid in this maner, I found one man amongſt 1000; but I haue not found one woman amongſt the whole rout. As if he ſhould ſay, that of 1000 men, he had found one wiſe; but throughout the race of women, he could neuer light vpon one that had iudgment. Therfore we are to ſhun this ſex, and to procure that the child be borne male: for in ſuch only reſteth a wit capable of learning. It behooueth therfore firſt to take into conſideration, what inſtruments were ordained by nature in mans body to this effect, and what order of cauſes is to be obſerued, that we may obtaine the end which we ſeeke for. We muſt then vnderſtand, that amongſt many excrements and humours which reſide in a mans bodie: nature (ſaith *Galen*) vſeth only the ſeruice of one, to worke that mankind may be preſerued. This is a certain excremẽt, which is termed whey, or wheyiſh bloud, whoſe engendring is wrought in the liuer, and in the veins, at ſuch time as the foure humours, bloud, fleagme, choler and melancholy, do take the forme and ſubſtance which they ought to haue.

Of ſuch a licour as this, doth nature ſerue her ſelfe, to reſolue the meat, and to worke, that the ſame may paſſe through the veins and through the ſtrait paſſages, carrying nouriſhment to all the parts of the body. This work being finiſhed, the ſame nature prouideth the veins; whoſe office is nought els, but to draw vnto them this whey, and to ſend it through their paſſages to the bladder, and from thence out of the body: and this to free man from the offence, which an excremẽt might breed

him.

him. But ſhe, aduiſing that he had certain qualities cõuenient for generation, prouided two veins, which ſhould carry part therof to the cods and veſſels of ſeed, togither with ſome ſmall quantitie of bloud, whereby ſuch ſeed might be formed, as was requiſit for mankind. Wherethrough ſhe planted one veine in the reins on the right ſide, which endeth in the right cod, and of the ſame is the right ſeed veſſell framed; and another on the left ſide, which likewiſe taketh his iſſue at the left cod, and of that is ſhaped the left ſeed veſſell.

The requiſit qualities of this excrement, that the ſame may be a conuenient matter for engendring of ſeed, are (ſaith *Galen*) a certaine tartneſſe and biting which groweth, for that the ſame is ſalt, wherethrough it ſtirreth vp the ſeed veſſels, & moueth the creature to procure generation, and not to abandon this thought. And therfore perſons very lecherous, are by the Latiniſts termed *Salaces*, that is to ſay, men who haue much ſaltneſſe in their ſeed.

Next to this, nature did another thing worthy of great conſideration, namely, that to the right ſide of the reines, and to the right cod, ſhe gaue much heat and drineſſe; and to the left ſide of the reines, & to the left cod, much cold and moiſture: wherthrough, the ſeed which laboureth in the right cod, iſſueth out hot and drie, and that of the left cod, cold and moiſt. What nature pretended by this variety of temperature, aſwell in the reins as in the cods, & ſeed veſſels, is verie manifeſt, we knowing by hiſtories very true, that at the beginning of the world, and many yeares after, a woman brought forth two children at a birth, wherof the one was born male, the other female; the end wherof tended, that for euery man, there ſhould be a wife, that mankind might take

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the ſpeedier increaſe. She prouided then, that the right ſide of the reines, ſhould yeeld matter hot and drie to the right cod, and that the ſame with his heat and drineſſe ſhould make the ſeed hot & dry for generation of the male. And the contrary ſhe ordained for the forming of a woman, that the left ſide of the reins, ſhould ſend forth ſeed could and moiſt to the left cod, and that the ſame with his coldneſſe and moiſture, ſhould make the ſeed cold and moiſt, whence it enſued of force, that a female muſt be engendred. But after that the earth was repleniſhed with people, it ſeemeth that this order and concert of nature was broken off, and this double childbearing ſurceaſed, & which is worſt, for one man that is begotten, 6 or 7 women are born to the world, ordinarily. Whence we comprizce, that either nature is grown weary, or ſome error is thwarted in the mids, which beareth her from working as ſhe would. What the ſame is, a litle hereafter we wil expreſſe, when we may lay down the conditions, which are to be obſerued, to the end a male child (without miſſing) may be borne. I ſay then, that if parents will attaine the end of their deſire in this behalfe, they are to obſerue 6 points. One of which is, to eat meats hot and drie. The ſecond, to procure that they make good digeſtion in the ſtomacke. The third, to vſe much exerciſe. The fourth, not to apply themſelues vnto the act of generation, vntill their ſeed be well ripened and ſeaſoned. The fifth, to companie with the wife foure or fiue daies before her naturall courſe is to runne. The ſixth, to procure, that the ſeed fall in the right ſide of the womb, which being obſerued (as we ſhall preſcribe) it will grow impoſſible, that a female ſhould be engendred. As touching the firſt condition, we muſt weet, that albeit a good ſtomacke do parboile

and alter the meat, and ſpoile the ſame of his former quality, yet it doth neuer vtterly depriue it ſelfe of them: for if we eat lettice (whoſe qualitie is cold and moiſt) the bloud engendred thereof, ſhalbe cold and moiſt, the whey cold and moiſt, and the ſeed cold and moiſt. And if we eat honny (whoſe quality is hot and dry) the bloud which we breed, ſhalbe hot and drie, the whey hot and dry, and the ſeed hot and dry: for it is impoſſible (as *Galen* auoucheth) that the humours ſhould not retaine the ſubſtances and the qualities, which the meat had, before ſuch time as it was eaten. Then it being true, that the male ſex conſiſteth in this, that the ſeed be hot and drie at the time of his forming, for certaine it behooueth parents to vſe meats hot and drie, that they may engender a male child. I grant well, how in this kind of begetting, there befalleth a great perill: for the ſeed being hot and drie, we haue often heretofore affirmed, it followeth of force, that there be borne a man, malicious, wily, cauilling, and addicted to many vices and euils, and ſuch perſons as theſe (vnleſſe they be ſtraightly curbed) bring great danger to the common wealth. Therefore it were better, that they ſhould not be gotten at all: but for all this there will not want parents, who will ſay, Let me haue a boy, and let him be a theefe and ſpare not, for the iniquity of a man is more allowable, than the wel-doing of a woman. Howbeit this may find an eaſie remedie, by vſing temperat meates, which ſhall partake but meanly of hot and drie, or by way of preparation, ſeaſoning the ſame with ſome ſpice. Such (ſaith *Galen*) are Hennes, Partridges, Turtles, Doues, Thruſhes, Blackbirds, and Goates, which (by *Hippocrates*) muſt be eaten roſted, to heat and drie the ſeed.

The bread with which the ſame is eaten, ſhould be white,

white, of the fineſt meale, ſeaſoned with Salt and Annis ſeed: for the browne is cold and moiſt (as we will prooue hereafter) and verie dammageable to the wit. Let the drinke be VVhite wine, watered in ſuch proportion, as the ſtomacke may allow thereof: and the water with which it is tempered, ſhould be verie freſh and pure.

The ſecond diligence which we ſpake of, is, to eat theſe meates in ſo moderat quantitie, as the ſtomacke may ouercome them: for albeit the meat be hot and drie of his proper nature, yet the ſame becommeth cold and moiſt, if the naturall heat cannot digeſt it: Therefore though the parents eat honny, and drinke VVhite-wine, theſe meates, by this meanes will turne to cold ſeed, and a female child be brought forth. For this occaſion, the greater part of great and rich perſonages, are afflicted by hauing more daughters than meaner folke: for they eat and drinke that which their ſtomacke cannot digeſt: and albeit their meat be hot and drie, ſauced with Suger, Spices, and Honny: yet through their great quantitie, then waxe raw, and cannot be digeſted. But the rawneſſe which moſt endammageth generation, is that of Wine: for this licour, in being ſo vaporous and ſubtile, occaſioneth, that the other meates togither therewith paſſe to the ſeed veſſels raw, and that the ſeed falſly prouoketh a man, ere it be digeſted and ſeaſoned.

VVhereon, *Plato* commendeth a law, enacted in the Carthaginean Common-wealth, which forbad the married couple, that they ſhould not taſt of anie Wine that day, when they meant to performe the rightes of the marriage bed, as well ware, that this liquor alwaies bred much hurt and dammage to the

childs bodily health, and might yeeld occaſion that he ſhould prooue vitious and of ill conditions. Notwithſtanding, if the ſame be moderatly taken, ſo good ſeed is not engendred of any meat (for the end which we ſeeke after) as of white wine: and eſpecially, to giue wit and ability, which is that wherto we pretend. The 3 diligence which we ſpake of, was, to vſe exerciſe ſomwhat more than meanly: for this fretteth and conſumeth the exceſſiue moiſture of the ſeed, and heateth & drieth the ſame. By this means a man becommeth moſt fruitful and able for generation: and cõtrariwiſe to giue our ſelues to our eaſe, and not to exerciſe the bodie, is one of the things which breedeth moſt coldnes & moiſture in the ſeed. Therfore rich and dainty perſons, are leſſe charged with children, than the poore who take pains. VVhence *Hippocrates* recounteth, that the principall perſons of Scythia were verie effeminat, womaniſh, delicious, and enclined to do womens ſeruices; as to ſweepe, to rub, & to bake: and by this means were impotent for generation. And if they begot any male child, he prooued either an Eunuch, or an Hermaphrodite. Whereat, they ſhaming, & greatly agreeued, determined to make ſacrifices to their God, and to offer him many gifts; beſeeching him not to entreat them after that maner, but to yeeld thẽ ſome remedy for the defect, ſeeing it lay in his power ſo to do. But *Hippocrates* laughed them to ſcorne, ſaying, That none effect betideth, which ſeemes not miraculous and diuine, if after that ſort they fall into conſideration therof: for reducing which ſoeuer of them to his naturall cauſes, at laſt we come to end in God, by whoſe vertue all the agents of the world doe worke. But there are ſome effectes, which muſt be imputed to God immediatly, (as are thoſe which come beſides

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the order of nature) and others by the way of meanes, reckoning firſt as a meane, the cauſes which are ordained to that end. The countrey which the Scythians inhabited (ſaith *Hippocrates*) is ſeated vnder the North, a region moiſt and cold beyond meaſure, where, through abundance of clouds, it ſeemes a miracle if you ſee the ſunne. The rich men ſit euer on horſebacke, neuer vſe any exerciſe, eat and drink more than their naturall heat can conſume; all which things make the ſeed cold and moiſt. And for this cauſe they beget manie females: and if anie male were borne, they prooued of the condition which we haue ſpecified. Know you (ſaid *Hippocrates* to them) that the remedie hereof conſiſteth, not in ſacrifiſing to God, neither in doing ought like that; but it behoueth withall, that you walke on foot, eat litle, and drink leſſe, and not ſo wholly betake your ſelues to your pleaſures. And that you may the more plainly diſcerne it, looke vpon the poore people of this countrie, & your very ſlaues, who not onely make no ſacrifices to your God, neither offer him gifts (as wanting the means) but euen blaſpheme his bleſſed name, and ſpeake iniuriouſly of him, becauſe he hath placed them in ſuch eſtate. And yet (though ſo lewd and ſacrilegious) they are very able for procreation, & the moſt part of their children, proue males, & ſtrong; not cocknies, not Eunuchs, not Hermafrodites, as do thoſe of yours. And the cauſe is, for that they eat litle, & vſe much exerciſe, neither keep thẽſelues alwais on horsback, like their maſters. By which occaſiõ, they make their ſeed hot & dry, and therthrough engender males and not females. This point of Philoſophy was not vnderſtood by *Pharao*, nor by his councell ſeeing that he ſaid in this manner; Come, let vs keepe them downe with oppreſſion, that they may not

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multiply, nor ioyne with our enemie, if warre be raiſed againſt vs. And the remedie which he vſed, to hinder that the people of Iſrael ſhould not encreaſe ſo faſt, or at leaſt that ſo many male children might not be borne (which he moſt feared) was to keepe them vnder with much toile of body, and to cauſe them for to eat leeks, garlicke, and onions, which remedie tooke but a bad effect, as the holy ſcripture expreſſeth: for the harder he held them oppreſſed, the more did they encreaſe and multiply. Yet he making reckoning, that this was the ſureſt way he could follow, doubled this their affliction of body. VVhich preuailed ſo litle, as if to quench a great fire, he ſhould throw thereinto much oile or greaſe: but if he or any of his counſellors, had been ſeen in this point of naturall Philoſophy, he ſhould haue giuen them barly bread, lettice, melons, cucũbers, & citrons to eat, and haue kept them well fed and well filled with drinke, and not haue ſuffered them to take anie paine. For by this means, their ſeed would haue become cold and moiſt, & therof more women than men bin begotten; and in ſhort time their life haue been abridged. But feeding them with much fleſh boiled with garlicke, with lecks, & with onions, and tasking them to work ſo hard, he cauſed their ſeed to wax hot and drie, by which two qualities, they were the more incited to procreation, and euer bred iſſue male. For confirmation of this veritie, *Ariſtotle* propoundeth a probleme, which ſaith, VVhat is the cauſe, that thoſe who labor much, and ſuch as are ſubiect to the feuer Ecticke, ſuffer many pollutions in their ſleepe? whereto (verely) he wiſt not to ſhape an anſwer: for he telleth many things, but none of them hit the truth. The right reaſon hereof is, that the toile of the body, and the Ecticke feuer, do heat and dry the ſeed;

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and theſe two qualities, make the ſame tart & pricking; and for that in ſleep all the naturall powers are fortified, this betideth which the probleme ſpeaketh of. How fruitfull and pricking the hot and drie ſeed is, *Galen* noteth in theſe words. The ſame is moſt fruitfull, and ſoon inciteth the creature to copulation, and is lecherous and prone to luſt, The fourth condition was, not to accompany in the act of generation, vntill the ſeed were ſetled, concocted and dulie ſeaſoned: for though the three former diligences haue gone before, yet we cannot thereby know whether it haue attained that perfection which it ought to haue. Principally it behoooueth, for 7 or 8 daies before, to vſe the meats which we haue preſcribed, to the end the cods may haue time to conſume in their nouriſhment, the ſeed which all that time was engendred of the other meats, and that this which we thus go deſcribing may ſucceed.

The like diligence is to be vſed touching mans ſeed, that the ſame may be fruitfull and apt for iſſue, as the gardeners doe with the ſeeds which they will preſerue: for they attend till they ripen, and clenſe, and wax drie: for if they plucke them from the ſtalke, before they are deeply ſeaſoned, and arriued to the point which is requiſit, though they lie in the ground a whole yeare, they will not grow at all. For this reaſon I haue noted, that in places where much carnall copulation is vſed, there is leſſe ſtore of children, than where people are more enclined to continencie. And common harlots neuer conceiue, becauſe they ſtay not till the ſeed be digeſted and ripened.

It behooueth therefore to abide for ſome daies, that the ſeed may ſettle, concoct, and ripen, and be duly ſeaſoned: for by this meanes, is hot and drie, and the good

ſubſtance which it had loſt, the better recouered. But how ſhall we know the ſeed to be ſuch, as is requiſit it ſhould be, ſeeing the matter is of ſo great importance? This may eaſily be known, if certaine daies haue paſſed ſince the man companied with his wife, and by his continuall incitement, and great deſire of copulation; all which ſpringeth, for that the ſeed is grown fruitfull and apt for procreation. The fifth condition was, that a man ſhould meddle with his wife in the carnal act, ſix or ſeuen daies before ſhe haue her naturall courſe: for that the child ſtraightwaies ſtandeth in need of much food to nouriſh it. And the reaſon hereof is, that the hot and drie of his temperature, ſpendeth and conſumeth not onely the good bloud of the mother, but alſo the excrements. VVherethrough *Hippocrates* ſaid, that the woman conceiued of a male, is well coloured and faire. Which groweth, becauſe the infant, through his much heat, conſumeth all thoſe excrements, which are woont to disfigure the face, leauing the ſame as a waſhed cloth. And for that this is true, it is behoofull, that the infant be ſupplied with bloud for his nouriſhment. And this experience manifeſteth, for it is a miracle that a male child ſhould be engendered ſaue vpon the laſt daies of the month. The contrarie befalleth, when a woman goeth with a female: for through the much cold and moiſt of her ſex, ſhe eateth little, and yeeldeth ſtore of excrements, wherethrough the woman conceiued of a girle, is ill fauoured, and full of ſpots, and a thouſand ſluttiſhneſſes ſticke vnto her; and at the time of her deliuerie, ſhe muſt tarrie ſo many more daies to purge her ſelfe, than if ſhe had brought a man child to the word. On the naturall reaſon wherof, God grounded himſelfe, when he commanded *Moſes*, that the woman, who brought

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forth a male, ſhould remain in her bed a weeke, and not enter into the temple vntill 33 daies were expired. And if ſhe were deliuered of a female, ſhe ſhould be vncleane for the ſpace of two weeks, and not enter into the temple, vntill after *66* daies, in ſort, that when the birth is of a female, the time is doubled. VVhich ſo falleth out, becauſe in the nine moneths (during which the child remained in the mothers wombe) through the much cold and moiſt of her temperature, ſhe doubly encreaſed excrements, and the ſame of verie malignant ſubſtance and qualitie, which a male infant would not haue done. Therfore *Hippocrates* holdeth it a matter verie perillous, to ſtop the purgation of a woman, who is deliuered of a wench.

All this is ſpoken to the purpoſe, that we muſt well aduiſe our ſelues of the laſt day of the moneth, to the end the ſeed may find ſufficient nouriſhment, wherwith to relieue it ſelfe. For if the act of procreation be committed ſo ſoone as the purgation is finiſhed, it will not take hold through defect of bloud. VVheron it behoo. ueth the parents be done to vnderſtand, that if both ſeeds ioine not togither at one ſelfe time, (namely that of the woman and of the man) *Galen* ſaith there will enſue no conception, although the ſeed of the man be neuer ſo apt for procreation. And hereof we ſhall render the reaſon to another purpoſe. This is very certaine, that all the diligences by vs preſcribed, muſt alſo be performed on the womans behooſe, otherwiſe, her ſeed (euill emploied) will mar the conception. Therefore it is requiſit they attend ech to other, ſo as at one ſelfe inſtant, both their ſeedes may ioyne togither.

This, at the firſt cõming, importeth very much, for the right

right cod, and his ſeed veſſell (as *Galen* affirmeth) is firſt ſtirred vp, and yeeldeth his ſeed before the left, and if the generation take not effect at the firſt comming, it is a great hap hazard, but that at the ſecond a female ſhalbe begotten. Theſe two ſeeds are knowen, firſt by the heat and coldneſſe, then by the quantitie of being much or little, and finally by the iſſuing forth ſpeedily or ſlowly. The ſeed of the right cod, commeth forth boiling, and ſo hot, as it burneth the womans belly, is not much in quantitie, and paſſeth out in haſt: Contrariwiſe, the ſeed of the left, taketh his way more temperat, is much in quantitie: and for that the ſame is cold and groſſe, ſpendeth longer ſpace in cõming forth. The laſt conſideration was, to procure that both the ſeeds of the husband & the wife, fall into the right ſide of the womb: for in that place (ſaith *Hippocrates*) are males engẽdred, & females in the left. *Galen* alleageth the reaſon hereof, ſaying; that the right ſide of the womb is verie hot, through the neighbourhood which it holdeth with the liuer, with the right ſide of the raines, and with the right ſeed veſſell: which members, we haue affirmed and approoued to be verie hot. And ſeeing all the reaſon of working, that the iſſue may become male, conſiſteth in procuring, that at the time of conception it partake much heat, it falleth out certaine, that it greatly importeth to beſtow the ſeed in this place. Which the woman ſhall eaſily accompliſh, by reſting on her right ſide, when the act of generation is ended, with her head down and her heels vp: but it behooueth her to keepe her bed a day or two, for the womb doth not ſtraightwaies embrace the ſeeed, but after ſome houres ſpace.

The ſignes wherby a woman may know, whether ſhe be with child or no, are manifeſt and plain to euery ones

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vnderſtanding : for if when ſhe ariſeth vp on her feet, the ſeed fall to the ground, it is certain (ſaith *Galen*) that ſhe hath not cõceiued, albeit herein one point requireth conſideration, that al the ſeed is not fruitful or apt for iſſue: for the one part therof is very wateriſh, whoſe office ſerueth to make thin the principal ſeed, to the end it may fare through the narrow paſſages, and this is that which nature ſendeth forth, and it reſteth, when ſhe hath conceiued, with the part apt for iſſue. It is knowen by that it is like water, and of like quantitie. That a woman riſe vp ſtraightwaies on her feet, ſo ſoon as the act of generation hath paſſed, is a matter verie perillous. Therfore *Ariſtotle* compelleth that ſhe beforehand make euacuation of the excrements, and of her vrine, to the end ſhe may haue no cauſe to riſe. The ſecond token whereby we may know the ſame, is, that the next day following, the woman will feele her belly empty, eſpecially about the nauell. Which groweth, for that the womb, when it deſireth to conceiue, becommeth verie large and ſtretched out: for verely it ſuffereth the like ſwelling vp and ſtiffneſſe, as doth a mans member, and when it fareth thus-wiſe, the ſame occupieth much roome. But at the point when it conceiueth (ſaith *Hippocrates*) ſodainly the ſame draweth togither, and maketh as it were a purſe to draw the ſeed vnto it, and will not ſuffer it to go out, and by this meanes leaueth many emptie places, the which women do declare, ſaying; that they haue no tripes left in their belly, as if they were ſodainly become leane. Moreouer, forthwith they abhorre carnall copulation, and their husbands kindneſſe, for the belly hath now got what it ſought; but the moſt certain token (ſaith *Hippocrates*) is, when their natural courſe faileth, & their breaſts grow, and when they fall in loathing with meat.

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What diligence is to be vſed, that children may proone wittie and wiſe.

§. 4.

IF we doe not firſt know the cauſe, whence it proceedeth, that a man of great wit and ſufficiencie is begotten, it is impoſſible that the ſame may be reduced to art : for through conioyning and ordering his principles and cauſes, we grow to attaine this end, and by none other meanes. The Aſtrologers hold; that becauſe the child is borne vnder ſuch an influence of the ſtarres, he commeth to be diſcreet, wittie, of good or ill maners, fortunat, and of thoſe other conditions and properties, which we ſee & conſider euery day in men. Which being admitted for true, it would follow a matter of impoſſibilitie, to frame the ſame to any art : for it ſhould be wholly a caſe of fortune, and no way placed in mens election. The naturall Philoſophers, as *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, and *Galen*, hold, that a man receiueth the conditions of his ſoule, at the time of his forming, and not of his birth: for then the ſtarres do ſuperficially alter the child, giuing him heat, coldneſſe, moiſture, and drouth; but not his ſubſtance, wherin the whole life relieth, as do the foure elements, fire, aire, earth, and water, who not only yeeld to the party compoſed, heat, cold, moiſture, and drineſſe, but alſo the ſubſtance which may maintain and preſerue the ſame qualities, during all the courſe of life. Wherethrough, that which moſt importeth in the engendring of children, is, to procure that the elements wherof they are compounded, may partake the qualities, which are

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requiſite for the wit. For theſe according to the waight and meaſure, by which they enter into the compoſition, muſt alwaies ſo indure in the mixture, and not the alterations of heauen. What theſe elements are, and in what ſort they enter into the womans wombe, to forme the creature, *Galen* declareth and affirmeth them to be the ſame which compound all other natural things: but that the earth commeth lurking in the accuſtomed meates which we eate, as are fleſh, bread, fiſh, and fruits; the water in the liquors which we drinke, The aire and fire (he ſaith) are mingled by order of nature, and enter into the body by way of the pulſe and of reſpiration. Of theſe foure elements, mingled and digeſted by our naturall heat, are made the two neceſſarie principles of the infants generation, to weet the ſeed, and the monthly courſe. But that whereof we muſt make greateſt reckoning for the end which we enquire after, are the accuſtomable meats whereon we feed: for theſe ſhut vp the foure elements in themſelues, and from theſe the ſeed fetcheth more corpulencie and qualitie, than from the water which we drinke, or the fire and aire which we breath in. VVhence *Galen* ſaith that the parents who would beget wiſe children, ſhould read three books which he wrot, of the facultie of the alements: for there they ſhould find, with what kinds of meat they may effect the ſame. And he made no mention of the water, nor of the other elements, as materials, and of like moment. But herein he ſwarued from reaſon: for the water altereth the body much more than the aire, & much leſſe than the ſound meats wheron we feed, And as touching that which concerneth the engendring of the ſeed, it carrieth as great importance as all the other elemẽts togither. The reaſon is (as *Galen* himſelf affirmeth)

becauſe the cods draw from the veines (for their nouriſhment) the wheyiſh part of the bloud, and the greateſt part of this whey, which the veins receiue, partaketh of the water which we drinke. And that the water worketh more alteration in the bodie, than the aire, *Ariſtotle* prooueth, where he demandeth, what the cauſe is, that by changing of waters, we breed ſo great an alteration in our health, wheras if we breath a contrarie aire, we perceiue it not. And to this he anſwereth, that water yeeldeth nouriſhment to the body, and ſo doth not the aire. But he had little reaſon to anſwer after this maner: for the aire alſo (by *Hippocrates* opinion) giueth nouriſhment and ſubſtance, aſwell as the water. Wher-through *Ariſtotle* deuiſed a better anſwer, ſaying; that no place nor country hath his peculiar aire; for that which is now in Flanders, when the North wind bloweth, paſſeth within two or three daies into Affricke, and that in Affricke, by the South is carried into the North; and that which this day is in Hieruſalem, the Eaſt wind driueth into the VVeſt Indies. The which cannot betide in the waters: for they do not all iſſue out of the ſame ſoile, wher-through euery people hath his particular water cõformable to the Mine of the earth where it ſpringeth, and whence it runneth. And if a man be vſed to drinke one kind of water, in taſting another, he altereth more than by meat or aire. In ſort, that the parents who haue a will to beget verie wiſe children, muſt drinke waters, delicat, freſh, and of good temperature; otherwiſe they ſhall commit error in their procreation. *Ariſtotle* ſaith, that at the time of generation, we muſt take heed of the South-weſt wind: for the ſame is groſſe, and moiſtneth the ſeed, ſo as a female and not a male is begotten. But the weſt wind he highly commendeth, and aduanceth it

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with names and titles very honourable. He calleth the ſame temperat, fatter of the earth, and ſaith; that it commeth from the Eliſian fields. But albeit it be true that it greatly importeth, to breath an aire verie delicat, and of good temperature, and to drinke ſuch waters; yet it ſtandeth much more vpon to vſe fine meats appliable to the temperature of the wit: for of theſe is engẽdred the bloud and the ſeed, and of the ſeed the creature. And if the meat be delicat and of good temperature, ſuch is the bloud made; and of ſuch bloud, ſuch ſeed; and of ſuch ſeed, ſuch braine. Now, this member being temperat, and compounded of a ſubſtance ſubtile and delicat, *Galen* ſaith, that the wit will be like therunto: for our reaſonable ſoule, though the ſame be incorruptible, yet goeth alwaies vnited with the diſpoſitions of the brain, which being not ſuch as it is requiſit they ſhould be, for diſcourſing and philoſophizing, a man ſaith and doth 1000 things, which are verie vnfitting. The meats then which the parents are to feed on, that they may engender children of great vnderſtanding (which is the ordinarie wit for Spaine) are, firſt, White bread made of the fineſt meale, and ſeaſoned with ſalt: this is cold and dry, and of parts verie ſubtile and delicat. There is another ſort made (ſaith *Galen*) of reddiſh graine, which though it nouriſh much, and make men big limmed, and of great bodily forces; yet for that the ſame is moiſt and of groſſe parts, it breedeth a loſſe in the vnderſtanding. I ſaid, ſeaſoned with ſalt, becauſe none of all the aliments which a man vſeth, bettereth ſo much the vnderſtanding, as doth this minerall. It is cold, and of more drineſſe than any other thing; and if I remember well the ſentence of *Heraclitus*, he ſaid after this maner, A drie brightneſſe, a wiſeſt minde. Then ſeeing that

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ſalt is ſo drie, and ſo appropriat to the wit, the ſcripture had good reaſon to terme it by the name of Prudence and Sapience. Partridges and *Francolini* haue a like ſubſtance, and the ſelfe temperature with bread of white meale, and Kid, and Muskadel wine. And if parents vſe theſe meats (as we haue aboue ſpecified) they ſhall breed children of great vnderſtanding. And if they would haue a child of great memorie, let them eight or nine daies before they betake themſelues to the act of generation, eat Trouts, Salmons, Lampreis, and Eeles, by which meat, they ſhall make their ſeed verie moiſt and clammie.

Theſe two qualities (as I haue ſaid before) make the memorie eaſie to receaue, and verie faſt to preſerue the figures a long time. By Pigions, Goats, Garlicke, Onions, Leekes, Rapes, Pepper, Vinegar, White-wine, Honny, and al other ſorts of ſpices, the ſeed is made hot and drie, and of parts verie ſubtile and delicat. The child who is engendred of ſuch meat, ſhalbe of great imagination, but not of like vnderſtanding, by means of the much heat, and he ſhall want memorie through his abundance of drineſſe. Theſe are woont to be very preiudiciall to the common wealth: for the heat enclineth them to many vices and euils, and giueth them a wit and mind, to put the ſame in execution: howbeit if we do keepe them vnder, the common-wealth ſhall receiue more ſeruice by theſe mens imagination, than by the vnderſtanding and memorie of the others. Hens, capons, veale, weathers of Spaine, are all meats of moderat ſubſtance; for they are neither delicat nor groſſe. I ſaid weathers of Spain: for *Galen*, without making any diſtinctiō, ſaith, that their fleſh is of a groſſe and noiſom ſubſtance, which ſtraieth from reaſon: for put caſe that in Italie,

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(where he wrot) it be the worſt of all others; yet in this our countrey, through the goodneſſe of the paſtures, we may reckon the ſame among the meats of moderat ſubſtance. The children who are begotten on ſuch food, ſhall haue a reaſonable diſcourſe, a reaſonable memory, and a reaſonable imagination. VVherethrough they wil not be verie profoundly ſeen in the Sciences, nor deuiſe ought of new.

Of theſe we haue ſaid heretofore, that they are pleaſant conceited, and apt, in whom may be imprinted all the rules and conſiderations of art, cleere, obſcure, eaſie, and difficult: but doctrine, argument, anſwering, doubting, and diſtinguiſhing, are matters wherewith their braines can in no ſort endure to be cloied. Cowes fleſh, Manzo, bread of red graine, cheeſe, oliues, vineger, and water alone, will breed a groſſe ſeed, and of faultie temperature, the ſonne engendred vpon theſe, ſhall haue ſtrength like a bull: but withall, be furious and of a beaſtly wit. Hence it proceedeth, that amongſt vpland people, it is a miracle to find one quicke of capacitie, or towardly for learning: they are all borne dull and rude; for that they are begotten on meats of groſſe and euill ſubſtance. The contrarie hereof befalleth in Citizens, whoſe children we find to be endowed with more wit and ſufficiencie. But if the parents carrie in verie deed, a will to beget a ſonne, prompt, wiſe, and of good conditions, let them, ſix or ſeuen daies before their companying, feed on Goats milke; for this aliment (by the opinion of all phiſitions) is the beſt, and moſt delicat that any man can vſe; prouided that they be ſound, and that it anſwer them in proportion. But *Galen* ſaith, it behooueth to eat the ſame with honny, without which it is dangerous, and eaſily corrupteth. The reaſon hereof

is, for that the milke, hath no more but three elements in his compoſition, cheeſe, whey, and butter. The cheeſe anſwereth the earth; the whey, the water; and the butter the aire. The fire, which mingleth the other elements, and preſerueth them being mingled, iſſuing out of the teats, is exhaled, for that it is verie ſubtile: but adioyning thereunto a little honny, which is hot and dry, in lieu of fire, the milke wil ſo partake of al the 4 elements. Which being mingled, and concocted by the operation of our naturall heat, make a ſeed verie delicat, and of good temperature. The ſonne thus engendred, ſhall at leaſtwiſe poſſeſſe a great diſcourſe; and not be depriued of memorie and imagination. In that *Ariſtotle* wanted this doctrine, he came ſhort to anſwer a probleme, which himſelfe propounded, demanding what the cauſe is, that the yong ones of brute beaſts, carry with them (for the moſt part) the properties and conditions of their ſires and dammes. And the children of men and women not ſo? And we find this by experience to be true: for of wiſe parents, are borne fooliſh children; and of fooliſh parents, children very wiſe; of vertuous parents, lewd children; and of vitious parents, vertuous children; of hard fauoured parents, faire children: and of faire parents, foule children: of white parents, browne children: and of brown parents, white and well coloured children. And amongſt children of one ſelfe father and mother, one prooueth ſimple, and another wittie: one foule, and another faire: one of good conditions, and another of bad: one vertuous, and another vitious. VVhereas if a mare of a good harrage, be couered with a horſe of the like, the colt which is foaled, reſembleth them aſwell in ſhape and colour, as in their properties. To this probleme, *Ariſtotle* ſhaped a very vntowardly anſwer, ſaying,

ing, that a man is caried away with many imaginations, during the carnall act: and hence it proceedeth that the children prooue so diuers. But brute beasts, because in time of procreation they are not so distraughted, neither possesse so forcible an imagination as man doth, make alwaies their yong ones after one selfe sort, and like to themselues. This answer hath euer hitherto gone for currant amongst the vulgar philosophers: and for confirmation hereof, they alleage the history of *Iacob*, which recounteth, that he hauing placed certaine rods, at the watering places of the beasts, the lambes were yeaned party coloured. But little auailes it them to handfast holy matters: for this historie recounteth a miraculous action, which God performed, therein to hide some sacrament. And the answer made by *Aristotle*, sauoreth of great simplicitie. And who so wil not yeeld me credit, let him (at this day) cause some shepheards to try this experiment, and they shall find it to be no naturall matter. It is also reported in these our partes, that a ladie was deliuered of a sonne, more brown than was due, because a blacke visage, which was pictured, fell into her imagination. Which I hold for a iest: and if perhaps it be true that she brought such a one to the world, I say that the father who begat him, had the like colour to that figure. And because it may be the better known, how fromshapen this philosophy is, which *Aristotle* bringeth in, togither with those that follow him, it is requisit we hold it for a thing certaine, that the worke of generation appertaineth to the vegetatiue soule, and not to the sensitiue, or reasonable: for a horse engendreth without the reasonall, and a plant without the sensitiue. And if we do but marke a tree loden with fruit, we shall find on the same a greater variety, than in the children of any

man. One apple will be green, another red; one little, another great; one round, another ill ſhaped: one ſoūd, another rotten: one ſweet, and another bitter. And if we compare the fruit of this yeare with that of the laſt, the one will be very different and contrary to the other: which cannot be attributed to the varietie of the imagination, ſeeing the plantes do want this power. The error of *Ariſtotle*, is very manifeſt in his own doctrine: for he ſaith, that the ſeed of the man, and not of the woman, is that which maketh the generation: and in the carnal act, the man doth nought els, but ſcatter his ſeed without forme or figure, as the husbandman ſoweth his corne in the earth. And as the graine of corne doth not by and by take root, nor formeth a ſtalke and leaues, vntill ſome daies been expired: ſo (ſaith *Galen*) the creature is not formed al ſo ſoon as the mans ſeed falleth into the womans wombe: but affirmeth that thirtie or fortie daies are requiſit, ere the ſame can be accompliſhed. And if this be ſo, what auaileth it that the father go imagining of diuers things in the carnall act, when as the forming beginneth not vntill ſome daies after? eſpecially, when the forming is not made by the ſoule of the father or the mother, but by a third thing which is found in the ſeed it ſelfe. And the ſame being only vegetatiue, and no more, is not capable of the imagination, but followeth only the motions of the temperature, and doth nothing els. After my mind, to ſay that mens children are borne of ſo diuers figures, through the variable imaginations of the parents, is none other, than to auouch, that of grains, ſome grow big, and ſome little, becauſe the husband-man (when he ſowed them) was diſtraught into ſundry imaginations. Vpon this ſo vnſound opinion of *Ariſtotle*, ſome curious heads argue, that the children of

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the adulterous wife reſemble her husband, though they be none of his. And the reaſon which leadeth them, is manifeſt: for during the carnall act, the adulterers ſettle their imagination vpon the husband, with feare leaſt he come and take them napping. And for the ſame conſideration, they conclude that the husbands children reſemble the adulterer though they be not his, becauſe the adulterous wife, during the copulation with her huſband, alwaies buſieth her ſelfe in contemplation of the figure of her louer. And thoſe who ſay, that the other woman brought forth a blacke ſonne, becauſe ſhe held her imagination fixed on the picture of a blacke man, muſt alſo graunt this, which by theſe queint braines is inferred: for the whole carrieth one ſelfe reaſon, and is in my conceit a ſtarcke leaſing, and very mockerie, though it be groũded on the opinion of *Ariſtotle*. *Hippocrates* anſwered this probleme better, when he ſaid, that the Scythians are all alike conditioned, and ſhaped in viſage, and rendereth the reaſon of this reſemblance to be, for that they all fed of one ſelfe meat, and dranke of one ſelfe water, went apparrelled after one ſelfe maner, and kept one ſelfe order in all things. For the ſame cauſe, the brute beaſtes engender yong ones after their particular reſemblance, becauſe they alwaies vſe the ſame food, and haue there-through an vniforme ſeede. But contrariwiſe man, becauſe he eateth diuers meates, euerie day maketh a different ſeed aſwell in ſubſtance, as in temperature. The which the naturall Philoſophers doe approoue, in anſwering to a probleme, that ſaith, What is the cauſe, that the excrementes of brute beaſtes haue not ſo vnpleaſant a verdure, as thoſe of mankind? And they affirme, that brute beaſtes vſe alwaies the ſelfe meates, and much exerciſe therewithall:

but a man eateth ſo much meate, and of ſo diuers ſubſtance, as he cannot come away with them, and ſo they grow to corrupt. Mans ſeed, and that of beaſts, hold one ſelfe reaſon and conſideration, for that they are both of them excrements of a third concoction. As touching the varietie of meats which man vſeth, it cannot be denied, but muſt be graunted, that of euery aliment there is made a different and particular ſeed. VVhere it falleth out apparent, that the day, on which a man eateth beefe or bloudings he maketh a groſſe ſeed, & of bad temperature; and therefore, the ſonne begotten therof, ſhalbe disfigured, fooliſh, blacke, and ill conditioned. And if he eat the carcas of a capon, or of a henne, his ſeed ſhall be white, delicat, and of good temperature. VVherthrough the ſonne ſo engendred, ſhalbe faire, wiſe, and verie gentle conditioned. From hence I collect, that there is no child born, who partaketh not of the qualities and temperature of that meat, which his parents fed vpon a day before he was begotte. And if any would know of what meat he was formed, let him but conſider, with what meat his ſtomacke hath moſt familiaritie, (and without all doubt) that it was. Moreouer, the naturall philoſophers demand what the cauſe is, that the children of the wiſeſt men, do ordinarily prooue blockiſh and void of capacitie? To which probleme they anſwer verie fondly, ſaying; that wiſe men are verie honeſt and ſhamefaſt, and therefore in companying with their wiues, doe abſtaine from ſome diligences, neceſſarie for effecting that the child prooue of that perfection which is requiſite. And they confirme this, by example of ſuch parents, as are fooliſh and ignorant, who, becauſe they employ all their force and diligence at the time of generation, their children doe all prooue wiſe and wittie;

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but this anſwer tokeneth they are ſlenderly ſeene in naturall Philoſophy. True it is, that for rendering an anſwere conuenient, it behooueth firſt to preſuppoſe and prooue certaine points; one of which purporteth, that the reaſonable facultie, is contrarie to the wrathfull and the concupiſcible, in ſort, that if a man be verie wiſe, he cannot be verie couragious, of much bodily forces, a great feeder, nor verie able for procreation: for the naturall diſpoſitions, which are requiſite, to the end the reaſonable ſoule may performe his operations, carrie a contrarietie to thoſe, which are neceſſarie for the wrathfull and the concupiſcible. *Ariſtotle* ſaith, (and it is true) that hardineſſe and naturall courage conſiſt in heate: and Prudence and Sapience in cold and drie. VVhence we ſee by plaine experience, that the valienteſt perſons are void of reaſon, ſpare of ſpeach, impatient to be icaſted withall, and verie ſoone aſhamed; for remedie whereof, they ſtraightwaies ſet hand on their ſword, as not weeting what other anſwer to make. But men endowed with wit haue many reaſons and quicke anſweres and quippes, with which they entertaine the time, that they may not come to blowes. Of ſuch a manner of wit, *Saluſt* noteth that *Cicero* was, telling him, that he had much tongue, and feet verie light: wherein he had reaſon, for ſo great a wiſedome, in matters of armes, could not end but in cowardiſe. And hence tooke a certaine nipping prouerbe his originall, which ſaith; He is as valiant as *Cicero*, and as wiſe as *Hector*. Namely, when we will note a man to be a buzzard, and a cow-babie. No leſſe doth the naturall faculty gainſay the vnderſtanding, for if a man poſſeſſe great bodily forces, he cannot enioy a good wit; and the reaſon is, for that the force of the arms and

the legges, ſpringeth from hauing a braine hard and earthly, and though it be true, that by reaſon of the cold and drie of the earth, he might partake a good vnderſtanding, yet in that it hath his compoſition of a groſſe ſubſtance, it ruinateth and endammageth the ſame. For through his coldneſſe the courage and hardineſſe are quenched: wherethrough, we haue ſeene ſome men of great forces to be verie cowardes. The contrarietie which the vegetatiue ſoule hath with the reaſonable, is moſt manifeſt of all others, for his operations, namely; to nouriſh, and engender, are better performed with heat and moiſture, than with the contrarie qualities, Which experience cleerely manifeſteth, conſidering how powerfull the ſame is in the age of childhood, and how weake and remiſſe in old age. Againe, in boyes eſtate the reaſonable ſoule cannot vſe his operations; whereas in old age, which is vtterly void of heat and moiſture, it performeth them with great effect. In ſort, that by how much the more a man is enabled for procreation, and for digeſtion of food, ſo much he leeſeth of his reaſonable facultie. To this alludeth that which *Plato* affirmeth, that there is no humour in a man, which ſo much diſturbeth the reaſonable faculty, as abundance of ſeed, only (ſaith he) the ſame yeeldeth help to the art of verſifieng. Which we behold to be confirmed by daily experience: for when a man beginneth to entreat of amorous matters, ſodainly he becommeth a Poet. And if before he were greaſie and loutiſh, forthwith he takes it at heart, to haue a wrinckle in his pumpe, or a mote on his cape. And the reaſon is, becauſe theſe workes appertaine to the imagination, which encreaſeth and lifteth it ſelfe vp from this point, through the much heat, accaſioned in him by this amorous paſſion. And that loue is an

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hot alteration, ſheweth apparently, through the courage and hardineſſe, which it planteth in the louer, from whom the ſame alſo reaueth all deſire of meat, and will not ſuffer him to ſleep. If the common-wealth bare an eie to theſe tokens, ſhe would banniſh from publicke ſtudies, luſty ſcholleis, and great fighters, inamoured perſons, Poets, and thoſe who are verie neat and curious in their apparrell: for they are not furniſhed with wit or abilitie for any ſort of ſtudy. Out of this rule, *Ariſtotle* excepteth the melancholicke by aduſtion, whoſe ſeede (though fruitfull) reaueth not the capacitie. Finally, all the faculties which gouern man, if they be very powerfull, ſet the reaſonable ſoule in a garboile. Hence it proceeds, that if a man be very wiſe, he proueth a coward, of ſmall ſtrength of bodie, a ſpare feeder, and not verie able for procreation. And this is occaſioned by the qualities which make him wiſe, namely; coldneſſe and drineſſe. And theſe ſelfe, weaken the other powers, as appeareth in old men, who (beſides their counſell and wiſdom) are good for nothing els. This doctrine thus preſuppoſed, *Galen* holdeth opinion, that to the end the engendring of whatſoeuer creature may take his perfect effect, two ſeeds are neceſſary, one, which muſt be the agent and former; and another which muſt ſerue for nouriſhment; for a matter ſo delicat as generation, cannot ſtraightwais ouercome a meat ſo groſſe, as is the bloud, vntill the effect be greater. And that the ſeed is the right aliment of the ſeed members, *Hippocrates*, *Plato*, and *Galen* doe all accord: for by their opinion, if the bloud be not conuerted into ſeed, it is impoſſible, that the ſinews, the veins, & the arteries can be maintained. Wherthrough *Galen* affirmed, the difference betweene the veines and the cods to be, that the cods doe ſpeedily make much

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ſeed, and the veins a little, and in long ſpace of time: In ſort, that nature prouided for the ſame, an alimẽt ſo like, which with light alteration, & without making any excremẽts, might maintain the other ſeed. And this could not be effected, if the nouriſhment therof had bin made of the bloud. The ſelfe prouiſion (ſaith *Galen*) was made by nature, in the engendring of mankind, as in the forming of a chick, and ſuch other birds, as come of egs. In which we ſee there are two ſubſtances, one of the white, and another of the yolke, of one of which, the chicke is made, and by the other maintained all the time whiles the forming endureth. For the ſame reaſon are two ſeeds neceſſarie in the generation of the man, one, of which the creature may be made, and the other by which it may be maintained whilſt the forming endureth. But *Hippocrates* mentioneth one thing worthie of great conſideration, namely; that it is not reſolued by nature, which of the two ſeeds ſhalbe the agent and formour, & which ſhall ſerue for aliment. For many times, the ſeed of the woman is of greater efficacy than that of the man, and when this betideth, ſhe maketh the generation, and that of the husband ſerueth for aliment. Otherwhiles, that of the husband is more mighty, and that of the wife doth nought els than nouriſh. This doctrin was not cõſidered by *Ariſtotle*, who could not vnderſtand, wherto the womans ſeed ſerued, and therefore vttered a thouſand follies, and that the ſame was but a little water, without vertue, or force for generation. VVhich being granted, it would follow impoſſible, that a woman ſhould euer couet the conuerſation of man, or conſent thereunto, but would ſhun the carnall act, as being her ſelfe ſo honeſt, and the worke ſo vncleane and filthy; wherethrough, in ſhort ſpace mankind would decay,

decay, and the world reſt depriued of the faireſt creature, that euer nature formed. To this purpoſe *Ariſtotle* demandeth, what the cauſe is, that fleſhly copulation ſhould be an action of the greateſt pleaſure, that nature euer ordained for the ſolace of liuing things. To which probleme he anſwereth, that nature hauing ſo deſirouſly procured the perpetuitie of mankind, did therefore place ſo great a delight in this worke, to the end, that they being mooued by ſuch intereſt, might gladly apply themſelues to the act of generation; and if theſe incitements were wanting, no woman or man would condiſcend to the bands of marriage, inaſmuch as the woman ſhould reape none other benefite, than to beare a burden in her belly the ſpace of nine months, with ſo great trauaile and ſorrowes, and at the time of her child-birth, to vndergo the hazard of forgoing her life. So would it be neceſſarie, that the commonwealth ſhould through feare enforce women to marrie, to the end mankind might not come to nothing. But becauſe nature doth her things with pleaſing, ſhe gaue to a woman, all the inſtrumentes neceſſarie for making a ſeed, inciting, and apt for iſſue, whereby ſhe might deſire a man, and take pleaſure in his conuerſation. But if it were of that qualitie which *Ariſtotle* expreſſeth, ſhe would rather flie and abhorre him, than euer loue him. This ſelfe *Galen* prooueth, alleaging an example of the brute beaſtes, wherethrough he ſaith, that if a Sowe be ſpeyed, ſhe neuer deſireth the Boare, nor will conſent that he approch vnto her.

The like we do euidently ſee in a woman, whoſe temperature partaketh more of coldneſſe than is requiſite: for if we tell her that ſhe muſt be married,

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there is no word which ſoundeth worſe in her eare. And the like befalleth to a cold man, for he wanteth the fruitful ſeed. Moreouer, if a womans ſeed were of that maner which *Ariſtotle* mentioneth, it could be no proper aliment: for to attain the laſt qualities of actual nutriment, a totall ſeed is neceſſarie, whereby it may be nouriſhed. Wherthrough, if the ſame come not to be concocted & ſemblable, it cannot performe this point: for womans ſeed wanteth the inſtruments and places, as are the ſtomacke, the liuer, and the cods, where it may be concocted. Therefore nature prouided, that in the engendring of a creature, two ſeedes ſhould concurre; which being mingled, the mightier ſhould make the forming and the other ſerue for nouriſhment. And this is ſeen euidently ſo to be: for if a blackamore beget a white woman with child, & a white man a *negro* woman, of both theſe vnions, wil be borne a creature, partaking of either qualitie. Out of this doctrin I gather that to be true, which many authenticall hiſtories affirm, that a dog carnally companying with a woman, made her to conceiue; and the like did a beare with another woman, whom he found alone in the fields. And likewiſe, an ape had two yong ones by another. We read alſo of one, who walking for recreation alongſt a riuers ſide, a fiſh came out of the water, and begat her with child. The matter herein of moſt difficulty for the vulgar to cõceiue, is, how it may be, that theſe women ſhould bring forth perfect men, and partakers of the vſe of reaſon, ſeeing the parents who engendred them, were brute beaſts. To this I anſwer, that the ſeed of euery of theſe womẽ, was the agent & former of the creature, as the greaterin force, whence it figured the ſame, with his accidents of mans ſhape. The ſeed of the brute beaſt (as not equall in ſtrength) ſerued for aliment, & for

nothing

nothing els. And that the ſeede of theſe vnreaſonable beaſts, might yeeld nouriſhment to mans ſeed, is a matter eaſie to be conceiued. For if any of theſe women had eaten a peece of bears fleſh, or of a dog, boiled or roſted, ſhe ſhould haue receiued nouriſhment thereout, though not ſo good as if ſhe had eaten mutton or partridges. The like befalleth to mans ſeed, that his true nouriſhment (in the forming of the creature) is another mans ſeed, but if this be wanting, the ſeed of ſome brute beaſt may ſupply the roome: but a thing which theſe hiſtories ſpecifie, is, that children borne of ſuch copulations giue token in their maners and conditions, that their engendring was not naturall.

Out of the things already rehearſed (though we haue ſomewhat lingered by the way therein) we may now gather the anſwere to that principall probleme, *vz*: that wiſe mens children, are wel-neere alwaies formed of their mothers ſeed: for that of the fathers (for the reaſons alreadie alleaged) is not fruitfull for generation, and in engendring, ſerueth only for aliment. And the man who is ſhaped of the womans ſeed, cannot be wittie, nor partake abilitie through the much cold and moiſt of that ſex. Whence it becommeth manifeſt, that when the child prooueth diſcreet and prompt, the ſame yeeldeth an infallible token, that he was formed of his fathers ſeed. And if he ſhew blockiſh and vntoward, we inferre, that he was formed of the ſeed of his mother. And hereto did the wiſe-man allude, when he ſaid, The wiſe ſonne reioyceth the father, but a fooliſh child is a griefe to his mother. It may alſo come to paſſe vpō ſome occaſion, that the ſeed of a woman may be the agent and form-giuer, & that of the woman, ſerue for nouriſhment, but the ſon ſo begotten will prooue of

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ſlender capacitie: for put caſe, that cold and dry be two qualities, whereof the vnderſtanding hath need: yet it behooueth, that they hold a certaine quantitie and meaſure, which once exceeded, they doe rather hurt than good. Euen as we ſee men very aged, that by occaſion of ouermuch cold and dry, we find them become children anew, and vtter many follies. Let vs then preſuppoſe, that to ſome old man, there yet remaine ten yeares of life, with conuenient cold and dry to diſcourſe, in ſuch ſort, as theſe being expired, he ſhall then grow a babe againe.

If of ſuch a ones ſeed a ſon be engendred, he ſhall till ten yeares age, make ſhew of great ſufficiencie: for that til then, he enioyeth the conuenient cold and drouth of his father; but at eleuen yeares old, he will ſodainly quaile away, for that he hath out-paſſed the point, which to theſe two qualities was behooffull. VVhich we ſee confirmed by daily experience in children begotten in old age, who in their childhood are verie aduiſed, and afterwards in mans ſtate, prooue verie dullards, & ſhort of life. And this groweth, becauſe they were made of a ſeed cold and dry, which had alreadie out-run the one half of his race. And if the father be wiſe in the works of the imagination, and by means of his much heat & drineſſe, take to wife a woman cold and moiſt in the third degree, the ſonne born of ſuch an accouplement, ſhalbe moſt vntoward, if he be formed of his fathers ſeed, for that he made abode in a belly ſo cold and moiſt, & was maintained by a bloud ſo diſtemperat. The contrary betideth, when the father is vntoward, whoſe ſeed hath ordinarily heat and exceſſiue moiſture. The ſonne ſo engendred, ſhalbe dull til 15 yeares of age, for that he drew part of his fathers ſuperfluous moiſture. But the courſe

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of that age once ſpent, it giueth firmneſſe, in aſmuch as the fooliſh mans ſeed, is more temperat and leſſe moiſt. It aideth likewiſe the wit, to continue nine moneths ſpace in a belly of ſo little coldneſſe and moiſture, as is that of a woman cold and moiſt in the firſt degree, where it endured hunger and want. All this ordinarily befalleth, for the reaſons by vs ſpecified: but there is found a certaine ſort of men, whoſe genitories are endowed with ſuch force and vigour, as they vtterly ſpoile the aliments of their good qualities, and conuert them into their euill and groſſe ſubſtance. Therefore all the children whom they beget, (though they haue eaten delicat meats) ſhall prooue rude and dullards. Others contrariwiſe, vſing groſſe meats, and of euill temperature, are ſo mightie in ouercomming them, that though they eat or porcke, yet they make children of very delicat wit. Whence it prooueth certain, that there are linages of fooliſh men, & races of wiſe men: and others, who of ordinarie are borne blunt, and void of iudgement.

Some doubts are encountred, by thoſe who ſeeke to pearce into the bottom of this matter, whoſe anſwer (in the doctrin forepaſſed) is very eaſie. The firſt is, whence it ſpringeth, that baſtard children accuſtomably reſemble their fathers, and of a 100 lawfull, 90 beare the figure and conditions of the mother. The ſecond, why baſtard children prooue ordinarily deliuer, couragious, and very aduiſed. The third, what the cauſe is, that if a common ſtrumpet conceiue, ſhe neuer looſeth her burden, though ſhe take venomous drenches to deſtroy the ſame, or be let much bloud, whereas if a married woman be with child by her husband vpon euery light occaſion, the ſame miſcarrieth. To the firſt, *Plato* anſwereth,

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saying, that no man is nought of his owne proper and agreeable will, vnlesse he be first incited by the vitiousnesse of his temperature. And he giues vs an example in lecherous men; who, for that they are stored with plentifull and fruitfull seed, suffer great illusions, and manie combers; and therefore (molested by that passion) to driue the same from them, doe marrie wiues. Of such *Galen* saith, that they haue the instruments of generation very hot and dry: and for this cause breed seed verie pricking & apt for procreation. A man then, who goeth seeking a woman not his owne, is repleniſhed with this fruitfull, digested, and well seasoned seed, Whence it followeth of force, that he make the generation: for where both are equall, the mans seed carrieth the greatest efficacie; and if the son be shaped of the seed of such a father, it ensueth of necessitie that he resemble him. The contrarie betideth in lawfull children; who, for that married men haue their wiues euer couched by their sides, neuer take regard to ripen the seed, or to make it apt for procreation, but rather (vpon euery light enticement) yeeld the same from them, vsing great violence and stirring; whereas women, abiding quiet, during the carnall act, their seed vessels yeeld not their seed, saue when it is well concoct and seasoned. Therfore married women do alwaies make the engendring, and their husbands seed serueth for aliment. But somtimes it comes to passe, that both the seeds are matched in equall perfection, and cumbat in such sort, as both the one and the other take effect in the forming, and so is a child shaped, who resembleth neither father nor mother. Another time it seemeth that they agree vpon the matter, & part the likenesse between them: the seed of the father maketh the nosthrils and the eies; and that of the mother,

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the mouth and the forehead. And which carrieth most maruell, it hath so fallen out, that the sonne hath taken one eare of his father, and another of his mother, and so the like in his eies. But if the fathers seed do altogither preuaile, the childe retaineth his nature and his conditions: and when the seed of the mother swaieth most, the like reason taketh effect. Therefore, the father who coueteth, that his child may be made of his owne seed, ought to withdraw himselfe for some daies from his wife, and stay till all his seed be concocted and ripened; and then it will fall out certain that the forming shall proceed from him, and the wifes seed shall serue for nourishment. The second doubt (by meanes of that we haue said already) beareth little difficultie: for bastard children are ordinarily made of seed hote and dry: and from this temperature (as we haue oftentimes prooued heretofore) spring courage, brauerie, and a good imagination, whereto this wisdome of the world appertaineth. And because the seed is digested and well seasoned, nature effecteth what she likes best, and pourtraieth those children as with a pensill. To the third doubt may be answered, that the conceiuing of lewd women, is most commonly wrought by the mans seed: and because the same is drie, and verie apt for issue, it fasteneth it selfe in the woman with verie strong rootes; but the childe breeding of married women, being wrought by their own seed, occasioneth, that the creature easily vnlooseth, because the same was moist and watry, or as *Hippocrates* saith, full of mustinesse.

What diligences are to be vſed, for preſeruing the childrens wit after they are formed.

§. 5.

THe matter wherof man is compounded, prooueth a thing ſo alterable, and ſo ſubiect to corruption, that at the inſtant when he beginneth to be ſhaped, he likewiſe beginneth to be vntwined, and to alter, and therin can find no remedy. For it was ſaid, ſo ſoon as we are born, we faile to be. Wherthrough nature prouided, that in mans body, there ſhould be 4 natural faculties, attractiue, retétiue, concoctiue, & expulſiue. The which concocting & altering the aliments which we eate, returne to repaire the ſubſtance that was loſt, ech ſucceeding in his place. By this we vnderſtand, that it little auaileth to haue engendred a child of delicat ſeed, if we make no reckoning of the meates, which afterwards we feed vpon. For the creation being finiſhed, there remaineth not for the creature, any part of the ſubſtance wherof it was firſt compoſed. True it is, that the firſt ſeed, if the ſame be well concocted and ſeaſoned, poſſeſſeth ſuch force, that digeſting & altering the meats, it maketh them (though they be bad and groſſe) to turne to his good temperature and ſubſtance, but we may ſo far forth vſe contrary meats, as the creature ſhall looſe thoſe good qualities, which it receiued from the ſeed wherof it was made: therefore *Plato* ſaid, that one of the things which moſt brought mans wit, and his manners to ruine, was his euill bringing vp in diet. For which cauſe he counſelled that we ſhould giue vnto children, meats and drinks, delicat, and of good temperature, to the end, that when they grow big, they may know how to abandon the euil, & to embrace the good. The reaſon hereof is very cleere. For if at the bginning

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the braine was made of delicat ſeed, and that this member goeth euerie day impairing and conſuming, and muſt be repaired with the meats which we eat, it is certaine, if theſe being groſſe and of euill temperature, that vſing them many daies togither, the braine will become of the ſame nature. Therefore it ſufficeth not, that the child be borne of good ſeed, but alſo it behooueth that the meat which he eateth, after he is formed and borne, bee endowed with the ſame qualities. What theſe be, it carrieth no great difficultie to manifeſt, if you preſuppoſe, that the Greekes were the moſt diſcreet men of the world, and that, enquiring after aliments and food, to make their children witty and wiſe, they found the beſt and moſt appropriat. For if the ſubtile and delicate wit, conſiſt in cauſing that the braine be compounded of partes ſubtile, and of good temperature, that meate which aboue all others partaketh theſe two qualities, ſhalbe the ſame which it behoooueth vs to vſe, for obteining our end. *Galen*, and all the Greeke Phiſitions, ſay that Goats milke boiled with honny, is the beſt meat which any man can eat: for beſides that it hath a moderate ſubſtance, therein the heat exceedeth not the cold, nor the moiſt the drie. Therefore we ſaid (ſome few leaues paſt) that the parentes, whoſe will earneſtly leadeth them, to haue a childe, wiſe, prompt, and of good conditions, muſt eat much Goats milke boiled with honny, 7 or 8 daies before the copulationnt. Balbeit this aliment is ſo good (as *Galen* ſpeaketh of) yet it falleth out a matter of importance for the wit, that the meate conſiſt of moderate ſubſtance, and of ſubtile partes. For how much the finer the matter becommeth in the nouriſhment of the braine, ſo much the more is the wit ſharpened. For which cauſe; the Greekes drew

out of the milke, cheese and whey (which are the two grosse aliments of his composition) and left the butter, which in nature resembleth the aire. This they gaue in food to their children, mingled with honny, with intention to make them witty and wise. And that this is the trueth, is plainly seen by that which *Homer* recounteth. Besides this meat, children did eat cracknels, of white bread, of very delicat water, with honny and a little salt: but in steed of vinegar (for that the same is very noisome and dammageable to the vnderstanding) they shall adde thereunto, butter of Goats-milke, whose temperature & substance, is appropriat for the wit. But in this regiment grows an inconuenience verie great, namely; that children vsing so delicat meats, shall not possesse sufficient strength to resist the iniuries of the aire: neither can defend themselues from other occasions, which are woont to breed maladies. So by making thē become wise, they will fall out to be vnhealthful, and liue a small time. This difficulty demandeth, in what sort children may be brought vp, witty and wise, and yet the matter so handled, as it may no way gainsay their healthfulnes. VVhich shall easily be effected, if the parentes dare to put in practise, some rules and precepts which I wil prescribe. And because deinty people are deceiued in bringing vp their childrē, and they treat stil of this matter: I wil first assigne them the cause why their children, though they haue Schoolemaisters and tutors, and themselues take such pains at their booke, yet they come away so meanly with the sciences, as also in what sort they may remedy this, without that they abridge their life, or hazard their health. Eight things (saith *Hippocrates*) make mans flesh moist & fat. The 1 to be merry, and to liue at hearts ease; the 2 to sleepe much: the 3 to lie in a soft bed: the 4 to fare

fare well: the fifth, to be well apparelled and furniſhed: the ſixth, to ride alwaies on horſebacke: the ſeuenth, to haue our will: the eighth to be occupied in plaies and paſtimes, and in things which yeeld contentment and pleaſure. All which is a veritie ſo manifeſt, as if *Hippocrates* had not affirmed it, none durſt denie the ſame. Only we may doubt, whether delicious people doe alwaies obſerue this maner of life; but if it be true that they do ſo, we may well conclude, that their ſeed is very moiſt, and that the children which they beget, will of neceſſitie ouer-abound in ſuperfluous moiſture, which it behoueth firſt to be conſumed: for this qualitie ſendeth to ruine the operations of the reaſonable ſoule: And moreouer the Phiſitions ſay, that it maketh them to liue a ſhort ſpace and vnhealthfull. By this it ſhould ſeeme, that a good wit, and a ſound bodily health require one ſelfe qualitie, Namely drouth; wherethrough, the precepts and rules which we are to lay downe for making children wiſe, will ſerue likewiſe to yeeld them much health, and long life. It behoueth them, (ſo ſoone as a childe is borne of delicious parents) inaſmuch as their conſtitution conſiſteth of more cold and moiſt than is conuenient for childhood, to waſh him with ſalt hote water; which (by the opinion of all phiſitions) ſoketh vp and drieth the fleſh, & giueth ſoundneſſe to the ſinews, and maketh the child ſtrong and manly, and (by conſuming the ouermuch moiſture of his braine) enableth him with wit, and freeth him from many deadly infirmities. Contrariwiſe, the bath being of water freſh and hot, in that the ſame moiſteneth the fleſh (ſaith *Hippocrates*) it breedeth fiue annoiances; Namely, effeminating of the fleſh, weakneſſe of ſinews, dulneſſe of ſpirits, fluxes of bloud, and baſeneſſe of ſtomacke. But if the

child issue out of his mothers belly with excessiue drineſſe, it is requisit to washe the same with hote fresh water. Therfore *Hippocrates* said, children are to be washed a long time with hote water, to the end they may receiue the lesse annoiance by the crampe, and that they may grow and be well coloured: but (for certaine) this must be vnderstood of those who come forth drie out of their mothers belly; in whom it behooueth to amend their euill temperature, by applying vnto them contrarie qualities. The Almains (saith *Galen*) haue a custome, to wash their children in a riuer, so soon as they are born; them seeming, that as the iron which commeth burning hot out of the forge, is made the stronger, if it be dipped in cold water: so when the hot child is taken out of the mothers wombe, it yeeldeth him of greater force and vigour, if he be washed in fresh water. This thing is condemned by *Galen* for a beastly practise, and that with great reason: for put case, that by this way, the skinne is hardened and closed, and not easie to be altered by the iniuries of the aire, yet will it rest offended by the excrements which are engendred in the body, for that the same is not of force, nor open so as they may be exhaled and passe forth. But the best and safest remedie is, to wash the children, who haue superfluous moisture, with hot salt water: for their excessiue moisture consuming, they are the neerer to health, and the way through the skinne, being stopped in them, they cannot receiue annoiance by any occasion. Neither are the inward excrements therefore so shut vp, that there are not waies left open for them, where they may come out. And nature is so forcible, that if they haue taken from her a common way, she will seeke out another to serue her turne. And when all others faile, she can skill to make new

waies,

waies, wherethrough to ſend out what doth her dammage. VVherefore of two extreames, it is more auaileable for health, to haue a skinne hard and ſomewhat cloſe, than thinne and open.

The ſecond thing requiſit to be performed when the child ſhalbe born, is, that we make him acquainted with the winds, and with change of aire, & not keep him ſtill locked vp in a chamber: for elſe it will become weake, womaniſh, peeuiſh, of feeble ſtrength, and within three or foure daies, giue vp the ghoſt. Nothing (ſaith *Hippocrates*) ſo much weakeneth the fleſh, as to abide ſtill in warme places, and to keepe our ſelues from heate and cold. Neither is there a better remedie for healthfull liuing, than to accuſtome our body to al winds, hot, cold, moiſt, and dry. Wherethrough *Ariſtotle* enquireth, what the cauſe is, that ſuch as liue in the Gallies are more healthy, & better colored, than thoſe who inhabit a plaſhy ſoil. And this difficulty groweth greater, conſidering the hard life which they lead, ſleeping in their clothes, in the open aire, againſt the ſun, in the cold, & the water, & faring withall ſo courſly. The like may be demanded, as touching ſhepheards, who of all other men enioy the ſoundeſt health, & it ſpringeth, becauſe they haue made a league with al the ſeueral qualities of the aire, and their nature diſmaieth at nothing. Cõtrariwiſe, we plainly ſee, that if a man giue himſelfe to liue deliciouſly, and to beware that the ſun, the cold, the euening, nor the wind offend him, within 3 daies he ſhalbe diſpatched with a poſt letter to another world. Therfore it may well be ſaid, he that loueth his life in this world, ſhal leeſe it: for there is no man that can preſerue himſelf from the alteration of the aire; therfore it is better to accuſtom himſelf to euery thing, to the end a mã may liue careles, & not in ſuſpéce.

The errour of the vulgar consisteth, in thinking that the babe is borne so tender and delicat, as he cannot endure to issue forth of the mothers wombe (where it was so warme) into a region of the aire so cold, without receiuing much dammage. And verely they are deceiued: for those of Almaine (a region so cold) vsed to dip their children so hote in the riuer: and though this were a beastly act, yet the same did them no hurt, nor deaths harme.

The third point conuenient to be accomplished, is, to seeke out a yoong nurse of temperature hot & drie: or (after our doctrine) cold and moist in the first degree, enured to hardnesse & want, to lie on the bare ground, to eat little, and to go poorly clad, in wet, drouth and heat; such a one will yeeld a firme milke, as acquainted with the alterations of the aire; and the childe being brought vp by her, for some good space, will grow to possesse a great firmnesse. And if she be discreet and aduised, the same will also be of much auaile for his wit: for the milke of such a one, is verie cleane, hot, and drie: with which two qualities, the much cold and moist will be corrected, which the infant brought from his mothers wombe. How greatly it importeth for the strength of the creature, that it sucke a milke well exercised, is apparently proued in horses, who being foaled by mares, toiled in plowing and harrowing, prooue great coursers, and will abide much hardnesse. And if the dammes run vp and down idlely in the pastures after the first cariere, they are not able to stand on their feet. The order then which should be held with the nurse, is, to take her into house, some foure or fiue months before the childbirth, and to giue her the same meats to eat, wheron the mother feedeth, that she may haue time to consume the

bloud

bloud and bad humours, which ſhe had gathered by harmfull meats, that ſhe vſed tofore, and to the end the child (ſo ſoon as it is born) may ſucke the like milke vnto that, which relieued it in the mothers bellie, or made at leaſt of the ſame meats.

The fourth is, not to accuſtome the child to ſleepe in a ſoft bed, nor to keepe him ouerwarme apparrelled: or giue him too much meat. For theſe three things (ſaith *Hippocrates*) ſcarſen and dry vp the fleſh, and their contraries, fatten and enlarge the ſame. And in ſo doing, the child ſhall grow of great wit, and of long life, by reaſon of this drineſſe: and by the contraries, he will prooue faire, fat, ful of bloud, & bockiſh; which habit, *Hippocrates* called Wraſtler-like, and holdeth it for verie perillous. With this ſelfe receit and order of life, was the wiſeſt man brought vp, that euer the world had; To weet our ſauiour Chriſt, in that he was man, ſaying (for that he was born out of Nazareth) perhaps his mother had no ſalt water at hand, wherewith ſhe might waſh him: but this was a cuſtome of the Iews, and of all Aſia beſides; brought in by ſome skilfull Phiſitions, for the good of infants, wherethrough the Prophet ſaith, And when thou wert borne, at thy birth day thy nauill ſtring was not cut off: neither wert thou for thy healths ſake waſhed in water, nor ſeaſoned with ſalt, nor wrapped in ſwathling clothes. But as touching the other things, ſo ſoone as he was borne, he began to hold friendſhip with the cold, and the other alterations of the aire. His firſt bed was the earth, his apparrell courſe, as if he would obſerue *Hippocrates* receit. A few daies after they went with him into Aegypt, a place very hot, where he remained all the time that *Herod* liued. His mother partaking the like humours, it is certaine, that ſhe muſt yeeld him a

milke

milke well exerciſed, and acquainted with the alterations of the aire. The meat which they gaue him, was the ſame which the Greeks deuiſed, to endow their children with wit and wiſdom. This (I haue ſaid heretofore) was the butteriſh part of the milke eaten with honny. Wherfore *Eſay* ſaith, He ſhall eat butter & honny, that he may know to eſchew euill, and chuſe the good. By which wordes is ſeen, how the Prophet gaue vs to vnderſtand, that albeit he was verie God, yet he ought alſo to be a perfect man: and to attaine naturall wiſedome, he muſt apply the ſemblable diligences, as doe the other ſons of men. Howbeir this ſeemeth difficult to be conceiued, and may be alſo held a folly, to thinke that becauſe Chriſt our redeemer, did eate butter and honny being a childe, he ſhould therefore know how to eſchue euill, and make choice of good: when he was elder, God being (as he is) of infinite wiſedome, and hauing giuen him (as he was man) all the ſcience infuſed, which he could receiue after his naturall capacitie. Therefore it is certaine that he knew full as much in his mothers wombe, as when he was thirtie three yeares old, without eating either butter or honny, or borrowing the helpe of anie other naturall remedies requiſite for humaine wiſdom. But for all this, it is of great importance that the prophet aſſigned him that ſelfe meat, which the Troians and Greeks accuſtomably gaue their children, to make them witty and wiſe, & that he ſaid, To the end he may know to ſhun euill and chuſe the good. For vnderſtanding, that by means of theſe aliments, Chriſt our ſauiour, got (as he was man) more acquiſit knowledge, than he ſhould haue poſſeſſed if he had vſed other contrarie meats; it behoooueth vs to expound this particle, (to the end) that we may know what he meant, when

he

he ſpake in thoſe termes. We muſt therfore preſuppoſe, that in Chriſt our redeemer were two natures, as the very trueth is, and the faith ſo teacheth vs; one, diuine, as he was God; and another humane, compounded of a reaſonable ſoule, & of an elimentall bodie, ſo diſpoſed and inſtrumentalized, as the other children of men. As concerning his firſt nature, it behoooueth not to intreat of the wiſdome of our ſauiour Chriſt: for it was infinit without encreaſe or diminiſhment, and without dependance vpon ought elſe, ſaue onely in that he was God, and ſo he was as wiſe in his mothers wombe, as when he was 33 yeares of age, and ſo from euerlaſting. But in that which appertaineth to his ſecond nature, we are to weet, that the ſoule of Chriſt, euen from the inſtant when God created it, was bleſſed, and glorious, euen as now it is; and ſeeing it enioyed God and his wiſdome, it is certaine that in him was none ignorance: but he had ſo much ſcience infuſed, as his naturall capacitie would beare: but withall, it is alike certaine, that as the glorie did not communicat it ſelfe vnto all the partes of the bodie, in reſpect of the redemption of mankinde; no more did the wiſedome infuſed, communicate it ſelfe; For the braine was not diſpoſed, nor inſtrumentalized, with the qualities & ſubſtance, which are neceſſary, to the end the ſoule may with ſuch an inſtrument, diſcourſe and philoſophize: for if you call to mind that which in the beginning of this worke we deliuered, the graces *gratis* giuen, which God beſtoweth vpon men, do ordinarily require, that the inſtrument with which they are to be exerciſed; and the ſubiect whereinto it is to be receiued, doe partake the naturall qualities, requiſite for euerie ſuch gift. And the reaſon is, becauſe that the reaſonable ſoule, is an

act

act of the body, and worketh not without the ſeruice of his bodily inſtrumentes. The braine of our redeemer Chriſt, whilſt he was a babe, and lately born, had much moiſture: for in that age it was behooffull ſo to be, and a matter naturall, and therefore in that it was of ſuch qualitie, his reaſonable ſoule (naturally) could not diſcourſe nor philoſophize with ſuch an inſtrumēt. Wherthrough, the ſcience infuſed, paſſed not to the bodily memorie, nor to the imagination, nor the vnderſtanding, becauſe theſe three are inſtrumentall powers (as tofore we haue proued) & enioyed not that perfection, which they were to haue; but whilſt the brain went drying, by meanes of time and age: the reaſonable ſoule went alſo manifeſting euery day more and more, the infuſed wiſdome which it had, and communicated the ſame to the bodily powers. Now, beſides this ſupernaturall knowledge, he had alſo another, which is gathered of things that they heard whileſt they were children, of that which they ſaw, of that which they ſmelled, of that which they taſted, and of that which they touched: and this (for certaine) our ſauiour Chriſt attained as other men do. And euen as for diſcerning things perfectly, he ſtood in need of good eies, and for hearing of ſounds, good eares: ſo alſo he ſtood in need of a good braine, to iudge the good and the euil. Whence it is manifeſt, that by eating thoſe delicat meates, his head was daily better inſtrumentalized, & attained more wiſdom. In ſort, that if God had taken frō him his ſcience infuſed, thriſe in the courſe of his life (by ſeeing that which he had purchaſed) we ſhall find, that at ten yeares he knew more than at fiue, at twentie, more than at ten, and at thirtie three, more than at twenty. And that this doctrin is true and catholicke, the letter of the Euangelicke text

proueth,

prooueth, ſaying; and Ieſus encreaſed in wiſedome and age, and grace, with God, & with men. Of many catholicke ſenſes which the holy ſcripture may receiue, I hold that euer better which taketh the letter, than that which reaueth the termes and wordes of their naturall ſignification. VVhat the qualities are which the brain ought to haue, and what the ſubſtance, we haue already reported, by the opinion of *Heraclitus*, That drineſſe maketh the wiſeſt ſoule. And by *Galens* mind we proued, That when the braine is compounded of a ſubſtance very delicat, it maketh the wit to be ſubtile. Chriſt our redeemer, went purchaſing more drineſſe by his age: for from the day that we are borne, vntil that of our death, we daily grow to a more drineſſe, and leeſing of fleſh, & a greater knowledge. The ſubtile and delicat parts of his braine, went correcting themſelues, whilſt he fed vpon meats, which the Prophet ſpeaketh of. For if euery moment he had need of nouriſhment, and reſtoring the ſubſtance which waſted away, and this muſt be performed with meates, and in none other ſort, it is certaine, that if he had alwaies fed on cowes beeſe, or porcke, in few daies he ſhould haue bred himſelfe a braine groſſe and of euill temperature: with which his reaſonable ſoule could not haue ſhunned euill, or choſen good, ſaue by miracle, and employing his diuinitie. But God leading him by naturall means, cauſed him to vſe thoſe ſo delicat meats, by which the braine being maintained, the ſame might be made an inſtrument, ſo well ſupplied, as (euen without vſing the diuine or infuſed knowledge) he might naturally haue eſchued euill, and choſen good, as do the other children of men.

FINIS.

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